

THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS
SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE

COMMENTARY VOLUME 4
PSYCHOLOGY

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY J.H. WASZINK AND W.J. VERDENIUS

EDITED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA
J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME LXXXI

THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE

COMMENTARY 4
PSYCHOLOGY

PAMELA HUBY



THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE

COMMENTARY VOLUME 4

PSYCHOLOGY

(Texts 265-327)

BY

PAMELA HUBY

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE ARABIC MATERIAL

BY

DIMITRI GUTAS



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
1999

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Theophrastus of Eresus: sources for his life, writings, thought, and influence / edited and translated by William W. Fortenbaugh ... [et al.]

p cm.—(Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 54)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents: pt. 1. Life, writings, various reports, logic, physics, metaphysics, theology, mathematics—pt. 2. Psychology, human physiology, living creatures, botany, ethics, religion, politics, rhetoric and poetics, music, miscellanea

ISBN 9004094407

1. Theophrastus 2. Authors, Greek—Biography—Sources.

3. Philosophers—Greece—Biography—Sources. I. Fortenbaugh, William W. II. Series.

PA4450.T49 1991

185—dc20

91-33945

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Theophrastus of Eresus : sources for his life, writings, thought and influence. – Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill

ISBN 90-04-09440-7

Commentary vol. 4. Psychology : (texts 265 - 327) / by Pamela Huby. With contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas. – 1999

(Philosophia antiqua ; Vol. 81)

ISBN 90-04-11317-7

ISSN 0079-1687

ISBN 90 04 11317 7

© Copyright 1999 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Preface	vii
Abbreviations	ix
Introduction	xi
Psychology (265–327)	1
Overview: Sources	1
Doctrines	6
List of Titles Referring to Works on Psychology 265	8
Writings on the Soul 266–8	13
Definition of the Soul 269–72	17
Sensation 273–96	32
Imagination 297–300	83
Epistemology 301–6	93
Intellect 307–27	114
Overview: Doctrines	114
Individual passages	115
Appendix	209
Bibliography	219
Indices to the Text	221
Principal terms: Greek	221
Principal terms: Latin	227
Principal terms: Arabic	234
Titles of Ancient Works Referred to in the Texts	235
Persons Referred to in the Texts	236
Indices to the Commentary	239
Texts Discussed or Cited	239
Persons and Groups (Ancient and Medieval)	248
General Subject Index	250

PREFACE

This will eventually be the fourth of nine volumes of commentary by various authors, each relating to a part of the collection of texts relating to Theophrastus compiled and edited under the leadership of W.W.Fortenbaugh and published in 1992 (*Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, edited and translated by William W. Fortenbaugh, Pamela M. Huby, Robert W. Sharples (Greek and Latin) and Dimitri Gutas (Arabic), together with five others: 2 vols., Leiden: Brill, 1992. Cited as FHSG). This volume covers texts **265-327**, which relate to psychology and epistemology.

This commentary is designed to be used in conjunction with the volume of texts and translations; that includes both an apparatus of parallels for each text and an apparatus of textual variations and emendations. In the commentary isolated words or phrases of Greek have been given in transliteration, with longer passages being given in Greek script. The titles of ancient works have generally been given in the same English versions as used in the text and translation volume.

The procedure adopted in writing the commentary varies according to the nature of the passage involved. At the start of each passage there is usually a short list of pieces of modern literature; for references to such works the reader should consult first that list and then the general bibliography at the end of this volume. Abbreviations are listed at the end of the Introduction.

The Preface to the text and translation volumes includes acknowledgements to many individuals and organisations who have helped us all. Here I wish to express thanks to the British Academy and to the Leverhulme Foundation, and to many individuals who in one way or another have patiently answered questions and helped in other ways: Han Baltussen, the late Henry Blumenthal, Edward Booth, Charles Burnett, Myles Burnyeat, Cecil Clough, Irma Croese, John Dillon, Winfried Fauser, William Fortenbaugh (a constant support), Lenn Goodman, Hans Gottschalk, Dimitri Gutas (who has contributed a section of the Introduction, the Appendix, the commentary on several passages, and advice on many other points), Anthony Kenny, Peter Lautner, the late Antony Lloyd, Jan Van Ophuijsen, the late Charles Schmitt, David Sedley, Robert Sharples,

Michael Sollenberger, Richard Sorabji, Carlos Steel, Josip Talanga, Alison Wood, Fritz Zimmermann. In addition the late George Kerferd helped in so many ways.

Pamela M. Huby
University of Liverpool
February 1999

ABBREVIATIONS

- AHDLMA*: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*.
ANRW: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*.
AOCAC: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Venice 1562-74.
BICS: *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*.
Bonitz: H.Bonitz *Index Aristotelicus* (*Aristotelis Opera*, ed. I.Bekker, rev. O.Gigon, vol.5), Berlin: De Gruyter 1961.
BT: *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, Leipzig: B.G.Teubner.
CAG: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. Berlin: Reimer, 1882-1909.
CCAA: *Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem*, ed. H.A.Wolfson, D.A.Baneth and F.H.Fobes, Cambridge, Mass. 1949.
CLCAG: *Corpus Latinorum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecum*
FHSG: See Preface p.i.
GCS: *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte*, Berlin 1897- .
GL: *Grammatici Latini* ed. H.Keil, Leipzig 1874.
JHS: *Journal of Hellenic Studies*.
LSJ: H.G.Liddell and R.Scott, rev. H.S.Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, ninth edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
MS: *Mediaeval Studies*.
Op. omn.: *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, ed. B.Geyer et al. Münster 1957- .
PL: *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1844-1904.
RUSCH: *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*
Suppl. Arist.: = *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, Berlin: Reimer, 1885-1903.
SVF: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim, Leipzig: Teubner 1903-24.
- CP* = Theophrastus, *Plant Explanations* (*De Causis Plantarum*)
DA = Aristotle, *On the Soul* (*De anima*)
Albert, *DA* = Albert the Great, *On the Soul*
DS = Theophrastus, *On Sensations* (*De Sensibus*)
EE = Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*
FL = Avicbron (Ibn Gabirol), *Fountain of Life* (*Fons Vitae*)
DGA = Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* (*De Generatione animalium*)
DGC = Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Passing Away* (*De Generatione et Corruptione*)

LCDA = Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* (De anima)

LS = *Light of the Soul*

NE = Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

PA = Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*

PDA = Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul* (De anima)

PN = *Parva Naturalia*

The following ancient work is cited by author's name only:
Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*.

INTRODUCTION

Our collection of texts is confined, with few exceptions, to passages where Theophrastus is named, and it is concerned with material that does not survive in manuscript form except embedded in the works of other authors. Hence we have to deal with reports in the form of paraphrases, as well as actual quotations. We have tried to take account of every reference to Theophrastus by name in any source before the cut-off date of 1450, after which most references are to works known from manuscripts and studied in the Renaissance. Many of the medieval references are of uncertain value, though some writers, like Albert the Great, have not yet been studied sufficiently for us to rule out the possibility that they used material in Latin now lost. The *Light of the Soul* (*Lumen animae*) needs even greater circumspection in using it. Most medieval material has been flagged in the heading as “dubious”, but that covers a range of uncertainty.

In this volume we have also to take account of much material that has reached us through Arabic sources. Those which still survive in Arabic have been covered by Dimitri Gutas, but much is from Averroes’ *Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul* which survives only in Latin, and I take the prime responsibility for that. Gutas’ contributions are succeeded by (DG). We have included, in an appendix, part of a paper written by Gutas for an audience of Arabists which considers Averroes’ dependence on Themistius for his knowledge of Theophrastus.

Sharples has pointed out that there is a tendency in some of our sources to couple Theophrastus with Aristotle as the chief representatives of the Peripatetic school, and so to emphasize their similarities, but then also to pick out differences which may after all be unimportant. In medieval material however Theophrastus is frequently coupled with Themistius. This is particularly so with regard to questions about the intellect. We have given considerable space to minor works on this topic, both because they are not easily accessible and because they indicate how much interest in this topic there was in that period. It should be emphasized that there is great uncertainty in this area: much interesting material comes through uncertain Arabic sources, and we cannot be sure, even when Theophrastus is named,

that the views given are really his; on the other hand to assume that they are not his might be to throw the baby out with the bath water. It has seemed worthwhile, therefore to try to work out what Theophrastus' views might have been.

Since there is disagreement among the editors on the value of the medieval material I present my views in what immediately follows: Gutas does so in the next section of this introduction. I think that while much of our material comes from Themistius' *Paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul*, from which we give excerpts in **307** and **320**, there is at least some evidence that a work by Themistius called *On the Soul* existed and was translated into Arabic, and that it is not easy to find everything in Averroes in the Themistius that we have, even if we assume that Averroes supposed that some parts of Themistius were from Theophrastus even when Themistius does not say so. See **309B** and n.**217**, and for 'this something', introduced by Averroes and Priscian but not in our Themistius, see **308A** and n.**177**. It is clear that Themistius was generally interested in Theophrastus (e.g. **94**), and in such a work, if it existed, is likely to have used him again. Note too that the evidence from Priscian at **307** shows that Themistius, however he may have interpreted them, quoted the actual words of Theophrastus accurately.

When we pass to the Middle Ages it can be argued that Gutas' blanket condemnation of all Latin "schoolmen" ignores the facts. Albert in particular displays a freewheeling curiosity, and the sources of his material have not yet been investigated adequately. Further, in the many disputes on a variety of matters in the thirteenth century, those who distorted their evidence excessively would be liable to be caught out. It seems safer to consider the possibility that Albert had access to material not yet discovered by us than that he continually quoted sources recklessly. That is not to say that he was always accurate, but much of what he says makes sense as deriving from Theophrastus. It fits in with the reliable evidence from Priscian. And, just as there are passages in Averroes that are difficult to trace in our Themistius, so there are passages in Albert which it is not easy to find in the Latin Averroes which we have. It is not possible here to make a detailed examination of these, but the commentary should help others to make up their minds. The passages have been arranged in a way that would fit the view that Theophrastus was working through Aristotle systematically. It may be of interest that there are places where Albert seems better informed than Averroes. Thus Averroes

holds in **308A** that Theophrastus and Themistius held as positive views which Albert treats as doubts, and that is much more in Theophrastus' style. Finally I am not clear why the remarks of Thomas (covered by us as an Appendix to **307A**), which Gutas quotes are so significant. In the second Thomas refers to Themistius as well as Theophrastus, and there is nothing in these passages to lead to the view that either of them said that the intellect was one in all men. For the further complications in this area see the discussion of **326A** and **B**.

It should also be remembered that our project is concerned not only with the actual words of Theophrastus but also with his influence, and since in certain areas that was immense in the Middle Ages, whether or not his views were distorted, it is important to study all the material we have. To conclude, there is still much work to be done, and caution is needed. But the function of a book like this is to encourage future scholars, even if that calls sometimes for speculation.

The Arabic Evidence and its Significance

by Dimitri Gutas

The only two psychological works by Theophrastus mentioned in the Arabic list (**3A FHSG**) of Ibn-an-Nadīm, the great Arab bibliographer, who wrote in 988 A.D., are a treatise *On the soul* in one book and another, on *Sensation and the Sensible*, in four. For these see on **265 1b** and **4c**. So far no verifiable fragments or even traces of these books have been found in Arabic philosophical works. Ibn-an-Nadīm is to be trusted implicitly, and far too little research has been conducted on Arabic philosophy and its ancient sources to preclude any discoveries or identifications in the future.

This is particularly true of the Arabic psychological treatises dealing with the subjects of the Aristotelian *Parva Naturalia* (*PN*). The question of the transmission of the *PN* in Arabic is very complicated and has not so far been adequately studied and explained. No MS of an Arabic translation of the Aristotelian text has yet been found, though there was one, since Averroes wrote on it a commentary which is extant. The nature of the text of this translation appears to be problematic, however, and the argument has been made that at least for some treatises of the *PN* there existed a different Greek recension, which is the one that passed into Arabic.¹ If that is so, the work of

¹ For a statement of the problem and an analysis of the extant information see Gätje (1971) 81-92; for the thesis that the Arabic recension of the *PN* was different

Theophrastus in Arabic under the title *On Sensation and the Sensible* also needs to be considered in the study of the Arabic tradition of the *PN*. It is not impossible that such an investigation may uncover some Theophrastean material.

Nevertheless, from the information available at present, it would seem that the psychological works by Theophrastus fell into neglect on account of the similarly entitled works of Aristotle. By contrast, Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's *DA* was used heavily in Arabic philosophical writings. The reasons are not immediately apparent. It would seem, on the one hand, that given that Themistius' paraphrase was a self-styled commentary on Aristotle's *DA* rather than an independent rival to it, as Theophrastus' work might have been taken, it was more appealing to the Aristotelians of Baghdad; and, on the other, that since Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn (d.903), who did the final and best translation of the *DA*, also translated Themistius' paraphrase, the two works were read and studied together in subsequent philosophical writings.² It accordingly appears more than likely that the information in such writings regarding Theophrastus' psychological theories (and particularly those about the intellect) comes from Themistius' quotations in that paraphrase.

This is demonstrably true in particular of Averroes, on two counts. In the first place, regard has to be paid to the cultural peculiarities of al-Andalus where Averroes was working. Philosophical literature did not travel very readily there from the East, and if the Arabic translations of Theophrastus' psychological works were not copied in the East, it is unlikely that they would have been available in al-Andalus to Averroes. Specifically, what Peripatetic literature did travel to al-Andalus was distinctly Farabian, insofar as many of the Aristotelian works commented upon by Andalusian philosophers, starting with Ibn-Bājja (Avempace), were texts by Fārābī and not by

from that preserved in Greek see S. Pines, 'The Arabic Recension of Parva Naturalia', *Israel Oriental Studies* 4 (1974) 104-53, repr. in his *Collected Works*, vol.2, *Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and in Mediaeval Science*, Jerusalem and Leiden: Brill (1986) 96-145. There is, finally, yet another "recension" of some form of the *PN* preserved in the Rampur MS discussed by H. Daiber, 'Salient Trends of the Arabic Aristotle', in G. Endress and R. Kruk, eds., *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism*, Leiden: Research School CNWS 1997 36ff.

² Indeed something like this seems to be implied by Ibn-an-Nadīm's remark in the *Fihrist* (251.16-18): in explanation of Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn's statement that he, Ishāq, made a revised translation of the *DA* thirty years after the first on the basis of a superior Greek MS, Ibn-an-Nadīm adds, 'this being the commentary of Themistius (*wa-huwa šarḥu Ṭamistiyyūs*)'. Cf. Gätje 20-7.

Aristotle (e.g. Ibn-Bājja's extant commentaries on Fārābī's works on logic) and, as I remark at the end of this introduction, the Peripatetic school of Baghdad was lax in promoting philosophers other than Aristotle. Second, there is the fact that Averroes makes a point, for reasons of his own, to cite his sources more than any other Arabic philosopher. In his philosophical works, and not only those on the soul, Theophrastus is almost invariably cited together with Themistius, and a systematic analysis of all these passages has shown (beyond a reasonable doubt, as I believe) that Averroes was citing Theophrastus through Themistius (see Appendix I).³

So much for the Arabic side of the transmission of the psychological works of Theophrastus. On the Latin side, the schoolmen used Averroes heavily, and hence Theophrastus appears also in Latin via Themistius as quoted by Averroes—in other words, four times removed from the original: Theophrastus as quoted by Themistius, Themistius translated from Greek into Arabic, the Arabic translation of Themistius quoted by Averroes and incorporated into his text, and finally Averroes' text translated into Latin. But Themistius' text was also translated into Latin directly, that is, without Averroes' mediating quotations. In this bifurcated transmission of Theophrastus via Themistius, therefore, it is possible to detect significant variations due to first, Averroes' own form of quotation and its translation into Latin, and second another translation of the paraphrase of Themistius, independent of Averroes. These variations have not yet been studied by modern scholarship, but they appear to have had significant effect on meaning. To this effect we have the testimony of Thomas Aquinas, who read Theophrastus on the intellect both in the Latin translation of Averroes' commentary on the *DA* and in the independent Latin translation of Themistius' paraphrase, and found them divergent:

I have not indeed seen the books of Theophrastus, but Themistius in his *Commentary* introduces his words to this effect, saying thus: "Now it is better to set forth the words of Theophrastus (307A)" (*On the Unity of the Intellect* 210 = Apparatus item 307A)...

It is also clear that Averroes wrongly reports the opinion of Themistius and Theophrastus concerning the possible and agent intellect (ibid 265 = part of 326B, here in the translation of Beatrice H. Zedler, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press 1968, pars. 44, 73).

³ For the general influence which the paraphrase of Themistius exercised on Averroes see Helmut Gätje, 'Die Übersetzung der Paraphrase des Themistios und sein Einfluss auf Averroes' in Gätje 1971 63-8. For a listing and analysis of all the instances where Averroes cites Theophrastus see Gutas (1999).

Modern scholarship has only now begun to realize the full implications of a statement such as this by Thomas (that there was a divergence with regard to the very same passage by Themistius between the Latin version made directly from Themistius' text and that made through the intermediacy of Averroes' commentary), namely, that an Arabic philosophical text, in the course of its transmission into Latin and from there into the independent work of a theologian, underwent several changes which may have altered its original nature and even rendered it unrecognisable. In the first place, the translator into Latin, assuming that he was fully capable, may have had an Arabic text (MS) more defective than the *textus receptus* we have. Secondly, he may have misunderstood and mistranslated his original. Thirdly, the Latin theologian using the translated text may himself have misunderstood the Latin even if it was translated literally, especially if the technical terminology used by the translator was taken to mean different things by the theologian. And fourthly, the theologian may slightly have altered the translated text in his quotation to fit his purpose; Latin schoolmen were interested in quoting authorities not to engage in dispassionate historical and philological scholarship but to prove a position already firmly held, or alternatively to reject an opposite view which would rhetorically be attributed to an authority. From all this it is clear that it is a dangerous procedure for those interested in recovering accurate fragments of an ancient philosopher to take such evidence from the Latin scholastics at face value. This applies especially to the theories of Theophrastus on the intellect—as transmitted by Themistius and then via Averroes into Latin—a subject which, because of its enormously significant theological implications (witness the raging controversies of the thirteenth century), would naturally lend itself to manipulation. Accordingly it is more prudent to adopt a conservative approach and assume, unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary, that all not immediately identifiable quotations in Latin about Theophrastus on the intellect are developments of themes in Themistius' paraphrase rather than that they derive from an allegedly unrecovered text by Theophrastus available to the Latins but not to us.

For this reason and because of the lack of serious studies on the precise Arabic sources of the Latin schoolmen it will be impossible consistently to give references to Arabic philosophical works allegedly quoted by them.

There remains to suggest reasons for the general absence of Theophrastus' works from Arabic philosophical writing. For the century and a half from 900 to 1050 the aggressive promotion of Aristotle as the most important philosopher by Fārābī and his school in Baghdad eclipsed other Peripatetics whose works were not seen to be commentaries on the Aristotelian treatises. Theophrastus' works in general, and especially the two on the soul and metaphysics—with their aporetic nature and identical titles with those of Aristotle—were hardly appropriate for constructing a dogmatic Aristotelian system which the Baghdad Peripatetics were seeking. After 1050 the crushing influence of Avicenna's philosophical works almost caused the disappearance of manuscript copies of Aristotle's works, let alone those of Theophrastus: witness the fact that for the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics* and most treatises of even the *Organon* there is basically but one Arabic MS extant. Hence it is not surprising that Theophrastus' works were neither extensively copied nor, as a result, much quoted in subsequent Arabic philosophical literature. The fact that we even have two Arabic MSS for Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* is a monument to the devotion to the preservation of knowledge fostered in Islamic civilisation.

PSYCHOLOGY

265-327 Regenbogen (1940) 1398-1402. Wehrli (1983) 490

OVERVIEW: SOURCES

By far the greatest part of our evidence for Theophrastus' psychological views comes from his own *On the Soul*, which turns out to be a "commentary" on Aristotle's work of the same name. It is generally agreed that after the early Peripatos the esoteric works of Aristotle received little attention until their rediscovery in the first century B.C. Even then it does not seem that his *On the Soul* (*DA*) was among the first to attract interest, and there is no evidence for a full-scale commentary on it until Alexander of Aphrodisias produced his about A.D. 200.⁴

Priscian of Lydia provides most of the material that touches on Aristotle's *DA*, but the end, and probably the beginning, of his work is lost, and we have instead **Themistius**, who is on the whole reliable, along with a little from **Iamblichus**, **Simplicius** and **Philoponus**, but for the rest we are dependent on **Averroes** and **Albert the Great** together with a few other medieval writers. The value of these has been disputed. See the Introduction.

Apart from Theophrastus' *On the Soul* there are a few passages from

⁴ But there is evidence that the work was not entirely unknown. Thus in Albinus/Alcinous' *Didascalicus* ("Teachings"), a work of Middle Platonism of the second century A.D., we find (ch.10) a hierarchy of soul, potential intellect (*nous dunamei*), active intellect (*nous kat' energeian*), and the Primal God. The terminology is Aristotelian, but it is applied to Platonism. Active intellect is said to intelligise all things simultaneously and always (Dillon's translation), and is to be equated with the (demiurgic) mind of the world, though the Primal God is Aristotle's Prime Mover (Dillon 1977 282-3). As early as the second century A.D., then, we find Aristotle's terminology in use, detached from an Aristotelian context. But see now Göransson (1995) for a critical study of the contents of the *Didascalicus*, a firm attribution to an Alcinous, and an attempt at dating which extends from the first century BC to the third century AD.

We can also deduce from Alexander of Aphrodisias that there had been some attempt in Peripatetic circles to interpret the *DA*. Some scholars think that Alexander's own teacher, whom they identify as Aristotle of Mytilene, held a view reported in Alexander's *On Intellect*. (This work may not be authentic, but it is not unreasonable to accept what it says.) He concentrated particularly on the active intellect. See Accatino and Donini (1996) xxvi and 271, and n.42.

Plutarch and **Arabic** collections which are on psychological matters but not from *On the Soul*. In addition we have the doubtful evidence of the *Light of the Soul*.

On Sensation(s) (and the Sensible), a doxographical work, is extant, at least in part: see Gutas' suggestions on 265 4c. We have also included some passages which are primarily epistemological, but which touch on psychological matters. The most important is from **Sextus Empiricus 301A**, but there may be valuable material in 303-5 from **Albert the Great**.

Since many of our sources are obscure or of doubtful value, I list and discuss the most important ones here:

Priscian of Lydia (5th-6th centuries A.D.) was one of the group of Neoplatonists who were active in the Academy of Athens before 529, when Justinian closed the school because of its paganism. Together with several others, of whom the most prominent were Simplicius and Damascius, he went off for a while to the Persian court, and there produced answers to a set of questions supposedly put to him by king Chosroes. These survive in a Latin translation.⁵ They cover a variety of topics from the soul to the Red Sea; in many cases the sources of the replies are identifiable, and there seems to be little original thought. It is also said in one MS, Coislinianus 387, that he wrote commentaries on Plato, none of which have survived, and that he was attacked by Philoponus. But see Huby and Steel (1997) p.139 n.68.

The *Metaphrase*, or, as we shall call it, *Paraphrase*, of Theophrastus' *On the Soul* is the only other surviving work that is certainly by Priscian, though there are respectable arguments by Bossier and Steel (See on 279) that he was also the author of the commentary on Aristotle's *DA* attributed to Simplicius. Alternatively the similarities between these two works are due to the fact that both drew heavily on Iamblichus. We do not know when the *Paraphrase* was written, and we do not know what happened to Priscian after he left Persia.⁶ The *Paraphrase* is built around Theophrastus' *On the Soul*, which has not come down to us. We can however reconstruct parts of it from Priscian and from Themistius' *Paraphrase of Aristotle's DA (PDA)*, which

⁵ *Suppl. Arist.* 1.2. 41-104. The Latin is bad.

⁶ For discussion of the last philosophers in Athens see I. Hadot, 'The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources' in Sorabji (1990) 275-303, and Blumenthal (1996) 42-7.

gives quotations from it that overlap with those given by Priscian and confirm the accuracy of both. It is clear that Theophrastus had Aristotle's *DA* before him in the form in which we now have it, and that he raised questions about its interpretation. Priscian undertook the *tour de force* of using it as a basis for his own Neoplatonist account of psychology. His *Paraphrase* now opens with a sentence containing the word *ephexês* ("next"), and does not actually name Theophrastus, although it is clear that he is the person involved. This implies that Priscian is continuing a commentary on a work of Theophrastus of which *On the Soul* is not the first part, and we know from Themistius that it formed the fourth and fifth books of Theophrastus' *Physics*.⁷ Some fragments of the earlier books survive,⁸ but nothing of Priscian's work on them. Further, there is a large lacuna in our text which starts in the section on imagination and continues into the section on intellect. There are a few other lacunae, but they appear to be short. At the end the copyist has a note: "look out for the rest", and that confirms the impression that what we have is not the end of Priscian's work. What we have is based on Aristotle's *DA* 2.5-3.5, with the exception of the short chapter 2.6 and the very end of 3.5. 3.3 429a2-9 are also left out, perhaps only because of the lacuna. So the greater part of Aristotle's positive views on psychology are covered. See now the English translation in Huby and Steel (1997).

Simplicius (6th century A.D.), like Priscian of Lydia, went to Persia and returned after 532, and probably wrote his long commentaries on Aristotle's works after that. He seems to have had access to a large library, and quotes verbatim from Theophrastus. Controversy has arisen over the commentary on Aristotle's *DA* attributed to him; if it is not by him it is by someone from his circle. See on Priscian of Lydia and also the discussion at 279.

Themistius (317-88) wrote a *Paraphrase of Aristotle's DA* which has survived and which is one of our main sources for Theophrastus'

⁷ Bywater in the preface to his edition (p. v) says that Priscian is only concerned with the fifth book. He seems to be assuming that the fourth book covered the material relating to Book 1 of Aristotle's *DA*, which is mainly historical, and the first three chapters of Book 2, which contain Aristotle's general account of the soul. He is perhaps supported by the fact that at 22.33-4 Priscian says he wants to go on to the rest of the fifth book, implying that he is already commenting on that at the end of the section on sensation. But if Bywater is correct nothing survives of that fourth book. Baltussen (1993) 246 considers whether Theophrastus' *On Sensation* could have fitted into the fourth book, and thinks not.

⁸ See Theophrastus 143-4, 146, 149, 153, and 176 FHSG.

views on the intellect. Passages from Theophrastus are embedded in a commentary in which Themistius appears to be giving his own views, though it cannot be ruled out that he is still using Theophrastus. In any case some later writers seem to have taken it that he was here using Theophrastus. See e.g. 327. It may be that he also wrote something else about the *DA*, which was known to Averroes, and is now lost. Our 325 contains material which cannot be traced to what we have. But see Gutas (1999).

Albert the Great (c.1193-1280) wrote many works commenting on Aristotle or developing his views. He outlived his pupil Thomas Aquinas, but has been overshadowed by him and little studied. For that reason we are still very ignorant about his sources. He names and quotes from many earlier writers, including both Greek and Arabic writers, and it is probably through the latter that he got his knowledge of Theophrastus.⁹

Averroes (1126-98) is, on face value, an important source for Theophrastus' views on intellect, and several passages from his commentary on Aristotle's *DA* and other works have been given. The Arabic original of his *Long Commentary on Aristotle's DA* (*LCDA*) has been lost, and we are dependent on two Latin translations, one by Michael Scot (c.1220-35) and one by Mantinus in the Renaissance. We have transcribed Michael's Latin, and given Mantinus' alternatives when they are available and important. Averroes was largely dependent on Alexander and Themistius, and in our Latin MSS there is frequent confusion between Themistius and Theophrastus. We have taken the policy decision to print all passages where there is a possibility that Theophrastus was named. See Gutas 1999.

Denis the Carthusian (1402-71) alias Denys van Leeuwen and Denys Ryckel, comes outside the period we had set, but we have used him because his works contain material independent of Renaissance discoveries; he remained, exceptionally, firmly in the old tradition. As a consequence he provides some material the source of which cannot easily be traced. His reliability is shown by cases where we can

⁹ The late Charles Schmitt in a private communication wrote: "where Albert got his material is a puzzle. I know of no other such references from the middle ages and no evidence that the relevant Theophrastus works were available. So far as I know Stobaeus and Photius were not known."

compare him with his source: e.g. at **259** and **326A**.¹⁰ For a discussion of the value of medieval and Arabic evidence see the Introduction.

Light of the Soul is a handbook providing quotations listed under appropriate headings for the use of preachers. It exists in a variety of states, not all of which have been published. Thorndike (See on **267**) thinks that the original must be of the end of the thirteenth or the beginning of the fourteenth century, and it was first printed by the Carmelite Matthias Farinator in 1477, with further editions following rapidly. R.H.Rouse (See on **267**) has identified the original of the printed version (his B) as by Gotfredus canonicus Vorowensis, probably in 1332. In the prologue, which according to Rouse relates not to the contents of the printed version, but to the prologue and contents of his version A, by Berengar of Landorra between 1316 and 1330, still unpublished, the author lists a great many books which he claims to have read, but many of these are puzzling. It is extremely unreliable in its attributions, and in places attributes the same passage to different authors, but it is not completely random. In the names of authors and the corresponding titles of books there is considerable uniformity, and some credibility. Aristotle's *Problems* appear frequently, and Avicbron's *Fountain of Life* (FL). Few authors are given several titles, though Aristotle has several, and Theophrastus also is exceptional with at least five titles, perhaps more. An additional problem is the use of contractions, with 'The' standing for Theophrastus or Themistius or Theophilus, to name only three. We have decided to print everything in which Theophrastus is certainly named, and one or two where there is some probability that he is meant. But all the material should be treated with extreme caution. See also R.W.Sharple, 'Some Medieval and Renaissance Citations of Theophrastus' in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 47 1984 187-9. The excerpts we give, except for **267** (from the prologue) are mainly from the first part, a collection of exempla under 76 *tituli* which Farinator divided into lettered sections. **268** and **506** are from the final section, a *florilegium* of which the first twelve chapters, which alone concern us, are similar in character to the earlier *tituli*.

For the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* see on **272**.

¹⁰ See J.Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* English edition London: Arnold 1924, reprinted 1954, and Pelican Books 1955 190-1, for an accessible account of his life and character.

OVERVIEW: DOCTRINES

As we have seen, most of our knowledge of Theophrastus' psychological views comes from his own *On the Soul*, a 'commentary' on Aristotle's work of the same name, from which Priscian of Lydia gives many excerpts. In it Theophrastus considers difficulties and obscurities in Aristotle, and develops a few theories of his own, strangely showing no evidence that he ever discussed these matters with Aristotle personally, although they were colleagues for many years. Most of these passages need detailed treatment, and it would be inappropriate here to try to summarise their doctrines, but full accounts will be found at each passage. Theophrastus appears to stand alone in the early Peripatos in making a study of Aristotle's *DA*. His contemporaries and immediate successors, when they discussed the soul at all, held views that can as well be connected with the *Phaedo* as with Aristotle. From Eudemus, whose name accompanies that of Theophrastus so frequently with regard to modal logic¹¹ as to suggest that the two worked together on it, and whom we know to have corresponded with Theophrastus about Aristotle's *Physics*,¹² we have nothing, while Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus held a 'harmony' view.¹³

Theophrastus worked steadily through Aristotle's treatise and accepted the latter's basic assumptions. What we have of Priscian, which is probably not complete, starts with the discussion of sensation at *DA* 2.5, and continues as far as the treatment of intellect at 3.5, but breaks off at that point. But it is clear that Theophrastus also used later parts of *DA*, and other relevant works of Aristotle like *On Sensation* and *DGA*. He insisted on the importance of using language appropriately to avoid being misled, but accepted that we have sometimes to transfer words from one primary subject-matter to another, which works if we know what we are doing. Priscian's work is divided into three parts, on sensation, on imagination, and on intellect, divisions which have their basis in Aristotle and are followed by Theophrastus. Nearly all we know about Theophrastus' views on sensation come from Priscian, for the fair number of passages from

¹¹ See 98D, 102A,C, 103C,D, 105,106A,C,D,E,G,H,I 107A.

¹² See 157, and also 147, 150, 151B, 153B

¹³ The evidence about Dicaearchus is conflicting. See R.W. Sharples, 'Dicaearchus on the Soul and on Divination' (forthcoming).

LS are of doubtful value. Theophrastus worried over Aristotle's claim that in sensing the sense-organ becomes like its object, for it could hardly become like it in colour or taste, for example, and so he fastened on Aristotle's references to form and *logos* as explanations of this process. He also considered at length things like light and colour and reflections.

Unfortunately a large part of Priscian's section on imagination has been lost, and while there are relevant passages in our **300** and **301** neither has the reliable connection with Theophrastus that Priscian provides. **301A**, from Sextus Empiricus, is an extended account of cognition, and may reflect Theophrastus, though it is attributed to Aristotle, wrongly, and to the Peripatetics in general, as well as to Theophrastus.

We have assigned this passage to Epistemology, but its contents are also psychological. Most other passages under that heading are from Albert the Great, and their value still needs to be assessed.

On intellect we have reliable material from Priscian and Themistius, raising questions about *DA* 3.4 and 5, and that is perhaps amplified by Averroes. Theophrastus brought passages from Aristotle's *DGA* into consideration in a discussion about the origin of soul and intellect in the human embryo. He also found difficulties in Aristotle's account of intellect, asking how it differed from matter, for both seemed to have no characteristics in themselves. He apparently replied that while matter receives individual form, intellect receives universal forms. His views were fastened on by medieval Christian writers who were concerned about the soul and intellect, and saw that Theophrastus differed in some ways from Aristotle on these matters. They raised questions about the relations between the material and the agent intellect, and between the intellect and intelligibles, and about how man might know God. Their accounts of Theophrastus are sometimes confused, but they suggest that he did consider these matters. The *fortuna* of Theophrastus' psychological works is mainly that of his study of the intellect, which passed through first Themistius, and then Arabic sources, to the West, and interested Albert the Great and his contemporaries, including Thomas Aquinas. His *On the Soul* was known to Priscian of Lydia in the sixth century, but the latter's work was unknown in the West until the Renaissance. Many of the references to him by people like Cicero may come from handbooks, but Sextus Empiricus may have known him directly at the end of the second century A.D.

265

LIST OF TITLES REFERRING TO WORKS ON PSYCHOLOGY

1a *On the Soul*

This is the agreed title for the work for which we have the most evidence. Themistius indicates that it had at least two books, and as the discussion of the intellect given by him in 307A was in the second book it is unlikely that there was a third. The work is said to have been part of a larger work called *Physics*, which may explain why Diogenes Laertius does not mention an *On the Soul*.¹⁴

1b *On the Soul (Arabic title)*

Gutas (1985) 80-2. Gätje (1971) 73-4.

The *Fihrist (Index)* of Ibn-an-Nadīm, completed in 988 AD, is the only Arabic source that contains an original list of the works of Theophrastus (no.3A); all other Arabic bibliographies are directly or indirectly derived from it. It is clear from the nature and length of the list that it was compiled by Ibn-an-Nadīm himself, and not copied from a translation of a Greek source. His purpose in compiling the *Fihrist*, as he states in his introduction, was to include the “books of all the nations, Arab and non-Arab alike, which exist in the language and script of the Arabs”; in other words, he intended his list of works by non-Arab authors to be not bibliographies of works composed by them but rather inventories of books about which he had information that they had been made available, in some form or other, in Arabic. His information was of different sorts: a bookseller and scribe by profession active in Baghdad, the cultural and scientific centre of his time, he doubtless handled many of them himself; for the rest, he relied on both oral and written sources, and the dependability of his information is accordingly as good as they are. For Greek philosophical works translated into Arabic he could hardly have had a more authoritative and reliable source: he derived a significant amount of his information from the philosopher Yaḥyā ibn-ʿAdī

¹⁴ Steinmetz (1964) 12 suggests that the 8-book *Physics* of Theophrastus consisted of 1-3 *On Motion*; 4-5 *On the Soul*; 6 *On the Coming-to-be of the Elements*; 7-8 *Meteorology*. It should be noted that for Aristotle Diogenes lists only an *On the Soul* in a single book (V 22). See now Sharples (1998) 2-4.

(893-974), the head of the Aristotelian school in Baghdad after 942. Ibn-an-Nadīm, who knew Yaḥyā personally and with whom he shared the same profession, had access also to his bibliographical files. In the case of Theophrastus, Yaḥyā may have been especially knowledgeable, since he translated Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, as Ibn-an-Nadīm informs us, a work which luckily is extant in Arabic.¹⁵ Ibn-an-Nadīm's report on Theophrastus cannot be dismissed lightly.

In the case of Theophrastus' psychological works, he lists only two, a treatise *On the Soul*, in one book, and another, *On Sensation and the Sensible*, in four. For the former he gives neither the source of his information nor the name of the translator. This is the only concrete reference to an Arabic translation of Theophrastus' *On the Soul* that is known so far; the only other known reference in Arabic to such a treatise, that by Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā (see below, 266) does not necessarily point to an Arabic version of Theophrastus' work: Qusṭā himself was an accomplished translator from the Greek and could have been referring to a Greek text. Ibn-an-Nadīm's report thus points to a work which has not been recovered either as an integral text in an independent MS tradition or indirectly in quotations by later authors. This fact should not detract however from either the validity or the value of this report; as a test case we have Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, which Ibn-an-Nadīm says was translated into Arabic, but which also left no traces in subsequent Arabic philosophical writing. In this case Ibn-an-Nadīm's report was corroborated by the discovery of two MSS containing the Arabic translation.¹⁶ In the case of *On the Soul* also the presumption is, unless there was a confusion in ascription to Theophrastus in the Greek tradition (and, more specifically, in the Greek MS used by the translator), that somebody translated into Arabic a Greek work on the soul in one book under the name of Theophrastus. This piece of evidence, as certain as any that can be had from bibliographical sources in late antiquity, has to be weighed in with the rest of the reports about Theophrastus' psychology.

See on 1a above for Themistius' evidence that Theophrastus' *On the Soul* consisted of (at least) two books: Ibn-an-Nadīm's source knew it as an independent treatise in one book. This represents a different

¹⁵ For a quick review of all the references to the relationship between the two fellow scribes see G. Endress, *The Works of Yahya*

ibn 'Adī, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag 1977 1-9; for the philosophical culture in Baghdad and its sophistication during their time see Joel Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam*, 2nd. ed. Leiden: Brill 104ff.

¹⁶ See Endress above, 28.

tradition from that of Themistius (and Priscian). Without further evidence we can only speculate about the relationship between these traditions. See also below on **266**. (DG)

1c *On Sense-perception*

Priscian of Lydia divided his discussion of Theophrastus' *On the soul* into three parts, to which he gave titles. The MSS give this title, and *On Imagination* (1e), but there is a lacuna at the beginning of the third part, so that *On Intellect* (1f) is a conjecture, but one that we may safely accept; it is however uncertain whether Theophrastus himself divided up his work and gave these titles to its parts.

1d *On the Part (of the Soul) connected with Sensation*

See **267** for a discussion of this title.

1e and 1f See under 1c.

137 no.2 and **271** have the title *On Motion*, and in **271** Simplicius discusses psychological matters from the first book of that work. That is likely to have been identical with the first book of Theophrastus' *On Physics*. See n.14.

2 *On the Power and Capacity of the Soul*

See **289**.

68 no. 36 *Thesis on the Soul* has been taken as an exercise in arguing and placed under logic. But this is the only title referring to the soul that appears in Diogenes Laertius' major alphabetical list of titles.

3 *Commentary on (the book) On the Soul*

See **268**.

4a and b *On Sensations* and *On Sensation*

The MSS of the extant doxographical work give it one or other of these titles. For suggestions about the original title and number of

books see below: Gutas on 4c. The work as we have it, however, contains separate sections on sensation and on sensible objects within one compass, opening with *Peri d'aisthêseôs* (*On sensation*), and having *Peri de tôn aisthêtôn* (*On sensible objects*) at 59. Further, Baltussen's suggestion is that the work is a fragment only in the sense that it may be part of a survey of views on the soul, and that, which might have had four books, would hardly be entitled just *On Sensation and the Sensible*, but *On the Soul*. That, however, appears to be the title for Theophrastus' work on Aristotle's *On the Soul* (see on 1a and b above), which appears to have been part of his *On Physics*. We are left with conjectures. Baltussen is inclined to think that our work was part of the *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (or, *concerning Natural Things*) (See 137 6), or possibly part of the *Physics*. Sharples doubts if a four-book work would fit into either of these. See now Sharples (1998) p.11 n.42 and Baltussen (1998).

4c *On Sensation and the Sensible* (Arabic title)

Gutas (1985) 80-2. Baltussen (1993).

Ibn-an-Nadīm states in the *Fihrist* (see on 265 1b) that a work by Theophrastus entitled *On Sensation and the Sensible*, in four books, was translated by Ibrāhīm ibn-Bakkūš (see 3A). This work is not known to be extant in Arabic nor have any parts of it so far been identified in Arabic philosophical writings. See, however, my comments on the Arabic tradition of the Aristotelian *Parva naturalia* in the Introduction, n.1. Ibn-Bakkūš¹⁷ was a contemporary of Ibn-an-Nadīm, working as a physician at the 'Aḍudi hospital in Baghdad; he was a translator primarily of medical and biological works, among which are the two by Theophrastus, *On Sensation and the Sensible* and *The Causes of Plants* (*Plant Explanations*) (See 3A). Hence the report of Ibn-an-Nadīm must be taken very seriously. (See above 265 1b).

The Arabic title of the work, as given by Ibn-an-Nadīm (*Kitāb al-hiss wa-l-mahsūs*), would translate a Greek *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητοῦ*, with both nouns in the singular. The singular form of the first word would agree with the evidence of some Greek MSS, which give the title simply as *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως*, while both the number of the first word and the number of the books contained in the treatise

¹⁷ On Ibn-Bakkūš see, most conveniently, M. Ullmann, *Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam*, Leiden: Brill 1972, 73-4.

would conflict with the evidence in “the best MSS of the Theophrastean work”¹⁸ and in the only Greek bibliographical source to list the work, Diogenes Laertius V 42 (See 4a above).

Thus half of the Arabic title agrees with some of the Greek MSS, which indicates that the Arabic translation was made from a Greek MS, but the second half of the title remains to be explained, and the number of books.

On the number of books, one answer is that the Greek tradition has preserved only one part of the original work while Ibn-Bakkūš had at his disposal the entire text. To quote Baltussen, “What we can say with some certainty is that we may regard the *DS* as a fairly complete text, which does not exclude the possibility that it was part of a larger context. This makes it a fragment in the sense that it may have formed a whole with and a continuation of a survey of views on the soul.”¹⁹ If that is the case, and, contrary to what Baltussen and Huby (see above) maintain, the larger context was not a general work on the soul but more specifically the subjects dealt with in the Aristotelian cluster of treatises in the *PN*, then Ibn-an-Nadīm’s evidence carries greater weight than that of Diogenes Laertius. Given the structure and method of Peripatetic doxographic treatises like Theophrastus’ *De Sensibus* (as argued by Baltussen), it could be maintained with some confidence that Theophrastus’ work was indeed in four books.

On the title, either the long title was the original, and Diogenes Laertius and the MSS give only an abbreviated version, or the extra words were added to the original short title on the analogy and under the influence of the title of Aristotle’s work, either in the Greek tradition or, more plausibly, within the Arabic tradition. (DG)

If Theophrastus also wrote on Aristotle’s *On Sense* no evidence for that remains.

137 no.35 *On the Images* appears in Diogenes Laertius’ list as one of six titles which may all be concerned with Democritus. See on **280** for the suggestion that Theophrastus considered Democritus’ theory of colours. See also Sharples (1998) 27-8.

¹⁸ Baltussen (1993) p.xiii n.1 and p.242 and n.159.

¹⁹ Baltussen (1993) 250.

246 no.4 *On Forms*: the MSS are divided between *eidôn* (forms) and *eidôlôn* (images). Since *On Images* (1 91) precedes this title (1 100) closely in Diogenes' list, *On Forms* is more probable.

- 5 *On Vision*, 6 *On Experience*, and 7 *On the Modes of Knowing* are all from Diogenes' list, and we know nothing more about them.

Of **436** no.18 *On Old Age* and **328** no.8 *On Derangement* we know only their titles, but **328** nos.9a and b *On Inspiration* and *On (Types of) Inspiration* is referred to in **726** for the claim that patients are cured of various troubles by having a pipe played over them, and **328** nos.11a and b *On Sleep and Dreams* may have contained what is said in **341**, that people dream more in spring and autumn, more if they lie on their backs, and not at all if they lie face down. See also after **300**. **342-4** are all on dreams, but they are from the *LS* and assigned by it to Theophrastus' *Commentaries*. **344** refers ambiguously to 'the part of the soul connected with sensation' in connection with the *Commentaries*, and this might provide a link with 1d above. See also on **288**.

WRITINGS ON THE SOUL

- 266-8** There is little to add to what we already have in the Titles list. It looks as if Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā knew something of Theophrastus, but nothing in his actual writings confirms this, and the *Light of the Soul* is of uncertain value.

- 266** Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā, *On the Difference between the Spirit and the Soul*, Introduction (cod. Istanbul, III. Ahmet 3483 in H.Z. Ülken, İbn Sina Risâleleri vol.2 [Istanbul 1953] p.95 and 83)

Gutas (1985) 81, no.[6].

Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā, a Greek by birth from the town of Ba'albakk in Lebanon, worked in Baghdad as translator, physician, and scientist during the second half of the ninth century.²⁰ He wrote his essay *On the Difference between the Spirit and the Soul* upon demand by an 'Abbāsīd

²⁰ See the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd. ed., V 529, and, more recently, the article by J. Wilcox in *Annals of Scholarship* 4 (1987) 57-74 for further references.

‘Abbāsid functionary, which explains its concision and character of a survey.

He introduces his work by claiming to have used the following sources:

‘I have put down in writing for you on this matter some essential points which I extracted from Plato’s *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*, from the book of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the soul, and from Galen’s *On the Concord* (sic) *of the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*, his *Anatomical Procedures*, and his *On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body*.’

The ambiguity of the phrase “from the book of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the soul” may be partly due to the uncertainty of the text; there is no critical edition of the Arabic, but three printings from three MSS, listed in the apparatus.²¹ The most defective source is the Gotha 1158 MS used by Gabrieli for his edition: it omits the name of Theophrastus altogether. The medieval Latin translation²² appears to have in this sentence two additions; it would seem that it read: “extracted from the book<s> of Aristotle <the philosopher>²³ and of Theophrastus <an incomprehensible word> on the soul”. The incomprehensible word, which, on the evidence of the reading in cod. Parisin., would appear to be Empedocles, does not appear in the Arabic MSS available in the published literature.

The reading of the Arabic text in the Istanbul MS (III Ahmet 3483) and in Cheiko’s edition²⁴ adopted here presents an intermediate version. The actual reading may be established only in a

²¹ See M. Plessner, ‘Beiträge zur islamischen Literaturgeschichte’, *Islamica* 4 (1931) 527-8. For the treatise itself and further references see M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, Leiden/Köln: Brill (1970) 128.

²² Or, translations: there is no consensus yet among the specialists as to whether there were one or two medieval translations, that of Johannes Hispalensis and another anonymous and longer translation. See Judith Wilcox, ‘Problems in the Latin manuscript Tradition of *De Differentia spiritus et animae* by the Physician Costa ben Luca (9/10 Cent.)’, in *Actas, XXVII Congreso Internacional de Historia de la Medicina* (31 Agosto-6 Septiembre 1980) vol.1 Barcelona 1981 363-5. But for our purposes there do not appear to be any significant differences between the alleged two recensions. The Latin text was edited by Wilcox in a doctoral dissertation which I (Gutas) have not seen. See also Charles Burnett, ‘“Magister Johannes Hispalensis et Limiensis” and Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā’s *De differentia spiritus et animae*. A Portuguese Contribution to the Arts Curriculum?’ in *Revista Mediaevalia, Textos e Estudos* 7-8, Porto 1995 221-67, here 237.

²³ The correct reading here is, as in the codd. Urbin. and Parisin., *philosophi*, not *physicis* as in the text of Barach. His mistake is apparently due to the misreading of an abbreviation.

²⁴ It is based on a Jerusalem MS in the Hālidiya library. The Istanbul MS described by Plessner (note 21 above), Ayasofya 2457, contains a text, he says, close to that of the Jerusalem MS.

critical edition of the Arabic text that will also take account of the Latin translation(s). The Istanbul MS bears the date 349 A.H./960 A.D., i.e. about fifty years after Qusṭā's death, but, as is frequently the case with such allegedly early MSS, its authenticity is suspect. For more details see the apparatus and the footnote to the translation, and Gutas above.

If the text is "the book of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the soul", it is presumably to be understood to mean "the book of Aristotle *On the Soul* and the book of Theophrastus *On the Soul*", not that there was a single work of which the two were joint authors. But in any case Qusṭā is not describing his sources with any precision but apparently mentioning some of the more famous names of ancient authors whom a relatively uninformed and busy political patron would know to have written on the subject.

In discussing the nature of spirit, *pneuma*, Qusṭā uses standard medical information from Galen without necessarily having used the precise texts he mentions. On the other hand he refers, if only by title, to Galen's *Quod animi mores*, a title missing from his introduction. From Aristotle he cites the famous definition of the soul from *DA*, but for Plato he copies only from a very derivative work attributed to the third century Christian author Gregory Thaumaturgos, entitled Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν ("A work in sections on the soul to Tatian", as the word κεφαλαιώδης was interpreted in the Arabic versions).²⁵ It follows that his list of sources is not to be taken literally but that it was included for the purpose of impressing his patron.

In this context, the fact that Qusṭā mentions Theophrastus indicates that Theophrastus' name was, in the second half of the ninth century in Baghdad, something that one could talk about and expect even lay persons to appreciate its significance. The mention of the book on the soul is more ambiguous: it might indicate that Theophrastus' *On the Soul* was translated earlier during the ninth century

²⁵ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca* X 1137-46, first identified by V. Ryssel in *Rhein. Museum* 51 (1896) 318-20. Two versions of the Arabic translation of Gregory's work, circulating under the name of Aristotle, were studied and edited by Helmut Gätje (Gätje 1971 54-62, 99-130) with references to earlier bibliography; for variant readings to the text from a Lisbon MS not used by Gätje see M. Ullmann in *Der Islam* 54 (1977) 114-17. Benedict Einarson first noticed that the same text by Gregory also appears under the name of Maximus Confessor in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* XCI 353ff.: 'On a supposed Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise on the Soul' *Classical Philology* 28 (1933) 129-30.

and was relatively well known, but that it was eclipsed by the translation of Aristotle's *DA* by Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn towards the end of the ninth century and by the rise of dogmatic Aristotelianism with Fārābī early in the tenth (cf. the Introduction, p. xvii). (DG)

In this study of physiological psychology, followed by a commentary on the definitions of the soul in Plato and Aristotle, it is difficult to find anything that appears to come from Theophrastus' *On the soul*. (PMH)

- 267** (Dubious report about a book of Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul B* prologue (*Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 41 [1971] p.76.16-17 Rouse)

Thorndike vol. 3 546-60. M.A. and R.H.Rouse, 'The Texts called "Lumen Animae"' *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 41 1971 5-113. C.R. Dodwell, *Theophilus: The Various Arts*, London: Nelson 1961

For cautions about the value of *The Light of the Soul* see Overview: Sources.

On the Part (of the Soul) concerned with sensation of Theophrastus listed here is followed by "Alpharabius *de differentia regionum*" and "Albertus Commentator *de impressionibus aeris*" as other books popular in Paris. The prologue contains a miscellaneous list of books, and we can deduce nothing from it. Theophrastus' book is not named in the printed version (B), but it might be identical with the "book of *Commentaries* about the part (of the soul) concerned with sensation", which is mentioned in **344**. According to Rouse our title is to be found in versions A and C (Austrian, between 1332 and 1357) also unprinted.²⁶ It could in theory be the first book of *On the Soul* (See **265** nos. 1bc and d), but it is unlikely that that was available in Latin in Paris in the thirteenth century, though, as we shall see, Albert the Great seems to have had some material which we cannot otherwise trace. "At that time" presumably refers to an earlier part of the life-time of the author, i.e. in the second half of the thirteenth century.

Dodwell l-ii has studied quotations from Theophilus in *LS*, and suggests that the compiler used volumes in which several works were

²⁶ Charles Schmitt, 'Theophrastus in the Middle Ages', *Viator* 2 1971 266 says that versions A and C each contain twenty to thirty extracts attributed to Theophrastus' *De parte sensitiva*.

bound up together, without indications of where one ended and another began. But the Rouses, p.34 n.55, doubt that this accounts for the situation as a whole.

- 268** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul B, Anthology* Chapter 9 On the Soul (ed. 1477² Farinator)

Here we have only the contracted form ‘The’ for the author. We might consider Themistius, for he did write a commentary on, or rather paraphrase of, Aristotle’s *DA*, but that work survives and there is nothing in it corresponding to this, though he does discuss *Phaedo* 67B at 106-7, and *Timaeus* at 106, 107 22-3, and at 106.29 he does use the expression “most weighty arguments” (*logoi ... embrithestatoi*), which might be the equivalent of “most strong assertions” (*firmissimis assertionibus*) here, but Themistius is there dealing with the *Timaeus*, and the sense of his total remark²⁷ is not the same. **268** might be a thoroughly muddled account of all this.

The *LS* and many other medieval Latin writers frequently referred to Plato’s *Phedron*. This is understandable because they knew neither the *Phaedo*²⁸ nor the *Phaedrus*. Here the *Phaedo* is the more relevant work. There is frequent reference to a *Commentum* (or *Liber Commentorum* etc) in *De anima* (*Commentary on* (Aristotle’s) *On the Soul*) by Theophrastus in *LS* (See **265** no. 3). That title is not frequent in connection with other authors, and while this fact by itself does not prove that the author had a work with that title to hand, it must be considered a possibility. Whether, if he actually had it, it was in fact by Theophrastus is a separate question.

DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

- 269-72** Only **269** gives what is strictly a definition, and there is considerable doubt about the meaning of Iamblichus’ words here. **270** is rather an account of the structure of the soul, and Theophrastus’ name is only one of a list which starts with Aristotle himself, and is probably not

²⁷ “The greatest number and most weighty arguments which he raised about the immortality of the soul lead back to the intellect.”

²⁸ The *Phaedo* was translated into Latin by Henricus Aristippus about 1156, but it did not make a great impression. See Berschin (1988) 232-3.

based on any direct knowledge of Theophrastus. 271 contains actual quotations from Theophrastus by a reliable source, but raises some problems of interpretation. 272 may give genuine information, but cannot be connected with anything else we know.²⁹

269 Iamblichus, *On the Soul* in Stobaeus, *Anthology* 1 49.32
(vol. 1 366.25-367.2 Wachsmuth)

A.J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* 3 *Les doctrines de l'Âme*, Paris: Librairie Lecoffre (Grabalda), 1953, 186-9. Jaap Mansfeld, 'Doxography and Dialectic', *ANRW* vol.II.36.4 (1990) 3056-3229 esp. 3130-31. Carlos Steel (1978). W. Theiler, 'Ein vergessenes Aristoteleszeugnis' *JHS* vol. 57.1 1957 127-31. Aristotele, *Della Filosofia* ed. M. Untersteiner Rome: Edizione di Storia e Letteratura, 1963. Blumenthal and Clark (1993).

Iamblichus' *On the Soul*³⁰ is lost, but we have considerable fragments of it preserved by Stobaeus, the fifth century anthologist. It included a doxographical section which covered a) the being (*ousia*) of the soul, and b) its activity (*energeia*) and functions (*erga*). This excerpt is from a) and Iamblichus says (365.6-7) that he will give in order all the opinions of earlier writers: his order is theoretical, not historical. Our passage follows one on Orpheus, which is an interpretation of Aristotle's words about Orphism at *DA* 1.5 410b27-31, but Iamblichus' emphasis is on the suggestion that there is a single external soul from which parts split off. Our present passage seems to continue the theme of a single original soul, and it is best to suppose that Iamblichus was more concerned with finding items to fit that slot than to give a full account of the views of, for example, Aristotle and Theophrastus.

That Aristotle in some works called the soul an *endelecheia* has been generally accepted for some time. Festugière 188 n.6 assembles the relevant evidence, and there is a long discussion by Untersteiner 269-75, on the passage of Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.22 which is part of what he regards as fragment 30 of Aristotle's *On Philosophy*. This account of *endelecheia* has recently been questioned by Mansfeld

²⁹ I thank Sharples for much help with the details of *LS*.

³⁰ For a recent summary of what is known about Iamblichus see Blumenthal and Clark 1-3, and for Stobaeus see Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 196-271.

3130-1,³¹ but in the present context, which seems to relate to a heavenly or divine body, it is surely appropriate. So here in Stobaeus keep the *entelecheia* of the MSS.³² Iamblichus' passage has not been related to the lost *On Philosophy*, but appears to be relevant to it.³³

As for Theophrastus, the alternative translation 'as Theophrastus says in some works' seems improbable. There is no reason why Theophrastus should be given as the source of information about Aristotle, about whom Iamblichus would have known as much as about Theophrastus, being, after all, the main source for our knowledge of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. Festugière p.189 n.1 suggests that Theophrastus used *entelecheia* about earlier thinkers in his *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (137 no.6). Otherwise he may have used it of Aristotle, referring to some works now lost, or used it of Aristotle's later works, or used it himself in some of his own theoretical works. Alternatively Mansfeld is right, and it is anyhow highly probable that Theophrastus did use *entelecheia*, though it does not occur in his

³¹ And in *Heresiography in Context* (Philosophia Antiqua 56) Leiden: Brill 1992 p.143 n.35.

³² See Festugière 188-9. In n.4 he notes that Arius Didymus (fr. phys. 3 Diels) says that Aristotle called it (*to eidos*) *entelechia* (*entelecheia*) either because it existed continuously (*endelechōs huparchein*), or because "it makes each of what shares in it perfect (*teleion*)" which involves a muddle between *entelecheia* and *entelecheia*. At Stobaeus *Anth.* 370.22 only *entelecheia* appears in the MSS, appropriately, in connection with Aristotle, but at 319.6-8 where Stobaeus is giving an introductory set of views on the nature of the soul, we find under Aristotle that it is the first *entelecheia* of a natural organic body potentially having life, with the note that we must understand *entelecheia* (sic) instead of "form" and activity (*energeia*).

Steel p.23. n.1 thinks that 366.12 (not 13)-367.9 is out of place and should be at 363.18-19: "on p.366.5-11 Iamblichus gives the conclusion of his survey of the traditional doctrines: he intends to adhere in his own exposition to the doctrine that the soul is an incorporeal substance. ... there is no reason to review again materialistic theories about the soul." But he has not in fact reviewed materialistic theories of the soul: he has only devoted one short paragraph to the atomists. Should that paragraph, 363.1-18, rather be moved to join 366.11-367.9? The atomists are not mentioned there, but would fit in well. It remains a question whether this whole discussion of the soul as corporeal should come after that in which the soul as incorporeal substance occurs, and where Iamblichus says he will adopt this view, but his arrangement is not all that clear and I think we should stick with what we have. So the final section is on the soul as material, covering hot and cold, the Orphics according to Aristotle, Orpheus himself, various Aristotelians, Theophrastus, the Stoics and Dicaearchus. If the block is a unity it must all concern material treatments of the soul, and it is unlikely that Iamblichus would have placed here Aristotle's view that the soul is an entelechy: the reading *entelechia*, meaning the continuous existence of a corporeal entity, should be preferred.

³³ Theiler 128 n.5 mentions it but refers only to Stobaeus, not Iamblichus. Mansfeld, *Heresiography* loc. cit. n.17 says that Festugière 183 n.6 assigns the Aristotle reference to a place among those passages believed to derive from the lost *On Philosophy*, but the reference should be to p.188.

Metaphysics: we may have an example in 317 9, where he seems to be following Aristotle's own words.

Festugière also gives various translations and interpretations of κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ θείου σώματος. Blumenthal suggests that the divine body is the same as the body made of ether in line 1. Cf. Simplicius *On Aristotle's On Heaven* p.1,24 where Iamblichus calls the fifth element "divine element/(form of) body" (Blumenthal), i.e. because that is *teleion* ("perfect"), which is brought out by calling it "divine" as opposed to "made of ether". Aristotle himself used "divine body" at *On Heaven* 2.2 286a11 of the heaven. Mansfeld takes *hên* ("which") in line 3 as referring back to *ousian*, whereas we have related it to *teleiotêta*.

The same point appears as part of later doxographies (162 Epiphanius and apparatus), though no other gives this account of Theophrastus. Epiphanius (315-403) became bishop of Salamis in Cyprus and waged war on heresies, including Greek philosophy. In his case the information is uncertain and it is not clear to what extent Theophrastus is supposed to have agreed with Aristotle, but since the last item in Epiphanius' list is on *endelecheia* we should take it that that was a point on which they were supposed to have agreed.³⁴ But caution is necessary because Epiphanius says that the soul is the *endelecheia* of the body, which may involve some confusion with *entelecheia*. The rest of what he says is fairly straightforwardly based on the Aristotle we know. Although Epiphanius was probably later than Iamblichus, it is unlikely that he was drawing on him. See now Sharples (1998) 103-5 for the value of Epiphanius' evidence.

The part of Priscian of Lydia's account of Theophrastus' psychology that survives begins (273) with his treatment of sense-perception, and that is based on Aristotle's *DA* 2.5. But Aristotle had already discussed the nature and definition of the soul in 2.1, and Theophrastus may well have dealt earlier with that. Further, in *DA* Book 1 Aristotle had covered many earlier views about the soul, including the Orphic one mentioned above. It is possible, then, that Iamblichus' claim is based on something Theophrastus said in an earlier part of his own *On the Soul*, but that is no more than conjecture.

³⁴ *endelecheia* seems to have got into Latin as the usual form of *entelecheia*. Is the bridge Martianus Capella 2.213 (*BT* p.78.16-17 Dick) *Aristoteles per caeli culmina quoque Endelechiam scrupulosius requirebat* and the earlier reference to *Endelechia* at 1.7 (p.7.10)? The MSS of Martianus have *endelechiam* and similar in both places. Most editors correct to *Entelecheia*, but that is unnecessary.

- 270** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On Animals* 16.1.11 (p.1093.36-1094.12 Stadler)

P.M. Huby, 'Soul, life, sense, intellect: some thirteenth century problems' in *The Human Embryo*, ed. G.R. Dunstan, Exeter: University of Exeter Press (1990) 113-22

Albert's sources have been little studied, but almost certainly he relied on Arabic intermediaries. This work refers back to his own *On the Soul* and *On the Intellect*.

Aristotle in *DGA* 2.3 736a24ff. discusses the parts played by the male and the female parent in conception, and uses the analogy of a craftsman, such as a carpenter or a potter, who employs his skill on his material, wood or clay, to produce an object with the desired form. In living things, the mother provides the matter, and the father's part is to give it shape or form. But Aristotle goes further, though rather obscurely: he likens the soul of the craftsman, in which the form and the skill exist and move the hands appropriately, and the hands then move the tools, to the nature (*phusis*) in the male, which uses the seed (*sperma*) as a tool. The nature here is clearly the nature of the individual thing, as so often in Aristotle, and in this passage there is only an analogy between it and the soul of the craftsman. But the passage was already known by Averroes (308A 38-40) and developed to bring in the intellect specifically: a pithy summary of the position accepted is to be found in Albert's *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul*, 1.1 p.3.31 Geyer: "every work (*opus*) of nature is the work of intelligence (*intelligentia*).” Later (p.3.44-5) he has: intelligence is the “first and universal mover (*motor*) in all nature”. So even at the lowest level of nature, intelligence plays a part. An elaboration of this is to be found in Albert's *On Animals* 16.1.11 (p.1092.28ff. Stadler), the passage preceding and including **270**, which covers plant, animal, and human life: from the elements of which all living things are formed comes a *spiritus* which already has “celestial powers or virtues”—to use that word to translate the difficult Latin term *virtutes*—which render it ready to receive life and the “work of life”. There follows apparently a stage when the virtue of the soul and the virtues of the parts of the body inform the relevant spirit and heat, so that the shapes of the appropriate organs are formed, and then, by the virtue of the first intellect (*intellectus*), a soul is created in it, and the actual details are worked out by the intellects

that move the lower spheres, that is, through their virtues which are in the seed (*semen*). This account is, I think, primarily Aristotelian, though it provides an opening for those who wish to bring in astrological elements.³⁵

Now another passage from *DGA*³⁶ comes into play, 2.3 736b27-8, where Aristotle discusses whether any parts of the soul exist before conception. He argues that most parts cannot exist without a body, and therefore cannot preexist. But it is left, he says, that intellect alone comes in from outside, and is alone divine. It seems unlikely that this passage tells us anything new about Theophrastus, though the possibility will be considered below. We shall see later (307A 2-3) that he was interested in the entry of the intellect into the foetus, but what we have here is far from his actual words. Theophrastus is named after Avicenna and Averroes, and it is a reasonable supposition that Albert's information came from one or more Arabic works translated into Latin. (For the reasons given in the Introduction in the section on the Arabic evidence it is not easy to identify relevant passages in the published Latin translations of either Avicenna or Averroes, and we are still ignorant about many of Albert's sources. DG)

It seems best to take the reference to Anaxagoras (line 10) as derived from Aristotle's *DA* 1.2 404b1-6 and 405a13-19. But Albert's words are difficult. He seems to distinguish between an external intellect and the rational and intellectual soul which is introduced into the foetus by the light of that intellect, and that is the intellect of which he says that Anaxagoras and Aristotle held that it is the original agent in all the preinduced—if that is the correct translation—virtues or faculties, perhaps a double rendering of the Greek *dunamis*, i.e. the vegetative and sensible powers. Aristotle does not say precisely that.³⁷

³⁵ The history of astrology is still obscure, but neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus seems to have been concerned with it. Tamsyn Barton, *Ancient Astrology*, London and N.Y.: Routledge 1994 22 notes our 194 (Proclus) as evidence that Theophrastus knew something of the Chaldeans, but nothing else from that period. She thinks that Greek astrology began not earlier than the third century BC, and perhaps later (p.23).

³⁶ There are actually three related passages, but two are corrupt and were left out of account by most writers: 2.3 737a7-13 2.6 744b21. See Huby 121-2 n.5. see also n.156.

³⁷ *praeinductis* (line 11). The parallel Greek word to *praeinducere* would be *proeisagein*, but Aristotle only uses that once, and not in a relevant context. Possibly some other author used it in a technical sense, possibly some Latin writer adopted

The nearest we get to Albert in ancient sources is Aëtius 3 5 11 (Diels p.392 = Stobaeus *Anth.* 1.48.7 p.317.15-16 W), reporting that Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, Xenocrates and Cleanthes said that the intellect enters from outside (*thurathen eiskrinesthai*). Apart from the fact that Aristotle is not named, though *thurathen* (“from outside”) of the intellect is particularly associated with him, this list is of doubtful value. The claim about Cleanthes, for example, is rejected by von Arnim *SVF* 1.523. But since Theophrastus did write more than one book on Anaxagoras (see 137 nos.29 and 30), and one on Xenocrates (137 no.41), he may be one of its ultimate sources. Further, while Anaxagoras is not known to have used *eiskrinesthai* (“to enter”) elsewhere—and neither did Aristotle—he did use *krinesthai* with a number of other prepositions (*apo*, *dia*, *ex*, *pros* and *sun*).³⁸ All this gives some small support to the view that Albert got his information ultimately from Theophrastus, the source of much doxography. But the views Albert expresses are the result of centuries of attempts to explain Aristotle. Thus the notion of the light of the intellect, which plays a large part in Albert’s own thought, may have its starting-point in the light simile at *DA* 3.5 430a15-16, but it goes far beyond that.

Albert’s reference to his own *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* is unhelpful. The chapter concerned, 2.24, extends the light analogy but seems to have a Neoplatonic source, and probably adds nothing from Anaxagoras or Aristotle or Theophrastus.

17 “all the more experienced Peripatetics”] Albert regarded many people as Peripatetics. In *On the Intellect* 2.2 506a15-16, for instance, he attributes to “the more subtle of the Peripatetics” a view that sounds Neoplatonic.

praeinducere for a special sense, or perhaps *praeinductis* here just means ‘aforementioned’. Against that, Albert uses *in conceptum inducitur* (“is introduced into the foetus”) of the rational and intellectual soul in what immediately follows.

³⁸ For his use of these words in other connections see Montgomery Furth, ‘A “philosophical hero”? Anaxagoras and the Eleatics’ in *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers* (ed. R. Sharples) London: UCL Press 1993 45-7 with notes. *eiskrinesthai* (and *ekkrinesthai*) of intellect also occur in Alexander of Aphrodisias?, *On Intellect* 112.31, in a theory that has been attributed to Aristotle of Mytilene, and of soul in a scholium taken from his lost Commentary on *DA* followed by Simplicius *On Aristotle’s Physics* 964.21. See M. Rashed, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la “Magna Quaestio”: Rôle et indépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotélicien’, *Les Études Classiques* 63 (1995) 295-351 and ‘A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion’, *Aristotle and After* ed R. Sorabji London: *BICS* Suppl.68 (1997) 181-95. See n.42.

There are other passages from *On Animals* which bear on human conception, like our 376A-C and 377, but they are mainly physiological, and although they name Theophrastus the connection is probably not very close. See Sharples' (1995) comments, 107-15.

Finally, there is a remote chance of finding Theophrastus' doctrine in two places where Albert goes beyond our Aristotelian texts:

1-3 "the rational or intellectual principle of life in man ... is indeed the same as the vegetable and the sensitive, but in its essence it is different" is not in our Aristotle, but at *On Dreams* 1.459a15-17 there is: "the imaginative is the same as the sensitive, but in essence the imaginative and the sensitive are different", and at *DA* 2.2 413b29-30: "(the essence of) the sensitive and (the essence of) that which can believe are different." The principle is already there in Aristotle, but someone has applied it to intellect. Perhaps Albert's source had a statement that the rational or intellectual was the same as the vegetable and the sensitive, but in essence they were different. It is only a conjecture, however, that the original source was Theophrastus.

13-15 "this is the order: what is alive is not at the same moment sentient, and what is sentient is not at the same moment man" goes beyond *DGA* 2.3 736b2: "for something does not become animal and man at the same moment". A similar point is made more fully by Albert at *Metaphysics* 2.7 (vol.16.1 p.98 58-64 Geyer): "one is not a baby and a child at the same time, and one is not a child and a young man and an adult at the same time, and one is not a young man and a grown man at the same time. And in a grown man the state of existence of the form is like being awake, not having one's activities tied or impeded."³⁹

Now at *DGA* 2.3 736a35-b1—the lines immediately preceding those quoted above—we have references to the vegetable and the sensitive followed by a lacuna, not recognised before Drossaart Lulofs but indicated by a marginal gloss in one late MS, Riccardianus 13 of the fourteenth century, and by Theodore of Gaza's translation, and supported by Michael of Ephesus' commentary.⁴⁰

³⁹ *non est infans et puer simul, et non est puer et iuuenis et adultus simul, et non est iuuenis et vir simul. et in viro est status esse formae quae est sicut vigilia, non ligatas vel impeditas habens operationes.*

⁴⁰ In *CAG* vol.14.3 (as Pseudo-Philoponus). At 83,13-14 he has καὶ ἔτι προϊόντα ὥσπερ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὴν λογικὴν ("and again going further like men the reasoning too"). Lulofs (p.xiii of his edition of *DGA*), says he used a late manuscript of little value.

Aristotle, in discussing the development of the foetus, says that foetuses clearly have the vegetable soul, and as time passes the sensitive soul by which they become animals, and the gloss adds: “and the rational (soul) by which it becomes man”. Further, the rational soul appears alongside the vegetable and the sensitive later in our existing text at 736b8-14, and it seems likely that Albert’s ultimate source knew the full text of Aristotle, although the lacuna occurred early enough to affect the whole of the main tradition. If so, the original material on which this is based goes back a long way, perhaps to Theophrastus.⁴¹

See on 301A for further discussion of *ordo*.

- 271 Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Physics* 6.4 234b10-20 (CAG vol. 10 p.964.29-965.6 Diels)

Hicks (1907) no.13 p.594. Barbotin (1954) no. XIII p. 272. W.W. Fortenbaugh, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts*, Amsterdam: Grüner 1984 no. L2 and p.150-2. L. Repici *La Natura e L’Anima Saggi su Stratone di Lampsaco* Turin: Tirrenia 1988 33-37. Sharples (1998).

This passage is primarily about the definition of motion. Theophrastus has substituted “incomplete activity” for Aristotle’s “entelechy”, and suggested that there may be more than one species of motion, and it is for this reason that he brings in psychological matters. But his claim that some motions of the soul start in the body and some in the soul can be taken as a sincerely held view, in agreement with Aristotle’s teaching. It is less certain that he would have brought intellect into a theoretical discussion of motion, though it is clear from 307A that he puzzled over the implications of Aristotle’s scattered remarks about intellect. It could be argued that he was also

⁴¹ At *On the Soul* 1.2.15 (p.58.52-5) Albert has: *Aristoteles videtur dicere in sextodecimo librorum suorum de animalibus ... quod non est vivum et animal simul, neque est vivum et homo simul, et quod cibativa anima prius inest quam sensitiva, et alia huiusmodi*. (“Aristotle seems to say in the sixteenth of his books on animals” (i.e. DGA) “... that what is alive is not at the same moment animal, and what is alive is not at the same moment man, and that the nutritive soul is in (a creature) before the sensitive, and other things of this kind.”) Albert related this to “certain Latin philosophers who say that there are different substances but one soul in the body of a man”. It is clear that this material was discussed at length in the thirteenth century. See Huby 115-7. There is also a development of these ideas in *On Animals* 16.1.11 p.1093.8-25, part of the passage discussed above.

unhappy about the idea that motion always involved potentiality, and brought in intellect as an example of something that was not potential (in the sense in which he was speaking of it) but which still involved motion.

Simplicius is concerned with the paradoxes of motion in Aristotle's *Physics* 6, in particular the argument at 234b10-20, that all that changes is divisible. Aristotle's point is that motion is neither at the beginning nor at the end but in between. Simplicius brings in Alexander of Aphrodisias, who used Aristotle's argument to defend his own view of the soul as inseparable from the body.⁴² In reply Simplicius wants to distinguish between bodily motions, to which Aristotle's paradox applies, and the motions of the soul like thinking and discriminating, to which perhaps it does not. He claims that Aristotle's definition of motion as the entelechy of what is potential, as potential (*Physics* 3.1 201b4-5 etc), applies to at least the majority of psychic motions, but leaves open the possibility of having to distinguish another kind of motion as well. He brings in Theophrastus at this point, and after him goes on to Strato, ending with a quotation from Aristotle, *Physics* 8.3 254a29, that imagination (*phantasia*) and opinion (*doxa*) seem to be kinds of motions.

The words quoted here are said to be from Theophrastus' *On Motion* Book I. That work had three books (See 137 no. 2), and it may have been part of the larger work called *Physics* of which Theophrastus' *On the Soul* also formed part. But it is probable that our passage was primarily connected with problems about Aristotle's treatment of motion in *Physics* 6.⁴³ Other passages from the first book are given in 155A, 155C and 156B. In particular 155A is on the same

⁴² This cannot be traced in the extant works of Alexander, and is probably from the *Commentary* on *DA*, fragments of which have now been discovered in a Paris MS, Suppl. gr. 643, including one closely related to Simplicius 964.15-23. See n.38. In his own *On the Soul* Alexander set out his theory of the intellect, and also in the *On Intellect*, if that is his, which has survived in the *On the Soul Mantissa*. The latter account was translated into Latin, and the text is given in Théry (1926) 74-82. Its authenticity has been doubted, but it was accepted as authentic by those who read it in Latin. It identifies the active intellect with God. Theophrastus is not mentioned in it. It is translated into English in Schroeder and Todd (1990), with details of its *fortuna* (1-4), and a discussion of its authenticity (6-22). See also Schroeder (1995).

⁴³ Sharples points out that according to Simplicius *In Phys.* 924.12 Aristotle's *Physics* 6-8 were known as *On Motion*, but there is a problem with Book 7: see Barnes in M. Griffin and J. Barnes (edd.), *Philosophia Togata* II, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996 36. Aristotle also dealt with motions and the soul at *DA* 1.4 408a34-b29.

passage of Aristotle as Simplicius is discussing here, and we may conclude that it was here that Theophrastus introduced his division of psychic motions, in close connection with Aristotle's arguments at this point. In **153A** and **B** Simplicius twice quotes Theophrastus' definition, or rather general account, of motion as "some incomplete activity (*atelês energeia*) of that which is potentially, as such (i.e. as being potentially), in each category." This resembles Aristotle's own definition, given above, but where Aristotle has entelechy (*entelecheia*) Theophrastus has "incomplete activity". Simplicius criticises Theophrastus' account as applying to change in general, not just motion, and in **153B** he quotes other remarks of Theophrastus about motion from *On Motion* Books 2 and 3. In the latter book indeed Theophrastus used Aristotle's own definition. In all these cases Simplicius is mainly concerned with whether there is motion in all ten categories, which may have slanted his account.

Elsewhere too Theophrastus makes connections between motion and the soul. But at **159** (Proclus) line 27 his remark that the soul is the source (*archê*) of motion is in a context about the heavens, and at **152** (Iamblichus as reported by Simplicius) it is unclear how much is from Theophrastus and how much from Iamblichus. Indeed Irma Croese has suggested privately that the quotation from Iamblichus has already ended at 304.32. If the last section of **152** is indeed from Theophrastus, it shows him passing from the statement that all motion is activity but not all activity is motion to the claim that perfection can be found in intelligible objects and things by nature unmoved. This might be seen as building on Aristotle's (and his own) reference to potentiality in the definition of motion, and a suggestion that entelechy can involve perfection (*telos* or *teleiôtês*) in things that have nothing potential about them. No source is given for this material. Finally **301A** from Sextus Empiricus involves several motions of the soul.

The only passage in Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* that is at all relevant here (5b3-7) is strangely remote from our present concerns, being in a criticism of Aristotle's cosmology.

Line 1 "These views"] Most likely these are the views in the whole of 964.23-9, the passage immediately preceding **271**, where Simplicius gives his own theory that the soul moves not in a corporeal motion, but in appropriate motions when thinking, and that Aristotle's definition of motion fits most psychic motions, at least those that have potentiality in their moving.

The quotation from Theophrastus starts with a clear distinction between motions of the soul that are corporeal and are started off by the body, and others which have their starting point in the soul. But the last part, from line 6 to the end, is disputed. First, it is not clear how much is from Theophrastus and how much from Simplicius: the possibilities are: 1) from line 6 *ei de* (“but if”) to line 7 *epagei* (“adds”) is all Simplicius; 2) all as far as *panteleios* (“all-perfect”) in line 7 is from Theophrastus; 3) Simplicius’ words begin at *hate de* (“since”) in line 7, as we have printed. Much hangs on the reading *de* (“but”) in line 6. If we keep it we have an incomplete sentence, and must suppose, unless we admit a lacuna, that Simplicius either a) gave an incomplete quotation from Theophrastus, or b) broke off himself. On view a) Theophrastus was content to hold that these motions started within the soul, but was aware of Aristotle’s doctrine, or rather remarks about, intellect, and allowed that intellect might involve some external stimulus. On view b) Simplicius thought he had quoted enough to make his point. Alternatively one might restore the grammar of the passage by reading *ge* for *de* as Diels suggested. The sense would then be that some motions start in the soul, at least if the intellect is something better and more divine. One then has the choice of treating “since it comes in from outside and is all-perfect” as a) still from Theophrastus or as b) Simplicius’ own explanation of the superiority of the intellect. Alternative a) involves Theophrastus in saying that these motions start within the soul if the intellect is something that comes in from outside. That seems unacceptable, though some might argue that motions can only start within the soul, and not from the body, if the soul contains some higher factor.⁴⁴

In any case these remarks are based on the tentative statement of Aristotle at *DA* 1.4 408b29 “but perhaps intellect is something more divine and impassible”, which itself comes at the end of a discussion which has included motions of the soul. View a), that the motions start within the soul if the intellect is superior, is difficult,⁴⁵ and it seems better to suppose that Theophrastus had something more to

⁴⁴ Wimmer suggested reading *eti* (“again”) for *ei* (“if”), which restores the grammar but hardly helps the sense. Sharples has suggested that the reading *ei de ge* could mean “seeing that”, but that does not accord with the tentative nature of Aristotle’s remarks.

⁴⁵ W. Theiler, ‘Gott und Seele im kaiserzeitlichen Denken’ in *Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne* Geneva: Vandoeuvres 1955 (Fondation Hardt vol.3) 71 links *pantelēs* as used of God by Albinus/Alcinous *Didasc.* 10.3 164.33 Hermann with what he sees as Theophrastus’ use of *panteleios* here (See n.4).

say about the supposition that intellect is better and more divine, for instance that there might be a source of thinking that was external to the soul, but that has been lost. It is then of less consequence whether we attribute “since it comes from outside and is all-perfect” to Theophrastus or to Simplicius. In favour of the latter is that *panteleios* is a typical Neoplatonic word, but the point is a valid one and could have been made by Theophrastus, using Aristotle’s remarks in *DGA*, to which he refers also at 307A.

Simplicius has a clear argument without any reference to intellect. He says that thinking etc. are motions of the soul, and supports that with quotations from Theophrastus, Strato, and Aristotle himself, who are all primarily concerned with the soul, not intellect. And he ends with: “But that according to the best of the Peripatetics the soul moves, even if not in a bodily motion, is clear from these (quotations)”. But there may be a clue to his addition of a reference to intellect in his qualification at 964.27-8, where he says that Aristotle’s definition of motion fits the motions of the soul, or at least the majority of them, those that have the potential in their moving. He goes on: “but if it does not fit (some), but there has been a separation, we must define them according to another kind (or species) of motion.” This suggests that Simplicius himself is aware of the possibility that there are some motions of the soul which involve no potentiality, namely those of intellect. We could then suppose that it was he who introduced the reference to intellect beginning with “but if” in line 6.

Secondly, there are alternative interpretations of *chôrismon* (“separation”) in line 8. In view of Simplicius’ reference to the possibility of there being more than one species of motion, with different definitions, at 964.28-9 quoted above, and his rather obscure reference to separation there, it seems most probable that it is this kind of separation into species that is relevant. That would certainly be “relevant to the definition”. But the idea of the soul’s being separated from the body is found in the vicinity in the discussion of the vehicle (*ochêma*) of the soul at 965.22-5, so that this sense is a second, though remote, possibility.⁴⁶ And such a separation might also be seen as “relevant to the definition”.

There is also a difficulty with *echei* (“involves”) in line 8. At first

⁴⁶ J. Talanga (private communication) suggests that *DA* 2.1 413a6-7, which implies that intellect might be separate from body, is relevant.

sight the subject seems to be the intellect of line 6, but Theophrastus' words are not a direct continuation of that passage and it is better to leave the subject unstated. Since *tautas* ("these") in line 9 is feminine plural we cannot directly refer it to the subject of *echei*, but one might supply an equivalent neuter plural to do the job.

In line 6 I have translated *energeia* as "activity": it is possible that Theophrastus here had Aristotle's paradox, reported above, in mind. He would then be replying to it by saying that in the case of the soul all three supposed parts, the starting-point, the (intervening) activity, and the end-point are in the soul, and in this case the paradox does not arise, for the soul is not extended spatially, and its relation to time is uncertain.

Repici interprets this passage in the course of her study of Simplicius' account of Strato's psychological theory which follows that of Theophrastus. But she does not recognise the difficulties and alternatives considered above.

See **301A** for more about motions in psychology, and **439** on the passions of the soul.

272 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chapter on Theophrastus, saying no.3

D. Gutas, 'The *Šiwān al-ḥikma* Cycle of texts', *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* vol. 102 1982 645-50. Gutas (1985) 85, no.3.

The *Depository of Wisdom Literature* is a gnomologium or collection of sayings compiled about A.D. 1000, using material earlier translated from Greek into Arabic. It gives 22 miscellaneous sayings attributed to Theophrastus. For a full account of the complicated story of the recensions and of some of the MSS see Gutas (1982). The source of this saying is unknown, and it does not fit in with any other material about psychology that we have from Theophrastus. But it is followed by no.4, our **485**, on the advantages of philosophical study, which is very similar to **484**, a passage from Cicero, and if **485** is authentic it increases the possibility that this is also authentic. It is a pleasant conceit.

Before leaving the general account of the soul we should mention our **65** from Jerome's *Defence against Rufinus*. The name Theophrastus appears in that passage, but it is best interpreted as a term of mild reproach referring to Rufinus, the contemporary and ex-friend of

Jerome who could be seen as a kind of Theophrastus. But, provided the name is not connected with an entirely different Theophrastus, it implies that our Theophrastus was known to Jerome as one who wrote about the soul. This is a fair supposition. It is possible that Jerome came across Themistius in Constantinople about 380, when both were there along with Gregory of Nazianzus, whom both knew. Indeed there was a close connection between Themistius and many Christians of his time. Themistius was interested in Theophrastus' psychology as well as his logic (See 307A and 320) and probably had access to a copy of his *On the Soul*. Themistius' *PDA*, in which Theophrastus is mentioned, was an early work, and so could have been known to Jerome. It is relevant that in the following section 10 Jerome has *Arcesilam aut Carneadem putes* ("you would think him an Arcesilas or Carneades"), likening him to those sceptics for his confessions of ignorance. We may speculate further and note that in 65 Jerome is referring to Rufinus' agnosticism about the creation of the soul and whether it preexists and enters the seed or is created and instilled into the embryo. This resembles one point which Theophrastus discussed in 307A 2-3. (That Theophrastus was concerned with intellect and Rufinus with the soul is at this period unimportant.) Against this Sharples suggests that it was just Theophrastus' aporetic style that Rufinus copied.

It may not be a coincidence that the *Theophrastus* of Aeneas of Gaza was written in Constantinople a century later between 485 and 490. The subtitle is: "that men have no preexistence and that the soul is immortal". Here Theophrastus is one of the interlocutors, a contemporary pagan who is converted to Christianity. Zacharias of Mytilene wrote an *Ammonius* in reply to Aeneas' *Theophrastus*. This Ammonius is clearly Ammonius son of Hermeias, the contemporary philosopher. Did Zacharias, in choosing this name for his work, do it because he assumed that ultimately Aeneas was thinking of our Theophrastus? This is all conjectural, but for what it is worth it suggests that Theophrastus' views on the soul were such as to be of interest in fourth and fifth century Constantinople. See also Sharples (1998) p.131 n.363.

163 from the *Depository of Wisdom Literature* attributes to Theophrastus the saying that human beings are the image and likeness of the stars, who are our parents and managers, but the additional remark that stars have rational souls and intellects only, whereas men have

vegetative souls as well is probably a commentator's addition.⁴⁷ See Sharples' discussion in Sharples (1998) 105-6.

SENSATION

273-96 Most of the following passages are from Priscian of Lydia, and are his excerpts from and comments on Theophrastus' *On the Soul*, itself based on Aristotle's *DA*. See now Huby and Steel (1997) for an English translation of Priscian. We have added passages from his contemporaries Simplicius⁴⁸ and Philoponus, and two from Plutarch, but **280** is primarily evidence for Epicurus, and **293** is of uncertain meaning. Several of doubtful value are from the *Light of the Soul*.

273 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.1 and 1.7 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.1.2-8 and 3.27-9 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

This is the first passage from Priscian of Lydia, for whom see Overview: Sources. It is the opening passage of his *Metaphrasis*⁴⁹ or Paraphrase of Theophrastus' *On the Soul*, which falls into three parts, the first being on sense-perception. **273** consists of two passages separated by two pages in which Priscian sets out his own complicated theory. In our lines 7-8 he refers back to what he has said in lines 3-7 about Theophrastus' views, and says that we should accept them, except for the point that "they" simply come in from outside. "They" are neuter plural, which would agree with forms (*eidê*), but the thought is that *logoi* and forms are on the same footing. By implication the latter was Theophrastus' view, but Priscian wants to emend it by introducing an internal factor, the projection of *logoi*. Aristotle's treatment of the senses starts at *DA* 2.5 416b33, where he discusses in what way the senses are affected. He sums up at 418a2-6: "the sensitive (part of the soul) ... is not like (its object) when it is

⁴⁷ P. Moraux ap. Altheim-Stiehl *East and West* n.s. 12 1961 14-15 refers to Aristotle *Metaph.* 12.8 and *On the Heaven* 2.12 292a18f and 1.3 270a12f., but only the last is at all like. B. Kytzler *ibid.* p.15 refers to Marius Victorinus *GL* 6 p.159.8-1, a musical passage. See also Gutas (1985) 86, no.5.

⁴⁸ **281** is certainly by Simplicius, but the authorship of **279** and **298A** is uncertain.

⁴⁹ The word *metaphrasis* is unique as the accepted title for a work. It is equivalent to "paraphrase", and in Byzantine MSS, as K. Ierodiakonou tells me, *metaphrasis* is found along with *periphrasis* as an alternative to *paraphrasis*.

being affected, but when it has been affected it has become like it and is as that is.” Theophrastus sees a difficulty here: the sense cannot be like the object in colour, taste, sound or shape (or, cannot be like colour etc.—the essential point is the same on either version) for that would be absurd. He takes over Aristotle’s list of colour, taste, and sound at 2.12 424a22-3, but writes “tastes” and adds shape. Aristotle’s alternative at 424a17-32 is that sensation involves the reception of the form (*eidos*) of an object without its matter, with the analogy of wax receiving an impression from a signet-ring. Further, at 424a24 this occurs “by way of (*kata*) the *logos*”. Theophrastus puts together the two words *eidos* and *logos* and sums up that sensation occurs with regard to the forms and the ratios without the matter. So far he has only endorsed Aristotle’s views, and we probably do not need to read more into Priscian’s implication that he said that the forms and ratios came from outside than that here too he was following Aristotle. We may conclude that here and elsewhere Theophrastus set out his own views by discussing Aristotle’s, and as Priscian’s order closely follows that of Aristotle we may suppose that Theophrastus did the same.⁵⁰

Problems of translation: *aisthêsis* stands for both sensation and perception, and there is no other Greek term. “Sense-perception” is frequently a possible compromise, and “sense” is sometimes the best rendering. In this work I have commonly used “sensation”, but sometimes a different word is required and is used. The related verb *aisthanesthai* raises similar difficulties. *logos* calls for a variety of translations in different contexts, but here there is general agreement that in the relevant passage of Aristotle the correct rendering is “ratio” (or “proportion”); see particularly 424a30-2, where Aristotle says that the *logos* is destroyed if the effect on the sense-organ is too violent. It is also the only possible rendering in 282 line 23. For *paschein* “being affected”, “being affected passively”, and “being acted upon” have been used as seems appropriate.

⁵⁰ For the view that Aristotle did think that a sense-organ became white or hot, for example, see R. Sorabji, ‘Intentionality and Physiological Process’ in M.C. Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty (edd.), *Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima*, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1992) 211-25. It is difficult to believe that Theophrastus was aware of such an interpretation. But we must be cautious about the word *atopon* (line 4): Baltussen (1998) 177-8 argues that it can mean no more than “strange”.

- 274** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.8
(*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.3.34-4.2 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

Here Priscian is not just following Theophrastus in his methodical study of Aristotle, but bringing him in as part of his own argument. Having developed his own account of sensation, he has asked how the soul—not the senses—is made like the objects of sense, and he gives a complicated account of the parts played by the soul and the sense-organs in sensation (p.3.18-34). For both there is a problem about how one thing can become like more than one other thing, and perhaps opposites, at the same time. He gives an example: how can the tongue be affected at the same time by both the bitter and the sweet? It is not clear whether he is already quoting Theophrastus' words or just paraphrasing him, but Theophrastus must have used such an example, and the next words, beginning "For it is not" are clearly his. Whether the reference to hearing comes from Theophrastus is also not clear.

But in any case we have Theophrastus raising a difficulty, and taking his lead from Aristotle, who at *On Sens.* 7 448a5-6, using the same example of bitter and sweet, denies that simultaneous perception of contraries is possible.⁵¹ There follows in Priscian an alternative account (lines 2-6): perhaps the tongue is indeed affected by different things on different parts, as is the case with touch, for we may become warm in one part and cold in another at the same time. This might come from Theophrastus, in working through possibilities, but it could equally well be by Priscian. We are left with uncertainty here.

- 275-79** (and **282** and **294**)

The following passages are concerned with questions about the medium of sensation: a) whether there is a medium for every sense—as there clearly is for sight, hearing, and smell— and b) its nature. That is not as easy as it seems, because, while water and air might seem to be mediums, both, and therefore primarily neither, are mediums for sight and hearing. In the case of sight we also speak of

⁵¹ Aristotle discusses the matter more profoundly—and more obscurely—in 448b17-449a20, and has also said something about it in *DA* 3.2 426b29-427a8.

the transparent, and even some solids can be transparent. It seems then that the primary medium in the case of sight is the transparent, and there may be something similar for other senses too.

We may add to the passages printed here an earlier passage of Priscian which Bywater thought came from Theophrastus (p.5.19-21): ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν ἢ ὁσφραίνεισθαι; καὶ πότερον διὰ μέσου πᾶσαι τινοί, ὡς ἡ ὄψις διὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ἢ ἔνιαι ἀμέσως ἐφάπτονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ τί τὸ διαφανές; (“But what is seeing or hearing or smelling? And are all (senses) through some medium, as sight is through the transparent, or do some immediately grasp their objects? And what is the transparent?”) This is embedded in a section which is clearly by Priscian, though based, as he says, on Iamblichus; its simplicity reminds us of Theophrastus’ style but the absence of any remark like “he says” makes its attribution uncertain. If it is by Theophrastus, it can be seen as his introduction to the following section of his work, covering 275-9.

Aristotle’s views need careful consideration. At *DA* 3.13 435a15-20 he says clearly that touch is in direct contact with its objects, which appears to rule out its having a medium, and he also appears to be saying that all other senses do have a medium, external or internal. There is some doubt about whether this final chapter does belong to *DA*, but it still seems to be by Aristotle. In the centre of *DA* there are two chapters (2. 10-11) bearing on the subject, which need to be read with care, but seem to come down in favour of the view that all senses, including touch, have a medium. Priscian tells us that Theophrastus agreed with Aristotle here, i.e. he both believed that this was Aristotle’s view and endorsed it himself.⁵²

275A Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul* 1.15-16 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.7.20-8 Bywater)

⁵² Arius Didymus, fr. phys. 17 Diels (= Stobaeus 1.15.9) says that there is something between the flesh and the object (if the text is correct). This is air, or water, or a mixture. But this is not obvious in the case of touch and taste because the distance is so small. Moraux (1973) 304-5 regards this as such a gross misunderstanding of Aristotle that it must come indirectly. He thinks Arius had a school compendium which he tried to shorten and systematize. See nn.69 and 118. See now Göransson (1996) for a reconsideration of Arius Didymus; but he accepts that the Stobaeus passages are from *an* Arius Didymus, whoever he was. For comments on this see Runia (1996).

275B Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.32 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.14.22-5 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

It is difficult to understand the significance of Priscian's quotation in **275A**. Whether or not we accept that the passage quoted above (5.19-21) stood as the introduction to this section, we would expect Theophrastus to have said more than is given here. **275B** is also odd, because it seems to ignore **277B** 11-15 and subsequent arguments. Priscian seems to have been driven to using as evidence that Theophrastus held that no sense immediately touches its object only this one statement, that it is not reasonable for what is not common or similar to exist in things uniform in genus, which without its context itself is far from clear. A number of questions arise: is the translation "uniform in genus" appropriate? Aristotle uses *homogenês* in both technical and non-technical senses. It occurs only once in *DA*, at 3.7 431a24, where it appears to be applied to the data of a single sense, like white and black, as opposed to those of two senses, like white and sweet. Elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between it, as meaning "belonging to the same genus", and *homoeidês*, "belonging to the same species", but it can also have a less precise meaning.

Again, is there some fault in our text of Priscian? Was there some fault in Priscian's text of, or evidence for, Theophrastus at this point? If something has been lost, it might be on the following lines: since there is some kind of similarity between the sensation and the object sensed, but a sense-organ and its object are not similar, there must be something in between which can link them by being common and similar to both. (This is very similar to Kant's argument for schemata.) This could lead on to the discussions we have in **277-9** about the various kinds of medium. **277B** lines 11-13 is relevant, but is so complicated that discussion must be left till we reach it. Ultimately it does not seem to help us here.

Perhaps we should take it that while Aristotle did indeed labour hard in *DA* 2.10-11 to establish that there is a medium in every case, Theophrastus accepted that much and contented himself with details.

"immediately" line 5: the Greek is *autothen*, which replaces *amêsôs* (also "immediately") in 5.19-21 quoted above. For that reason "immediately" is preferable here to the "spontaneously" which has also been suggested. The final lines of **275A** look forward to the full discussion of the transparent in **278**.

- 276 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.31 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.14.16-17 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

Priscian reports Theophrastus' question, whether each object of perception reaches a sense similarly, or some more and some less, but gives his own answer—preceded by *oimai* (“I think”), which is the common-sense one that various conditions of the medium and the sense-organ affect the degree to which the object is, as one might say, successfully perceived. This context makes it clear what is meant by “each” in our text. It is taken up by *to aisthêton* in line 18 of Priscian, and must refer to the object cognised through the medium by the sense-organ. Whether Theophrastus gave a reply of this kind or left his question unanswered—or, indeed, said something quite different, is uncertain. Priscian's use of “I think” at least suggests that he did not find this view clearly stated by Theophrastus. It is also difficult to relate this question to Aristotle. He does use the word *homoiôs* (in the same way) of the senses at *DA* 2.9 421b13, but here the question is whether all animals use the same method to smell, and the answer is that only man has to inhale, and at 2.11 423b1, where the question is whether different senses work in different ways. In neither case is there a contrast with more and less. At 2.11 423a5-6 Aristotle is discussing touch, and imagines a covering of the flesh, either just surrounding it or else growing on to it. He says that the sensation (*aisthêsis*) would get through even more quickly in the latter case. Here we have two key words used by Theophrastus—*aisthêsis* and *diikneisthai* (“get through”)—but the relation between them is different, for in Aristotle it is the sensation that gets through, but in Theophrastus it is something else—the sense-object—that gets through to the sense.

In view of **275B** above, we cannot suppose that Theophrastus gave a criticism of Aristotle's account of the medium in the case of touch. We do not know what he was doing. At **716,85** (Porphyry) in a criticism of the view that musical notes are numbers, Theophrastus again uses *diikneitai*, this time of hearing, and says that both high and low notes get through (to the ear), but high ones are grasped more quickly. But this cannot be related directly to Priscian's problem, for Priscian is talking about successful perception, and that is far more complicated than mere speed in sensing.

- 277A** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.30 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.14.10-12 Bywater)

R.W. Sharples, 'Theophrastus on Tastes and Smells' in Fortenbaugh (1985) 193-7 and notes. D.N. Sedley, 'Three notes on the Treatment of Tastes and Smells', *ibid.* 205-6. John Ellis, 'The trouble with Fragrance', *Phronesis* 35 (1990) 290-302. T.K. Johansen, 'Aristotle on the sense of smell', *Phronesis* 41 (1996) 1-19. Huby and Steel (1997).

This passage is placed here because of its subject-matter, but in Priscian it comes after **278**, though following closely and still on the topic of the medium in sense-perception. Priscian himself has been discussing the effect that the transparent undergoes to produce sight, and criticizing various suggestions. It is not entirely clear why he now brings in what Theophrastus has to say about smell and hearing, but it may be because air for them plays a similar part to that played by the transparent for sight, and the same questions arise about how they occur.

Theophrastus' remarks put together shortly points made in three separate passages of Aristotle: Aristotle says a lot about smell, but little that is relevant here, but a) in the odd final paragraph of *DA* Book 2 (12 424b3-21) he considers various questions (well described by Hamlyn in his Clarendon translation (1968) 115 as "lecturers' questions") ending with the not very clear suggestion (424b15-18) that air is affected by smell, which is important for distinguishing between the effect of smell on the nose and its effect on air; b) at *On Sense* 5 442b29-443a2 he refers to the medium of smell: he says both air and water are smellable, and what is common to them is the transparent, but it is capable of being smelt (*osphranton*) not *qua* transparent, but *qua* being capable of washing and cleansing flavoured dry matter; c) at *DA* 2.3 421b9 he says that smell is through what is between, such as air and water.

Theophrastus' views on smell are found also in his *On Odours* and *Plant Explanations*. *On Odours* opens with the statement that smells are all from mixture. In *CP* 6.1.1 we have in full what is compressed in our passage from Priscian: the transparent is that which is common to air and water, and it has present in it the dry ingredient in flavour, which is odour. What is mixed in air or the transparent should not however be taken to be some kind of effluence, for that view is criticized at *DS* 20 (but see also 90 and Sedley's views discussed

below), but should probably be taken along with the statement that air undergoes some effect. Only in 277A is being affected brought together with mixing, and to what extent this is just repeating Aristotle without more interpretation is unclear.

For the account of hearing we may refer to Aristotle *On Sense* 6 446b6-9: words may be misheard because the intervening air has had its shape changed; the noun *metaschêmatisis* ("change of shape") and the verb *metaschêmatizesthai* are used. Though he does not develop this further, we may assume that he accepted the view that air is given a shape when hearing occurs. Theophrastus followed suit, and after him there are further references to this view.⁵³

The word *schêma* ("shape") occurs in Theophrastus' technical discussion of music reported by Ptolemy at 716, 88-90: there is a difference in shape between high and low notes, but in that passage there is nothing about air as a medium. The Pseudo-aristotelian *On things that can be heard* 800a3-4 denies that voices and sounds are due to the air being given a shape, as does Strato (Fr. 144 Wehrli) as reported by Alexander *On Aristotle's On Sense* p.126.19-20. The Pseudo-aristotelian *Problems* XI 23 (901b16) asks how it is that although voice is air given a shape, and air often loses the shape, yet an echo is heard clearly and has kept its shape. The problem is one of a miscellaneous group about voice, and the emphasis is on echoes, not on the shaping of air. It is likely that the two pseudoaristotelian works are, like Strato, of the early generations after Aristotle, and they are evidence that the question of the nature of sound was widely discussed.

There are serious difficulties in understanding both Aristotle and Theophrastus. On smell Sedley says, perhaps too confidently, that Aristotle denied the effluence theory,⁵⁴ and discusses at length Theophrastus' treatment of Empedocles in his *DS* 20, arguing that correctly interpreted it shows that Theophrastus accepted the effluence theory of smell. For Sedley, then, Theophrastus is consciously correcting Aristotle and, incidentally, accepting what is in fact the correct theory. (See also *DS* 90, where also it appears that Theophrastus is accepting the effluence theory). It would be pleasing to accept this, but it seems equally likely that Aristotle was cautious in his approach to smell, and that Theophrastus merely followed him. I

⁵³ R. Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano' in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* Suppl. vol. 1991 p.231 n.18, is cautious about the interpretation of this.

⁵⁴ Cf. Beare (1906) 133-6 on Empedocles.

agree more with Sharples, who brings out the difficulties in Priscian's passage on p.194. It is not perhaps correct, however, to say that the passage explicitly states that the air is affected *by* what is mixed with it. Possibly Theophrastus took the two points from Aristotle but did not mean to connect them together. (Sharples also (p.193-5) brings together other relevant evidence from Theophrastus.)

In all of this there is no mention of the transodorant, which we will meet in **277C**. It is just air that is treated as the medium.

277B Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.30 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p.15.6-9 and p.15.20-17.33 Bywater)

For bibliography see on **277A**; Beare (1906)

Here a number of questions bearing on the sensory medium are brought together. In places it is particularly difficult to be sure whether we are dealing with Priscian or with Theophrastus. We have printed an almost complete section of Priscian, omitting only his highly Neoplatonic account of reflections (p.15.9-20). There are here a) direct quotations from Theophrastus, b) paraphrases, and c) some comments of Priscian's own. The first section, however, lines 1-10, raises few problems about which parts are due to Theophrastus.

A) Theophrastus said that *reflections* involve an imprinting⁵⁵ of a shape (of the reflected object) on the air. Here Theophrastus departs from what we have in Aristotle, at least in terminology. Aristotle does not give a thorough treatment of reflections in *DA*, though he touches on the matter towards the end of that work, in a kind of footnote, at 3.12 435a5-10, saying that it is better to suppose that in reflections the air is affected by the shape and colour (of the object), and also at 2.8 419b29-33, giving nothing of moment in *On Sense*. He also deals with reflections from the physical side in the *Meteorology*, discussing theories which use reflections as explanations for a variety of phenomena from the milky way to the rainbow. But it is only in his long discussion of the rainbow that he touches on the physiological side. Presumably with justification Priscian compares Theophrastus with Plato on this topic. But Plato's *Timaeus* 46A-B only explains reflections in terms of internal and external fires, and concentrates rather on the visual effects of various distorting mirrors; it seems

⁵⁵ Beare 26-7 on Democritus uses "moulding" or "modelling".

inadequate as the sole source here. *Alcibiades* I 132A-133A is concerned with seeing oneself in a mirror, and *Sophist* 266B-C with the fact that there is an image in a mirror. In view of Priscian's eagerness to make the comparison, and the way in which he does it, using very similar language—"some filmy⁵⁶ representative image of the bodily forms"—in his interpretation of Theophrastus in lines 3-4 of **277B** and in his account of Plato in lines 5-6, we need not suppose that the similarity between Plato and Theophrastus was in fact very close; If we were to render *isôs* in lines 3 and 8 as "perhaps", that would weaken further the suggestion that Theophrastus and Plato were alike. But why was Plato brought in at all? Priscian names him only once elsewhere, at 19.12, where he says that Plato says that body is knowable by opinion plus sensation. And here he hardly gives a straightforward account of Plato. It is likely that Theophrastus said more than we have here about reflections, and my own guess is that at this point he did bring in a less material, more formal, account of reflections which in some ways resembled Plato's.

emphasis had a long history in Greek thought. It occurs frequently in Theophrastus' *DS*, in connection with Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus. In 27 Anaxagoras' view that seeing is by the *emphasis* in the *korê*—here clearly the pupil of the eye—is given, and at 36 Theophrastus attributes this to "the many", and goes on to criticize it on various grounds, finally calling it a common and ancient doctrine.

What is certain is that Theophrastus in his *On the Soul* said that there was as it were an imprinting of shape in the air.⁵⁷ The theory is in fact close to what Aristotle says at *DA* 3.12 435a5-10, described above. Aristotle's terminology, however, is different from that of Theophrastus, since he uses *schêma* where Theophrastus has *morphê*, and neither here nor anywhere else uses *apotupôsis*. Theophrastus on the other hand uses *apotupôsis* also in *DS* 51, with the related verb at 50, where he is discussing Democritus' account of vision, and makes frequent use also of related words like *tupos* and *entupôsis*. In these passages the notion of an imprint is prominent, and there does not seem to be any technical difference between the various words used. Now Theophrastus severely criticizes this theory, and it would be

⁵⁶ The translation of **277B** has accidentally omitted the word *eidôlikên* in lines 3 and 5, which qualifies *emphasis*. This kind of image is in its own way physical, whereas the images to which Priscian refers by *emphasis* without qualification are mental.

⁵⁷ Bywater's insertion of *en* in line 2 is justified by its presence in the repetition of the words at line 9.

surprising if he were to adopt it himself, unless perhaps he made a distinction between a material and a formal imprinting. The criticism of Democritus is in material terms, that, for example, that which receives the impression must be thick (*puknos*), and that the imprinting theory seems unnecessary in conjunction with Democritus' theory of effluences. On the other hand Priscian seems rather to be giving us the cautious expression of an attempt to describe something formal, and that is not open to the same objections. It is possible that the *kai* in line 2, here translated "as well", is used to bring out the point that a formal as well as a material element is involved, though other interpretations are possible.

B) Theophrastus then takes up a number of remarks of Aristotle: a) the general point that like is said to be affected by like (*DA* 2.5 416b35, 417a17-20) b) the place of the medium in sensation (*On Sense* 2 438a13-14, *DA* 2.9 421b9). From line 11 onwards disentangling Theophrastus from Priscian becomes more difficult. Priscian would hardly have devoted his attentions to Theophrastus if he had not found in him material that was grist to his own mill, so that it is not surprising that as well as quoting directly from Theophrastus he also gives what appear to be paraphrases of his views, interspersed, however, with statements of his own. Given the absence of punctuational devices for indicating changes of speaker, in places where objections and replies occur in such a way that the sense is obscure if they are not sorted out we should pay close attention to the use of particles and similar devices. I propose to run through **277B** #34 onwards to see what can be done, numbering each sentence. 1) 11-12 is clearly reporting Theophrastus, who is the subject of *epagei* ("adds"). 2) 12-13 linked to 1) by *gar* ("for"), might be by either Theophrastus or Priscian, but a) what is said is based on Aristotle and would be acceptable to Theophrastus, so that it is less important who actually said it, and b) the content of 3), introduced by *oun* ("therefore"), somewhat favours the view that Theophrastus had said something like 2). On the other hand c) the word *apeilêmmenou* ("enclosed") followed by *aeros* ("air") produces a harsh hiatus which is foreign to Theophrastus' careful style. It corresponds to Aristotle's *enkatoikodomeitai* ("has been walled up"—Hamlyn) (*DA* 420a9). Even if Theophrastus made the change, it is unlikely that Priscian is quoting him directly. In 3) 13-15 the subject of *zêtei* ("enquires") must be Theophrastus. The examples at the end could be Priscian's additions, but again they are in agreement with Theophrastus' thought.

4) 15-18 is the first to raise serious difficulties. It opens with *ê* ("or else"), introducing an alternative view. Is this Priscian's or Theophrastus'? Theophrastus has asked why it is not the case with all the senses that the organ and its objects are homogeneous. We do not get a direct answer, but rather the suggestion that it might be so in all cases. In favour of its being Theophrastus' answer is that in what follows are two terms which, on the authority of Philoponus (277C), are his coinages,⁵⁸ and that if it is not his we are given no answer from him. Against is the fact that in 5) 18-19, linked to 4) by *gar* ("for"), is an expression, "the external substratum to the activities of the objects of sense", which is very close to one used by Priscian in a passage where he is clearly setting out his own views: at 12.25, in his own account of vision, he says that colour uses the transparent like a substratum for its own activity. But a) there are minor differences: in the first we have the dative, in the second the genitive form, and b) if, as I have said, Priscian found Theophrastus congenial, it could be because in him he found views, such as this one, which resembled his own. As presented here it is not beyond what we might expect of Theophrastus. And what follows, with its listing of the senses and its use of Theophrastus' terms *diêches* and *diosmon* must at least be based on Theophrastus. A small further point is the reference to "the qualities related to touch" (line 21). In an unfortunately mutilated passage of Ptolemy's *On the Criterion* 16.17 Lammert, the word *poiôtêtas* ("qualities") is also used in connection with touch. So this expression precedes Priscian. 6) 21-2 goes on to Theophrastus' second question, how like is affected by like, and the reply is the thoroughly Aristotelian one that the potential is affected by the actual. From line 24 onwards Priscian reports a succession of questions, and while certainty is impossible it seems most likely that he is following and reporting Theophrastus fairly accurately, and that the jerkiness of the treatment was in the original. So we see Theophrastus here bringing together a number of separate passages of Aristotle, and asking questions as he thinks fit. It is likely that the following set of aporiai are from him, and the questions why the eye-ball is of water and hearing is of air is also close to Aristotle.

Let us now follow the substance of the argument: first (lines 11-15) Theophrastus discusses the homogeneity between some objects of sense and their organs: it holds for taste and hearing, but at first sight

⁵⁸ For a defence of this now disputed view see below on 277C.

not for the other senses. Theophrastus uses the word *homogenês* of the relation between the sense organ and its objects, though Aristotle does not. But he simplifies Aristotle's account of taste (DA 2.10 422a34-b16) to say that the tongue is aware of flavour through the moist, and uses his account of hearing (DA 2.8 420a2-b4) which involves the air inside the ear being moved by the external air, to conclude that in both these cases organ and object are homogeneous.⁵⁹ The suggestion is that what is common to the object and the organ in the case of sight is the transparent, in the case of hearing the transsonant, and in the case of smell the transodorant, the transsonant here being substituted for air in the original account (lines 12-13). All these common items are described as "the substratum to the activities of the sense-objects".

There follow two questions: in what way is like affected by like in these cases, and are the other senses similar? In reply to the latter he suggests that in fact all are similar, for in each case there is something which is common to the object and the organ, in sight the transparent, as is well known, but similarly the transsonant in the case of hearing, and the transodorant in the case of smell.

So we have an obvious medium in seeing and hearing and smelling, and taste has already been covered. There remains touch, and he (or Priscian) adds for touch "that which can receive qualities related to touch." Each of these is "an external substratum to the activities of the objects of sense"—an account of which the origin is uncertain. We shall see Theophrastus talking of the transparent as the matter (*hulê*) of colour (278 33-4), but it seems to be Priscian himself at 12.25 who uses the precise expression we are considering, speaking of colour as "using the transparent as a substratum to its own activity (*energeia*)". and we may recall the linguistic similarity of Aristotle's cautious remark (DA 2.11 422b32-3) that it is not obvious what is the single substratum in the case of touch that corresponds to sound in hearing; but in Theophrastus the substratum is that which underlies the activity of sensing, while in Aristotle it is the logical substratum which underlies in the case of hearing differences like high and low.

At this point (22-4) we get the answer to the other problem, about how like is affected by like: the potential is affected by the actual, the potentially transsonant air, for example, being affected by that which

⁵⁹ These examples indicate the sense in which he is using *homogenês* here: they do not help to determine the sense in which it is used in 275A line 7.

is actually transsonic—this word rendering what is presumably another coinage of Theophrastus. Aristotle had said something similar about taste at *DA* 2.10 422b15-16, and about smell at *On Sense* 2 438b21-4, and used the potential/actual dichotomy in many places, but not precisely like the generalisation given here.⁶⁰ That would seem to be Theophrastus' own development.

But what are the objects of sense referred to here? There are two possibilities, a) the actual sensation received in the organ, or b) the object which is sensed through that sensation. Aristotle was aware of problems here, and discussed them at length in *DA* 2.6, but that chapter raises problems of various kinds, and his distinctions do not help us here. For most of what we find here it seems to be the seen colour or the heard sound that is in question. These are the *energeiai* ("activities") to which the transparent, transodorant etc. are the substrates, and the sense organs are like the substrates.

28-30 But another question intervenes: both water and air can convey colour and sounds, but the eye is made only of water,⁶¹ and the organ of hearing of air. That seems to amount to this: if the transparent and the transsonant are to be found in both air and water, why does the eye contain liquid and the ear air only? (Smell is also mentioned). The answers are straightforward: water is more appropriate to the eye, and air to the ear. Theophrastus then turns to minor problems about hearing and smell.

There is a textual problem in line 29, which reflects a similar difficulty in Theophrastus' source, Aristotle's *On Sense* 2 438a15. The word we have adopted, *eupilêptoton* ("denser") is Wimmer's suggestion, following a strong collection of MSS of Aristotle.⁶² Förster⁶³ refers to Plato, *Timaeus* 45B8-C2 where *sumpilêsantes* ("compressing") is used in connection with the contents of the eye. Wimmer's form is not however found elsewhere, and alternatives abound. The reading of the best MS of Priscian, *eupilêptoton*, seems impossible; no such word exists. Alexander, and several other MSS of Aristotle, have *euupolêptoton*—which again is not found elsewhere, but which LSJ

⁶⁰ Aristotle's solution is at *DA* 2.3 417b18-20: "in one way (a thing) is affected by the like, in another by the unlike. For the unlike is affected, but when it has been affected it is like."

⁶¹ See note 64 below.

⁶² But Ross is wrong in saying that this is also the reading of Priscian. It is not found in his MSS.

⁶³ 'Textkritische Betrachtungen zur aristotelischen Schrift De Sensu' *Hermes* 73 (1938) 469.

render “more easily enclosed”, though Ross apparently does not consider such a possibility, and says this form is inappropriate, preferring *euapolēptoterōn*, which LSJ do not mention. Ross also likes Beare’s *enapolēptoterōn* (“more easily encapsulated”); Priscian’s other MSS have *euepilēptoterōn*, which might be derived from *epilambanein* in the sense of “stop by pressure”, but since Theophrastus here must have been following Aristotle, and the reading is not found in any of Aristotle’s MSS, it seems better to ignore it.

To resume our analysis, at 18) 30-31 the explanation of why hearing is of air is not actually in Aristotle, but is based on his account of hearing in *DA* 2.8, and raises no difficulties.⁶⁴ At 19) 31-2 there is an acknowledged quotation from Theophrastus and while 20) and 21) 33-4, linked by *gar* (“for”) could be Priscian’s comments, it is likely that all down to *osphrêsis* (37) is from Theophrastus.

31 The next problem starts from Aristotle’s claim (*DA* 2.9 421b18-19) that man alone—or, better, man and some other animals, as in *DA* 2.7 419b1-2 and *On Sense* 5 444b16-19⁶⁵—can smell only when inhaling, while other animals do not need to inhale in order to smell. If so, why cannot (creatures) hear without air? The answer is that air is needed because the sound of a blow cannot be heard without air inside the ear. And the actual organ of hearing is air, but it is not the same with smell, for here the inhaling serves only to open up the passages. This rather compressed argument follows Aristotle, both in what it says and in what it does not say. It starts from the observation that air is not essential for smell. Why then is it essential for hearing? The answer is that air has a different function in the two cases, being the actual organ in hearing, but not so in smell. As with Aristotle, the nature of the organ of smell is left unclear. Later on, as we shall see, Theophrastus says uncertainly that the organ of smell is one or the other of air and water.⁶⁶

Next we turn to *sound*. 1) (38-9) is a quotation, and 2) (39-40) is connected with Theophrastus’ own *Meteorology*. 3) (41-3) takes up Aristotle’s statement that air is connatural with hearing, and raises an objection, discussed below. 4) 43-4 is obscure in itself but seems to be adding a further consideration, to be discussed below. And 5) 44-5

⁶⁴ At [Arist.] *Problems* 31 29 960a33-4 it is said that hearing is of air, but also that the eye (*omma*) is of fire, which differs from what we have here.

⁶⁵ See also *On Respiration* 7 473b15-27.

⁶⁶ Several MSS omit *ou* (“not”) in line 33. This does not seem to be acceptable, and the confusion in the following line may be due to a tear or blot in the archetype.

seems to continue the thought by saying that the inner sound is not perceptible without qualification, and we are not aware of it unless we block up our ears. Against that, 5) is introduced by *ê* ("or else"), which might suggest a contrast with the thought of 4). 6) (45) is connected to 5) by *goun* ("at any rate"). Now both 7) and 9) contain the word *zôtikê* ("vital"), used of *kinêsis* ("movement"), and this is a typical expression of Priscian. We can therefore take 7) to 9) as by Priscian, and indeed the whole of 5) to 9) beginning with "Or else" as his contribution, so that at 5) Priscian does continue the thought of 4), but with his own ideas. In 10) (50-1) we seem to return to Theophrastus. The subject of the verb *apophainetai* ("declares") could be either a) Theophrastus, with Priscian still speaking, or b) Aristotle, with Theophrastus raising the question. If what has preceded is, as I have argued, by Priscian, then the subject would appear to be Theophrastus. But what is stated is also the opinion of Aristotle, and this sentence plus what follows reads like an objection of Theophrastus to Aristotle, in which case the sentence with which we started would be by Theophrastus, and the subject of "declares" would be Aristotle. Against this, the words are not exactly what Aristotle himself said: at *DA* 2.7 419a26-31 he mentions separately sound and smell, and then touch and taste, sight having already been dealt with, and at 2.11 423b20-25 there is a discussion which is not similar to Theophrastus' explicit generalisation. The arguments are evenly balanced. An attractive solution would be to take the subject of "declares" as Theophrastus, but to interpret the whole as meaning that Theophrastus is asking how it can be that no sensation occurs when the object touches the sense-organ. This would be in line with the form of many other of his objections to Aristotle. But the order of the words is against this, and I have found no other example of such a use of *apophainetai*. Since Aristotle does indeed say that no sensation occurs when the object of sense is in contact with the organ, it is better to accept b). 11) (51-3), then, is the reason for asking this, namely that in the case of smell the smell does seem to reach the organ proper. With another "Or else" in 12) (53-4), it is perhaps best to take 12), 13) and 14) as all by Priscian, though the suggestion that the true object of sense is the physical sound or the scented herb could have been made by Theophrastus. But 14) (55-6) with its reference to the form of the activity is more like Priscian, and in 15) (57-8), although he says he is quoting Theophrastus, the opening *gar* ("for"), whether it is Priscian's addition or not, is surely

meant to indicate that he is doing this in a defence of his own views. 16) to 20) (58-68) form a unity giving a highly technical account of the details of perceiving. In 16) Priscian refers back to his own account of the transparent at 6.27-7.1, which he admits to come from Iamblichus, and it is reasonable to suppose that here too we have Priscian. The final paragraph (69-77), in spite of a textual problem, clearly starts with Theophrastus differing from Aristotle about the differentiae of colour and sound. The end is probably still his, though it might contain a comment by Priscian.

38-9 Let us now look at the content of all this. Aristotle had said (*DA* 2.8 419b19-21) that sound needed solid objects, but Theophrastus raises the case of winds, which do not seem to involve solids, but do make noises. His solution is that winds a) make a noise by falling upon the earth, and b) produce thunderclaps by breaking against a cloud as against a solid. We now have the Arabic version of his *Meteorology*, which contains a view resembling the latter point. It is given as the fourth cause of thunder in that version:⁶⁷ when the wind violently strikes a broad and icy cloud. (Other causes involve the wind blowing through clouds.) What Theophrastus has done is to raise a difficulty about Aristotle's account of sound, and solve it by giving two examples of the wind making a sound by striking a solid.

41ff The next question fastens on Aristotle's claim (*DA* 2.8 420a4 and 12) that air is connatural with hearing (or, with some MSS, that hearing is connatural with air). There is a textual problem in line 41: what the MSS give seems impossible, but it is difficult to produce a convincing alternative and we have added cruces. The sense must be that there is a relation of connaturality between hearing and air and it seems that Theophrastus is raising difficulties about this. *sumphuês* at *DA* 2.11 423a5 means "grown on", and some idea of natural continuity seems involved here. That gives Theophrastus his first premise, that air is connatural. His second is that the inner air (in the ear) is set in motion by the outer air. But if so, motion should sense motion, and not sound sound, the latter being, presumably, what Theophrastus accepts.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ The English translation by Hans Daiber is now in Fortenbaugh and Gutas (1992) 261.

⁶⁸ It has been objected that *aisthanesthai* with the accusative cannot give this sense, but the reference here is not to being aware of a sensible object, and such uses are to be found in Aristotle, e.g. *PA* 1 31 87a29-30, *DGA* 5 2 781a16-17, and *DA* 3 3 427a20, where the objects are in one way or another abstract.

An alternative version is: “movement would be perceived as movement, but sound not as sound.” In any case the problem is how we pass from the movements of the external and internal air to hearing and sound. Two solutions are proposed: the first, still from Theophrastus, is: that which is inside would prevent this, as in the other cases. What is inside, and what would be prevented, and what are the other cases? It could mean: “However at any rate the inner (sound, or movement) would prevent (this) as also in the other cases.” (Or perhaps: “It would prevent the inner (sound) as also in the other cases.”) Both the preceding and the following sentence seem to imply that there is a continuous sound inside the ear, in the air it encloses. Perhaps the neuter form *to enuparchon* (“that which is inside”) is meant to refer indiscriminately to both sound and air, and perhaps the movement of the air too. And because of this there is neither movement sensing movement nor sound sound, but hearing sensing sound by means of movement.

“The other cases” must surely be the senses other than hearing. Most likely the reference is to *DA* 2.11 423b17-23, where Aristotle deals with all the senses and denies that something placed actually on the sense-organ would be sensed by it: 275A indicates that Theophrastus also held this view. At 44ff we have reached a discussion which seems to be Priscian’s own, though the source of the first sentence with its reference to the internal sound is uncertain. It appears to be an alternative account of what Theophrastus has called “that which is inside”, and is that the inner air itself sounds, but we can only hear this if we block up our ears. So we would have: the inner sound would prevent our sensing the outer sound. But the relevance of this is unclear. This is followed by a sentence beginning *alla kai* (“but also”), which could itself be a sign of a switch of speakers. By now at any rate we have Priscian’s view. It includes the typically Neoplatonic notion of a vital motion, and stresses the place of form in sensing. So Priscian is saying that in hearing we do not have just a physical joining of motions, but also a psychological situation involving form. It is true that both Aristotle and Theophrastus gave form a place in sensation, but the account as a whole is surely Priscian’s, and it is he who gives a clear answer to Theophrastus’ problem.

50ff But he then returns to the views of the Peripatetics, though here again not all is entirely clear. The starting-point of the problem is “his” (surely Aristotle’s) statement that no sensation occurs

when the object of sense is being touched. The argument follows from the previous discussion of hearing, and the view that the external movement and the sound penetrate to the air inside the ear, which is also the organ of hearing. This appears to be in conflict with the claim that there is no sensation when the object is in contact with the organ. The case of smell is adduced (11) 51-3 as being similar. Here it is the smell or odour that is being drawn in, not just the air, as in the earlier discussion of smell. An ingenious solution follows: (12) 53-4 the object in these cases must be external, the blow that is the origin of the sound, and the thing that is the source of the smell, just as the object of sight is the external object seen. And it is the form of their activity that reaches the sense-organ.

There follows (57-8) an explicit quotation from Theophrastus, to the effect that something must get through from the object to the organ. The verb *diikneisthai* is again present, as in line 50. So we either have two quotations from Theophrastus joined by some extraneous material from Priscian, or a complete argument from Theophrastus, part of which may be in Priscian's words. None of it is in the kind of Neoplatonic language which would rule out Theophrastus. The immediately following sentence (58), however, expresses the same doctrine as is found in the passage of Simplicius (or Priscian) at 279 and which is given as that author's own doctrine, namely, that colour moves sight with the cooperation of the transparent. Priscian then refers back to his own account of how this is done, another passage where he resembles Simplicius (Priscian 6.27-7,1 and Simplicius, *On Aristotle's DA* 132,30-2). The argument which follows is technical, and we have insufficient clues to be able to assign it to either Priscian or Theophrastus with confidence. It leads to the conclusion that what we perceive is the distant object, by means of form and activity, which is the doctrine of both. In the final paragraph, (69-77) we have an almost exact quotation of Aristotle's words at *DA* 2.8 420a26-8, that we are aware of high and low (pitch) by means of sound, as we are aware of colours by means of light. The translation of *episêmainetai* in line 72 should be: "he ... approves, (saying that)" and Theophrastus is rejecting a view held by someone else, not Aristotle, and stating the correct analogies: either sound is to high and low as colour is to black and white, or colour as a genus, is analogous to sound as a genus.

There is a textual problem here: the words *antilegein esti* (“it is possible to argue against”) are not in the best MSS, and if we keep them the interpretation is a little forced, but without them there are also difficulties. We would then have Theophrastus interpreting Aristotle as saying that light is to colour as sound is to high and low, and objecting to the analogy.

277C Philoponus. *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 2.7 419a33 (CAG vol.15 p. 354.12-16 Hayduck)

For bibliography see on **277A**

Philoponus is our primary source for the information that Theophrastus coined names for the parallels in hearing and smelling to the transparent in seeing. Priscian (**277B**) uses these names but does not ascribe them directly to Theophrastus. Of the passages mentioned in the apparatus Alexander, Themistius and Simplicius repeat most of this information, but also without naming Theophrastus. The passages in the Suda where he is named probably derive from Philoponus. Arius Didymus (fr. phys. 17), here as elsewhere, substitutes Aristotle's name.⁶⁹ Finally the Suda, on *rhis* (“nose”) attributes to Theophrastus an account of the nose which is also to be found in Philoponus, but not there ascribed to Theophrastus. For all this see Sharples. It has been suggested by Baltussen that Philoponus is mistaken, and that these are typical commentators' coinages, but that seems unnecessary. Arius, whose dates are now disputed (see n.102), knew them fairly early.

The words *diaporthmeuesthai* (“convey”) and *diaporthmeutikos* are very rare. They are not found in Aristotle, and the adjective is not mentioned in LSJ. The verb is used by Plato at *Symp.* 202E3, but of Eros as an intermediary between gods and men. It is also used

⁶⁹ (Stobaeus *Anth.* 484.15-21) We see by way of the movement of the actually transparent: (the transparent is not only air and water but glass etc.). We hear by way of the activity of the intervening transsonant (κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ μεταξὺ διηχοῦς): what are transsonant are air and fire and water and some compound bodies. Moraux (1973) 299-300 says that some of Arius' psychological reports are genuinely Aristotelian, but the reference to 'common sense' is not. There underlies his reports a search for a coordination and systematization of various passages from *DA* III 1-3 and the *PN*. See n.52. Runia (1996) has pointed out (p.379 n.41) that some of Stobaeus' lemmata, though not the one here, refer to 'Aristotelians' and the like, but says these may be due to Stobaeus himself.

once by Priscian at p.7.9 in its active form, when he says that the transparent and the space between are believed to *convey* sight, in that they make it complete by light and provide the appropriate length in distance. Priscian here seems to be setting out his own views on sight, but the presence of this unusual word may indicate that he is also using Theophrastus. Against this is the fact that in **277C** it is colours, not sight, that is conveyed. The word is also used by Themistius *PDA* 62.11, again of colour.

The other sources for *diêchês* etc. do not use *diosmos*, but Themistius has it with *diaphanês* at *PDA* 62.11. Alexander *Quaest.* 1.2 p.7.10-11 has *diosmos* as the name of that which is receptive and revelatory (*mênutikon*) of smell. See also Philoponus 319,14-17; 322,25; 353,29-30; 292,32.

- 278** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.17,18, 20, 21, 23 and 29 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 pp.8.1-9 and 8.29-9.7 and 9.30-3 and 10.3-5 and 13-17 and 11.14-20 and 13.30-14.3 Bywater)

Background Aristotle *DA* 2.7 418a26-419b3 is mainly about light, colour, and the transparent. It contains the following relevant statements:

- A) 418a25-6 Sight is of what is visible, which is colour.
- B) 418b2-3 Colour is seen in light.
- C) 418a31-b1 Colours can set in motion the actually transparent, and 419a13-15 when this is continuous it moves the sense-organ.
- D) 418b4-6 The transparent is what is visible because of the colour of something else.
- E) 418b6-9 The transparent includes air and water and many solids, which have in them a certain *phusis* (nature) which is the same in air and water and ether.
- F) 418b29-31 The transparent has the same nature in both darkness and light, but is only potential in darkness.
- G) 418b9-11 Light is the actuality/activity of the transparent *qua* transparent. Darkness is potentially in it also.
- H) 418b11-13 Light is as it were the colour of the transparent when it is made actually transparent by fire etc. *On Sense* 3 439a18-19 adds that it is the colour of the transparent *kata sumbebêkos* i.e not essentially so.
- I) 418b14-20 Light is not fire or a body or an effluence of a body—for then it would be itself a body— but the presence of fire or

something similar in the transparent. For two bodies cannot be in the same (place), light is the opposite of darkness, darkness is the absence of such a *hexis* from the transparent, so its presence will be light.

J) 419a23-5 Fire is seen both in darkness and in light, and the transparent becomes transparent through it.

K) 418b28-31 The colourless, i.e. the transparent in potentiality, or the dark, is receptive of colour.

We may add:

L) *On Sense* 3 439a22-5: The transparent is a common nature or power (*dunamis*) which does not exist separately but is in air, water etc. to a greater or less extent.

M) 439a30: Colour is either the limit or in the limit of a body.

Theophrastus' *DS* is mainly doxographical, but contains some relevant points, especially in his treatment of Empedocles. His remarks about light are always *ad hominem*, but we shall see that he referred frequently to theories of seeing which will be considered in the appropriate place.

The passages printed here are selections from a much longer section of Priscian, in which he usually indicates clearly when he is turning to Theophrastus. The omitted portions mainly give his own sophisticated account of the transparent, though I discuss below two passages (10.5-13 and 10.17-24) which are doubtful.

Theophrastus is clearly unhappy with the account of the transparent at E and L: the word *phusis* ("nature") is uninformative, presumably chosen by Aristotle for its vagueness, and so he brings in *pathos* ("affect") and *diathesis* ("disposition") as alternatives. *Diathesis* is closely related in sense to *hexis* ("state"), and in Aristotle they are sometimes used as synonyms and sometimes distinguished, but it is impossible to tell whether Theophrastus was making any such distinction here. In any case both a *pathos* and a *diathesis* is something that can be brought about, and so the question, by what, is appropriate. But we are not given Theophrastus' answer, if he gave one. He accepts the obvious fact that water, air, ether and some solids are transparent, but wants to go deeper into the matter. Using Aristotle's argument about light in I he argues that since these are bodies, the transparent cannot be another body in them, and must therefore be an affect or a disposition. The course of the following argument is interrupted by a lacuna: he seems to be ruling out the possibility that the cause of transparency

is one or more than one of the simple bodies, earth, air, fire and water, for water and air are transparent themselves, and cannot therefore be themselves the cause of their own transparency; he may then have said that there are reasons why neither earth⁷⁰ nor fire individually or in conjunction with others can be the cause. The last sentence of this section (6-8) probably means that compounds are also ruled out, as all are coloured, and therefore have in them the limit of the transparent (Cf. M).

In the section omitted in our line 8 Priscian himself says that the transparent is not an affect or a disposition but a form. The transparent in fire has light essentially, and that in earth darkness. He suggests that it might after all not exist in earth, but withdraws that suggestion. The passage reads as if it is common ground between Priscian and Theophrastus that the transparent exists in both earth and fire, but Priscian rejects Theophrastus' question about what produces it, for that would be inappropriate for a form.

8-15 Against Aristotle's view, in G, that light is the activity of the transparent, Theophrastus suggests that it is the activity⁷¹ of "that", which, in this context, must be the source of light, e.g. the sun, or a fire. Thus he brings in a plausible alternative, but he ends with an account according to which, in a sense, both views are correct: light is like heat, which can be seen both as the activity of the source of heat, and as the activity of that which is heated. The reference to heat seems to be Theophrastus' own, certainly if we take *isôs* as meaning "equally", not "perhaps". This is supported by the fact that at 9.34-10.1, in a passage we have omitted in our line 19, Priscian says that Theophrastus is here showing that the

⁷⁰ At 8.14-23 Priscian has: "For the transparent in fire has light essentially, but that in earth essentially darkness. Hence just as fire is a thing that produces light, so earth is a thing that makes darkness: for darkness is not the privation of light, but itself too an actuality. But perhaps we do wrong in supposing that the transparent exists even in earth, if it is true that the transparent is receptive of light. Or we do not do wrong. For it is receptive not only of light, but also of darkness, as has been said. And then even earth is coloured, and colour is the limit of the transparent in bodies that are bounded; so that even in earth the transparent is not (to be seen as) essentially only receptive of darkness, but of this in its depths, but on its surfaces of light also, if colours are lights of a kind, and if it is true that even earth is illuminated on its surface." Some of this may reflect Theophrastus' views.

⁷¹ Between Aristotle and later philosophers the meaning of *energeia* in this connection changed from "actualisation" to "activity". See S.Sambursky, 'Philoponus' Interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Light' *Osiris* 13 1958 114-7. We can see the change beginning already in Theophrastus.

activity of light is formal, "since heat too is from a form (*ap' eidous*)". That should imply that Theophrastus drew an analogy between heat and light.⁷² Theophrastus follows this with a linguistic point, similar to others elsewhere, claiming that correctness in language is not necessary, provided we understand what is meant, so that light may be called both a passive affection and an activity of the same thing.

The word translated "affection" here is *pathêma*. This is related to *pathos*, the common term for passive effect, and two questions arise, a) whether it was actually used by Theophrastus here, and b) whether it should be taken as having a technical meaning different from *pathos*. a) It is used freely by Aristotle and by Priscian to express his own views (1.14, 2.10 and 19, 13.17 and elsewhere), so that in a passage where Priscian is not actually quoting Theophrastus directly, as is the case here, we cannot be sure whether it was in fact used by Theophrastus. But this may be less important because b) as Bonitz s.v. shows, it is difficult to separate *pathos* and *pathêma* in Aristotle, and in some cases at least the reasons for using one rather than the other seem to be stylistic. The only other case in our passages from Theophrastus is again in Priscian (299 below, p.24.23) where there does appear to be an actual quotation from Theophrastus. But there again it is not necessary to make a distinction between *pathos* and *pathêma*. However, in order to mark the difference I use the word "affection" here, and one might ask if he used *pathêma* because he already had a strange status for the transparent. There is a problem with Peripatetic language when the transparent is not a substance but perhaps a *pathos*.

In the gap in line 15 Priscian gives his own account of light.

Theophrastus next takes up I, that light is not a body nor an effluence. He again appeals to observation, saying that it only occurs in the presence of a body such as fire, and might therefore appear to be a bodily effluence and a body. There is a textual difference here: Aristotle says that light is the presence of fire, but Theophrastus asks why it occurs in the presence of fire. We cannot change one text to harmonise it with the other, for the grammatical structures of the relevant sentences make either change improbable. Perhaps Theophrastus was using Aristotle's terminology to give a more generally acceptable account, which does not try to

⁷² The nearest in Aristotle seems to be *Physics* 8.4 255a22-3, where the actually hot and the potentially hot occur.

define light, but picks out a well-known fact about it which is sufficient to make his point. But the two positions are different: Aristotle's view that light is a *hexis* consisting in the presence of fire may be seen as either sophisticated or inadequate, while Theophrastus, at least as reported here, just says that light on this basis would appear to be corporeal, which would be in conflict with Aristotle. His solution is: "it must not be taken like this," i.e. in a way which would conflict with Aristotle, "but as is natural." This has some similarity to his remarks in lines 14-15 above that we should not worry too much about names, and elsewhere that we must understand the words used in an appropriate sense (e.g. 307C.3-4).

The word *pephuken* ("as is natural") is difficult. The verb is connected with *phusis* ("nature"), but in this context its sense is far from clear. Probably here as elsewhere Theophrastus has seen a difficulty but not tried to solve it in a sophisticated way. In the gap in line 19 is Priscian's comment, as we have seen, that Theophrastus is showing that the activity of light is in some way a matter of form. But this is clearly Priscian's interpretation, aimed at showing that Theophrastus supported his own views, and is not a report of what Theophrastus actually said.

The next question (19-21) does not directly attack a statement of Aristotle's, but arises from his general position. If darkness is seen without light, light is not the only cause of seeing. But perhaps darkness is not visible. So much is clearly Theophrastus. But it is uncertain where the quotation from him ends, and I therefore quote the rest of what follows until we get back to the next clear quotation from Theophrastus:

"For we do not perceive it through an impression, but by privation and not seeing; but fire, and anything else there may be of this kind, are seen in darkness as being themselves the cause of the (actually) transparent and for this reason not needing that thing (light) to be seen. Therefore fire does not need, in order to be seen, the transparent in actuality, that is, already illuminated: but since there must be some medium (for seeing is not by means of contact), this must be transparent, so that it should not, by being solid and resistant, hinder with its darkness-creating property the activity of the luminous things on one another, fire I mean and the organ of sense." (10.5-13)⁷³

⁷³ οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἐπέρευσιν αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνομεθα ἀλλὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄραν· τὸ δὲ πῦρ καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν σκότει ὁράται, ὥς αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς αἴτιον καὶ διὰ

Some of the vocabulary here needs comment: a) *epereisis* (“impression”) is not used by Aristotle and possibly its earliest attested use is in Chrysippus (281-208 B.C.). But that does not exclude its use by Theophrastus, especially as Epicurus has *epereis-mos* at *Letter to Herodotus* 50.4. *Epereisis* is also found at 301A.16, from Sextus Empiricus, though there too it need not be in a quotation from Theophrastus. It is also used on his own account by Priscian, at 5.5, but perhaps under the influence of Iamblichus. b) *idiōma* (“property”) is also not used by Aristotle, but it occurs in Epicurus (puzzlingly at *Letter to Herodotus* 79, but straightforwardly at *Letter to Pythocles* 109), who was a younger contemporary of Theophrastus. It occurs once again in Priscian at 24.20, where it is almost certainly his language, perhaps again derived from Iamblichus. c) The most important word is *skotopoios* (“darkness-creating”) which LSJ report only from Priscian and some scholia. It occurs in Priscian also at 8.15, where it is opposed to the even rarer word *phōtourgos* (“light-creating”), reported only for Priscian, and at 11.25.⁷⁴

This makes it probable that the words here are Priscian’s, though that does not exclude the possibility that he is here, as sometimes elsewhere, paraphrasing Theophrastus. Certainly the views put forward here are appropriate to Theophrastus.

22-5 Next Theophrastus argues that if light is a) the cause of seeing and is also b) the colour of the transparent, and is c) visible, then colour must be the cause of colours being seen (a and b), and the visible the cause of visible things being seen (a and c). There is a textual problem here: at 10.15 all the MSS have the genitive *horatou*—i.e. light is the colour of the transparent and the visible—but this does not fit the sense, and the change of a single letter to give *horaton*—light is visible—much improves it.

Aristotle is perhaps apologetic in H about saying that light is the colour of the transparent, and Theophrastus draws out its paradoxical implications, but admits in the end that though paradoxical

τοῦτο οὐ δεόμενον πρὸς τὸ ὁραθῆναι ἐκείνου. τοῦ μὲν οὖν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἤδη πεφωτισμένου, οὐ δείται πρὸς τὸ ὁραθῆναι τὸ πῦρ. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τι εἶναι μεταξύ (οὐ γὰρ κατ’ ἐπαφὴν ἢ ὕρασις) διαφανὲς εἶναι τοῦτο χρή, ἵνα μὴ στερεὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον ὃν παραποδίζει τῷ σκοτοποιῷ ιδιώματι τὴν τῶν φωτοειδῶν εἰς ἀλλήλα ἐνέργειαν, τοῦ τε πυρὸς φημι καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ὀργάνου.

⁷⁴ But both words occur also in [Dionysus] *De Caelesti hierarchia* (7.1 and 8.2).

the conclusions that colour (as light) is the cause of colours being seen, and the visible the cause of the visible being seen, are in line with the agreed fact that taste is by flavour, which, if the argument holds, must mean that flavour is the object of taste, and therefore the cause of tastable objects, i.e. flavours, being tasted, though Theophrastus does not say that here. Theophrastus is here relying again on Aristotle, who says at *DA* 2.10 422a16-17: “as what is visible is colour, so what is tastable is flavour”, though this telescopes the two aspects of seeing, colour and the visible, which Theophrastus has just distinguished, and we might ask him rather to say that the tastable is the cause of our tasting and flavour the cause of our being aware of flavours. Aristotle himself had noted (*DA* 3.2 426a15-16) that the activity of the organ of taste is called *geusis*, but that of flavour has no name. To sum up, Theophrastus has been working through the implications of something Aristotle has said, and showing that they are acceptable.

In the portion omitted in line 25 Priscian spells out (10.17-18) what Theophrastus did not say, that flavour is the proper object of taste (and sound of hearing), as colour is of sight. But the section (10.17-11.14) is mainly concerned with Priscian’s own views, although it raises some pertinent questions. It contains a number of references to “someone”, and it is not easy to be sure either how many or who these people are. I summarise: but someone (A) will say: “as flavour is the proper object of taste, and sound of hearing, needing nothing else outside for setting the organ in motion”—unless someone (B) were to mention the transsonant, as colour needs the transparent; yet even so colour needs a source of light as well. A development (C) of the theory of sight follows, claiming that the fact that light is needed shows the superiority of sight to the other senses, but then we have again: “perhaps someone (D) would say that ...” and again, “But on this account, someone (E) would say ...” Now “Someone (A)” cannot be Theophrastus, as we have here an objection to what Theophrastus has just said, but “Someone (B)” could be. There is evidence (277BC) that Theophrastus himself invented the term “transsonant”, giving a name to what had been left nameless by Aristotle. The views of (C) on the other hand, seem to be those of a Neoplatonist, those of “Someone (D)” are similar to those of Simplicius? (*On Aristotle’s DA* 135.25-136.2), and those of “Someone (E)” seem to be a reply to “Someone (D)”, and may express Priscian’s own views. It seems however that

Theophrastus himself used 'someone might say' and similar expressions. Thus Daiber gives a number of examples (Daiber [1991] 284-5) from the *Meteorology*, newly restored from Arabic and Syriac sources.

Taking the passage as a whole, I think that Priscian is using Theophrastus' term "transsonant", but not otherwise quoting him, though it is barely possible that "Someone (A) will say ..." is still part of a quotation from Theophrastus, which could then also accommodate "Someone (B)". The doctrine expressed could be his without difficulty, and I quote it:

"But', someone will say, 'as flavour is the proper sense-object of taste, and sound of hearing, needing nothing else from outside for the organ of sense to be moved, unless indeed someone should speak of the transsonant, as colour needs the transparent, yet even so sound is at once perceived if the correct amount of air is in between, but colour needs the light-giving thing from outside, if it is going to become visible.'" There follows the Neoplatonist passage C.

In the difficult passage 25-31, if the text as emended is correct, Theophrastus is concerned about Aristotle's statement C above that every colour is such as to move the actual transparent, and asks how that movement comes about. The textual problem is complicated: a) The reading used here, *boulomenos*, ("wanting"), has greater MS support, and it seems best to keep it. If so, it applies to Theophrastus as the subject of *phainetai* ("is clearly"): the alternative is *boulomenous*, which must then go with *hêmas* ("us"), in line 30. The sole justification for the change is that the original reading is awkward, but there is little less awkwardness with this alternative. b) There remains the difficulty that there seems to be a need for a verb between *kineisthai* and *dikaion*, but the MSS provide none. All alternatives centre on *dia tinôn*, which is in all MSS and would mean "through some" or through what". I favour *diateinôn* ("extending"), which involves only the insertion of a single letter. It will then balance *boulomenos*, and its subject will again be Theophrastus. If we abandon these suggestions the alternative is to read the last part as meaning: "it is right for us, wanting to extend ... to enquire", and then Theophrastus vanishes from the scene. But the problems of this sentence remain the same in other respects. On our view a) Theophrastus believes that the transparent is moved by colours; b) he recognises that there is a problem about

how it is moved, but thinks that those who hold other views about the nature of seeing also have to solve it. It is true that the problem about how the transparent is moved can hardly apply to those who do not believe in the transparent, but this difficulty remains for almost any reading of the text. One should perhaps take *kineitai* as meaning "the movement occurs", i.e. on any analysis.

Two theories are mooted, that seeing is by an effluence, or that it is by action and being acted upon. The view that it is by an effluence is an old one, merely mentioned by Aristotle at *DA* 2.10 422a15,⁷⁵ attributed to Empedocles at *On Sense* 2 438a4, and generally criticized at 3 440a15-21. Theophrastus also deals with it in his *DS*. In 1 he links effluence with the view that sensing is of like by like, and in 5 with Plato and his theory of seeing. At 19-22 he gives a long criticism of Empedocles, who held that all the senses involved effluences, but he has little to say about seeing; at 50-1 he has scorn for Democritus' theory,⁷⁶ referred to again at 80, but he does refer to acting and being acted upon in connection with it, and he says that in seeing an *emphasis* is found in the air between the eye and the object, by way of an effluence from the object. He also in 5 connects Plato with the view that colours are borne in to the eye from objects and fuse with what comes out from the eye, a doctrine midway between the belief that the sight falls on its objects and the belief that something comes in, apparently referring to *Timaeus* 45B-D and 67CD. Stratton, ad loc., suggests that the Pythagoreans,⁷⁷ and sometimes, as Aristotle says (*On Sense* 2 437b24-438a5) Empedocles, are the holders of the view that something proceeds from the eye. Perhaps surprisingly, Theophrastus does not discuss them in this connection in his *DS*.⁷⁸

The simplest explanation of all this is that Theophrastus is just pointing out that the transparent exists, on any account, and those

⁷⁵ At 2.7 418b15 Aristotle dismisses the view that light is an effluence from a body.

⁷⁶ Theophrastus found Democritus' account of sensation in general puzzling, and his text is made difficult by a lacuna in 49. Richard Baldes, 'Democritus on Visual Perception: Two theories or one?' *Phronesis* 20 1975 93-105 criticises the view that the *emphasis* exists midway between the eye and the object, and Baltussen (1993) p.170 n.142 thinks that Theophrastus may have combined two separate passages from Democritus to produce a puzzling result.

⁷⁷ See also Beare (1906) 49 n.3, who also mentions Alcmaeon.

⁷⁸ Priscian has some general remarks on how seeing occurs at 5.22-6.15, quoted below, in which he mentions several theories, including those of emission and those of action, but the ideas are mainly his own.

who ignore it have to answer questions about it just as much as he does. Effluences from objects, and emissions from the eye, equally have to pass through the space between them, and here too the question "How?" can be raised.

With regard to the view that seeing is by acting and being acted upon, a more precise and attractive interpretation of line 28 comes from a MS reading which was, regrettably, omitted from our printed apparatus, but has been adopted in the revised impression: the MSS HM²P² have *to de*, not *ta de*. We then have: "by the former (colours) being active, and the latter (the transparent) being passive". The question remains, how this can be extended to those who do not believe in the transparent, but how the transparent is moved does seem to be the question mainly addressed in the intervening pages (11.20-13.30) where Priscian gives his own views. Rather than pick out passages from there it will help to quote 5.22-6.15 which covers the same ground: "Well, I think that sight is made complete neither by reception, as being given shape by its objects by way of some effluence from them, nor by emission, with some body being sent out and touching its objects; nor is it that colours move the transparent and as it were give it shape, and the transparent then moves the sight; but the forms, having an active (*drastêrion*) power to act (*dran*) each on what is suitable for being affected, are not in every case in contact, but (act) also on those that are at a distance so long as the distance is correct for the one group to act (*poiêsai*) and for the other to be acted upon. For through their being corporeal and confined in something and circumscribed by space, they do not work on (*energei*) any kind of existent whatsoever, but on what is at a correct distance for the active (*drastikêi*) power of the things which act and for the prepared state of the thing acted upon, and also for the size of the effect (*peisis*). For instance, the object seen acts on the organ of sight from a certain distance which is correct for both that which is seeing and that which is being seen, for the latter for being acted upon, and for the former for acting. But since it is not simply the case that the effect upon that which has the power of sight from that which is seen creates the sensation—for the excessive (effect) interferes because it is out of scale with the size of the effect by which the sensation (would occur)—it also requires distance. Hence very bright things which are nearer than the right amount hinder and completely prevent seeing. But since sensation is made complete

not only in the sense-organ's being acted upon, but also, as has been said, in its being active (*energein*), that which sees will also be active (*energêsei*) about that which is seen, not changing it or having any effect (*pathos*) on it, but being active about it in a conscious way. For it is not as a body, but as a living thing and a thing that can see that it is active. Indeed it is because this kind of life and this cognitive power is in a body, and does not contain in itself as their cause the objects of sense in the way the heavenly life does, but is made complete by means of the interval between it and them, this too needs the interval connecting them to be of the right size."

Thus in this expression of his own (and Iamblichus'⁷⁹) views Priscian touches on the question of effluence and emission, and then makes frequent use of the notions of acting and being acted upon. The coincidence with what he attributes to Theophrastus is remarkable.

Other points: a) where does the emphasis lie in the original claim (26) that the transparent is moved by colours, i.e. is it on "moved", or on "colours"? The reference to "How" which follows suggests the former. b) There are other references by Priscian to the views mentioned here: 7.6-11 is a kind of summary in which he says that sight advances through being active about the sense-object, and receives something through being affected by it. The transparent conveys this. There is much more again in the pages of Priscian that follow this section, where he gives his own views about whether and how the transparent is moved. Among other things he says that it is not by giving it shape that colours move the transparent (12.10), that colour floats on (12.20-22) and is transported by the transparent (12.30), and that not even smell, much less sight, involves effluences (13.25-7). He is primarily concerned with the formal activity involved in sensation and with the second half of Theophrastus' aporia, whether the transparent is moved by a combination of action and passivity, and many of his remarks relate to that.

32-8 It is not clear how much of what is printed as the remainder of this passage is from Theophrastus. Priscian presents as his own

⁷⁹ Iamblichus' views on light are considered in John F. Finamore. 'Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent' in Blumenthal and Clark (1993) 55-64, but Priscian is mentioned only in the notes.

the suggestion that perhaps all objects of sense move the senses by being active, but colour does it only when there are present light and the transparent which is its matter, as Theophrastus says. All that is directly attributed to Theophrastus is the view that the transparent is the matter of colour and must be present for it to be seen, though the rest is consistent with his views. This is an alternative view to the one immediately preceding in Priscian at 13.27-30, and not given here, that only colour works actively; "as has been said": it is difficult to trace this reference back in Priscian; the general idea is present in Aristotle, *DA* 3.2 426a2-19, though that is more precisely an analysis of what is involved.

The idea that the transparent is the matter of colour is a new one: the nearest we have in Aristotle is that the eye, or rather the pupil or, better, the eye-ball, is the matter of sight (*DA* 2.1 412b20, 413a2-3), that the eye contains water, which is transparent (*On Sense* 2 438a14, b6), and that the transparent is colourless, and what is colourless is receptive of colour (*DA* 2.7 418b26-8). The account of colour in *On Sense* 3 439a13-b18 is unhelpful. What we have here may be Theophrastus' attempt to cast Aristotle's evasive account into something more precise, but it is also possible that Priscian is fastening on something said by Theophrastus in another context which is important for Priscian as supporting his own views. At 12.25 he has said that *colour* uses the transparent as a substratum (*hupokeimenon*) for its own activity: at 9.27, by contrast, he has denied that *light* is a perfection in the transparent as a substratum. Substratum and matter are closely connected, and he may be treating Theophrastus' statement as similar to his own view.

The word *eidopoieitai* ("is given form") (line 35) is a favourite one of Priscian's and indicates that this sentence contains his, or Iamblichus', views. That light is visible not in the transparent but through it and in itself (*kath' hautō*) may or may not be from Theophrastus, but the final claim, that the transparent is the same as, or not to be divided from, light, is certainly his. But it is puzzling. We have just seen Theophrastus apparently trying to be more precise than Aristotle, but here he seems to go the opposite way, and what he says can be only partially true. It ignores Aristotle's distinction between the potential and the actual transparent, and the statement at *DA* 2.7 418b28-31 that the potential transparent is colourless (and therefore lightless). Again, to paraphrase *DA* 2.7 418b4-13, the transparent still exists in darkness, though it is then

only potential. The same is not true of light. Priscian continues: "for neither is there light without the transparent, nor is there perception of it without light." The natural way to take this is that Priscian is justifying his endorsement of Theophrastus' claims, but it may still reflect what Theophrastus had said. However it only supports the claim that light is not to be separated from the transparent, not that it is the same as it. (One caution is necessary: *tauto* "the same" is a conjecture of Bywater's, not actually adopted by him, for the *auto* of all the MSS.) The statement that light is visible in the transparent and *kath' hauto* may be referring back to Aristotle's remark at *DA* 2.7 418b4-5 that the transparent is not visible *kath' hauto*.

There is no clear account of what Theophrastus finally thought the transparent was. We are left with the suggestion that it is a *pathos* or a *diathesis*, but lines 8-15 and 25-31 raise difficulties. The first passage considers in what way light is an activity or an affection (*pathêma*) of the transparent, and the second how the transparent is moved by colours. These are awkward questions to raise about a *pathos* or a *diathesis*, and in what Priscian reports the difficulty is not faced. The claim (line 34) that the transparent is the matter of colour is less difficult, given the variety of ways in which *hulê* ("matter") can be used. But we should note Theophrastus' insistence, lines 14-15, that what we call things is not as important as understanding them; here he is talking of light and its status as both activity and affection, and this may be a sign that he saw that the established Peripatetic system was inadequate also for the curious case of the transparent.⁸⁰

The agreed facts about seeing, about distance and excessive brightness, taken from Aristotle, were accepted by both Theophrastus and Priscian.

⁸⁰ Aristotle, *On Dreams* 2 459b24-460a12, refers to the 'fact' that if a menstruating woman looks in a mirror it becomes stained, which Aristotle takes to show that sight can act as well as be affected. The action involves moving the air. This passage is discussed by Anthony Preus, 'On Dreams 2, 459b24-460a33, and Aristotle's ὄψις' in *Phronesis* 13 (1968) 175-8 and Rosamund Kent Sprague, 'Aristotle on Red Mirrors (*On Dreams* II 459b24-460a33)' in *Phronesis* 30 (1985) 323-5.

- 279** Simplicius *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 2.7.419a13 (CAG vol.11 p.136.20-9 Hayduck)

F. Bossier and C. Steel, 'Priscianus Lydus en de *In De Anima* van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius' in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 34 (1972) 761-822, now revised in an English version in Huby and Steel (1997) 106-37. Steinmetz (1964) 10, n.4. I. Hadot, 'The Life and Work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources' in Sorabji (1990) 290-2, and H.J. Blumenthal Addendum p.324 of that volume. Blumenthal (1996) 68-71.

The author (lines 10-11) says that he has dealt with the subject more fully in his epitome of Theophrastus' *Physics*. Bossier and Steel have used this as evidence that the commentary from which the passage comes is not by Simplicius but by Priscian of Lydia, and that the work referred to is Priscian's *Metaphrasis*. But while Theophrastus' *On the Soul* was part of his *Physics* (See **307A**), Priscian's *Metaphrasis* can hardly be seen as an epitome; it is more like a selective commentary in which Priscian puts forward his own views at length, and extends rather than summarises Theophrastus. It has been argued that 'epitome' here could mean "brief account" with interspersed comments, but these comments are extensive, and from what we know of Theophrastus' other works the summarising cannot have amounted to much. Steinmetz has proposed to rewrite Simplicius to have "in (my work on) the summary of Theophrastus' *Physics*", but that would presuppose that there was an existing epitome of Theophrastus, for which there is no evidence. As it stands, the genuine Simplicius is referring to a work of his own now lost. Unless the alternative theory is accepted on other grounds, this passage is insufficient to prove it. On the other hand, in our **298A**, also from the disputed commentary on the *DA*, the author refers to Theophrastus' *Physics*, and it would not be unreasonable to suppose that he knew that work and summarised it. See now Sharples (1998) 13. There is a growing consensus that the work is neither by Simplicius nor by Priscian.

The account of the transparent given is presented as that of the author, not that of Theophrastus, but it supports Priscian's evidence in **278** of the kind of problems that Theophrastus was raising. Much of it has parallels in Priscian: 136.20-3 with Priscian 17.16-19 (= **277B** lines 58-60); 136.24 with 12.29-30; 136.26-8 with 17.20 (= **277B**

lines 61-2). Two of these passages are connected in Priscian with Theophrastus, but the middle one is not.

The word *diabibazon* ("passing on") or transporting, is Hayduck's correction for *diabibazontos*, and makes better sense. The same word is used by Priscian 12.29-30, where also it is said that the transparent transports colour, but also that colour comes upon the sight floating on the transparent. There is no positive reason to attribute this point to Theophrastus.

- 280 Plutarch, *In Reply to Colotes* 7 1110C-D (BT vol.6.2 p.179.14-28 Pohlenz and Westman)

E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* Florence: "La Nuova Italia" 1936 (*Il Pensiero Classico* 4) 1 24 n.3. R. Westman. *Plutarch gegen Kolotes. Seine Schrift Adversus Colotem als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle* Helsinki 1955 (*Acta Philosophica Fennica* VII). D. Furley, 'Democritus and Epicurus on sensible qualities' in *Passions and Perceptions* ed. J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993 87-90. D. Sedley, 'Theophrastus and Epicurean Physics', in van Ophuijsen and van Raalte (1998) 333-56.

This passage is our only direct evidence that Epicurus wrote against, or less probably to,⁸¹ Theophrastus.⁸² The work is not listed by Diogenes Laertius, but as he says that he is only giving the best of Epicurus' many writings we need not try to identify it with one that is on his list. See 137 33-8 for works that may have been written about Democritus by Theophrastus.

For Theophrastus' views on colour, see also 278.22-36 and 279; Aëtius 1.15.9 Diels (Stobaeus *Anth.* 149.17-18 and 149.21-150.3 Wachsmuth) provides some relevant material. He ascribes to Epicurus and Aristarchus—most likely the astronomer (c.310-230 B.C.) who was a pupil of Theophrastus' pupil Strato, and was already an adult when Theophrastus died—the view that things are colourless in the dark, and to Aristotle the view that in the dark

⁸¹ See Anna Angeli, 'Frammenti di Lettere di Epicuro nei Papiri d'Ercolano', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 23 1993 16 for actual examples of the two senses in the letters of Epicurus and his circle. She does not mention any letters to Theophrastus.

⁸² But David Sedley has argued that much of Epicurus' arguments about physics are based on Theophrastus' work.

bodies have colour potentially. Aristotle does not say this in so many words, but it is in tune with things that he and Theophrastus said.

The word *meros* ("section") in Epicurus has the special meaning of being a part of his doctrine. (See Westman 140) So this passage seems to mean that Epicurus rejected Theophrastus' view not only on the basis of his own general teaching, which might be thought to go against common sense, but also on common sense grounds, although he did admit that there were considerations based on observation which might support Theophrastus. It is unlikely that these observations are taken by Epicurus from Theophrastus, but they could be, and in any case help to indicate his view. It has been suggested by Einarson and De Lacy (Plutarch vol.14 Loeb 207) that Epicurus was attacking what Theophrastus said against Democritus in *DS* 72-82 and *CP* vi 2. But if Democritus is concerned we should rather think of Theophrastus' *Flavours, Colours and Fleshes* (137 36), probably connected with Democritus, and may suppose that somewhere Theophrastus said that colours are really there in the dark, and perhaps that he said that they were *sumphuê* ("intrinsic") to bodies, though against that Epicurus himself (*Letter to Herodotus* 54) used *sumphuê* in a related way of those qualities which are necessarily related to shape, and the word may be his.

We have taken the whole of lines 5-10 as part of Epicurus' treatise, but Pohlenz (*BT* vi 2, ed. 1) takes only the first sentence, as far as line 6, as part of that treatise, the rest being Plutarch's comment. Westman, however, 141-3 argued that the whole belonged to Epicurus.⁸³

- 281 Simplicius *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.5 302a 21-3 (*CAG* vol. 7 p.602.5-6 Heiberg)

Simplicius is discussing Aristotle's statement that fire and earth exist potentially in flesh and wood, for these are seen to be secreted from them. Simplicius is justifying the particular claim that fire is secreted from flesh by a) this item from Theophrastus, b) a

⁸³ His suggestions are in the Addenda to the second edition. Furley 87-90 discusses the whole passage of Plutarch with reference to where the quotation from Epicurus ends and to Plutarch's argument against Epicurus, but does not consider Theophrastus' position. He does however think that the darkened room cannot be Plutarch's contribution.

personal communication from an Alexandrian doctor, Megethios, that he had seen a man with a hip-disease (or sciatica) from whose hip fire came out and burned the bedclothes; the trouble (*pathos*) then ceased, c) the scabs of anthrax coming from fire, and the very hot fevers. This is a miscellaneous lot. Taken by themselves, Theophrastus' words might be either a general claim or about a specific incident. But in this context it is more likely to have been a particular case. The word "flame" (*phloga*) is also rather strong for a general claim. On the other hand if it were a general claim it would fit in with our 278 lines 29-30, the idea that the sense-organ sends something out, but in any case that is not a view that Theophrastus himself endorses.

In *DS* 26 Theophrastus reports that Alcmaeon said that there was fire in the eyes because when hit these *eklampein* ("flash out"). But a similar point is made by Aristotle in his *On Sense* 1 437a24, and it hardly seems relevant here.

Is it more than a coincidence that *LS* (Thorndike vol. 3 553) quotes from Archytas of Tarentum's *On Events in Nature*, a work frequently cited in it, that a dying man emits fiery rays from his eyes? As Thorndike says, (549) this has little to do with the genuine Archytas. It is likely that Theophrastus did say what Simplicius attributes to him, but in what context we do not know.

See also 292.

- 282 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1 42-3 and 44 and 45 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 19.14- 20.9 and 20.22-5 and 21.4-8 Bywater)

Stratton (1917). Huby and Steel (1997)

This passage is frequently obscure, but it is based on an obscure part of Aristotle, the opening section of *DA* 3.1.⁸⁴ Aristotle's aim is to show that there are no more senses than five. He seems to be concerned sometimes with the sense-organ, and sometimes with the medium, and his argument is connected with the place of the elements in sensation. So we have: *DA* 3.1 424b33-425a2 a) the organ is of air, and air is "of sound and colour", b) air and water are "of colour", for both are transparent. This juxtaposition may be

⁸⁴ The discussion at Alexander, *Questions and Solutions* 3.2 p.89-91 is not obviously helpful here.

justified by his view that the organ and the medium are homogeneous, but his argument is still unclear, and seems irrelevant to what he wants to prove. The first nine lines of our quotation give a summary of Aristotle's views, and most of the rest consists of Theophrastus' questions about it. It is uncertain whether the summary is the work of Theophrastus or of Priscian.

Lines 1-3 should now read: "Aristotle believes that there are no more senses (than five) because of the fact that all things are perceptible by us, the touchable by touch, and those through a medium because (the senses) have these things by which the medium is known".⁸⁵

Line 7 may misrepresent Aristotle: he has at 424b31-3 "if through one several are perceived being different in genus, it is necessary that one who has a sense-organ of this kind be sensitive to both." It is unclear at first whether "through one" is one sense-organ or one medium, but the example that follows, 424b33-4, "e.g. if the organ is of air and air is of sound and colour", shows that it is air as the medium that is relevant. This interpretation is supported by the words "a sense-organ of this kind", i.e. one made appropriately of air or water, and by Theophrastus' comments in lines 13-24, especially "if through air (it can know) both the objects of smell and those of hearing". But in line 7, in the summary, we have "if more than one is perceived *through one sense-organ*", and that is not Aristotle's meaning.

There is a textual problem in line 8. Here all MSS of Priscian read *amphoin* ("both") alone. The sense would then be "what has one or the other to be able to sense both". But in context that makes nonsense, and since the corresponding sentence in Aristotle—425a3—reads *tou di' amphoin* ("that which (can be sensed) through both") it seems necessary to emend to that here. It is true that even some MSS of Aristotle also omit *tou di'*, but editors have generally accepted it, and it is supported by some commentators and Averroes.

Aristotle's first step is to distinguish between touch and the other senses, which are said to be through a medium, and whose objects are sensed by means of, for example, air or water. But he is

⁸⁵ I owe this interpretation to Carlos Steel. A puzzle is that there is nothing in Aristotle about knowing the medium: rather he says that things that are sensed through a medium (are sensed) by the simples, like air and water.

tackling a general question, applying to all animals, about how many senses there can be. So he speaks in general terms of beings which possess organs capable of sensing sound and colour, and seems to envisage the possibility that e.g. the organ of sight might be of air and not of water. So, since colour can be seen through both air and water, a being with only an organ made of air or one made of water should be able to see colour. (He has also said that if e.g. sound and colour are sensed through the same medium, e.g. air, a being with a sense-organ composed of air should be sensitive to both). Now this is all controversial in itself, and its relevance to the question about the number of senses is far from clear.

As far as we can tell, Theophrastus had the same text before him, and instead of clarifying it he asks questions about the basic assumptions only, that is about the organ and the medium and their working and composition: His first words are obscure, and do not have an exact equivalent in Aristotle. In their context, however, they must be saying something about the objects of the other senses and how they are known, and it seems to be by those senses having—or being composed of—that by which the medium is known, namely air and water. The conclusion, that these senses are of air or water, is the same as Aristotle's, but the path by which it is reached is not. What is most puzzling is that Theophrastus seems to be saying that the medium itself is known by these senses, whereas earlier the focus of attention was the objects known through the medium.

With fire and earth excluded, the argument centres on the parts played in sensation by air and water, and it is here that the confusion between organ and medium is most evident. One source of trouble may be that the preposition *di'* can mean both "through (a medium)" and "by means of (a sense-organ)". Now it is obvious that we can see and hear through both air and water as medium—there is no mention here of the transparent and the transsonant of which we have heard earlier—and it also seems to be assumed that the organ must resemble the medium.

a) (lines 10-12) this seems to be a general question about how the senses work. *pothen* is awkward: if we take it as "With what" it might be introducing a question about what thing produces sensation, with the implication that neither air nor water is adequate. Otherwise it must be taken as "How", asking for a more detailed account. b) (lines 13-18) it is true that we are aware of both smell

and sound through air, but the objects that we smell are not the same as those that we hear. Also, the fact that some air, like that in the windpipe, is sensitive to neither sound nor smell, shows that air is not in itself sensitive to sound or smell. So the *logoi* or ratios involved must be all-important. (In this passage at least the only possible sense of *logos* is ratio or proportion). c) (lines 19-23): with the text as printed, to which no alternative seems plausible, the argument is that we must reconsider the view that a sense-organ is of a single element, either air or fire. The truth is only that one or other predominates.⁸⁶ At **336B** (Galen) the importance of what predominates in the constitution of a man or a horse is arguably attributed to Theophrastus.

There follow several arguments in favour of the view that the sense-organs are not pure: i) at any rate we say that the hot is common, and in some cases the moist. Stratton 34 interprets this of the sense-organs, so that we must say that all have heat in common, and some have moisture. This is probably the best interpretation. It is based on Aristotle's remark (*DA* 3.1 425a5-6) that fire either belongs to none or is common to all, for nothing is sensitive (*aisthêtikon*) without heat. Theophrastus telescopes this to "the hot is common", passing from the simple element fire to the "opposite", heat,⁸⁷ and then puzzlingly brings in the moist, "in some cases"—puzzlingly because both air and water, which are agreed to be prime elements in sensation, are moist. This cannot be an addition made unthinkingly by Priscian, for he refers back to it at 20.28-9, in a way that excludes that possibility. But its relevance needs discussion: we have been talking about air and water, and it is not clear how the hot and the moist are supposed to fit in. Aristotle's physics involved air being a combination of hot and wet and water a combination of cold and wet, so Theophrastus may be arguing that a sense-organ, being necessarily hot, cannot be just water i.e. cold and wet only. ii) We then have an argument in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*: if it were the case that sense organs are pure, then that which has least admixture will be most sensitive, and the most sensitive of all will be that which is separated from the living thing (and therefore not contaminated by anything

⁸⁶ See Beare (1906) 248 n.2.

⁸⁷ For the relationship between the elements and the opposites see *DGC* 2.3 330a30-b6, and James Longrigg, *Greek Rational Medicine* London: Routledge 1993 154-9.

else). iii) (lines 23-5) if ratio is involved, it must be a ratio between more than one kind of thing. These three arguments all lead to the conclusion that each sense must be of more than one element.

We now (25-6) switch to a new topic: why are two elements only involved in sensation? Again the hot appears, as being the basis of life, and therefore connected with the senses. But the thread of the argument is again obscure. Probably Theophrastus is arguing that since only living things have sensation, the hot is necessary for sensation. Priscian, in a passage omitted at the end of 26, has his own reply to this, arguing in detail that neither earth nor fire is appropriate for a sense-organ. There follows a single sentence (A), (his 20.21-2) the origin of which is unclear: "And if several through the same, that which has this will also know the several in those animals which are not maimed or incomplete." This telescopes two sentences of Aristotle: a) 3.1 424b31-3 "if through one several ... that which has such a sense-organ must be sensitive to both", and b) 425a9-10 "All the senses are possessed by those which are not incomplete or maimed." Thus a qualification is added to a) on the basis of b) which is perfectly acceptable. But it is unclear whether it is the work of Theophrastus or of Priscian. Slightly in favour of Priscian is what follows, introduced by *gar* ("for"). This is an argument of Priscian's incorporating one from Theophrastus, who is continuing with the subject of ratios, (and eventually asking exactly what part they play in sensation). Priscian applauds Theophrastus for his interest in ratios, and then adds that what is really perfect must have all the ratios. So the whole argument looks like Priscian's own defence of sentence (A). Finally (our 27-34) Theophrastus asks what part ratios play in sensation. Although Aristotle and Theophrastus are agreed that sensation involves *logos* ("ratio"), the precise meaning of this difficult term is left unclear. It is certainly some non-material aspect of the total situation, and it cannot be a simple mixing of the elements in a certain proportion. Aristotle is unhelpful. He twice (*DA* 2.12 424a28-32 and 3.2 426a27-b2) refers to the fact that a too loud sound or a too bright light prevent proper sensation, and brings in the *logos* as what is destroyed, but that is all. Theophrastus denies that the *logos* can just be in the mixture of elements and their relation to one another, and says it must be a relation between the sense-organ and the object. This last sentence is Priscian's, but he is reporting Theophrastus. This interpretation is supported by

the following lines, not given by us, in which Priscian gives his own views, but repeats the word *schesis* (“relation”) as if it were Theophrastus’.

In *DS* 32 Theophrastus talks of sense as being in some *summetria* (“proportion”) and *krasis* (“mixture”) towards the sense-object. He is here attacking Anaxagoras’ claim that all sensation is painful, and picking out the special point that too intense stimuli are painful; he is making the same point as Aristotle. Unfortunately *summetria* and *krasis* raise questions of interpretation just as *logos* does.⁸⁸ After our passage, at his 20.28, it seems to be Priscian who returns to the point that the hot is common to all, and the moist to some, and who argues that it does not follow that the sense-organs are mixed.

It does not appear, then, that Theophrastus succeeded any better than Aristotle in saying why there are only five senses. Rather he confirms the original obscurity of Aristotle’s arguments, but seems to conclude that the senses must be of mixed elements, and that the ratio between them and their objects is important, but achieves no further clarification.

283-92 We have brought together several passages from the *LS* concerned with light and eyes. For *LS* see Overview: Sources.

283 (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul B* chapter 9, On the Apostles, I (ed. a.1477² Farinator)

As elsewhere it is uncertain what name should be given. But there is a parallel here with **314A** 63-4, in which Albert the Great is giving the view of both Themistius and Theophrastus: colours are in light, which is their hypostasis. So it is a reasonable supposition that one or other of these is meant. This could be a comment on Aristotle’s *DA* 3.5 430a15-17: (intellect is like) light, which makes potentially existing colours actual colours. But this remark is not in Themistius’ *PDA*.

substantia (line 2) is a plausible emendation for the *sona* or similar of the original texts.

⁸⁸ These words are used again at *DS* 46, in an attack on Diogenes of Apollonia’s theory connecting the senses with air, but in such a negative way that they are of little help to us.

- 284** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B chapter 7, On the Blessed Virgin, Q (ed. a.1477² Farinator)

The author explains what a star is, and brings in a) Themistius, whose name is given in full, with a double claim, b) Avicbron, who supports the first claim, and c) Theophrastus, whose name is also given in full, who supports the second: a) dense and thick bodies take in and retain light; this is not in fact in Themistius on the second book of *DA*. b) what is opaque and dense takes in light more; Avicbron in his *FL* does talk of light penetrating darkness, but not precisely like this. c) what is dense retains light because light cannot penetrate it; this alone is ascribed to Theophrastus. But the whole thing is odd. Avicbron was later than Themistius, so that Themistius cannot have quoted him and Theophrastus to support his own claim. It looks as if some fourth person put it all together, and it is of very doubtful value. For Avicbron see also on **313**.

- 285** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 38, On Contemplation, S (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

The expansion of “Theus” is again uncertain.⁸⁹ As for the title, the only obvious work would be the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle, but that has only two books, and contains nothing similar to this. Themistius on book I *Posteriorum* is cited in 63 Ca, but nothing seems to be connected with Themistius’ surviving Commentary on the *PA*.

The present quotation involves an analogy: air = worldly vanity, fire desire, water bodily pleasure (and earth inhumility?) But it is also something that Theophrastus might have said, provided we interpret *in sole* as “in sunlight”.

- 286** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 61, On rejoicing, D (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus’ name is given in full and the title *libro Commentorum* (“book of commentaries”) is frequently attributed to him in *LS*. (See **268**) The first two lines, that the air appears to tremble in fine

⁸⁹ According to Sharples (private communication), Farinator’s first edition of Sept.3 1477 has *The* plus the contraction for *us* printed above the line: *The²*, but the second of Dec.31 1477 has an elongated sign with the tail coming down to the line: *The⁹*.

weather, could express his views. The supposed explanation for this is not in the extant *Problems* wrongly attributed to Aristotle, but he could have said it in the genuine problems, now lost, and Theophrastus could have quoted from that, but this is all very conjectural.

- 287-9** These three passages are curiously linked by the fact that Galen, *On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body* 10.3 (BT 2 66-8 Helmreich), brings together several points found in them and connected with Theophrastus, though he himself does not name Theophrastus.

R.W. Sharples, 'Snow Blindness and Underground Fish-Migration' in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 51 1988 181-3.

- 287** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 7, *On the Blessed Virgin, Ma* (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

The point that light interferes with light, and fire with fire, is frequently made in ancient times.⁹⁰ Theophrastus himself said (*DS* 18) that the lesser fire is extinguished by the greater; (*On fire* 11) that lamps are less visible when a fire is burning; and in *On Fainting* (345 line 4) "a larger fire extinguishes a smaller one". Aristotle *On Dreams* 3 461a2 has "a small fire is obscured by a greater", and Galen *On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body* 10.3 says that if you put a lamp or flame in bright sunlight it will at once die down, and if you put a lamp or flame near a larger one it is at once quenched: always the lesser light (*augê*) is overcome by the greater. Finally Priscian in his *Paraphrase* 11.4-5 has: "in the sun the light of a lamp is not visible", in the course of a technical argument of Priscian's own which is not directly connected with Theophrastus. We may see the remark as by now commonplace. But Priscian also, in his *Answers to Chosroes* 3 p.61.4 takes the point from Aristotle's *On Dreams*.⁹¹

Theophrastus may well have made such a point in his *On the soul*. But here again the supposed author's name is not given in full.⁹²

⁹⁰ Beare (1906) 22 n.6 suggests that the notion "probably arose in the popular mind from the disappearance of the stars when the sun rises."

⁹¹ For further references see Sharples (1995) p.26 n.65, and add [Aristotle] *Problems* 33.2 961b32; Alexander, *Quest.* 1.20 p.34.28-9.

⁹² There is a discrepancy between the first and second editions of Farinator about the book number in line 2. Our *secundo* follows the Arabic numeral which appears to be a 2 in the first edition, but the second has *tertio* written in full. (Sharples)

- 288 (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 8, On the Angels, D (ed. a 1477² Farinator)

The name of the author is again incomplete, but that of his work, *Commentary*, is similar to that attributed unambiguously to Theophrastus in 286, 290, 291, 292 and elsewhere, which suggests that here too the writer of *LS* had Theophrastus in mind. The point made here, that the stars shine more in the dark than in the light, is related to the more general point of 287. It is also illustrated by Galen in the passage mentioned above by the fact that the stars are visible when there is a major eclipse of the sun, with a reference to Thucydides, who at 2.28 says that during an eclipse of the sun some stars became visible.

- 289 (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 23, On Worldly Affluence, L (ed. a 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus' name is given in full. The title *On the Power and Capacity of the Soul* is not otherwise known. It has been conjectured that the original Greek title was just *On the Power of the Soul*, but the word *dunamis* was rendered by the two Latin words *virtus* and *potentia*. As in 287 and 288 there is again a connection with Galen. The *LS* passage appears to make two points, that we are less able to see when we are exposed to strong light, and also when we are weak. Whether these are to be taken together or separately is not clear. Theophrastus himself in *DS* 18, already mentioned at 287, treats the fact that the lesser fire is extinguished by the greater as the explanation of why we cannot look directly at the sun and, in general, *to katharon* - a clear sky or, with Beare (22-3) "an excessively bright object". And in his *Metaphysics* 9b12-13 he refers in a metaphor to our weakness in looking at very bright things. But this weakness is not, it seems, a pathological state, but that common to all, even healthy, people. Galen refers to Xenophon's soldiers, blinded by snow (*Anabasis* 4.4.12-13), and to the prisoners of Dionysius whom he brought from the darkness of a dungeon into a whitened room (*On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body* 10.3). Since Galen also lists situations where ordinary healthy people can be affected by brightness he seems to have separated the two. But in any case the relationship of Galen to both Theophrastus and *LS* is uncertain. See also Sharples (1995) n.65. *minus visos nos ipsi sumus* is grammatically odd, but its sense must be what we have given.

- 290** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 38, On Contemplation, B (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)
- 291** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 37, On Confession, Ta (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)
- 292** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) *Light of the Soul* B, chapter 37, On Confession, Ya (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

290-292 are all ascribed to the same source, Theophrastus in the book of *Commentaries*. All are connected with the eye, and all are concerned with matters of experience. **291** adds the theoretical point that the more pure something is the less it can endure anything in it which is opposite. The implication is that the eye is very pure, and this is in line with the Peripatetic view that the eye is made of water (See e.g. **277B** line 29). All one can say is that all this could have come ultimately from Theophrastus.

- 293** Plutarch, *On the Right Way to Listen to Lectures* 2 37F-38A (*BT* vol.1 p.76.10-24 Paton)

Plutarch, *De auditu* (A text and Commentary) ed. B.P. Hillyard New York: Arno Press 1981 p.49-50

The title in the MSS (except C *περὶ τοῦ συνετώως ἀκούειν*) is just *περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν* ("On listening"). The title we give is found only in Lamprias' catalogue of Plutarch's works.

It is not clear what the context of this passage was. It could be argued that it is part of a treatment of music which dealt with its emotional effects (See **719-21**). But the opening with its reference not only to hearing but to sight, taste, and touch makes it more probable that it came in a psychological context. If so it is probably about the effects of thunder and loud noises. But it does not seem to be related to Aristotle in the way that the excerpts we are giving from Priscian of Lydia are. The vocabulary is largely non-Aristotelian: *ptoia* ("excitement") and *ktupos* ("crash") are not used at all by Aristotle, and *patagos* ("clash") occurs only in the probably spurious *On the Universe*. There are some similarities with **726A** (Apollonius) which tells us that in his work on inspiration Theophrastus said that music had a healing influence, but also told of the maddening effect of the sound of a trumpet, and used the verb *existanai* ("drive mad" line 8), and the noun *ekstasis* ("disturbance" line 4) which we have in line 3

here. Plutarch may therefore be quoting here from *On Inspiration*, but that work itself sits uneasily between at least music and psychology. So this passage is probably on the disturbing effect of loud noises. Plutarch uses it as an introduction to a new section of his essay. It is likely that his use of Theophrastus stops here, but I give a little more. He continues: "Yet it is more rational than emotional", and explains that this is because while vice can enter the body and affect the soul through many parts of the body, it is only through the ears that virtue can affect the young.

Hillyard thinks that the elaborate composition in threes may be due to Plutarch. He accepts Wilamowitz' emendation *epipherein* for *epipherei* in line 3, which would carry the implication that sentence 2-5 is from Theophrastus. All the nouns are paralleled in Plutarch but *ktupos* and *patagos* are mostly from poetry and later prose.

- 294** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1 40 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 18.7-17 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

We return to the question whether every sense has a medium between the organ and the object. In Priscian himself this passage follows our **277B** and precedes our **282**. Theophrastus is said to have agreed with Aristotle, and the following account is based on *DA* 2.11 423b1-26. It does not however repeat Aristotle's language, and mostly summarises the main argument.

In no sense is there sensation when the object is directly on the organ: therefore even with touch and taste there must be a medium. This is supported by an example taken from Aristotle (*DA* 423b14-17): it is like feeling a blow though a shield. But there are differences between e.g. seeing, on the one hand, and touching and tasting on the other. In the latter the medium is in us, not outside. Not only is much of Aristotle's account omitted,⁹³ but there are some important differences. 1) In our account a stone is introduced as the source of the blow, which is not in Aristotle. 2) Aristotle says that in the case of touch we sense not by (*hupo*) the medium, but together with it (*hama*). Theophrastus says that in the cases of taste and touch it is not

⁹³ For Aristotle's full theory with criticism see Beare (1906) 241-6.

through (*dia*) but with (*sun*). However at the end of Theophrastus' account the medium is referred to as "that through which". (I have spoken of "Theophrastus' account", but some of the language may be Priscian's.) 3) The word *prospiptein* ("fall upon") is not used by Aristotle.

There is a textual problem at line 9. I print *alla sun*, ("but together with") which is the reading only of H supported by Ficino: the other MSS have *all' oun* ("but therefore"). The Basle edition has *all' oun hama* ("but therefore at the same time") in the margin. *alla sun* seems the best reading, but with it the accusative *tên cheira* ("the hand") seems awkward. But there is already awkwardness between the active *plêttei* ("strikes") and the passive *horatai* ("is seen") which will remain with any reading unless we make a very radical change.

Between the end of 277B and this passage we have omitted 18.1-7 in which Aristotle's statement (*DA* 2.10 422a34-b2) that since what can be tasted is moist the organ of taste is neither moist nor incapable of being moistened is scrutinised. Once again a mysterious *tis* ("somebody") is introduced, and we cannot say whether the views given are those of Theophrastus or of somebody else. I translate it: "Or it is not as moist, someone might say, that it is perceptible by taste, but as moist with flavour (Cf. *On Sense* 5 442b29). In that case the organ should only have been flavourless. Or, since taste grasps its proper object by touching as well (Cf. *DA* 2.10 422a8), it is necessary that it is affected, and as by a thing touched. So that also as by a moist thing; hence it is not necessary for the sense-organ to be occupied beforehand by its own moisture." This is a separate problem, and could be a question raised by Priscian, but is typical also of Theophrastus.

295 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1 46 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 21.16-20 Bywater)

Beare (1906). Peter Lautner, 'Rival theories of self-awareness in Late Neoplatonism', *BICS* 39 (n.s.1) 1994 107-16. Huby and Steel (1997).

Theophrastus next turns to Aristotle's account of how the "common sensibles" e.g. size and shape, are known. Aristotle's views on *koinê aisthêsis* ("common sense") are not easy to harmonise.⁹⁴ In *DA* 3.1 425a14-29 he said that there was no such thing as a special sense-organ for the common sensibles, but argued for a common sense which deals with the deliverances of the various senses. At *On Sleep* 2

⁹⁴ See Beare 277-336.

455a21 he did speak of “one master sense organ”, and at *On Youth and Old Age* 3 469a10-12 he said that the common organ of sense is in the heart, but we have no evidence that Theophrastus tangled with this matter, and we need not investigate it further. But Aristotle also said (*DA* above), on a plausible reading of the text, that the common sensibles are known, in one way or other, by movement, a view quoted here. There is however a lacuna of unknown length in Priscian’s text, and we can learn little except that Theophrastus is introduced after the example that size is known by sight and by touch. Theophrastus again uses the word *morphê* for form or shape where Aristotle has *schêma*. See on **277B**.

One may question the text in the neighbourhood of the lacuna. As it stands, Priscian’s *oimai* (“I think”) appears to be interpolated into a continuation of the sentence which starts with a quotation from Theophrastus. In that case *mê dioristhentos* (“when it has not been determined”) looks like Priscian. But a) it is a verb used commonly by Aristotle and also by Theophrastus (*DS* 72), and b) Priscian often used *oimai* to introduce his own views. (That *morphê* is used in lines 29 and 31 is not significant. Priscian uses it elsewhere, but never *schêma*). Perhaps then the lacuna should be indicated before *oimai*, and we should suppose that the sentence immediately following has been slightly corrupted to harmonise the grammar. I propose therefore to quote the whole of Priscian between our **295** and **296** (p.21.20-32):

“we ought then to say that we are able to know the common (sensibles) by movement not in this way, that we are aware of movement primarily, but incidentally or secondarily of the rest, but (that we are aware) in a similar way of all the common (sensibles), and in the case of absolutely all by movement, that is by being altered. And if sight is moved by size, it does not perceive it incidentally as it does the sweet; for sight is not affected or altered by the sweet. And even if size had some special sense, it would be perceptible incidentally by the other senses, as the sweet is. But as it is it is not like this, but by producing movement. There is not therefore anything peculiar as a sense to size; and it is the same for the other (sensibles) which are common. And shape in particular produces movement, and the effect (*pathos*) from it is less obvious, but more (obvious is) the activity of the sense, because shape moves the sense, through being more formal, more actively and more steadfastly.”⁹⁵

⁹⁵ δεῖ οὖν οὐχ οὕτω τῇ κινήσει λέγεσθαι γνωριστικούς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῶν κοινῶν, ὡς προηγουμένως μὲν τῆς κινήσεως, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ ἢ δευτέρως τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως μὲν πάντων τῶν κοινῶν, πάντως δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων τῇ κινήσει, τουτέστι τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, συναισθάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους ἡ ὄψις, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται ὡς τοῦ γλυκέος· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδὲ ἀλλοιοῦται ἡ ὄψις

Some of this is in Priscian's language, in particular "primarily" (*proëgoumenôs*) and "secondarily" (*deuterôs*) in lines 21-2, and at the end, especially "more formal" (*eidikôteron*), "more actively" (*energetikôteron*), and "more steadfastly" (*stasimôteron*). But the doctrine may be from Theophrastus. So we may perhaps take Theophrastus to be saying with Aristotle that we do perceive shape by movement. Aristotle had said (425a17-18) that we perceive size by movement and therefore shape (*schêma*), because shape is a kind of size (*megethos ti*). This latter claim is not stated or defended elsewhere in Aristotle, and perhaps Theophrastus asked for a defence. Alternatively, in view of "when it has not been determined (or defined)" at the end of 295, it could be that he was primarily concerned with what kind of movement was involved. Priscian suggests that it was change (*alloiôsis*), and specifically that the object of sense affects the sense (of which sight (*opsis*) is an example) by moving it. Indeed all the common sensibles are known similarly by movement, and it seems to be that kind of movement which involves a change in one or other of the particular senses.

296 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1 47-8 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 21.32-22.1 and 22.9-14 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

Aristotle also saw the common sense as that which gave what we might call self-awareness. According to Priscian Theophrastus followed Aristotle here. In neither of the discussions, at *DA* 3.3 425b12-25 and *On Sleep* 2 455a15-22, does Aristotle use the term "common sense", but at 455a16 he does have *koinê dunamis* ("common faculty"), and there is no doubt about what he meant. This common faculty is that by which one perceives that one sees and hears, and judges (*krinei*) that sweet things are different from white, and sleeping and waking are affections of this faculty.

The two passages we give are divided in Priscian by a section which undoubtedly gives his own views about the common sense. Before this, in our lines 1-4, the point is that the common sense is

ὑπὸ τοῦ γλυκέος, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἰδίαν τινὰ εἶχεν αἰσθῆσιν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἦν αἰσθητὸν ὡς τὸ γλυκύ. νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἀλλὰ τῷ κινεῖν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις μεγέθους ἰδία ὡς αἰσθησις· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα κοινά. καὶ ἡ μορφή δὲ κινεῖ, καὶ ἥττον διαφαίνεται τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς πάθος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς αἰσθήσεως διὰ τὸ εἰδικώτερον τῆς μορφῆς ἐνεργητικώτερον καὶ στασιμώτερον κινούσης τὴν αἰσθῆσιν.

aware of the activity or lack of it of each particular sense, and for this reason we perceive our own perceiving. How much of this is direct quotation and how much Priscian's paraphrase is hard to tell: the language used is not close to that of Aristotle who uses neither *sunaisthanesthai* ("perceive both") nor *argia* ("inactivity") in this connection, but the thought is surely that of Theophrastus. In what follows the gap it is again difficult to distinguish between Theophrastus and Priscian. In line 5 Priscian is endorsing something of Theophrastus', but it need be no more than the statement, repeated from line 4, that the same sense is aware of opposites, and therefore of its own inactivity as well as its activity; on the other hand it may include the conclusion from this that each sense will grasp something separate from its own organs. That amounts to saying that awareness of inactivity is of a second-order kind, and cannot therefore be the simple work of the sense-organs; this argument will apply with even greater force to the common sense. There is already material for this in Aristotle: at *DA* 3.2 425b20-2 he said that we are aware by sight of darkness as well as light, though not in the same way. He did not enlarge on this, but the suggestion that darkness is known through awareness of the inactivity of the eyes is a fair one, and could well be due to Theophrastus. But the passage is difficult: a) we have chosen the rendering "each sense will grasp what is separate in a way from its own organs"—meaning for instance that darkness is grasped by awareness of the inactivity of sight, in preference to "will have some sort of separation from its own organs", which is less precise. b) It seems best to accept the reading of some MSS *to* ("the") rather than the *tôi* ("by the") of Bywater; then the meaning is that sight (the sense) recognises that the inactivity of the eyes is darkness. Otherwise we would have "would not have perceived that it was dark by the sense-organ's not being affected". In either case what the sense recognises is propositional.

I translate the next two sentences of Priscian (22.14-16), which are not printed in our edition:

"Hence also the common sense, but not each (individual sense) will be aware of itself and its own activity: and if of its activity, then of its inactivity: and if of its inactivity, then at the same time it would be inactive and active as being aware".⁹⁶

⁹⁶ διὸ καὶ ἡ κοινὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑκάστη ἑαυτῆς συναισθήσεται καὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τῆς ἀργίας· εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀργίας, ἅμα τε ἂν ἀργοίη καὶ ἐνεργοίη ὡς συναισθανομένη.

Then there is a comment that is clearly Priscian's, and it is possible that the conclusion above, that the common sense would at the same time be inactive and active as being aware, is Priscian's, for it leads him into the theoretical account which follows. In his lines 21-3 there is a clear reference to Aristotle which is in the style of Theophrastus, but not said to be his. It takes up Aristotle's remarks at *DA* 3.2 427a2-5 about whether that which judges (or discriminates or is aware) is numerically indivisible and inseparable, but in essence separable. Priscian says: "Hence also what judges (or discriminates or is aware) is one in number and indivisible, but in essence divisible, in that it is active in accordance with different *logoi*." Priscian is not repeating Aristotle's words, and could be giving us Theophrastus' paraphrase. The interesting question then is whether the final remark, about different *logoi*, is also from Theophrastus, or from Priscian. Since both Priscian and Theophrastus made *logoi* a central part of their theory, we cannot decide.⁹⁷

There follows immediately a reference to Aristotle's statement that voice is a harmony⁹⁸ (426a27) which is in the same chapter, *DA* 3.2, as the other passages already discussed. It is again not possible to tell whether there is anything of Theophrastus in the discussion which follows, though it centres on the idea of *summetria* ("proportion") which we have already met. Some of the language is certainly Priscian's.

This concludes Priscian's treatment of sense-perception.

IMAGINATION

297-300 We have lost much of what Theophrastus said on this subject because of the lacuna in Priscian. He and 'Simplicius' tell us that Theophrastus and Aristotle held that imagination was another faculty besides sensation, and enquired about its relation to intellect. **300** is a late and general passage which is unlikely to tell us much about Theophrastus.

⁹⁷ The text of Aristotle 427a2 is uncertain, with some MSS having *ἐν* or *ἐν* with *ἀριθμῶ*, which could mean "one in number". Editors have rejected this, but Priscian here (line 22) has *ἀριθμῶ μὲν ἐν*, which might support that reading; against that *ἐν* is necessary for the sense, but it is not so in Aristotle.

⁹⁸ The reading is uncertain, but only this makes sense, and it is what Priscian read.

- 297** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1 49-2.1 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 22.33-4 and 23.4-5 Bywater)

Gerard Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*, Galway University Press 1988 34-7.

The gap in the line numbers is due to the fact that the heading of the next section was inserted on p. 23 of Bywater's edition of Priscian, between our lines 2 and 3 (See **265** 1e). There is nothing missing in the text. And we are still with the fifth book of Theophrastus' *Physics*.

Phantasia ("imagination") had a variety of meanings for different philosophical schools, but Theophrastus is here following Aristotle and for him the sense was similar to, though not identical with, our "imagination". I therefore use that term here. All we can get from this passage is that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in discussing imagination after perception.

In what follows this Priscian gives his own summary, in his own language, of Aristotle *DA* 3.3 428a19-28. Since he himself held in a strong form, following Iamblichus, that *phantasia* was a separate faculty existing alongside sense, even his statement here that Theophrastus held a similar view may slightly misrepresent him. Since so little of Theophrastus' account survives we cannot tell. Except for **300** from the very late Denis the Carthusian, our other evidence comes either from Priscian himself or from the *Commentary on DA* of 'Simplicius' (**298A**), the views in which are very close to those of Priscian, and from Sextus Empiricus, who is primarily concerned with epistemology (**301A**)

- 298A** Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.9 432a15 (*CAG* vol.11 p.286,27-32 Hayduck)

- 298B** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.6 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 29.3-6 Bywater)

H.J. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on Phantasia', *Review of Metaphysics* 31 1977 p.242-57. Watson, see **297**. Huby and Steel (1997). Blumenthal (1996) 160-2.

- 298A** See on **279** for the question of authenticity.
In Aristotle's discussions imagination comes between sense and intellect. Throughout philosophy there has tended to be a fundamental

distinction between sense and intellect or reason. Imagination is a link between them and if it is seen as a separate entity the question where it stands arises. This did not interest Aristotle, but it was of great interest to the Neoplatonists, as Henry Blumenthal has shown (248-52). Since our evidence comes entirely from Neoplatonic sources, we must view it with some caution, but unless they are grossly misleading Theophrastus himself did start asking such questions. The statement of 'Simplicius' with its actual reference to the *Physics* is sufficient for this. It is probably correct to take the *Physics* here as including *On the Soul* (See 307A lines 20-1).

Our author is discussing the passage where Aristotle asks whether there is a separate part of the soul concerned with movement. Aristotle's vocabulary is not stable. In line 432a16 he speaks of *dianoia* ("understanding"), and in line 18 of *nous* ("intellect") as if he regards the terms as interchangeable. Further, Themistius *PDA* 88.14-15 says we need not be concerned if one and the same thing is called *nous*, *logikê dunamis*, *noêsis*, and *dianoia*. Aristotle then brings in imagination as something shared by men with animals, but at 3.10 433b29 he distinguishes between imagination connected with sense (*aisthêtikê*) and that connected with reason (*logistikê*); the former alone belongs to animals. It is likely that Theophrastus fastened on this and tried to fit rational imagination into the twofold classification of intellect and sense. Do we have Theophrastus' own terminology here? To ask whether the rational imagination is rational or irrational sounds confused, but he could have been asking whether what Aristotle called the rational imagination was, on another classification, really rational or irrational. Theophrastus was given to picking on inconsistencies of language, and there is no reason to suppose that he developed any further positive theory at this point.

Watson 56 refers to 531 16-19 (Porphyry), where Theophrastus talks of the similarities between souls of men and of animals in desires, angry impulses, calculations (*logismois*) and sensations. If Theophrastus is consistent that must exclude the rational imagination under discussion here.⁹⁹

The omitted words in line 2 are a reference back ("as we said earlier") to 220.38, where 'Simplicius' is discussing *DA* 3.4 429a10, where similar problems arise. He has much to say about them there

⁹⁹ U. Dierauer, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik* Amsterdam: Grüner 1977 (Studien zur antiken Philosophie 6) 172 thinks that this is not the view of Theophrastus, but Watson disagrees.

too, but they are probably not relevant to Theophrastus. The translation of *isôs* in line 2 is uncertain: “equally” would be a possible alternative to “perhaps”.

298B This seems to be based on the same passage of Theophrastus as that referred to in **298A**. It is part of Priscian’s section on intellect, and the reference back, “even as we have already said”, cannot be traced, but it may well have been in the lacuna (25.26) at the end of the discussion of imagination, which was probably of some length.¹⁰⁰ The use of the word *zôê* (“life”) here is almost certainly Priscian’s own. Since this passage links Theophrastus closely with Aristotle, it adds nothing to **298A**. It is noteworthy, however, that the statement is tentative—“seem sometimes”—which suggests that this is not the full story.

At 29.17 Priscian refers to the possibility that Theophrastus called the whole rational soul intellect; see below on **311**.

Compare **301A** 23-30, where Sextus Empiricus gives a detailed account of human cognitive powers, including *phantasia* and rational *phantasia*.

299 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul* 2.3 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol. 1.2 p. 24.20-4 Bywater)

G. Watson, see on **297**.

Because of the lacuna at the end of Priscian’s treatment of imagination, this is the last passage we have from that section. It is a comment on Aristotle’s main discussion of imagination in *DA* 3.3, and is about its place in the whole psychological scheme. Theophrastus rejects two possibilities, that it is in the part of the soul connected with sense, and that it is in the sense-organ. To deal with the latter first, he makes the simple point that sensation occurs (in the sense-organ) only when the object is present, but images can occur when it is absent. This might seem to contradict what Aristotle says at 3.2 425b24-5, that “perceptions and imaginings (Hamlyn) remain in the organs when the objects have gone away”. It seems more probable,

¹⁰⁰ It is probably only a coincidence that both ‘Simplicius’ and Priscian have such a reference back at this point, and is not evidence that they are one and the same writer, though the other similarities between **298A** and **298B** are interesting in this connection.

however, that Aristotle is there referring to the special case of after-images which sometimes occur when objects are no longer there, and is not making a general claim. (In *On Dreams* 2 459b5-23 Aristotle discusses after-images and similar phenomena where the effect on the sense-organ persists after the cessation of the primary stimulus.) There is an obvious difference between images received in that situation and the images of imagination as usually understood, and Theophrastus is making an unexceptionable statement.

The first claim raises the question of what is meant by *en tōi aisthêtikōi* ("in the part of the soul connected with sense"). This is the only place in Priscian where the adjective does not qualify some noun. But Aristotle freely uses the neuter form alone, as at *DA* 1.1 402b13, where *to aisthêtikon* is given as a part of the soul on a par with intellect, and this must be the sense here. Theophrastus must be rejecting the possibility that imagination exists in the sensitive part of the soul. *Phantasia* in line 3 should probably be taken as referring, exceptionally in Priscian, to an individual image, for Theophrastus is following *DA* 3.3 428a11-12, where Aristotle uses *phantasiai* in this way. Alternatively it might be said that the faculty of imagination can be false or misleading, just as the faculty of sense gives true reports. Compare 428a16-18, where *phantasia* is said to be capable of being false, whereas *epistêmê* ("knowledge") and intellect are truthful. Two possibilities are excluded, that it is in the part of the soul connected with sense, or in the sense-organ, but we are not told what positive answer Theophrastus gave. Since he raised the question of the location of imagination it is likely that he answered it, but we are not told how. Priscian has been talking about the place of imagination in the soul, but his words do not directly help us here.

At *DA* 3.9 432a30-b2 Aristotle says that it is difficult to give a satisfactory analysis of the soul into parts. He mentions several possible parts, and says "and the sensitive, which one would not easily class as either irrational or as having reason, and the *phantastikon* (imaginative), which by being on the one hand different from all, and on the other the same as or different from some of these, raises difficulties". At *On Dreams* 1 459a15-17 he has: "the *phantastikon* is the same as the sensitive, but to be *phantastikon* and to be sensitive are different. Dreaming belongs to the sensitive—but to this qua *phantastikon*". On the other hand at *DA* 3.3 427b7ff he distinguishes between *noein* ("thinking"), and *aisthanesthai* ("sensing") and assigns *phantasia* along with *hupolêpsis* ("supposal") to thinking. Clearly Aristotle was

far from sure how to deal with imagination. In our passage Theophrastus is fastening on a point which seems to make a clear distinction between imagination and the sensitive, and we do not know whether he went on to consider other points. But putting together **298A**, **298B**, and **299** and the passages from Aristotle I have mentioned, it is reasonable to suppose that he did follow up some of the problems which Aristotle touches upon.

In what follows this passage Priscian gives his own views. But at line 32 the approach changes, and Priscian's use of the word *sumphêmi* ("I agree") implies that he regards himself as being in agreement with Theophrastus at this point; I therefore quote lines 24.32-25.1: "And I agree, on the other hand, that clearly often when the body is being moved along with (*sunkinoumenou*) the images (*phantasiai*) and disposed in accordance with them, the images (*phantasmata*) also appear in the sense-organ, but (in the organ) not as connected with sense, hence not from outside, nor as being altered by some bodies acting (on it), but as receiving the forms connected with imagination." Although it might seem natural to take the first half as giving the substance of his agreement, and the second, after *all' ouch* ("but not") as his qualifications, it makes more sense to take the whole as giving his agreement with something he found in Theophrastus. A possible starting-point is Aristotle, *On Dreams* 3 462a8-15, which uses certain phenomena connected with waking and going to sleep to show that there are imaginative movements in the sense-organs. Theophrastus may have spelled out the implications of this to emphasize the part played by imagination in affecting those organs. It remains likely, however, that he is concerned with some rare phenomena, and not giving a general account of imagination and sense. On the other hand Priscian, right at the beginning (1.18-19), refers to imagination as taking the initiative in stimulating the sense-organ—unlike sense, which needs the object as well—(using the word *sunkinein* as in 24.32). He is clearly making a general claim there. Priscian continues with his exposition of his own views to the point where the lacuna occurs and the end of the discussion of imagination is lost. In the course of it he refers to Aristotle's difficult discussion of the part played by imagination in our seeing the sun as a foot across (*DA* 3.3 428b7, *On Dreams* 1 458b28), but it is not possible to tell whether he is here following Theophrastus. Watson, however, 35, takes 25.10-26 as giving Theophrastus' reply to Aristotle: "The phantasia can make the wrong projection even though the

sense intake is right: but the faculty of *phantasia* (*to phantastikon*) may also be confronted on occasion with objectively wrong input from sense-objects. and it must then get the truth from *phantasia*—as for instance when we see the sun as a foot wide but must reckon it to be (*phantazometha*) many times the size of the earth by following the laws of geometry.” Theophrastus rejects Aristotle’s dilemma thus: “There is not *aisthêsis* of the *phantasmata*, because *aisthêsis* is concerned with the objects of sense-perception, and the *phantasmata* are the products of the projection of *phantasia*. It is not impossible for the subject to have true and false views about the same object as, for example, the sun, since he is receiving the opposed views from different faculties” (Watson’s rendering of 15-20). ‘*phantasia*’ is here being used as a power of projecting and comparing images as in *DA* 3.7 431a14-15: “a succession of such images rolled past the mind’s eye by *phantasia* will make it clear that the size of an object diminishes with the distance of the perceiver from it—this is the reference to the laws, or necessities, of geometry. The fact of plurality will by itself reveal the deceptiveness or not of the impressions.”¹⁰¹

A passage in Stobaeus, *Anth.* 1.58 p.497 Wachsmuth, purports to give Aristotle’s views on *phantasia* and the criterion. It cannot in fact be about Aristotle, but, as with other similar passages, probably gives early Peripatetic views. It was assigned by Diels to Arius Didymus¹⁰² (fr.16 p.456), and has been drastically compressed in transit. It opens with the statement that *phantasia* is a kind of affect (*pathos ti*) and a movement resulting from sensation when actualised. ... The name extends to all the senses and the movements of the understanding (*dianoêtikas*), which are called *phantasiai* homonymously. (See n.110)

The first part is clearly about individual images, as in 299.3, and has no parallel in our Theophrastus. It is also difficult to accept an equating of affect and movement, though it might come from a careless reading of the source of 301A. But just possibly Theophrastus did say that a *phantasia* of this kind was an affect. For the rest of this passage see on 301.

¹⁰¹ Watson 123: Proclus *In Tim.* 1 250,24-5 takes up the same point, perhaps from Theophrastus.

¹⁰² For whom see Runia (1996). The whole question of Arius Didymus has been reopened by Göransson (1995).

- 300** Denis the Carthusian, *Commentary on Boethius' books On the Consolation of Philosophy* 2.4.14 (vol.26 p.218aB-bB ed. 1896-1913)

Denis the Carthusian is a late source, but on the test of comparisons with Thomas Aquinas he at least gives a reliable account of his immediate sources. See Overview: Sources. The context here is his report that views differed over whether the soul, for Aristotle, was mortal or immortal. But all parties agreed that for him the intellect was immortal, so that there was a difficulty for those who held that the soul was mortal. Theophrastus is listed with a mixed group of Greeks and Arabic writers who held that Aristotle thought that the soul was mortal.

Since the passage summarises the views of so many people, we must treat it with caution, and we may fairly assume that Denis' knowledge of Theophrastus came solely from some of those listed. He is looking back to the Averroist controversies of the thirteenth century, as is shown by the list of those who held that the soul is immortal: Avicenna, Ghazali, Farabi, Alkindi, Albumazar¹⁰³ 'Maurus' among Arabic writers, and Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, Giles of Rome (1247-1316) and Ulrich of Strasburg among the Latins. But William of Paris¹⁰⁴ and many others held the opposite view, while Henry said that you could not decide. (This Henry may be either Henry of Harclay or Henry of Ghent).

Of those listed with Theophrastus Averroes is an important source for Theophrastus' views on the intellect (See **308AB**, **309AB**, **321**, **324**, **325**). He does not, however, appear to have ascribed to Theophrastus the views reported here. Indeed in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* he says that Theophrastus and Themistius held that the material intellect survives (See **324**, but also **308B**). For Alexander of Aphrodisias see n.42. Themistius' extant *PDA* is one of our main sources for Theophrastus' views on the intellect (See **307A** and **320AB**). They come in a section in which Themistius appears to be giving his own views, though it cannot be ruled out that he is sometimes using Theophrastus without naming him. In any case some later writers seem to have taken it that this was the case, and this

¹⁰³ Abū-Maʿṣar al-Balḥī (10/viii/787-9/iii/886), famous Baghdad astrologer during the early 'Abbāsids, widely translated into Latin and very influential in the West. See David Pingree, *Encyclopedia Iranica* I 337-40, and the edition of his *Introduction to Astrology* by Charles Burnett (Leiden: Brill 1995) (DG). 'Maurus' here means no more than 'Arab'.

¹⁰⁴ William of Auvergne c.1180-1249 Bishop of Paris 1228-49.

passage from Denis is an example. Our lines 17-18 resemble Themistius' words: "this potential intellect, when it receives its own form with the productive intellect shining upon it" (109.4-5). It seems probable from this survey that Themistius is one immediate source for Denis, and that Theophrastus is mentioned only because he was quoted by Themistius in the vicinity of the passage given above. If that were all, we could ignore it. There is, however, some similarity between this passage and **270**, and in both Aristotle's *DGA* is brought in. It could be, therefore, that material used by Albert there is also behind some of what we have here.

The view stated here is that a) the soul is mortal, b) the intellect is immortal; there must therefore be a problem about their relationship. This was solved by saying that the highest power of the soul was the passive intellect, identified by some with the *potentia cogitativa* ("power of thought") and by others with the *potentia imaginativa* ("power of imagination"). We may perhaps connect this with **298AB**, and identify the *potentia cogitativa* with *dianoia* ("understanding" or "thought"), and the *potentia imaginativa* with imagination. Themistius has a complicated theory about the passive intellect, fastening on Aristotle's difficult words at the end of *DA* 3.5 that the passive intellect is perishable, distinguishing it from the potential intellect, and identifying it with the common (thing) of 1.4 408b28-9, which also perishes. He quotes the relevant passages at length, and wrestles with the problems involved; it is not his fault that the result is not entirely coherent. That it is his own theory is indicated by 108.28-30 (= **320A** 11-12) where, having quoted Theophrastus, he says, "From all this it is clear that it is not a bad idea of ours that with them (Aristotle and Theophrastus) there is another intellect, the passive and perishable." It seems unlikely that Theophrastus said any of this, because if he had done so Themistius would have brought him in as supporting evidence. All we can conclude from **270**, **298AB**, and **300** is that Theophrastus evinced some concern about the divisions within the soul above the level of sense. Avempace (Avempote) is the Latinized form of Ibn-Bājja, whose full name was Abū-Bakr Muḥammad ibn-Yaḥyā ibn-aṣ-Ṣā'ig, d.1139; see D.M. Dunlop in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. III 728-9 s.n. Ibn Bājdja. No Latin translation of his work has survived, but some may have existed.¹⁰⁵ He may have been known through the quotations from him in Averroes, though those

¹⁰⁵ Charles Burnett (private communication) would like more evidence for this.

in Albert, who mentions him frequently, differ from those in the published Latin translations of Averroes. His work on the soul has survived in Arabic and was published and translated into English by M.S. Hasan Ma'sumi, *Ibn Bājjah's 'Ilm al-Nafs*, English Translation and Notes, Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society 1961. His *Treatise on the Contact of the (Active) Intellect with Man* is given in *Al-Andalus* 7 (1942) 1-47 in Arabic text and Spanish translation. We have no evidence that he mentioned Theophrastus.

A certain Abubacher is also frequently mentioned by Albert the Great. Arabists identify him with Avempace, but Denis here, and Albert frequently, mention him alongside Avempace as someone different.

See on 301A for further discussion of *ordo*.

342-4 should be mentioned here, as related to psychology. They are from the *Light of the Soul* and are on dreams, but of very doubtful value. See Sharples (1995) 22-4. There is also a passage in Priscian's *Answers to Chosroes*, for which see Overview: Sources, chap 3 (*Suppl. Arist.* 1.2 3 p.62.7-28) which Bywater thinks might be from Theophrastus: "It seems also to be amazing that we remember on awaking those *phantasmata* which occur in sleep, but of those things which we do when awake we have no *phantasia* or memory in sleep. The reason is that memories are either of the things we sense or which are seen in *phantasia*: but neither occurs in sleep. For when asleep we do not sense, and of those things which are done in reality there is no *phantasticum*, and so in consequence no dream either. Of those things which happen in sleep there are some (which happen) not only from some *phantasia* but also by another passion, just as those who are hungry or thirsty or even satisfied with food seem to chew. But if sometimes those who are asleep have a memory of *phantasmata*, yet they do not know what has been done by them: for neither do they perform any other movements likely to wake them nor do they remember (things) like changes (*conversiones*) of mind or ecstasies or afflictions or other things likely to stir them up. For when many particles are at work they seem to sense by taste and touch and hearing, and believe that they are thirsty and run to the springs, and in consequence make an attack on (the) other passions. But fittingly and according to the time or some sort of position of the body and way of lying the dreams become more troubled or more pure. For round spring and autumn they are turbid and false, as if immediately

from their food. But in the morning pure, with the disturbances stopping. And again those who are on their backs dream, but those sleeping on their faces are in a good position i.e. they dream less.”

It can be argued however that the source is not Theophrastus but Aristotle. The latter in his *On Sleep* 2 456a27-9 refers to a discussion in his own *Problems*—now lost—about why men remember their dreams when awake, but not their “waking acts” (ἐγρηγορικὰς πράξεις). The context includes a reference to sleep-walking, so that these waking acts should be seen as the acts of a sleep-walker. Now the opening words of the above passage include *eorum quae agimus vigilantes nullam in somnis phantasiam aut memoriam habemus* which appears to include the fact that we do not remember in sleep what we have done when awake, but what follows is better seen as an answer to Aristotle’s problem. Since Priscian frequently took material from Aristotle this could be an excerpt from the lost *Problems*, and we should perhaps remove the words *in somnis phantasiam aut* from our quotation.

The end of our passage resembles 341: see Sharples (1995) on that.

Earlier, chap.2 p.57.10-58.25, another passage possibly from Theophrastus, is mainly on the physiology of sleep, being a reply to the question whether sleep is hot or cold, but includes: “But some things are connected with spirit (i.e. *pneuma*): then they sleep and remember without any sensation or intelligence of phantasmata, and when sleeping they are more contemplative and more capable of discovering true things than when awake (57.14-17).

EPISTEMOLOGY

301-306 This is a mixed bag. Sextus gives us a rich empiricist account similar to that of Aristotle in *PA* 2.19, partially confirmed by Clement. Cicero’s evidence is mainly negative, and the three passages from Albert are interesting but of uncertain value. **306** fits in with nothing else and its value is also uncertain.

301A Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.216-26 (*BT* vol.2 p.52.9-54.5 Mutschmann)

P.M. Huby, ‘Theophrastus and the Criterion’ in Pamela Huby and Gordon Neal, *The Criterion of Truth*, Liverpool University Press 1989 107-22. A.A.Long, ‘Ptolemy on the Criterion: an Epistemology for the

Practising Scientist' *ibid.* 151-178. Tarrant (1985). R. Lefebvre, 'Aristote, l'imagination et le phénomène: l'interprétation de Martha Craven Nussbaum' *Phronesis* 37 1992 22-45.

Sextus Empiricus (c.200 A.D.) included in his sceptical writings a section on "the criterion" in which he considered philosophers from Thales onwards, even though none of those earlier than Theophrastus had used the term criterion¹⁰⁶ in this connection. He places Theophrastus—actually "those surrounding Aristotle and Theophrastus"—between Epicurus and the Stoics.¹⁰⁷ Tarrant 108-10 suggests that Sextus drew this material from Antiochus: if so, or if he drew on another intermediate source,¹⁰⁸ he need have had no direct knowledge of Theophrastus, and we should not look for Theophrastus' own words here, though some of the technical terms may be his.

It is an open question whether Theophrastus spoke of a criterion.¹⁰⁹ Since Aristotle did not, but Epicurus and the Stoics did, Theophrastus might have done so, but we have no evidence apart from this passage of Sextus.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Arius Didymus fr. phys. 16, as reported by Stobaeus, did ascribe an account of criteria to Aristotle: "the criteria of knowledge of these are intellect and sense". But this is a mistake, like much else in Arius, and reports Peripatetic views. See n. 110.

¹⁰⁷ *hoi peri X* is a difficult Greek expression which has been taken to be a periphrastic way of referring to X, but in this context it seems better to take it as referring to the Peripatetic school in general but also to Theophrastus in particular. The views described are not those of Aristotle, and are unlikely to be those of any Peripatetic other than Theophrastus.

¹⁰⁸ At p.154 n.62 Tarrant is non-committal: "The purpose of *Math.* 7.219-25 in some earlier source had surely been to relate the activities of memory, thought, concept-building, and knowledge to initial evident sensations, upon which all were thought to rely. The conclusion at 7.226 in which more originality may be attributed to Antiochus himself ... still emphasized the necessity of reliable sense-data for the mind to work with." The earlier source must then be prior to Antiochus. But J.Barnes, 'Antiochus of Ascalon' in *Philosophia Togata* 1 (edd. Miriam Griffin and J.Barnes) Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989, 64-5 is doubtful about Antiochus as a source for Sextus.

¹⁰⁹ See Long 156-7. Diogenes Laertius 5 29, in a generally accurate account of Aristotle's views, attributes to him the statement that the criterion of truth of operations connected with phantasia was sense-perception, and of ethical matters ... intellect. This might be based on Theophrastus.

¹¹⁰ We may perhaps adduce the passage of Arius Didymus (fr.16) mentioned at the end of the discussion of 299, which continues: "And the criteria of the knowledge of these are intellect and sense, the one of the objects of intellect, the other of the objects of sense. For neither could sense judge the universal, nor intellect the particular. And all arise out of these and through these." But as well as purporting to give Aristotle's views, these words are incoherent and therefore unreliable.

It may be significant that Sextus' account is not entirely clear. He has as criteria both a) *aisthêsis* ("sense") and *noêsis* ("thinking"), and b) *to enarges* ("self-evidence"), which is common to both. This may be a superficial fault of presentation, but it seems more likely that Sextus, or his source, searched Theophrastus for what could count as criteria, rather than that Theophrastus said something like this. Sextus' words (lines 3-4) that some things are objects of sense and others objects of intellect echo Aristotle *DA* 3.8 431b21-2, but then Sextus has *noêsis* where Aristotle has *epistêmê*. Sextus' statement that Theophrastus said something about *enargeia* ("self-evidence") is supported by other evidence, e.g. **85B** from Syrianus, **90A** from Alexander, and **112C** from Simplicius, and it could be that for him self-evidence was the basic criterion which he applied to both sense and thought.¹¹¹ Tarrant 52 thinks that it was Antiochus who attributed this to Theophrastus, but in view of the other passages mentioned above that seems unnecessary.¹¹² Aristotle and Theophrastus (e.g. *Metaph.* 8 9b6) certainly accepted that sense and thought were the sources of knowledge. For possible conflicts with other accounts of Theophrastus' views see Sharples (1998) p.38 n.94.

The vocabulary of this passage is interesting: *noêsis* should mean the activity of intellect, but we need not press it here. Aristotle's language is notoriously loose in such matters, and Theophrastus may have followed him in using that word without differentiating it from *nous* ("intellect"). Tarrant, 109-10, thinks that the shift from *noêsis* in 5 to *nous* in 8 is due to Antiochus.¹¹³ *Taxis* looks here like a technical term, but it is not used in this way by either Aristotle or Theophrastus. We may compare **270** 13-15, where Albert the Great uses the Latin equivalent, *ordo*, in connection with Aristotle's account at *DGA* 2.3 736a27-b5 of the various levels of soul, which is couched in temporal terms e.g. *hama* ("at the same time"), and in which the word *taxis* does not appear, at least in our existing imperfect text. Possibly *taxis* acquired the meaning of biological temporal order some time after Aristotle, perhaps given it by Theophrastus. Clement of Alexandria *Patchwork* 2.4. (p.119.21-2 Stählin) puts intellectual

¹¹¹ Michael Frede, 'Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions', *The Sceptical Tradition* (ed. Myles Burnyeat) University of California Press 1983 75 and M. Frede, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* University of Minnesota Press 1987 160 suggests that Theophrastus was the first to assume that evidence guarantees truth.

¹¹² See Long 177 n.45.

¹¹³ Albinus/Alcinous, *Didascalicos* 4.8,14,19-23, uses *noêsis* in this connection, but with a Platonic slant.

apprehension first in the order of nature, but sensation first in relation to us. The words *kinêma* and *kinêsis* seem to be used indiscriminately of movement by Sextus. Aristotle used *kinêma* rarely, and in him it meant something like “jerk”. Possibly Theophrastus used it as a more precise term in opposition to the all-purpose word *kinêsis*.¹¹⁴ *epiginetai* etc. must in this context mean something like “supervene”. We may compare Aristotle’s use of it at *NE* 2.3 1104b4 of the pleasure or pain that supervene on our actions. *ichnos* (“footprint”) is not used by Aristotle: he uses *monê* for “trace” once at *DA* 1.4 408b18. *kat’ enargeian* seems to be no more than a periphrasis for the adjective *enargês* (“self-evident”). For *phantasia* and *phantasma* see Lefebvre, especially 30. *anazôgraphein*: *anazôgraphêsis* is found in Albinus/Alcinous, *Didascalicos* 4.13, supposed to be from Plato, but not in fact there.¹¹⁵ “By something” and “from something” represent the Greek expressions formed from the prepositions *hupo* and *apo*, and remind us of similar expressions used by the Stoics with regard to the criterion, but they are not the same and we do not need to see Stoic influence here, though it may be present.¹¹⁶ Again *sunkata-tithenai* is the Stoic term for “assent”, but that too need not be pressed.

The details of the account given here are similar to what we find in Aristotle, but go beyond him.¹¹⁷ The aim is to show how various aspects of our thinking are related, and this is done largely by means of what Theophrastus calls “movements”. I will first give a summary of this part, and then details. He starts with sense. This is moved by sense-objects (cf. 273 where the same is said of both Aristotle and Theophrastus). When this movement has self-evidence there supervenes in animals another movement called memory (of the sensation) and *phantasia* (of the sense-object). A third movement is rational *phantasia*, which results from our judgment and choice, which as potential is called *dianoia*, as actual intellect. This involves a *phantasma*, like “generic man”. There follow from this: concept, knowledge, and skill. The use of movements in psychological analyses

¹¹⁴ It is used in Priscian only three times, at 2.6, 19, and 22. These are in Priscian’s own words, but he is closely commenting on Theophrastus and could be using his terminology. He is referring to a *kinêma* in the sense-organ at the time of sensation.

¹¹⁵ See Sharples, ‘Philo Judaeus, Alcinous, and Alexander’ in Huby and Neal p.248, n.34

¹¹⁶ See Long 157-61.

¹¹⁷ A similar account, based on Antiochus, is in Cicero, *Academics* 2,30.

is also to be found in 271, where, while desires etc. are movements of the body, decisions and speculations are movements of the soul.

The first stage is clear, and we have already met it in Priscian. In the second is a reference to “those living things which are superior and better and able to move of themselves”. In a Peripatetic context this must refer to animals. The restriction of this effect to cases where the sensation has self-evidence raises difficulties.¹¹⁸ Can I not remember puzzling sense-experiences? And sometimes when I am deceived can I not have a *phantasia* of an object which is in fact mistaken? It is difficult, on the psychological side, to distinguish between the true and the false here. But it could be that Theophrastus meant, and even perhaps said, that it was only when the sensation was self-evident that a reliable memory and *phantasia* followed. Epicurus and the Stoics also used the notion of *enargeia*, and we have seen that there is good reason for accepting the attribution of it to Theophrastus by Sextus, but beyond that it is difficult to go. It is however interesting that it is said that this movement of the soul keeps some similarity to the object of sense. This fits in with Theophrastus’ problem about similarity in 273. This second movement is called both memory and *phantasia*, and the sense of these terms is elucidated by the analogy of Dion’s footprint: the actual sensation is like the footprint, and the object which caused it is like Dion. *Mnêmê* has many senses in Greek, and *phantasia* perhaps even more, and we can see the special applications here as a matter of stipulative definitions: we ought to say that what we remember is the actual sensation, but that we have a *phantasia* of the object which caused it.

So far we have been dealing with single sensations and individual sense-objects: now we pass to rational *phantasia*, which is said to be a third movement which the second movement, memory and *phantasia*, has within¹¹⁹ itself and which supervenes as a result of our judgement and choice. This account is difficult. A possible explanation is that Theophrastus is building on Aristotle’s *DA* 3.3 428b10-17, where *phantasia* is said to be a movement, and a rather obscure discussion of possible movements follows.¹²⁰ Some elucidation in Sextus comes

¹¹⁸ Arius Didymus has *kat’ energeian* in a rather similar connection: Arius: κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως (See end of commentary on 299). Sextus: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ ἐνέργειαν περὶ τὴν αἰσθήσιν κινήσεως. It is just possible that our text of Sextus is wrong, corrupted by the earlier reference to *to enarges* in line 6, but on balance I would keep it as it stands. Cf. 422 line 3, and Sharples’ note 550.

¹¹⁹ The reading here has been doubted.

¹²⁰ Moraux (1973) 301 on Arius Didymus, says that the idea that *phantasia*

from the following example: from seeing Dion someone gets a *phantasia* of Dion and from that he creates for himself a *phantasma* such as “man in general”. There is no difficulty in understanding this: rational *phantasia* produces universal concepts. But the expression “man in general” (*ton genikon anthrôpon*) is also used by Sextus (246) of the Stoics, and Myles Burnyeat suggests that this is a case of Antiochus assimilating Plato and Aristotle to one another. He argues that *phantasia*, being assigned to the *aisthêtikon*, should never have generic contents. But in 299 Theophrastus rejects the view that *phantasia* is in the *aisthêtikon*. However that may be, the thought is acceptable, except for the implication that the forming of concepts is a voluntary matter. We would not see it this way, but Theophrastus may be doing no more than contrasting the passivity of receiving impressions from outside with the more active process of thinking about them. The language used also needs comment; first there is a *phantasia*, which, following what came in stage two, we can describe as an image of an individual, and then we form a *phantasma*, here rendered “object of phantasia”, which is generic. But this then becomes *dianoia* and intellect. It is uncertain a) whether Theophrastus himself introduced this distinction between *phantasia* and *phantasma*, and b) if he did so, whether we should press it. If he did, it must mark two different kinds of image. Further, should we press what appears to be the equating of this *phantasma* with *dianoia* and intellect? The fundamental point must be that thinking involves universal concepts. It is possible in Greek to take *dianoia* as an act of thinking, but that seems inappropriate when it is that which can¹²¹ produce the model, and therefore not an act, which is rather intellect. Further, the grammar of 31-3 would lead to the equation of *dianoia* and intellect with soul, which would then lead to equating soul with the original *phantasma*. So far we have been dealing with movements in the soul. But from here on movements are not mentioned, only names. So from intellect and the activity of *dianoia* come *ennoia* and knowledge and skill. Knowledge and skill are clearly not movements, but *ennoia* seems different. It is usually translated “concept”, and, used without qualification, became part of the lingua

extends to all the senses and the movements of the understanding is not in Aristotle in so many words. He relates it to *DA* 3.7 431a14-17, b2-10 3.8 432a8-14, 3.10 433b29 and *On Memory* 1 449b30-50a5. See also *DA* 3.11 434a7-8.

¹²¹ It is possible to see a piece of Stoic etymologising here, in the connecting of *dianoia* with *dunasthai*.

franca of philosophy in Hellenistic times (Long 155). Here it seems to have two aspects, as the simple universal form and as in the hierarchy which we call species and genera, though Sextus uses *eidos* for both form and species. Lines 35-40 are not easy, though the drift is clear: the formation of concepts involves bringing together a number of separate experiences. The reference to “intellectual images” (*phantasmata*) is surprising, but it may be to DA 3.8 432a8-14, where Aristotle is considering, rather obscurely, the place of *phantasmata* (his word here) in thinking.¹²²

How does this all relate to the *phantasma* of generic man in lines 27-8 above? One way out is to see Stoic contamination in the mention of Dion, for Dion is a stock Stoic name: although the doctrine of *phantasia* given here is not Stoic, we may have a rewriting of Theophrastus’ doctrine in partially Stoic terms. Then we could, for Theophrastus, disregard the equating of the *phantasma* of generic man with *dianoia* and intellect, and stick to the doctrine of 23-40 that concepts arise from the activity of *dianoia* and intellect. Then knowledge and skill follow on concepts, and so does *doxa*. *Doxa* involves the acceptance by the soul of a *phantasia* and of the object which it appears to represent. But this can hardly be—or at least should not be, on the level which we have reached, after the acquisition of concepts—the unfounded belief that the sensation is of Socrates; it must be at least that it is of a man.¹²³

Theoretically all this could be dealt with in terms of movements, but it would be excessively complicated. As it is, we have Theophrastus developing the physiological account of psychological matters given by Aristotle, which contained only the two movements of sensation and of *phantasia*, DA 3.3 428b10-17 and 429a1-2, and adding a third, supervenient, movement, that of rational *phantasia*, which has the job of linking individual “images” together to enable the intellect to use them. Finally we return to sense and intellect as criteria, with the analogy of a tool and the craftsman, and examples of tools, the point being that intellect cannot test things without the help of sense.¹²⁴

¹²² Lefebvre 30 has argued that Aristotle moved finally to the view that the *phantasma* came about in the absence of sensible objects in *On Memory* and *On Dreams*.

¹²³ Tarrant 100 finds “doxastic reason” in this account, followed by “epistemonomic reason”. But Sextus does not use those terms. Tarrant also, 108, sees this account of *doxa* as Hellenistic.

¹²⁴ For a more extended treatment of this theme see Ptolemy, *On the Criterion of Truth* 4.1-14 Lammert (p.182-3 Huby and Neal).

- 301B** Clement of Alexandria, *Patchwork* 2.2 9-5 (GCS vol. 2 p.118.2-4 Stahlin)

S.R.C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971.

Clement was a near contemporary of Sextus, but a Christian philosopher. This passage comes in the middle of a discussion of faith (*pistis*) in the Christian sense. It confirms parts of Sextus' evidence but adds the important reference to *pistis*. For Clement this word included, but was not limited to, the Christian notion of faith:¹²⁵ for Theophrastus it must have meant "conviction" or "certainty". Our passage is however ambiguous, for "this" (*tautês*) in line 2 could refer back either to sense or to conviction. Since Clement uses this point only to further his religious argument we can learn nothing more from its context, and it is possible that he has reworded it for his own purposes. "The reason in us" may be his invention, but it remains obscure how he thought that sense came into the matter at this point. There is much other similar material in Clement, which once would have been assigned to Antiochus, though that is now more doubtful. Only here is Theophrastus named, but it is unnecessarily sceptical to suppose that he held no such view as this. It may not be a coincidence that in the text of Aristotle's *DA* 3.3 the word *pistis*, unusually, occurs four times at 428a20-24, and is preceded by *enargôs* ("self-evidently") at 428a14, in the context of a discussion about the definition of imagination.

- 302** Cicero, *Lucullus* 112-3 (BT p.82.30-83.14 and 83.19-24 Plasberg)

F.H. Sandbach, 'Phantasia Kataleptike' in A.A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism*, London: The Athlone Press 1971 9-21. David Runia, 'Aristotle and Theophrastus conjoined in the Writings of Cicero' in W.W. Fortenbaugh and Peter Steinmetz (edd.) *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, New Brunswick and London: Transaction 1989 (RUSCH 4) 23-38. B. Inwood and J. Mansfeld (edd.) *Assent and Argument* Leiden: Brill 1997.

This work is also known as (the sole surviving) part of the *Prior Academics*. See now M. Griffin, 'The Composition of the *Academics*:

¹²⁵ For *pistis* in Clement see Lilla 118-42.

motives and versions' in Inwood and Mansfeld 1-35. For this passage see W. Görler, 'Cicero's Philosophical Stance in the *Lucullus*' in Inwood and Mansfeld 36-57 esp. 44-5.

At best this is a negative piece of evidence about Theophrastus' epistemology. Cicero has been discussing the Stoic basis of knowledge and is here using Stoic terminology and discussing the definition of *phantasia katalêptikê* ("cognitive presentation") as an impression (*tupôsis*) in the soul, impressed from something true, and such as would not arise from what was not the case.¹²⁶ In Cicero's Latin *impressum* stands for *tupôsis*, and *comprendi* for *katalambanesthai*. From this he indicates what the Peripatetics, among others, did not hold: the Stoics held that there were certain presentations which could not but be true, because they had come from something that existed, but others, who include Aristotle and Theophrastus and followers of Plato, did not hold that, and also believed, against the Stoics' view, that the wise man could hold opinions.

It seems likely that Cicero is drawing his material from Antiochus, who is believed to have systematised earlier philosophy in a tendentious way.¹²⁷ In any case the focus of interest is on what those concerned did not say, i.e. the extra clause, "in such a way that it could not have been impressed by something else", which seems to come from Zeno. The view that the wise can hold true opinions is also attributed to them. Since there is no reason to suppose that Theophrastus took issue with the Stoics in precisely such a way, we need not go further.¹²⁸

Carneades (d. 129), head of the sceptical Academy, and an opponent especially of the Stoics, held that nothing could be known, but that men had to hold opinions to live. See now M. Burnyeat, 'Antipater and Self-refutation: elusive argument in Cicero's *Academica*' in Inwood and Mansfeld p.307 for Carneades., and J. Allen, 'Carneadean Argument in Cicero's Academic Books' *ibid.* 217-56.

Xenocrates (396-304) and **Polemo** (d.273) were successive heads of the Academy, the latter being a contemporary of Theophrastus and Zeno. Antiochus tended to lump them together with Aristotle and Theophrastus as representatives of Plato's true philosophy.

¹²⁶ Sandbach 20-1, notes 12-13, has shown that there are difficulties with this definition, but for our purposes the details do not matter.

¹²⁷ For this see Runia, *passim*.

¹²⁸ Tarrant 53-62 includes the Peripatetics in a wide-ranging account of apprehension.

Antiochus of Ascalon (d.68?) as it were refounded the ‘Old Academy’ in reaction against scepticism and was the teacher of both Cicero and the Lucullus to whom this work is addressed. But he was very much under the influence of Stoicism, and on this score Cicero attacks him. Antiochus is discussed at length in Inwood and Mansfeld *passim*.

The text in line 10 is uncertain: Runia 28 no. 7 seems to have read *mihi minorem* and takes this “lesser figure” to be Antiochus himself. In any case the point about Theophrastus is unaffected.

303 (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.3 (vol.2 p.9a6-39 and 10a32-6 and 40-b2 Borgnet)

304 (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Ethics* 2.4 (*Op. omn.* vol. 14.1.1 p.106.56-107.9 Kübel)

B. Nardi ‘La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ inchoatio formae’ *Studi di filosofia medievale* Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura 1960 69-101.

Although Albert’s sources for his knowledge of Greek philosophy have been little studied it is known that he used Michael Scot’s translation of Averroes’ *LCDA*. But what we have here does not come from that work.¹²⁹ The *Posterior Analytics* was written before he had knowledge of William of Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle’s *PA* about 1269 (or earlier). See on **247**.¹³⁰

These two texts, though their purposes are different, are both connected with Aristotle’s *PA*, where at the beginning, 1.1 71a1-2, and again at the end, 2.19 99b28-9, Aristotle is concerned with preexistent knowledge. In 2.19 he asks if, and how, such knowledge is possible, and gives an answer in empiricist terms. But the chapter is difficult¹³¹ and could have stimulated Theophrastus to a critique. Albert (**303** 23-7) thinks that there was an argument between Theophrastus and Aristotle, which is possible but unlikely: almost certainly he got his material from Arabic sources and either they or he misunderstood the situation. Albert first gives Theophrastus’ answer

¹²⁹ See Miller (1954) 57-71.

¹³⁰ But the translation by James of Venice was vastly popular and remained in use until the fifteenth century. See Berschin 217.

¹³¹ For a full discussion see J. Barnes’ Clarendon translation (Oxford 1975) 248-60, and 258-71 in the second edition of 1994.

to the problem of how knowledge is possible, and ends at 19-20 with a translation of Aristotle's words (71a1-2): "all intellectual learning comes from preexistent knowledge." This need not be a muddle: Theophrastus could have tackled the same problem and ended with the same words in a discussion of what Aristotle had said.¹³²

Aristotle's own reply to the problems he raises is that we must have some *dunamis* ("faculty"), but not one of a kind that will be more valuable than our knowledge of first-principles in respect of accuracy (99b32-4). He equates this faculty with sensation, and on this builds his account of the acquisition of knowledge, including the words τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη (100a8) ("the starting-point of art and knowledge") which are exactly rendered by *principium artis et scientiae* in 304 27, at the end of that part of 304 (21-7) which should be connected with 303.

In Albert's two accounts Theophrastus is shown as departing from Aristotle and concentrating on universals and intellect¹³³, rather than on sensation. Like Aristotle he is concerned with a faculty (*potentia*), but it is formal and somehow contains the principles of knowledge. In 303 Albert goes into considerable detail about what he says are Theophrastus' views about this original state, applied to the intellect, not to sense: it is one of *inchoatio* and *confusio*. The word *inchoatio* occurs quite often in Albert, sometimes in connection with Theophrastus (See 376A and Sharples' Commentary thereon). For Albert it has a positive sense, meaning not just "incomplete" but "potentially something and not completely indeterminate".¹³⁴ The doctrine given is one Theophrastus could have held, that the mind is not just a *tabula rasa*, but has certain characteristics which equip it to receive knowledge. But if the doctrine is his he must have expressed it in Greek: what Greek words did he use? For *confusio ataxia* is available, but *inchoatio* is more difficult;¹³⁵ possibly however Theophrastus did

¹³² It is just possible that an exchange of views between Aristotle and Theophrastus did occur. Some odd passages in Aristotle's logic may be replies to Theophrastus and Eudemus. But we cannot treat Albert's statements as evidence for anything of this kind.

¹³³ Modern scholars have tended to take the word *nous* in Aristotle's *PA* as meaning no more than 'intuition' or 'comprehension', but philosophers with a fully developed theory of intellect, like Albert, equated it with the *nous* of *DA*. If Albert is even approximately correct, Theophrastus must already have taken a step in this direction.

¹³⁴ I owe these points to Bob Sharples. J. Weisheipl, 'Matter in Fourteenth Century Science' in McMullin 152 calls *inchoatio formae* "incipient actuality".

¹³⁵ One suggestion (Sharples) for *inchoatio* is *aparchê* (G. Goetz and G. Gunder-

say something on these lines, but using phrases rather than nouns. Perhaps he took up Aristotle's remark at *PA* 2.19 100a10 that the *hexeis* (mental states) concerned are not determinate (*aphôrismenoi*).¹³⁶

There is a further very sophisticated argument on a similar question reported by Averroes in **308A** 5-27, connected with Theophrastus (and Themistius), and in **308B** where Theophrastus' is the only name given, though "other commentators" are mentioned. There is a fair chance, then, that Theophrastus did say something of this kind. Perhaps, too, he extended the notion widely. In **303** Albert refers to Aristotle's *Physics* I, which must be to 1.5 188a31-b8, "nothing whatever is by nature such as to do or undergo any chance thing, through the agency of any chance thing ..." where what is at issue must be, or at least include, a change like that from white to non-white. Aristotle's point is that such changes cannot be from any chance thing to any other, and that the possibilities are limited. It is unlikely that this reference was introduced by Albert, and we may suppose that Theophrastus used it because for him it followed that that from which the change occurred must have had in it something which limited the possibilities.

Closely linked with *inchoatio* in Albert is the idea of formal potentiality, used three times in **303**: the intellect has that in which the unknown exists in formal potentiality, and has formal potentiality in which all intelligibles exist in their formal inchoateness—an expression in which *inchoatio* and *formalis* are brought together—

mann *Glossae Latinograecae et Graecolatinae* (*Glossaria Latina* 2), Leipzig: Teubner 1888 233 no. 31), but that does not appear to have been used philosophically, and does not quite fit the bill. *spermatikos*—*seminalis*—is also unsuitable: we need a word for the state rather than the activity concerned. At *PA* 2.19 99b25-6 Aristotle rejects the possibility that there are in us *hexeis* which *enousai lelêthasin* ("are present in us but escape notice"—Barnes) as the source of our knowledge. This seems nearer to the *latitudo* (*formarum*) which Bonaventure (*In 2 Sent.* 7 p.2.2.1) uses (primarily of Anaxagoras), though in his account there seems to be little difference from our *inchoatio*. Sharples notes that in several places Albert links Theophrastus with Porphyry (e.g. **376A**), and suggests that the route was via Porphyry and the Arabs. But if so we still need the Greek word Porphyry used. See n. 132.

¹³⁶ At 2.19 99b20 Aristotle refers back to 1.2 71b20-72b4 where he has a fuller discussion of first principles. But it is not clear whether these are propositions or concepts, and they can range from the meanings of familiar terms to fundamental axioms or laws of thought. See the discussion of 'primary intuitions' at **98FG** (Averroes on modal logic). At *DA* 3.8 432a12-14 Aristotle shows uneasiness about the status of the *prôta noêmata* ("primary thoughts") in relation to images.

Themistius at 109,4 interprets Aristotle's thought by a progression through the stages of the *Categories* and suggestions about the part played by intellect. This comes almost immediately after our **320A**, but there is no positive reason to connect it with Theophrastus.

namely the first principles in which the intelligibles exist in formal potentiality.¹³⁷

In 303 there is first (1-11) a general argument attributed to Theophrastus, that nothing is capable of receiving anything except from an inchoate and confused state,¹³⁸ and then a particular application (11-17), that there is formal potentiality in the intellect in which are all the objects of intellect in their formal inchoateness. So it is not only the intellect, but the intelligibles, that are in this inchoate state. The next sentence (17-18) appears to say that among the intelligibles are the first principles of the intelligibles, in which the intelligibles exist in formal potentiality. This looks like repetition, but presumably means that the first principles are in some sense in the intellect, and they involve all other intelligibles, but all exist only in an inchoate form except when actualised. The analogy with colours which follows is also difficult. Colours are sometimes said to exist in coloured objects in the dark only potentially, but this passage refers to their existence in bright light or in what is transparent.¹³⁹ Is this a

¹³⁷ Nardi's study of *inchoatio* in Albert is inadequate because he is unaware of the passages which connect the notion with Theophrastus, and thinks that its origin lies with Augustine, who used it in connection with *Genesis* and the creation, particularly with what God did on the seventh day, and the Neoplatonists. He shows, however, that once the expression had come into circulation among the schoolmen it was discussed avidly. We should not, therefore, suppose that the many references to *inchoatio* in Albert all reflect Theophrastus' teachings, even at a distance. I give, however, a passage from his *Physics* 1.3.15 (68.65-71): *ens in potentia* ("potential being")—involves *potentia formalis quam relinquit privatio, ex hoc quod relinquit formalem aptitudinem ad actum: et ita forma, quae educitur de potentia, secundum sui essentiam est in materia potentia habituali, sed confusa et indeterminata* ("a formal potentiality which a privation has left, from the fact that it has left a formal aptitude for becoming actual: and so the form, which is drawn out from the potentiality, according to its essence is in matter with a potentiality for a 'habit', but confused and indeterminate.") At *Summary of Theology* 2 4.2.4 Albert has, from Porphyry's lost commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*: *haec potentia est potentia inchoationis formae, hoc modo quo omnis habitus inchoatur*. ("This potentiality is a potentiality for the *inchoatio* of form, in the way in which every habit has its beginning.")

For formative power see Sharples (1995) on 376A, p.110-12.

See also Helen S. Lang, *Aristotle's PHYSICS and its Medieval Varieties* New York: State University of New York Press 1992 Chapter 6: Albertus Magnus: Aristotle and Neoplatonic Physics.

¹³⁸ There is an implied opposition between what is inchoate and confused and what receives *ex sola substantia* ("only from its substance"). For change to occur what receives must be capable of receiving neither nothing nor everything.

¹³⁹ The alternative interpretation would be "as colours are actually bright or transparent". This would be in agreement with our rendering of *in actu lucidi esse* in line 25 below, but destroys the parallel with "the intelligibles exist in formal potentiality", and does not seem to make much sense. Perhaps something is seriously wrong with the text here.

misunderstanding of *DA* 3.5 430a16-17 where light makes potential colour actual, or is it the more subtle point that colours are potentially there even in white light or in what is transparent, when they are not seen as colours?

The account of the differing views of Theophrastus and Aristotle is preceded, in the gap between 22 and 23, by references to Farabi, Avicenna and Ghazali,¹⁴⁰ and the argument that if a universal is abstract it will not give its name to the intellect. At 10a6 there is: "that which is an object of thought is said to be intellectual according to its being, and it is said to be universal according to its potentiality. And the intellect is not said to be universal, nor human, nor asinine."¹⁴¹ The source of this is uncertain and it is not ascribed to Theophrastus.

After this Albert gives the gist of the differences between Theophrastus and Aristotle. Theophrastus' view, which we shall meet again (308, 314), is that the intellect is receptive of abstract form just as matter is receptive of form, whereas Aristotle held that the universal is in the intellect in a state of abstraction, and so actually bright. There appears here to be a distinction between a universal and a form, and we may bring in Albert's remarks at 310B, where he says that Theophrastus and Themistius made the mistake of supposing that the universal was received in the intellect by the reception of the subject. For Aristotle the universal was abstract and therefore would not make the intellect a stone, for example, but to avoid that risk Theophrastus preferred to talk of abstract form, rather than universal. I postpone the rest of this argument for later treatment, with 314A.

One may speculate that Theophrastus linked the *PA* passage with *DA* 3 4, which is about the relation between intellect and the intelligibles (See especially 316).

- 304 is from the first commentary by Albert on the *NE*. The titles in the MSS vary considerably, and the present editor, Kübel, has called it *Super Ethica: Commentarium et quaestiones*. It was written while Thomas Aquinas was with Albert, perhaps collaborating with him, and after the *Dionysii de divinis nominibus*, so that it may be dated to 1250-2,

¹⁴⁰ These three are also linked with Theophrastus at 323A.

¹⁴¹ *id quod intelligitur dicitur intellectuale secundum suum esse, et dicitur universale secundum suam potentiam. et intellectus non dicitur universalis, neque humanus, neque asinus.*

after the *Sentences* and before the paraphrases of Aristotle's works.¹⁴²

Albert seems to have had as commentaries on the Ethics only Averroes' *Middle Commentary* and Eustratius. But in several cases he refers to a commentator where Kübel has been unable to find a reference in Averroes or elsewhere.

In line 4 Albert refers explicitly to a *Commentum on the Soul*: this seems to be different from Theophrastus' *On the soul* from which Priscian and Themistius quote, and is rather a commentary in which Theophrastus' views are reported. Latin writers frequently use "*Commentum super On the Soul*" and the like when referring to a commentary on a particular work, so while *Commentum de anima* could mean *Commentary on the Soul* that would be an unusual, indeed unique, use of *commentum*.¹⁴³ So the source of the following information is obscure, but the argument is a serious one and worthy of a philosopher of standing. It combines material from *DA* with some from the *PA* related to what was used in 303.

Albert is here commenting on the chapter (2.3) of the *NE* in which Aristotle says (1105b2-12) that men become virtuous by acting virtuously. Albert asks if any *habitus* can be left in the operator from his operations, and gives seven arguments against, ending (106,53-5): "No act leaves anything in what is active, but the operation of justice is of this kind" (i.e. is an act): "therefore it does not leave a habit in the operator."

Our passage is the Solution to these objections. There are two relevant passages in Aristotle's *Physics* 2, 196b17-22: "Of what happens some are for the sake of something, and some not, ... and what are done from *dianoia*, and what from nature are for the sake of something", and 197a7-8: "*Prohairesis* ('choice') is not without *dianoia*."

Albert uses "nature" and *propositum* in this connection, and *propositum* seems to cover the combined notions of *dianoia* and *prohairesis*.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² See H.P.F. Mercken, 'The Greek Commentators on Aristotle's *Ethics*', in Sorabji (1990) 441-2. He describes what we have as a *reportatio* of Albert's lectures, probably by Thomas Aquinas.

¹⁴³ The expression seems to have no parallel in *On the Ethics*. If it means a commentary on the *DA*, could it be to Porphyry's *On the Soul* in five books, referred to by the Suda and by Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 14.10? Theophrastus and Porphyry are named together by Albert at 376A and C. Kübel thinks it refers to Averroes 399.344 ff. but that, which includes our 309A, seems to have little relevance.

¹⁴⁴ Compare Albert's *Physics* 2.2.14 (*Op. om.* 4.1 p.119.89-120.1 Hossfeld): *quaedam fiunt a proposito sicut illa quae fiunt a libero arbitrio et intellectu deliberante, sicut sunt omnia voluntaria* ("Some things come from purpose like those which come from free will and a deliberating intellect, as are all voluntary (acts)").

“Purpose” seems an appropriate translation. There is an analogy between nature and purpose:

nature	purpose
form	universal
prime matter	possible intellect

But purpose is more noble (*dignius*) than nature and so nearer to its perfection.

In the next analogy (28-39) three things are compared, intellect, virtue (in particular justice), and light. The strategy is to point out similarities and show how even in the case of virtue one can explain how the agent can in a way have an effect on himself. This would answer Albert’s question. The accounts of intellect and of light (278-9) are found elsewhere in Theophrastus and can be assigned to him with some confidence, but the account of virtue is not paralleled elsewhere, and we have the choice of supposing either that Albert or some predecessor adapted material from Theophrastus for his own purposes, or that the whole complicated argument comes from Theophrastus.

TABLE OF FACTORS

	SEEING	KNOWING	VIRTUE
a) universal agent:	light	agent int. (theoretical)	agent int. ¹⁴⁵ (practical)
b) particular agent:	coloured object	species	operatio justa
c) state:	transparent (illuminated)	capacity to learn	disposition
d) perfection:	seeing well? ¹⁴⁶	knowledge	virtue
e) instruments:	?	first principles	principles of possible actions
f) particular agent: distinguishes	sight	‘habit’	‘habit’
g) part. agent is...	made visible	made abstract and intelligible in being universal	given standard by univ. agent
h) product:	seeing?	science	virtue

¹⁴⁵ Or reason: see p.105.92 *primum agens opera iusta, quod est ratio* (“the primary agent in producing just acts, which is reason”).

¹⁴⁶ Albert is using, not setting out, the analogy, so that he does not state every detail. While the analogy with light is useful in places, it is the analogy with knowledge that helps the argument to its conclusion; the learner, who is active, yet produces in himself the habit of knowledge, and similarly the man who does virtuous acts can produce in himself a virtuous disposition.

In line 5 *quod est opinio Aristotelis* may mean either that Theophrastus says that this is Aristotle's view, or that Albert himself is making this statement. In any case Aristotle does not say precisely this, though it might be an interpretation of his views, but it is Theophrastus' view.

The reading is uncertain in line 21, but the parallel with *dispositiones sive instrumenta* at 32 seems decisive in favour of *habitus instrumentalem*. *Habitus* is the equivalent of the Greek *hexis*, though there seems to be the same kind of confusion with *dispositio* in Latin as there is between *hexis* and *diathesis* in Greek. Thus speaking in his own right Albert has at 107,13-14 *potest distinguere habitum removendo contrarias dispositiones* ("it is possible to distinguish a 'habit' by removing its contrary dispositions"), which separates dispositions from 'habits', but at 48-56 he says that a disposition in its own nature is the same as a 'habit'.¹⁴⁷

So here a 'habit' is the means by which an agent can work on himself. It is a state which can be altered by the agent, and brought to perfection by making distinct in it what was confused before. With both knowledge and virtue there is a 'habit' which potentially knows, or is virtuous, because it can have distinctions made in it by the particular agent, and this must mean that what is inchoate and confused in it can be made precise by a species, or a just action, just as the latent colours in light can be distinguished by a coloured object.

In line 22 *perfectionem quae sunt prima principia* looks odd but can hardly have any other meaning than "the perfection which is the first principles".

In lines 22-3 *ab aliquo* could mean "by anyone" rather than "from anyone".

¹⁴⁷ We may add (18-21): *per speciem ... inducitur scientiae habitus in intellectu possibili, et sic per operationem inducitur virtus in virtutem motivam* ("the 'habit' of knowledge is brought into the possible intellect through a form, and likewise 'virtue' is made into motive virtue through an operation"); (36-8): *ante generationem habitus dispositiones illae non sunt actus, sed via ad actum* ("before the generation of a 'habit' those dispositions are not actual, but on their way to actuality") (45): *et sic est in dispositione, quae est ad habitum virtutis* ("and it is thus in a disposition, which is related to a habit of virtue") (48-56): *dispositio secundum naturam suam est idem quod habitus ... dispositio est facile mobilis, quia nondum est in ultima perfectione, habitus autem difficile mobilis, quia est sicut in termino motus*. ("a disposition according to its own nature is the same as a 'habit' ... a disposition is easily changeable, because it is not yet in its ultimate perfection, but a 'habit' is difficult to change, because it is as it were at the end of its movement.") Add 308.11-14: health (and *euechia*) is not a *habitus*, but a *habitus*.

In lines 25 and 29 *species* must mean “species” and not “form”. The opinions in lines 17-20 are a) that the agent intellect is part of the soul and b) that it is separate but shines on souls like light. These opinions will be discussed later, on 314.

In Albert, *DA* 3.2.18 (p.204.30-63) Albert has a similar treatment of light and intellect.

- 305** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Causes of the Universe and its Origin from the first Cause* 1.2.7 (vol.10 p.397a9-37 Borgnet) but now vol.17.2 p.32.54-33.10 Fauser (1993)

The new text has few changes, and I give it in a footnote.¹⁴⁸ The only major change is the substitution of *adunatus* and *adunante* for *adiutus* and *adiuvante* in line 10. The translation would then be:

“Their intellect is not pure, and is not united by an established ‘habit’ of knowledge. But some, with a ‘habit’ that actually unites the intellect ...” . There is also *effectivum* for *effectum* in line 12, though the change in meaning is marginal.

This is a commentary in the form of discussions and a paraphrase of the anonymous *Liber de Causis* (See 249A). Fauser (p.V) dates it to between 1264 and 1268. It is clear from the opening that Albert’s information comes from Arabic sources. Theophrastus is linked, as so often, with Themistius,¹⁴⁹ but also, as occasionally elsewhere, with Porphyry. The printed passage is immediately followed by a detailed example using lawyers, and it is likely that there is much Arabic colouring here. The foundation of it all may be *DA* 2.5 417a22-b2,

¹⁴⁸ *ab antiquis Peripateticis, Theophrasto scilicet et Porphyrio et Themistio, et a posterioribus Avicenna scilicet et Algazele et Alfarabio, quoddam inter caetera convenientius exemplum positum est, triplicem enim videmus scientiam esse in homine vel, ut magis proprie loquamur, triplicem hominis scientiae modum secundum diversitatem scientium sumptum; quidam enim non sciunt quod sciunt, nec respondere de scitis sunt parati nisi per magnam scitorum et scibilium indagationem et collationem, quibus inveniunt convenientias et differentias et antecedentia et consequentia singulorum; propter quod intellectus eorum non est purus, nec per stantem scientiae habitum adunatus.*

quidam autem ex habitu ipso adunante intellectum de omnibus parati sunt reddere rationem, quae in scientia illa quaeri possunt. et hoc faciunt ex habitu ipso, qui in effectivum induxit possibilem eorum intellectum. quidam autem, ut dixit Homerus, per naturam boni sunt. quorum intellectus lumine universaliter agentis intellectus sic illustratus est, ut statim audita quaestione qualibet certi sint se posse determinare eam, eo quod intellectus eorum species et lumen intelligibile est et scibile.

¹⁴⁹ Themistius, *PDA* 55.17-35 is an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s distinctions of potential and actual knowing at 2.5 417a22-b2. It involves three kinds of knowledge, but is much nearer to Aristotle than to Albert.

containing the influential distinction between two ways of potential knowing. That passage could ultimately be the basis for the interpretation found in Albert, though that is not what Aristotle had in mind, nor, surely, Theophrastus.

There are, however, certain points here which may be connected with what we know from elsewhere. The distinction into three types of knowledge seems based on observation corrupted by theory. The first type concentrates on particulars and, presumably, achieves some success without progressing to the higher level of habit. The second has a habit which brings the possible intellect into actuality. This jargon can hardly be derived from Theophrastus. The third involves the intellect being illuminated by the light of the universal agent intellect. Albert has more on these lines in 315, where a full discussion will be found.

The reference to Homer is puzzling, and *Odyssey* 8.134 is only a suggestion. Albert can have known nothing of Homer directly, and may have received misleading information from Arabic sources.¹⁵⁰ Alternatively, and better, Fauser suggests that Albert has muddled up Homer and Hesiod: he refers to *NE* 1.4 1095b9-10 and 10.9 1179b20, where Aristotle said that some unnamed people thought that men are good by nature,¹⁵¹ and says that Robert Grosseteste identified these with Hesiod in his translation of *NE*, which Albert knew; Fauser also shows that elsewhere Albert identified Homer and Hesiod.

In line 17 we have treated *species* as plural from a comparison with 317.2 and 8-9, where, following Aristotle *DA* 3.4 429b30-1, Theophrastus says that intellect is things or the objects of intellect.

[Additional
text =
305B]

(Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Udalricus Strassburgiensis, *On the Highest Good* (*De summo bono*) 4.tract.1 cap.3 154-165 and 249-97. (p.21,19-30 Pieperhoff).¹⁵²

This mainly summarises, without slavishly following the language of, what Albert says, omitting the names of the Arabs in line 2, but at lines 14-17 has a longer passage:

¹⁵⁰ For knowledge of Homer in the Latin West till the time of Dante see R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian*, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1986 236-41 and 249-97.

¹⁵¹ Usually treated as three separate theories by different thinkers.

¹⁵² vol.4 1-2(1-7) S.Pieperhoff Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1987

qui per se sine doctrina hoc possunt, sicut patet in Aristotele et Hippocrate et aliis, qui veritates scientiarum primitus invenerunt, et sicut in scientia legum patet in primis inventoribus, et talis aliquid simile habet cum scientia divina. scit enim per lumen intellectus proprii sine habitu acquisito et ideo nullius potest oblivisci nec indiget collatione ad sciendum, set tantum relatione speciei sui intellectus ad scibilia, et similiter est in Deo. (“those who by themselves without being taught can do this, as is clear in Aristotle and Hippocrates and others, who originally discovered the truths of the (branches of) knowledge, and as is clear in the first discoverers in the knowledge of laws, and there is something similar with the knowledge of the divine. For that knows through the light of its own intellect without an acquired habit and can therefore forget nothing and needs no gathering together for knowing, but only the relation of the form of its own intellect to what can be known. It is like this also in God.”)¹⁵³

While this is in conformity with Albert’s sentiments, it goes beyond them, and perhaps reflects the contents of a source common to Albert and Ulrich. But it is unlikely that it adds to our knowledge of Theophrastus.

- 306** (Dubious report about a saying of Theophrastus) *Depository of Wisdom Literature* chap. on Theophrastus, saying no 15

Gutas (1985) 90-1. Daiber (1985) 106-7.

This is from the same collection of sayings as **272**.

The Arabic word ‘*Aql*’ can mean both *nous* (intellect) and *noêsis* (intellection). Gutas favours the latter and thinks that the two types represent the Stoic *logos endiathetos* (“internal thought”) and *logos prophorikos* (“external speech”). If this is correct, the original of this passage is unlikely to be by Theophrastus. Gutas, however, connects it with Ibn Buṭlān’s argument against Ibn Riḍwān in which he distinguished between a thought, its symbol—a spoken word, and the symbol of that—a written word, in order to conclude that “understanding from the word of the teacher is easier and closer than that from the words of a book”, and then associated this theory with a report that Theophrastus and Eudemus would never have under-

¹⁵³ *scientia divina* could mean either “knowledge of God” or “God’s knowledge”. Without the final sentence, “It is like this also in God” one might suppose that it is all about God’s knowledge, but as it is, and in view of what Albert says, it seems to be saying that knowledge of the divine is itself by direct intuition.

stood parts of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* had they not heard it explained by their master. It is thus possible that Theophrastus may have argued in favour of oral against written teaching.

Daiber wants to read "provided with a distinct nature" for "innate", and "provided with hearing" for "through listening", and he thinks the passage is about potential and active intellect. For him the passage is based on genuine material. But in view of the evidence for Theophrastus' views on intellect (307-27) it seems unlikely that he would have proceeded in this way.

This comes after a list of sayings (722-5) which relate music to the soul, so that there might be some connection with them.

INTELLECT

Overview: Doctrines

For sources see pp.1-5

Among the material here a number of themes emerge which cannot be dealt with in connection with a single passage. Thus Themistius puts together several in our **307A**:

TOPIC A: Questions raised by Aristotle's *DGA*. At 2.3 736b28 Aristotle says that the intellect enters (the male seed) from outside. This theme occurs three times in **307A**, but there is a lacuna in Priscian.

TOPIC B; Intellect is all things potentially, but nothing actually, which is in **307A** twice and in **307BC 308AB**; this leads on to receptiveness in **308AB** and the **309s**.

The argument may be set out as follows:

- i) the possible intellect must be receptive and so it must be of a certain kind.
- ii) i.e. it must have such a nature that it can receive certain things (but not others).
- iii) matter is such as to receive forms as particulars **308AB**.
- iv) intellect is such as to receive forms as universals **308A**.
- v) anything must have in an inchoate and confused state what it is going to receive **303**; i.e. in the case of the intellect something of the nature of which it is ignorant but which it can know, specifically the *prima principia* of the intelligibles. These are developed in two ways,
 - a) with a reference to modes and axioms **98FG**
 - b) with reference to words in **303** and **304**.

The general point of the nature of the receptive is developed

- a) with regard to the female "seed" (**377**). See Sharples (1995) on this.

- b) with regard to matter and form **308AB**: in Averroes the difference between prime matter and the material intellect involves a difference in the way they receive forms; in **309A** it is argued that the material intellect must be some entity, for otherwise there would be no receptiveness or preparedness; in **309B** there is an attack on Alexander's account of preparedness; in **310B** Albert refers to the objection of Theophrastus and Themistius, which appears to be that the reception of the universal would be the reception of the subject, and

the reception of one form would prevent the reception of its opposite or a different one. There are some other related arguments elsewhere. Albert (314A,69-75) includes in a series of arguments said to be from Theophrastus and Themistius, that if the possible intellect and prime matter were the same, prime matter would think.

c) with regard to movement (303).

TOPIC C: Questions about how the intellect is related to the intelligibles, and whether the intelligibles are eternal (307ACD and 325).

TOPIC D: Agent intellect and theoretical intellect (308A).

Averroes introduces a third intellect, the theoretical, and purports to give the arguments of Theophrastus and Themistius about this. One question discussed is why the intellect sometimes thinks and sometimes does not. Aristotle suggests that it might be because of the mixture, but the question then arises, the mixture with what? Averroes says it is the mixture with the material intellect and not because the intelligibles are created. See on 308A.34-56.

307s In editing Themistius and Priscian in 307 we have kept each writer's text as it stands in the MSS as far as possible, rather than trying to harmonise them, in the hope that in this way we may arrive at Theophrastus' original words. The results are in some cases improbable, but this method means that we do not lose what might be valuable evidence about Theophrastus.

307A Themistius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.5 430a10-25 (CAG vol.5.3 p.107.30-108.18 Heinze)

Hicks (1907), Appendix 589-96. Schroeder and Todd (1990). Todd (1996). Moraux (1942) 110-113. D.Balme, 'Anthropos anthropon gennai Human is Generated by Human' in G.R.Dunstan (ed.), *The Human Embryo* University of Exeter Press 1990 20-31. B.C.Bazán, 'La Noética de Temistio' in *Revista Venezolana de Filosofía* 5-6 1976-7 51-82. Devereux (1991). Huby (1991).

This is the first of four passages, a long one from Themistius and three shorter ones from Priscian of Lydia. In them a number of points made by Theophrastus are reported but are very much jumbled up. Themistius' first point, about the origin of intellect, has no parallel in Priscian, in whose work there is a lacuna (307B) covering the opening of his discussion of intellect.

We may judge Themistius' methods from a comparison with Priscian, who appears to follow Theophrastus' order closely: in all Themistius introduces six points, and Priscian has all but the first. But the order is different, and it seems likely that Themistius has brought together into one passage what were in fact separate in Theophrastus. Priscian is likely to be more reliable because of his method; he followed Theophrastus, who himself followed Aristotle. Hicks, though, prefers Themistius. If we assign letters to the points, Themistius has abcdef, while Priscian has a lacuna, b, a stated omission, dcef.

Themistius presents his passage as being about the potential intellect, but the distinction between potential and actual or productive intellect is not made in *DGA*, about which Theophrastus was arguing, and it is unlikely that Themistius was justified in this claim. The source of the problem is various passages of *DGA*, which discuss the *thurathen* intellect, that which comes from outside. At 2.3 736b27-8 Aristotle concludes after a long argument that of all "parts" of the soul only the intellect comes in from outside, and it alone is divine.¹⁵⁴ At 737a7-13 Balme says that the text is corrupt but the sense is not in doubt, and translates: "But the body of the semen, in which there also comes the portion of soul-source¹⁵⁵—partly separate from body in all those in which something divine is included (and such is what we call the intellect)...." Here "something divine" is included presumably in the semen, though that is not certain, and this may be the origin of our word *sumperilambanomenon*.¹⁵⁶

The words Themistius gives (2-3) as an actual quotation from Theophrastus are just about intellect unqualified: "In what way is it that the intellect, while coming from outside and being as it were

¹⁵⁴ At *DA* 1.4 408b18-19 Aristotle says that the intellect seems to come to be as a substance in (the individual) and not to be destroyed. Again it is intellect unqualified.

¹⁵⁵ For soul-source (τὸ τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρχῆς) Balme compares *DGA* 3.11 762b16-18, where Aristotle has been explaining how genesis involves some surplus from food. What is taken off in (*enapolambanomenon*) or secreted from (*apokrinomenon*) in the *pneuma* of the psychic source makes the foetus and puts movement in it. For Aristotle's use of *pneuma* see the deflationary account of Julia Annas in her *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* Berkeley: California University Press 1992 18-20.

¹⁵⁶ *Thurathen* occurs later in *DGA* 2.6 744b21, but here too the passage seems to be corrupt. It is about nature using various better or worse materials for the formation of various parts of the body, and if we keep the passage as it stands we have to suppose that the *nous thurathen* also takes a hand. This seems improbable. *Thurathen* occurs again at 745a4, again with a possibly corrupt text, but in any case it seems to have little to do with Themistius' problem. See also n.36.

superposed, is yet connate?”¹⁵⁷ He repeats the point in lines 21-3, but there are problems there. In our translation he says that Aristotle and Theophrastus find much the same difficulties about the potential intellect. But is it “much the same” as one another, or “much the same” as about the actual or productive intellect, or “much the same as I have” as Schroeder and Todd suggest? Since Todd (1996) 133 later withdraws the latter suggestion and Aristotle does not in fact raise these questions about the potential intellect, we should perhaps take all this as Themistius’ imposition of his own views on Theophrastus. Then the latter would have been looking at *DGA* 2.3 736b28 and asking about the relationship of the intellect, unqualified, to the foetus into which it has entered via the semen. Themistius gives Theophrastus’ answer in lines 7-8: “coming from outside” is to be interpreted not as superposed, but as included at its original generation. The word translated “superposed”, *epithetos*, is not used in this connection by Aristotle. Rather, it was used by Theophrastus to express one possible interpretation of Aristotle, which would convey the idea of something added on from outside and existing separately. This Theophrastus rejected in favour of saying that the intellect was included at the original generation, and so explained how it was connate (*sumphuês*).¹⁵⁸

There is a textual problem in line 8: the MSS all have *sumperilambanon* (“including”), supported by Aquinas’ *comprehendens*, but this has generally been rejected by editors.¹⁵⁹ Gomperz’ *sumparalambanomenon* (“being taken along with”) seems unnecessary, but Brandis’ *sumperilambanomenon* (“being included with”) has been generally accepted. We may compare Aristotle’s *DGA* 2.3 737a9-10 where, in a difficult and probably corrupt text, we have “in which something divine is included (*emperilambanetai*)”.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Schroeder and Todd add “to the soul”, relying on Themistius’ words at 98.34, where he says that the potential intellect is more connate to the soul (than the actual).

¹⁵⁸ *sumphuês* is not used in this sense by Aristotle. In places he uses *sumphutos* as the antithesis of *exothen* or *thurathen*, and it is used by Theophrastus at *Metaph.* 6a10 of the possibility that desire is *sumphutos* to the first heaven. See also on 320AB. See also Lautner (n.351) n.47.

¹⁵⁹ Only Josef Bach, *Der Albertus Magnus Verhältniss zu der Erkenntnisslehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Araber und Juden* (Vienna 1881 repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva 1966) 27 wants to keep it, referring to Bonitz 717a60 and 582a13.

¹⁶⁰ We have not printed a passage from Bessarion which also deals with this material because its sources are obscure and he is outside our time limits, but it will be discussed at the end of this volume.

On the next point (307A 4-6, 14-16—Topic B) Themistius and Priscian largely agree. An analogy is drawn between intellect and matter, implying that intellect is to intelligible objects as matter is to material objects. The problem concerns three passages of *DA*: 3.4 429a22-4, 429b30-1, and 3.5 430a10-12, which claim that intellect is potentially everything—or all thoughts, but actually nothing until it actually thinks. In the last passage the potentiality of matter is also mentioned. We have Priscian's evidence for this point also (307B 3-4; 307C 2-3) and Averroes' (308A 1-4; 308B 2-3).

Themistius gives an introductory question: "and what is its nature?" followed by an endorsement of a paraphrase of Aristotle: "that it is nothing actually, but everything potentially, as is also the case with sense, is well said". If this is a quotation from Theophrastus, it looks as if he is endorsing someone else's account of Aristotle's views, but going on to disagree with a proposed interpretation of it. That other person would then have suggested the analogy with matter which Theophrastus rejects, as he does in lines 14-16, and presumably also the criticism rejected in line 5, that intellect is not even itself (if that is the correct reading)¹⁶¹

Priscian in 307B has a different order, and we are hampered by the loss of the opening words of this argument. For textual problems see on 307B. He suggests (line 3) that in Theophrastus' original there was a gap between the two points, but he agrees with Themistius that Theophrastus wanted intellect to be an underlying potentiality. or one playing the role of subject, which resembled matter but differed profoundly from it, because intellect is a "this something" or substance.

¹⁶¹ We have suggested two possible translations: "that it is not even itself" makes a clever debating point, and should be adopted, whereas "it must not be taken in a sense foreign to Aristotle" is unsatisfactory because it does not tell us what the proposed interpretation is. Some support for our view is also given by 312, which may be seen as a development of the same point. Gutas says: "For the Greek text here, the Arabic evidence is not conclusive; one could argue, on the basis of the Arabic text, that the Greek archetype read either *ouden autos* or *oude autos*. Taken literally, the Arabic wording supports the reading *ouden autos* (*fī nafsihi laysa bi-shay' in aṣlan*) as argued by G.M. Browne, 'Ad Themistium Arabum' *Illinois Classical Studies* 11 (1968) 241-2. However, since the phrase *oude autos*, as attested in the Greek tradition printed by Heinze is so difficult to understand that Heinze felt the need to elaborate it by adding in his apparatus "scil. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλαβεν", it is also very likely that the Greek archetype of the Arabic did have *oude autos*, as in the rest of the Greek tradition, but that the Arabic translator, unable to understand it, interpreted it as *ouden autos*. Hence our note in the apparatus, 'Arab. fortasse *ouden*'. Devereux (p.36) also, independently, prefers *ouden*, as do Schroeder and Todd 113 and Todd (1996) 133 and n.73.

At line 9 the question of the relations between the intellect and its objects (Topic C) is raised, and that is paralleled in **307C**. Heinze has inserted *hup'* before *autôn* in line 9 to give "by them", whereas in **307C.5** Wimmer has substituted *auton* for the *auto* of the MSS. The Arabic translation, for which see below, does not corroborate the addition of *hup'*, but Gutas suggests that it could be understood in the way needed to make sense. What Theophrastus wrote is uncertain, but his intention, to question how to take the fact that the intellect is affected by its objects, is clear. At **307A.10** Themistius' MSS have *aisthêsis* ("sense"), whereas Priscian's have *aisthêseis* ("senses"). but again Theophrastus' main point is not in doubt. In the same line Themistius' MSS have *hupo sômatos* ("by a body"), which does not make sense, and we have preferred to read the *hup' asômatou* ("by an incorporeal thing") of Priscian.

The problem is that both intellect and its objects are incorporeal, and what the commonsense question arises, how do they affect one another? And where does the initiative lie, with intellect, which has control over its thoughts, or with its objects, on analogy with the senses? See *DA* 2.5 417b24-5.¹⁶² This is connected with Aristotle's struggles at 2.4, and is developed further in **311**.¹⁶³

In line 14 some people have placed the comma after *noein*, not *mê*, but the senses do not have control over their experiences; compare **307C.10**. In view of the latter we may ignore Schroeder and Todd's suggestion p.114 n.162 and the evidence of the Arabic translation.

For lines 24-7 see the commentary on **307D.4-6**. The Arabic version given below omits *pathêtikos* (passive), but that word is found in Priscian's version at **307.5**.

Lines 27-8 are almost identical with **312.10-11**. The context there is clear, whereas here Themistius introduces uncertainty with his "going on", which may imply a break in his reporting of Theophrastus.

¹⁶² *EE* 8.2 1248a23-31 might be thought relevant. But that is in a very peculiar section of that *Ethics*, also known as *On Good Luck*, in which also the text is in a very bad way. Further, it appears to put the starting-point of reasoning in God, who is superior to intellect, not here treated as another intellect.

¹⁶³ Lautner (See n.351) in his study of Bessarion, takes *archên* in line 13 as "principle" and argues that intellect, as this principle, must be unique and not individual. But in this context, centring on the problem of the initiation of thoughts, that will hardly do. The Arabic translator also understood this passage differently (see below), but Priscian confirms what we have. See also the content of **307CD**.

Since Averroes made use of this same passage but in an Arabic translation, it will help us to assess Averroes' evidence if we give a translation of the Arabic, made by Gutas.

'It is best that we also mention what Theophrastus said about the potential intellect and about the actual intellect. Concerning the potential intellect he said the following:

"As for the intellect, how—I wish I knew—is it) being from outside and as if carried (in)? For, as it is, it is contiguous. And what is its nature? For the claim that it is actually nothing but potentially all things is correct, as is the case with sense-perception, for we ought not to believe about it that it is nothing at all in itself—for that would be contentious—but that it is a certain underlying potentiality as is the case with things mixed with matter. But that it is from outside perhaps ought to be posited not by way of being carried (in) but by way of being included together in the first generation. And how—I wish I knew—do the intelligibles come about? And what is being-affected for them? For it (being-affected) must (occur), since it (the potential intellect) is going to come to actuality as sense-perception does. But which being-affected and which change can occur from a body to something incorporeal? And is the starting-point from that (the body) or from itself? For someone might think that being-affected occurs to it only on account of that, because it does not occur from itself for some things in a state of being-affected and for some principle of everything. It is in its power to intelligize or not, just as (perception with) the senses is in its power.

It is appropriate that it might appear that this too is repugnant, namely, that the (potential) intellect should have the nature of matter with the result that it itself would be nothing while all things would be possible with respect to it."

(Theophrastus also said) other things related to these which it would be too long to relate, despite the fact that what he said is not long but rather extremely abridged and concise on the term itself. As for the concepts, what he said contains many problems, many reminders, and much solving of the problems. These are in Chapter Five of his book on *Physics* and Chapter Two of his discussion on the soul. What appears from all these statements is that they were having, also concerning the potential intellect, almost one and the same problem—whether it is from outside or contiguous; they were trying to specify precisely how it could be from outside and how it could be contiguous; and they were saying that it was also unaffected and separate, like the active intellect and the intellect in actuality; for he (Theophrastus) said:

"The intellect is unaffected—unless indeed it is in a different way!" and he also said

“In its case, being-affected ought not to be understood as being moveable—for movement is incomplete—but rather as activity.”

After he had gone on for some time in his argument he said:

“The senses cannot be without body; but as for the intellect, it is separate.”

(For the continuation see on **320A**, and for notes see the Appendix.)

Apparatus item

Thomas Aquinas *On the Unity of the Intellect* 210 says that he has not seen the books of Theophrastus themselves, but he translates Themistius’ words about Theophrastus at **307A.1-8**. In 218 he says that, on a certain view, the connection (*continuatio*) of the intellect with man would not be at its original generation, as Theophrastus says (**307A.7**)

307B Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul* 2.4 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.25.28-26.7 Bywater)

Devereux (1991). Huby (1991). Huby and Steel (1997).

Theophrastus rejected the view that Aristotle’s words meant that the intellect was literally nothing until it was thinking. His words suggest that there was already, when he was writing, argument about the meaning of Aristotle’s text. Themistius and Priscian differ slightly: Priscian’s “nor in the same way” is weak, and Themistius’ account is preferable.

lines 4-8 continue a topic which was only begun by Themistius (**307A.4-6,14-16**), by making a distinction between intellect and matter. Theophrastus, as elsewhere, rejects the suggestion that they are identical, and says distinctions must be made. There is a difficulty with the words οὐδὲ πάντα νοῦν in line 5, which we have translated “nor of all intellect”, as does Devereux 36. The words could mean “nor that all things are intellect”, or “nor that intellect is all things” which perhaps suits the accusative forms better. The argument would then be that if intellect is potentially all things, all things are it, but similar points are argued more effectively later on, and the interpretation “nor of all intellect” better suits the following words: “but it is necessary to make distinctions”, which are taken up partially in lines 6-8 where there is a distinction between the intellect connected with the soul and the intellect in activity. Theophrastus

seems to mean that Aristotle's words are to be connected only with intelligible objects, which are not material, and that it is only the potential intellect that is potentially all things. The sense will then be that we must not take it that all intellect (is like this). Lines 5-6 make the extra point, beyond Themistius, that matter is not a "this something", i.e. a substance, but intellect can hardly be anything else.¹⁶⁴

There is some doubt whether the words "the intellect that is connected with the soul" in line 7 are from Theophrastus or from Priscian's commentary. It would be consistent with Priscian's methods for him to insert a remark of this kind, but it is not impossible for Theophrastus to have used the word *psuchikos* ("connected with the soul") and Priscian himself did not use it except here, if he did, and in the immediately following commentary, which is devoted to his own views.¹⁶⁵ The starting-point for this is the obscure expression *ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς* at *DA* 3.4 429a22, followed by "and I call *nous* that by which the *psuchê* thinks and supposes". This Aristotle goes on to identify with the potential intellect. Most commentators take the first expression as meaning something like "that part of the soul which is called *nous*", but it could mean "that which is called the *nous* of the

¹⁶⁴ Albert the Great, *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* 2.4 (p.509b21-5 Borgnet) has been put here for want of a better place. The passage runs;

et etiam quod in omnibus talibus intelligens intellectus et forma intellecta idem sunt actu per esse habentia differentiam, sicut perspicuum in loco in quo est color abstractus, idem est actu cum natura coloris per esse differens, quod esse importatur per distinctionem utriusque, et quod intellectus possibilis non est materia, sed forma. Hoc ignoravit Theophrastus. "And again (it is clear) that in all such cases the intellect when thinking and the form which is thought of are the same in actuality having a difference through their essence, just as the transparent in a place where there is a separate colour is the same in actuality with the nature of the colour although differing through their essence, which essence is brought in through the distinction between the two, and that the possible intellect is not matter, but form. Theophrastus did not know this."

This is the sole reference to Theophrastus in this context. Albert has begun the chapter (p.508b) by saying that "the Philosophers" have made four points about the possible intellect, of which the third is that it is rather the place of the intelligibles than their matter. Here he is concerned with the idea that the possible intellect is potentially all intelligibles, and has introduced the simile of the transparent; he has said that the transparent which takes up light in its depths is different from the transparent on its surface when illuminated which is colour, and distinguishes between the nature and the essence of a thing. His argument is not very clear, and if he believed that Theophrastus thought that the possible intellect was matter, he was mistaken.

¹⁶⁵ Priscian goes on to distinguish between matter, as being at the lowest level, which is reasonably said to be everything potentially, and sense, which is said to be form (*DA* 3.8 432a2). This could be based on Theophrastus, but then Neoplatonic terminology takes over.

soul”, and Themistius, *PDA* 94.27-9, amplifies what Aristotle says by distinguishing this use of *nous* from that which extends it to *phantasia*, which seems to support the latter interpretation. Whoever it was, Theophrastus or Priscian, who used the word *psuchikos* here, also seems to have taken it in the latter way. The expression ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς occurs twice elsewhere in *DA*, at 1.3 407a4-5 where it is used about Plato’s *Timaeus*, and can be taken to refer to Plato’s usage, and at 3.9 432b26, where it is denied that *to logistikon*—the reasoning part of the soul—and “what is called *nous*” is the source of movement, and this then seems to be equated with the “theoretical *nous*”. Since the word *nous* occurs in Homer and is famous in philosophy from at least the time of Anaxagoras, whom Aristotle so often quotes, the expression as equivalent to “what is called *nous*” is strange. In 429a22 the juxtaposition with *tês psuchês* is even stranger, so that “what is called the *nous* of the soul” might be better. We may compare 1.2 404b5 ὁ κατὰ φρονήσιν λεγόμενος νοῦς (“the intellect called ‘with thought’”), which for Anaxagoras is confined to men, and not all men. (See also 3.10 433a31: “the *dunamis* (faculty) of the soul called *orexis*”, where we can understand the introduction of a technical term, and Aristotle *Metaph.*a 2 993b10 τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς (“the intellect of our soul”). Bonitz does not list this usage.¹⁶⁶

Theophrastus is presumably taking up Aristotle’s remarks about potential intellect and that in activity, in *DA* 3.4 and 5, and warning against taking them in the same way as matter is said to be potential. This point will be discussed further in connection with 308.

307C Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul* 2.4-5 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.27.3-6 and 8-14 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

Lines 1-4 relate to 307A 14-16 and 5-10 repeat 307A 9-16, with a few differences.

The grammar of 9-10 is awkward. We have chosen to keep the *archê* of the MSS rather than follow Themistius’ *archên*.¹⁶⁷ This derives from

¹⁶⁶ See also Huby (1991) 131. Steel (1978) p.148 n.25 accepts “the intellect connected with the soul” as Theophrastean. Devereux, n.11, is also of interest. Plotinus equates this with “the so-called intellect”; see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘On Soul and Intellect’ in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* ed. Lloyd P. Gerson Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996) 99.

¹⁶⁷ Bywater’s apparatus to our line 5, his 9, is misleading. The text of Themistius used by Wimmer to support his *auton* was itself emended, as is shown by our

DA 2.5 417b24 νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ (“thinking is in his power”). But here we have “in his, or its, own power”.

The omitted lines contain only a reference back by Priscian to what he has said earlier.

307D Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.5-6 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.28.13-17 and 20-3 and 29 and 31 and 29.1 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997)

Lines 1-4 partially coincide with **307A** 10-12 and **307C** 5-7. But the expression “in incorporeal things which are separate from bodies” is not there, and is probably Priscian’s account of the status of intelligibles, expressing his dualist approach to psychology. I quote the omitted lines 28.17-20 from Priscian:

“calling the perfecting from the intelligibles a passive effect, since it is necessary for the intellect to be pure (i.e. unmixed with anything else) in every way. But since it is made perfect also from the intelligibles by way of its own activity, for this reason we would understand those words ‘a passive effect’ in a broader sense and not strictly.”¹⁶⁸

Lines 4-6 must be taken with **307A**.24-7. The starting-point is the suggestion, taken from Anaxagoras, that the intellect is impassible, which leads to the problem that it cannot think, because thinking involves being affected in some way. Theophrastus’ move is to suggest that the sense of passivity¹⁶⁹ involved here must be a new one. So much is easy, but then there are differences between the two texts, and difficulties of meaning. First, Themistius has *kinêton* (*kinêtikon* in MS C only), but Priscian *kinêtikon*, the former being passive, the latter active in meaning. Both can be rendered by “moving”, which has both meanings. In any case Theophrastus wants to reject a sense of “passive” which is connected with “moving” in some sense, and to substitute that of activity. To treat passivity as activity, or even actuality, is paradoxical. Can “moving” in any sense bridge the gap? We have used “in terms of activity” to allow for various possibilities. Theophrastus rejects “moving” because motion is incomplete: the

apparatus to **307A** 9. The Aldine ed. and Spengler print *auton* and Spengler does not comment in his apparatus.

¹⁶⁸ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν τελείωσιν πάθος καλῶν, ἐπεὶ πάντῃ καθαρεύειν τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν κατ’ οἰκείαν τελειοῦται ἐνέργειαν, διὰ τοῦτο κοινότερον ἄλλ’ οὐ κυρίως ἂν τοῦ πάθους ἐκείνου ἀκούοιμεν·

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle uses *pathêtikos* of intellect only at DA 3.5 430a24, which is cryptic.

implication is that the kind of passivity connected with intellect and knowledge involves completion.

Priscian (28.23-5) interprets Theophrastus' words as redefining "passive effect": he says:

"You see that in the case of intellect, he redefines 'passive effect' not as incomplete, nor in terms of change¹⁷⁰ or any kind of movement, nor as from outside, but in connection with activity (*kat' energeian*). And he asks people to agree to his use of the names, because we transfer the names from the objects of sense to intellectual things. And he asks leave to redefine 'being affected' (in this way)."¹⁷¹

Van Ophuijsen in a private communication refers to 317.3-4 where *energeiai* "in the sense of a perfecting from outside received passively" is rejected, and suggests reading *energeiai* also in 307D.6. It would however be more difficult to introduce that at 307A.27, which has the accusative form.

Bywater, comparing 307A 25-6, thought there was some corruption in the text at 5 here, and suggested a lacuna, but we need only suppose that Priscian has telescoped the two steps given by Themistius: a) intellect is passive in an special sense, and b) the word "passive" must be interpreted in a special way. For the thought compare *DA* 2.5 esp. 417b5-9 where Aristotle speaks of different senses of "change" (*alloiousthai*) in a similar connection.

The passages from Priscian omitted in our lines 7-8 are all devoted to his own views.

At 29.6-7 Priscian repeats "and for what reason does it not always (think)?" confirming that they are Theophrastus' words. These take up *DA* 3.4 430a5-6, where Aristotle says that he must enquire why we do not always think, but does not in fact do so. See 311.

308s Some of Averroes' points in 308A are not entirely clear, and I have added a passage based on him from a Latin writer which differs sufficiently to suggest that there may be some faults in his text as we have it. James of Piacenza (308C) is clearly commenting on Averroes' passage immediately preceding the words "And they confirmed"

¹⁷⁰ Reading *tropên* for the *tropon* of the manuscripts.

¹⁷¹ ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδ' ἀτελὲς οὐδὲ κατὰ τρόπον ἢ τινα κίνησιν οὐδὲ ἔξωθεν ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὸ πάθος ἀφορίζεται ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. συγγινώσκειν δὲ ἀξιοῖ τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσει, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ νοερά μεταφέρομεν τὰ ὀνόματα. ἀξιοῖ δὲ ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸ πάσχειν.

Priscian then seems to begin a comment of his own, but it ends with a lacuna probably of some length.

(308A.57), but what he says is not like that. I am inclined to think that what we have is James' rewriting of Averroes rather than something which has been lost, but we cannot be sure. 308B is also from Averroes, and contains some useful but difficult points. Davidson (1992) 220-356 studied Averroes' theory of the intellect exhaustively on the basis of all the extant texts in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin, and may be consulted with profit in connection with the following passages (Gutas).

- 308A** Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.4 429a21-4 in the version of Michael Scot (CCAA vol.6.1 387.22-389.63 and 389.71-391.116¹⁷² Crawford)

Davidson 1992. O. Leaman, *Averroes and his Philosophy* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988. 'The Soul and Essence' 82-116 provides a useful background to this part of Averroes.

The Arabic version of this commentary is lost, but we have a medieval Latin translation by Michael Scot (1220s or 1230s) and a Renaissance one by Mantinus: we have printed the Scot version and given in the bottom apparatus and the notes to the translation all important variations found in Mantinus.

Averroes starts with the material intellect, passes (line 34) to the agent intellect, and ends (line 63) with the theoretical intellect (Topic D). The passage opens with a lemma from *DA* 3.4 429a22-24, omitting the reference to the intellect of the soul: the intellect "is actually none of existing things until it thinks". Averroes interprets this in his own way, equating the intellect concerned with the material¹⁷³ intellect. He develops what he calls a definition of the material intellect by adding to Aristotle's words "(it) is potentially all ideas of universal material forms" an expansion of 429a30-1, which says that the intellect is potentially *ta noêta* ("the intelligibles").¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² For Crawford's Averroes we have adopted the practice of giving a page number followed by the line number of the section concerned, which may extend over several pages.

¹⁷³ This term is not used by Aristotle in this connection, but is first found in Alexander as *hulikos*: it is justified by Aristotle's use of *hulê* ("matter") at 3.4 430a10. See Huby (1991) 138-9.

¹⁷⁴ See Christian Knudson, 'Intentions and Impositions', (edd. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg) *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* Cambridge: CUP 1982 479-95. The medieval Latin word *intentiones* for *noêta* is replaced by *conceptus* in Mantinus' version.

The following lines (from line 5) are not attributed to Theophrastus or Themistius, but at line 30 Averroes says that this argument (which he has just given) led them to adopt a certain view, which we may assume that they did adopt. The essential point of the argument is that intellect differs from prime matter because it is related to universal material forms, but prime matter is related to sensible forms, and for this reason the intellect has powers of cognition but matter does not. They differ in their way of receiving forms, for matter receives them in such a way as to become a determinate or individual thing, but intellect does not. The details are obscure,¹⁷⁵ but we may see Theophrastus as taking further the argument started in **307A** by not merely denying that intellect and matter are identical, but working out how they differ.

This argument is not to be found in what we have of Themistius, but it is possible that other works of his were available in Arabic, and that they did give more information about Theophrastus.

The difference between prime matter and the material intellect involves a difference in the way they receive forms. See on Topic B above.

Averroes concludes (25-7) that Aristotle had put forward a “nature” which is not matter or form or a combination of the two.¹⁷⁶ The conclusion that Themistius and Theophrastus are supposed to have drawn is that the material intellect is a substance that cannot be created or destroyed, and that it is not “this”,¹⁷⁷ because what is “this” is either a body or something in a body,¹⁷⁸ and the material intellect is neither.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ For the problems in the transmission from Themistius’ Greek via Arabic to medieval Latin scholars see the Introduction on the Arabic evidence.

¹⁷⁶ “Nature” may represent *phusis*, a favourite word of Theophrastus.

¹⁷⁷ For more on the notion of “this something” see on **312**. It is interesting that while this notion is in Priscian, and can therefore be fairly attributed to Theophrastus, it is not in the part of Themistius which deals with Theophrastus.

¹⁷⁸ *corpus* may be “body” or “a body”. Matter must be body, but what is *tode ti* must be a body, or something in a body. Scot here has *forma*, but Mantinus *potentia(m)*, which suggest that the ultimate original may have been *dunamis: virtus* appears in a similar connection in line 14 above.

¹⁷⁹ Neither Themistius nor Priscian, our Greek sources, talks of “prime matter”. But it is reasonable to fill the gaps in their evidence with an argument that the intellect is not the same as the matter of material objects. The main difference, missing in Greek, is that “prime matter” receives forms as individuals, but the intellect receives them as universals. The point that matter is not “this something” is made by Priscian **307B** 6, and there the question of intellect is raised, but not answered.

Averroes¹⁸⁰ 34-56 turns to the discussion by Theophrastus and Themistius of the agent intellect as introduced by Aristotle in *DA* 3.5. But he introduces also a third intellect, the theoretical, and purports to give their arguments about this:¹⁸¹ if the first two were eternal, the third, which they produce, is also eternal. But if all are eternal there is no room for creation or change, and so there cannot be any agent or created intellect, except perhaps in a different sense, by analogy.¹⁸² The theoretical intellect is the completion¹⁸³ of the material intellect by the agent, and so is composed of the material and that which is actual.¹⁸⁴ And the agent sometimes thinks and sometimes does not because of its mixture with the material intellect. It was for this reason that Aristotle posited the existence of a material intellect, and not because intelligible objects are generated.¹⁸⁵

The next paragraph, 57-63, amplifies this. The agent intellect exists in us when¹⁸⁶ we abstract forms and then understand them. Averroes and Albert (314A 44-51) both make a distinction, which is supposed to be in Aristotle, between *denudare*, which means “strip” or “reveal”, and *intelligere*.¹⁸⁷ Averroes equates *denudare* with making (forms) actually objects of thought, after they were potential, just as

¹⁸⁰ We have omitted his lines 389.63-70, which appear to be his own comment, supporting the view that the material intellect is a substance capable neither of being created nor of being destroyed, with a reference to Aristotle’s use of the words “impassive”, “separable”, and “simple”, for which see on 309B.

¹⁸¹ It may be this section that Pico della Mirandola (160.5-7) used. See Sharples (1998) 99-101.

¹⁸² Albert works this out more fully in 313, and makes it clear that what is involved is doubts about impassivity and not firmly held dogmas. His words at 186.53-7 are given under 313.

¹⁸³ The Latin is *perfectio*. This presumably represents some compound of *telos*.

¹⁸⁴ At 35-6 Averroes has identified the actual and the agent intellect. See I. Craemer-Ruegenberg (1980) p.52 n.10.

¹⁸⁵ In Michael Scot’s version lines 44-54 = 389.83-390.97, printed here, seem to be continuing to give the views of Theophrastus and Themistius. Against this Mantinus has: *sed ex huius modi opinione eorum sequeretur* (f.140C) (“From this opinion of theirs it would follow”), implying that Averroes is here giving his own conclusions. But at line 55 we have “and they confirmed this” which suggests that the whole passage was giving their views. This is supported by Matthew of Aquasparta (See p.131) and James of Piacenza (308C).

¹⁸⁶ In line 58 it is unlikely that *cum* with the indicative *videmur* can mean “since”, even in this kind of Latin. “Since” would amount to “seeing that”, but “when” implies that the agent intellect exists in us (only) when we are engaged in these activities with the objects, and not otherwise. This view seems to be supported by lines 51-3, and considerations of grammar and argument together lead me to put “when”.

¹⁸⁷ The nearest is at *DA* 3.7 431b12-19, one of the fragments put together in 3.7, in which Aristotle makes an unfulfilled promise to say more about abstraction.

grasping them is receiving them.¹⁸⁸ Albert states a problem supposed to have faced Themistius and Theophrastus, and refers to *DA* 429a13-18, which says, hypothetically, that intellect is like sensation and receives forms, from which Albert concludes that *intelligere* is not only *denudare*, but also receiving, intelligibles. This seems to go beyond Averroes, but is still not very clear.¹⁸⁹ Alexander(?) is clearer. At *On the Soul Mantissa* (= *On Intellect*) 111.15-19 he explains the method of the productive (or potential when perfected) intellect which is in us: first it makes (something) intelligible by abstraction, and then receives something of these which it thinks and defines in such a way that it is a “this something”. For if it separates and receives at the same time—yet it conceives the separation first: for this is for it to be receptive of form.

While the grammar, and Bruns’ punctuation, are not entirely clear, the distinction between abstracting or separating and receiving are there.¹⁹⁰ The argument is attributed to “Aristotle”, who has been identified with Aristotle of Mytilene, a teacher of the author of this work, though that view is now disputed.¹⁹¹ Whoever he was, he may or may not have got this distinction from Theophrastus. The point cannot be found in our Themistius. Davidson 20-4 summarises the Arabic version of the *On intellect* which differs in some respects from the Greek. In particular he takes it that the *aisthêton* is light, as Averroes also did.

64-72 Finally Averroes introduces from *DA* 2.5 417b24 the question why we can think at will, though not perceive at will: he has three intellects, the theoretical, the agent, and the dispositional (which

¹⁸⁸ In the Latin translation of Averroes *expoliare* is used as well as *denudare*. The clearest statement is at 495 462-71: the intellect which exists in us has two types of action, a) passive—*intelligere* b) active—*extrahere formas et denudare a materiis* (“to draw out the forms and strip them of matter”) which equals *facere eas intellectas in actu* (“making them actually known by the intellect”) after they were in potentiality, and therefore they are in our power. This is on *DA* 431b16-19 and there is then a reference to Alexander.

¹⁸⁹ We get no help from James of Piacenza or Matthew of Aquasparta, though Matthew amplifies, or distorts, the point that the action of the intellect abstracts species from phantasmata.

¹⁹⁰ See also Alexander, *On the Soul* 84,8-9, and Accatino and Donini (1996) ad loc.

¹⁹¹ For the arguments for this identification see R. Goulet, ‘Aristote de Mytilène’ in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* ed. Goulet, Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique vol. I (1989) 411-12. Schroeder (1990) 22-31 has reopened the question. See also Schroeder (1995). Accatino and Donini (1996) argue that it is by Alexander but earlier than *On the Soul*. I thank Sharples for much help here.

Mantinus calls the acquired), and he appears to say that Theophrastus and Themistius equated the dispositional with the theoretical, and explained its weakening and strengthening by “the mixture”. This seems to be a different point from that at 51-3, which was about thinking and not thinking: it seems to be about our gradual acquisition of knowledge.

line 66: *iam fuit* (“it had already been stated”). Averroes should not be seen as referring back to something he himself has just said, but to lines 34-56. In 63-70 he is speaking mainly of the theoretical intellect, but at 68 Scot has *intellectus qui est in habitu* and Mantinus *qui habitu existit (seu adeptus)*. Averroes equates that “dispositional” intellect with the agent.

After what we have printed Averroes goes on to discuss two questions about the position of Theophrastus and Themistius, which appear to be his own, but some commentators have taken them as also being by Theophrastus and Themistius. For that reason we must consider the first (391.117-392.146) which is that the position that the material intellect is eternal contradicts Aristotle’s view that the relation between the actual object of intellect and the material intellect is like that of the object of sense and that which senses. And it contradicts the facts, for if forming by the intellect is eternal, what is formed must be eternal, and so sensible forms would be actually thought outside the soul, and would not be material. Further, Aristotle says that the soul knows nothing without imagination: if such forms were eternal, sensations would be eternal, and if they were eternal, either the objects of sense would be eternal, or sensations would not be of external objects.¹⁹²

The second objection (392.158-393.175) centres on a question which it seems so unlikely that Theophrastus had thought of that I do not propose to follow it in its ramifications.

A clearer account is given by Thomas Aquinas **326A**, who perhaps reflects something now lost in Averroes’ text.¹⁹³ Thomas is the source

¹⁹² At 384.25-8, before our passage, Averroes seems to attribute to Aristotle the statements that a) the intellect is *in genere virtutum passivarum* (“in the class of passive powers”) and b) that it is *intransmutabilis* (“unchangeable”) because it is not a body or a *virtus* (“power”) in a body, but before that, at 380, there is a long argument, mainly based on the parallel with sensation, to demonstrate that Aristotle said that the intellect is *genere virtutum passivarum*. It is fairly clear that Averroes is aware that he is being paradoxical, and that this is not what Aristotle actually said, so that the conclusion at 384.25-8 given above is Averroes’ account of his own views.

¹⁹³ Thomas does not mention Averroes’ *debilitas* and *additio*.

of Matthew of Aquasparta's *Thirteen different Questions about the Soul* 7.2 p.122.16-38 quoted at **326A**. But what follows is of interest here: at p.123 Matthew gives three objections made by Averroes to Theophrastus and Themistius. The second, that the agent intellect is related to the possible not as the object of sense is related to sense, but like light,¹⁹⁴ and the third, that if that intellect is eternal, so will the objects of thought be, and so there will be outside the soul actual thoughts (*res intellectae*), are given by Averroes as his own objections (391.117 and 121), to the view of Theophrastus and Themistius given at 389.83-390.97 = **308A.44-56**, but the first, that if the theoretical intellect is eternal then there is no necessity for the possible and agent intellect to exist, since they are only necessary for the generation of species, corresponds to that view.¹⁹⁵ That is, Matthew sees three objections to Theophrastus and Themistius where Averroes gives one view of theirs followed by one compound objection. On the other hand James of Piacenza **308C** takes it for granted that at this point Averroes is still giving the views of Theophrastus and Themistius, but he seems less reliable.

On the mixture see **320A**.

Apparatus items

Thomas of York (d. c.1260)¹⁹⁶ *Sapientale* 7.76-7 quotes lines 13-14 as being the views of Avicenna and Ghazali and Aristotle and Averroes and other imitators of them like Theophrastus and Themistius (*et alii imitatores eorundem utpote Theophrastius* (sic) *ac Themistius*).

1-13 are summarised in Walter Burley (c.1275-1345) *On the Powers of the Soul* 111.2-8.

For Albert *On the Soul* 186.53-7 see on **313**

308B Averroes, *On the Connection between the Abstract Intellect and Man* (AOCAC vol. 9 f.156F-G)

The text printed here is the Latin version of this Letter. There is a close connection between the Letter and the *Treatise on the Soul's*

¹⁹⁴ Averroes as we have him does not mention light.

¹⁹⁵ Matthew says a fourth objection follows, which corresponds to Averroes' second question (392.158-393.175).

¹⁹⁶ For his life and works see E.Longpré, 'Fr. Thomas d'York, O.F.M.', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 19 1926 875-930; D.E. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century* London: Humphrey Milford 1930; New York: Russell and Russell 1964 49-55.

Beatitude. In the Hebrew version the Letter corresponds with Chapters I and II of the Treatise, which is thought by some to be of about 1190.¹⁹⁷

In line 1 appears a phenomenon which we will meet again: the MSS of the two works concerned, both in Hebrew and in Latin, differ in that some have the name of Themistius and some that of Theophrastus. We have adopted the principle of printing or referring to every passage in which Theophrastus' name appears in some MS, or even, in the case of 325, when another authority says that Theophrastus is involved. Since the differences appear in the Hebrew as well as the Latin versions, they cannot be due just to abbreviations in the Latin MSS.

This excerpt is concerned with the nature of the material intellect and its existence as potential, pointing out its similarity to prime matter; in line 4 "the potentialities which can receive material forms" must be those of matter. For more see on 309C. Here Aristotle's *Physics* is brought in, with a reference to 1.9 192a25-34, where Aristotle is talking about prime matter and arguing that it cannot be created or destroyed.

308C James of Piacenza, *Lecture(s) on the third (book) of On the Soul* (p.150.1-152.17 Kuksewicz)

James was Master of arts at the University of Bologna in 1340-43 and author of several commentaries on Aristotle, of one on the "Fallacies of St Thomas", and of a work on Disputed Questions.¹⁹⁸ He makes it clear that he is commenting on Averroes' passage immediately preceding the words "And they confirmed" (57) but what he says is not like that. James can be eccentric, and here though he starts by going through Averroes and reporting his views faithfully,¹⁹⁹ where Averroes says that the intellect does not always think because of the mixture with the material intellect, James brings in the *virtus imaginativa et cogitativa* ("imaginative and thinking faculty"), which is sometimes subject to itself and sometimes not. From the quotations he gives James is clearly following our Latin translation, and most of

¹⁹⁷ See S.G. Nogaes, *Al-Andalus* 32 (1937) 1-36.

¹⁹⁸ Z. Kuksewicz, *Averroïsme Bolognais au XIV^e Siècle* Warsaw: Editions de L'Academie Polonaise des Sciences 1965 191.

¹⁹⁹ But in places he is so difficult to follow that I am inclined to think that our printed text includes doublets.

the time he divides the text into sections with short reports of their contents, sometimes putting arguments into syllogistic form and sometimes raising objections. However there are also some striking discrepancies, some of which affect other parts of Averroes, and the whole thing needs a separate study.

Even here, James follows Averroes in his account of why the intellect does not always think, and differs from him only in that Averroes says that it is because of the mixture with the material intellect, but James says that it is because of the annexation of the imaginative and cogitative virtue, which is sometimes subject to itself and sometimes not. This is a difference of some significance, the explanation of which is uncertain; I am inclined to think that it has nothing to do with Theophrastus, though we cannot be sure. There are rather similar, though less striking differences, between the two Latin translations of Averroes, in which that of Mantinus sometimes appears to be glossing rather than simply translating.

We have printed only that part of the passage where James differs from Averroes, but he also refers to Theophrastus and Themistius at 151.1 and 3, on Averroes 389.71. The whole section to 151.4 seems muddled and perhaps includes a doublet. See also on **308A**.

309s All are on the notions of suitability and receptivity with regard to prime matter and the material/potential intellect. This is not mentioned in so many words by Aristotle himself—the *tabula rasa* is the nearest—and Averroes is the first who connects it with Theophrastus. Alexander discusses it at some length, but does not mention Theophrastus. See the account in the discussion of **308A**. It seems also that Averroes addressed the same question of Theophrastus in a different way, arguing that the material or possible intellect must be a fourth type of being.

309A Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.4 429a21-4 in the version of Michael Scot (CCAA vol.6.1 399.344-6 and 351-61 Crawford)

Davidson (1992)

The basic argument is put most simply here: the material intellect must have no form, and yet must be something; otherwise there would be no receptivity or preparedness. There is then a difficulty:

Mantinus' version leads to the interpretation that preparedness²⁰⁰ is a kind of receptivity, because they are not found in the substrate. Scot's, which we have printed, is ambiguous, but could mean the same.²⁰¹ Grammatically "they" could be preparedness and receptivity, but forms is also possible.²⁰² Alexander, *On the Soul* 84-5, says that the material intellect is nothing but suitability (*epitêdeiotês*) for the reception of forms, like the tablet with nothing written on it, or rather the unwrittenness of the tablet.²⁰³ Jean de Ripa,²⁰⁴ *Lecture on the First Book of the Sentences* question 2.2.1 (vol. 1 p.333.87-100 Combes) develops this by saying that no pure potentiality can immediately receive as a subject any accidental individual form, for it must first receive a substantial form. Since the doctrine of substantial forms is a medieval one,²⁰⁵ we need not attribute this to Theophrastus,²⁰⁶ but it supports the view that "they" must be forms. I

²⁰⁰ Scot uses *preparatio*, Mantinus *aptitudo*. Both must stand for *epitêdeiotês*. Here we have used "preparedness" or "aptitude", but both are to be taken as equivalent to "suitability". For *epitêdeiotês* see Lucas Siorvanes, *Proclus* Edinburgh University Press 1996 p.200 n.23. Both Scot and Mantinus add *receptio*. Would there have been two Arabic words?

²⁰¹ Sharples thinks it means "the preparedness and the receptiveness (derive) from the fact that ..." , but that is not supported by Mantinus. Gutas suggests following MS C, which omits *non*, and translating "for preparedness and receptivity are among those things that are found in a substrate." The Latin *ex* would render the Arabic *min*, meaning "from", "from among". We would then have the argument "and if not, there would not be receptiveness nor preparedness" because these need a substrate in which to exist. On the other hand "they are not found in the substrate" could mean that *forms* exist somehow apart from the substrate or *hupokeimenon*, but that must be ready to receive them. But has something gone wrong?

²⁰² The Venice edition has *invenitur* for Crawford's *inveniuntur*.

²⁰³ There is some unclarity in Alexander: at 84.17 he speaks of the material and subject (*hupokeimenon*) intellect, and equates this with the suitability mentioned above, but at 85.3-4 he says that the suitability is not affected (*paschei*) when it is brought into actuality (*energeian*), for neither is there anything *hupokeimenon*. See Accatino and Donini (1996) 276. See also *Questions and Solutions* 2.7 (Suppl. Arist. 2.2 52.27-30, 53.14-18 (for which I thank Sharples)) on what matter will be if it derives its being without quality and shape from privation and its being qualified and given shape from form, although this is concerned purely with matter and not with the intellect. Alexander rejects the presuppositions of the question, and says that for matter its being matter will not consist in being qualified, but in possessing a suitability and capacity according to which it is able to admit qualities; it will also be imperishable. He then applies Aristotle's distinction between simple negation and negation by transposition: it is the former that applies to matter. Averroes does not seem to be using this material, but the point made is behind what he says.

²⁰⁴ A. Combes, 'Presentation de Jean de Ripa' *AHDLMA* 23 1956/7 145-242 examines many problems connected with Jean de Ripa.

²⁰⁵ See E. McMullin, 'Four Senses of Potency' in McMullin.

²⁰⁶ But Jean otherwise reports Averroes faithfully in 333.4-334.17.

suggest tentatively, then, that 7-8 means: because preparedness and receptivity are not found in a (bare) substrate. This is partially supported by Alexander, but it remains unclear why this should be a reason for preparedness/suitability being equated with receptivity.²⁰⁷ The alternative, forms, will be considered later. See on 309C.

Averroes concludes that the material intellect ought to be prime matter, but that is unlikely, because a) prime matter, in effect, is not cognitive, i.e. it is not capable of conceiving nor capable of making distinctions, and b) (according to Mantinus) how can a thing in this state be called a separate or abstract thing? Scot's version: "And in what way is it said (to be—D) of something whose being (*esse*) is such that it is abstract? may involve being said to be in something, or being said about something. What is the thing in this state? Presumably the material intellect, and its being separate or abstract reflects Aristotle's "separate" (*chôristos*). Mantinus' remark now makes sense: a purely potential intellect cannot be separate."²⁰⁸

Apparatus items

For Averroes 409-10 see below p.137.

Albert, *On the Soul* 205 21-4 refers with approval to Averroes' reply to Theophrastus on how the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of the possible intellect differ.

Albert, *Summary of Theology* 1.1(7) 30.1 (228.38-41 Geyer): "and this kind of generation, although it is without movement properly speaking and is all formal, by the fact that the receptivity of the possible intellect is not the receptivity of matter, as Aristotle said in arguing against Theophrastus."²⁰⁹

This is part of Albert's reply to the problem about the distinction of the persons of the Trinity, in particular about the generation of the Son. He says that in a spiritual creature generation is twofold, by

²⁰⁷ For a further complication see Matthew of Gubbio's account pp. 136-7.

²⁰⁸ Sharples suggests "how is that thing whose being is such that it is abstract said to be in something?" This involves taking the antecedent of *cuius* to be the subject of *dicitur*, and supplying "a form" as that subject. Forms are abstract and cannot therefore be in intellect if it is prime matter. Or, "how can matter, which is abstract, be said to be in something whose being is like this?", in which the antecedent of *cuius* must be *aliquo*.

²⁰⁹ *et talis generatio, quamvis sine motu sit proprie loquendo et sit tota formalis, eo quod receptio possibilis intellectus non est receptio materiae, ut dicit Aristoteles contra Theophrastum disputans.*

way of the possible intellect and the agent. Our passage refers to generation by way of the possible intellect, which Albert dismisses as not being like divine generation. In making Aristotle reply to Theophrastus here as elsewhere it is probable that Albert's sense of history is at fault, though it is barely possible that he is drawing on a source unknown to us.

Albert, *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists* 3.2 (24.57-9 Hufnagel) refers to Averroes, and Hufnagel applies what he says to this passage. But the similarity is not complete: Albert says: "And already before me Averroes was forced to concede this when he resolved the question which asks what kind of an entity intellect is, since it is potentially all things. For what is potentially all things appears to be nothing in actuality. It does indeed have a determination similar to that of matter in one way, but it is entirely dissimilar to matter in its potentiality for reception. And this deceived Theophrastus when he thought that the possible intellect was the same as matter."²¹⁰

Albert has misunderstood the situation. Theophrastus argued about the relation between matter and the possible intellect, but did not in the end identify them, and instead adopted Albert's solution.

Matthaeus de Eugubio,²¹¹ *Utrum illud quod intelligunt motores celorum seu orbium sit unum vel aliud et aliud?* ("Is that which the movers of the heavens or the orbs know one or different things (for different movers)?²¹²") p.251.3-6 Kuksewicz.²¹³

Matthew attacks this in four sections of which the first is: *Utrum in intelligentiis sit dare intellectum possibilem realiter distinctum ab actualitate ipsarum* ("Whether one should grant that in the intelligences there is a possible intellect really distinct from their actuality".)

In our passage he is arguing against the second argument about this: (p.248.18-21) "Just as a sensible being is divided into matter and form, so an intelligible being must be divided into what are similar to

²¹⁰ *et hoc iam ante me coactus est concedere Averroes, quando solvit quaestionem qua quaeritur quale ens sit intellectus, cum sit potentia omnia. quod enim omnia est potentia, nihil videtur esse secundum actum. unde ad esse quidem habet determinationem similem materiae per aliquem modum, sed in potentia receptionis omnino est dissimilis materiae. et hoc deceptit Theophrastum, quando putavit quod intellectus possibilis idem esset cum materia.*

²¹¹ Matthew of Gubbio was one of a group of Averroists working in Bologna in the second quarter of the fourteenth century, himself active 1333-1347.

²¹² That this is the sense is shown by Matthew's illustration: is what the mover of the sun knows different from what the mover of Saturn knows?

²¹³ See n.198.

these two. And Averroes adds ‘and this is necessary in all abstract (separate) intellects, that know (*intelligit*) something outside themselves.’”

Matthew replies that on this reasoning the possible intellect is purely possible, and so different from matter, and the composite, and form, and also from the agent intellect, and, with all this, that it is still an entity, although Theophrastus was doubtful about this.²¹⁴ He is clearly referring to Averroes 409.654-410.663, where Theophrastus is not named but where his question is discussed: “The third question (and it is how the material intellect is a certain entity, and is not some material form and is not prime matter either) is solved thus: for it must be thought that that is a fourth type of being. For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, so intelligible being should be divided into what are similar to these two, that is into something similar to form and into something similar to matter. and this is necessary in every separate intelligence which knows something else; and if not, there would not be a multitude of abstract forms.”²¹⁵

This, then is a second reply of Averroes to Theophrastus’ question, separate from the one about receptivity.²¹⁶

309B Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul* 3.4 429b29-430a2 in the version of Michael Scot (CCAA vol.6.1p.432.123-34 Crawford)

Here Averroes criticizes Alexander’s account of suitability, described in the discussion of **309A**. He says that Theophrastus, Themistius and Nicolaus, and other Peripatetics, could not attribute (Gutas’ improvement on “bear”) those things to the thing that is the subject of the

²¹⁴ *ad secundam dico quod per illam rationem vult intelligere et probare quod intellectus possibilis, qui nobis apropiatur, sit purum possibile, et sit aliud a materia, composito et forma, et etiam ab intellectu agente, et cum hoc quod adhuc sit ens, cum de hoc dubitaret Theophrastus.*

²¹⁵ *tertia autem questio (et est quomodo intellectus materialis est aliquod ens, et non est aliqua formarum materialium neque etiam prima materia) sic dissolvitur. opinandum est enim quod iste est quartum genus esse. quemadmodum enim sensibile esse dividitur in formam et materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile forme et in aliquod simile materie. et hoc necesse est in omni intelligentia abstracta que intelligit aliud; et si non, non esset multitudo in formis abstractis.*

²¹⁶ Matthew’s account of Averroes’ views and the conclusion he draws is unclear, and in contrast with his normal way of arguing. Kuksewicz admits (p.8-9) that because of the circumstances in which he himself was working he has been unable to produce a critical edition. It may be that something has gone wrong with the text at this point.

state of preparedness. Averroes makes great use of Alexander in his own commentary on Aristotle's *DA*; Nicolaus of Damascus was a contemporary of Augustus. He took an interest in Theophrastus, and identified his *Metaphysics* after the rediscovery of Aristotle's works by Andronicus. In Themistius' *PDA* there is nothing that bears on this point. But it is possible that there were other works of his on the *DA*, and that he used Theophrastus there.²¹⁷ Since we have some evidence in **309A** that Theophrastus did deal with suitability we may conclude that Averroes' basic point, that these men differed from Alexander, is correct. Since he was familiar with Nicolaus, Alexander, and Themistius, it is impossible to know from which he got his information about Theophrastus.

line 9: *dicendo* is an unexpected grammatical form, of which the subject is unclear. If the text is correct, it appears to be Theophrastus, Nicolaus, and Themistius.

The four expressions which follow are those applied by Aristotle to intellect in connexion with Anaxagoras. They do not appear together in any single passage, but come in overlapping groups. "Simple" and "not mixed with the body" are used with *katharon* ("pure") of Anaxagoras' *nous* at *DA* 1.2 405a16-17, "simple" and "impassible" with "having nothing in common with anything" again of Anaxagoras, but applied also to the problem of how intellect thinks if thinking is (involves) being affected at 3.4 429b23-5, and "separate",²¹⁸ "impassible", and "not mixed with the body" at 3.5 430a17-18 of the productive intellect.²¹⁹

As in **309A**, the centre of interest is the suitability of the material intellect, which in Alexander was corporeal. This does not appear to help with the general problem about being in a subject which was touched on in **309A**. There are some other related arguments

²¹⁷ Gätje (1971) 64-5 discusses the fact that Ibn-an-Nadīm lists an *On the Soul* by Themistius in two books. Gutas thinks that it is unlikely that Averroes had access to this. No traces of it have been recovered in Arabic (see the Introduction, pp.xiii-xv). H.J. Blumenthal, 'Photius on Themistius (Cod.74)' *Hermes* 107 1979 174 takes the possibility that this work could have been known to the Arabs seriously.

²¹⁸ We have taken *abstractam* as equivalent to Aristotle's *chōristos* and translated it as "separate".

²¹⁹ The eccentric James of Piacenza reports for lines 4-7: *nos videmus Theophrastum, Themistium et Nicolaum et omnes philosophos peripateticos, qui non intellexerunt verba Aristotelis, dixerunt tamen quod Aristoteles loquitur de substantia intellectus.* (p.215.25-7) "We see that Theophrastus, Themistius, and Nicolaus and all Peripatetic philosophers, who did not understand the words of Aristotle, said yet that Aristotle is speaking of the substance of the intellect." This is the more peculiar because in what precedes, (214-5), he shows a fair understanding of Averroes.

elsewhere. Albert the Great (314A 69-74) includes in a series of arguments said to be from Theophrastus and Themistius, that if the possible intellect and prime matter were the same, prime matter would think. And in Averroes and Albert are a set of arguments about suitability and receptivity which go on from the question we have already met in Averroes, about how the intellect and forms are related, to its nature as being able to receive them.

line 4 Nicolaus: this passage is Nicolaus of Damascus, fr.6 Roeper; T 9.2 Drossart Lulofs. It probably relates to his *On the Philosophy of Aristotle*, which survives only in a severely abridged form: of book 10, *On the Soul*, we have only 10 lines.²²⁰ This work is probably identical with the summary of the philosophy of Aristotle on the soul listed in Ibn-an-Nadim's *Fihrist* (T 54(a) Lulofs), but the latter also lists a work of which the correct title is *Refutation of those who claim the intellect to be identical with the intelligibles* (T5 4(c) and 6 Lulofs), which might be a more suitable home for the kind of argumentation to which Averroes refers. Gutas, however, thinks it unlikely that Averroes knew this work, whereas he cites the summary several times in the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*.

Apparatus items

Albert, DA 3.2.17 (203.15-19), says that Averroes, Themistius, Theophrastus and Nicolaus the Peripatetic agree with him that "in the intellect there is beforehand nothing at all, but to pure receptiveness is added actual reception".²²¹

This is embedded in Albert, DA 203.1-24, and is preceded by: "since therefore the intellect is receptive, it takes on any intelligible without being affected and without motion and without time, and therefore it needs a twofold agent, an agent which confers a form on what moves it, and (another which) moves it. For the agent intellect confers the form of intellectuality on both the intelligible and the possible intellect, just as light, being one, both completes the transparent and makes colours exist in actuality. But the intelligible moves it by distinguishing it as colour does the sight. And this is as if we were to say that letters were to write themselves on the tablet.

²²⁰ See Drossart Lulofs' edition of the first five books of Nicolaus' *The Philosophy of Aristotle* Leiden: Brill 1965, x, 9-10 and 15.

²²¹ *in intellectu ... omnino nihil praecedit, sed purae receptibilitati acquiritur receptum secundum actum.*

"But this kind of receptive potentiality belongs only to the possible intellect, and not to sense, since certain material dispositions for receiving the sense-object precede in sense, like heat or cold or things like that." Our passage is followed by: "and for that reason it is perfectly clear how the possible intellect is distinguished from prime matter and that being accepted and receptivity and potentiality and all such are said equivocally of the possible intellect and other receptive powers."²²²

Antony of Parma, *Question about the possible and the agent intellect* (cod. Vat. Lat. 6768 f.163^b).

"There are four views about that question, one was Alexander's, another was by Avempace, the third was that of Averroes and Themistius and Theophrastus, according to what is said, and I believe that (it is the view) of the Philosopher" (i.e. of Aristotle) "and the fourth that of faith."²²³

This work, probably of 1310-15, used the *Questions about the intellectual soul* of Siger de Brabant, and is mainly on Averroes. Kuksewicz²²⁴ says that Antony was the first to rediscover the works of Siger. The question in the quotation is about the unicity of the intellect.

309C (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great *On the Soul* 3,2,3 (*Op. omn.* vol.7 p.181.81-90 Stroick)

In the early *Summary about Creatures* Albert does not mention Theophrastus, and mentions Themistius only twice, though he has much

²²² sic igitur cum sit receptibilis intellectus, sine passione et motu suscipit et sine tempore quodlibet intelligibile, et ideo indiget duplici agente, agente scilicet, quod conferat formam moventi, et movente. intellectus enim agens confert formam intellectualitatis et intelligibili et possibili intellectui. sicut unum lumen et perficit diaphanum et facit actu esse colores; sed intelligibile movet ipsum distinguendo eum sicut color visum. et hoc simile est sicut si diceremus quod litteras scriberent seipsas in tabula.

(11) talis autem potentia receptiva soli convenit intellectui possibili, ita quod non sensui, quoniam quaedam materiales dispositiones ad sensibile recipiendum praecedunt in sensu, sicut calor vel frigus vel aliquid huiusmodi. in intellectu autem ... (Our text)

(20) et per istud nunc perfecte patet, qualiter distinguitur intellectus possibilis a materia prima, et quod passio et receptio et potentia et omnia talia aequivoce dicuntur de intellectu possibili et aliis potentiis receptivis.

²²³ de ista quaestione ... sunt quattuor opiniones; una fuit Alexandri, alia fuit Avempace, tertia fuit Averrois et Themistii, et Theophrasti, quantum ad illud quod dicitur, et credo quod sit Philosophi. quarta fidei.

²²⁴ Zdzisław Kuksewicz, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance: La théorie de l'intellect chez les Averroïstes Latins des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*. Institut de philosophie et de Sociologie de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences (Wrocław, Varsovie, and Cracovie, 1968)

about Alexander, the Arabs, especially Averroes, “Collectaneus”, who is to be identified with Dominicus Gundissalinus,²²⁵ Damascene, Porphyry, and Boetius. Later he refers frequently to Theophrastus on certain topics, as here on (prime) matter. A case in point is Albert, *DA* 3.2.9 (p.189.3-9) which refers to Avicbron’s *FL*: “Avicbron differs from all the views reported above in the book which he called the *Fountain of Life*. For not being able to settle the question of Theophrastus, (who said) since the intellect is possible, by which it can become all things, and matter is prime, by which likewise it can become all things, he agrees that prime matter and the possible intellect are of the same nature.”²²⁶

Avicbron was the Jewish philosopher Ibn Gabirol (1022-54/70). His *FL* of about 1046 survives, and was known to medieval writers after being translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century,²²⁷ but there is no mention of Theophrastus in it. However he does hold views of this kind (*FL* 3.173), to which Albert refers elsewhere (*On the Causes of the Universe and its Origin from the First Cause* 1.1.5 p.10b-15a Fauser) In the late *On the Intellect and the Intelligibles* 1.6 (vol.9 p.486b1-32 Borgnet) Albert again refers to *FL* and sets out its account of prime matter and intellect, but says that this was erroneous (in the eyes of) all the Peripatetics.²²⁸

In **309C** we have the claim that Theophrastus objected to Aristotle’s supposed account (of the possible intellect that it was separate etc) that it implied that there was no difference between prime matter and possible intellect. Albert’s preceding argument stands by itself (See also on **313**), and it is possible that Theophrastus is being dragged in here as he apparently was in connection with Avicbron. However we have seen that he did raise the question and solved it. **309A** and **B** are to some extent supplemented by **309C**. The argument may be put thus: if the possible intellect is separate (from its objects—the intelligibles) in the way that a tablet is separate from the pictures on it (before they are drawn), it can only be in the way that

²²⁵ This has been established by Dag Hasse. The route seems to be by “Toletanus”. I thank Charles Burnett for this information.

²²⁶ *ab omnibus superius dictis dissentit Avicbron in libro quem Fontem vitae appellavit. quaestionem enim Theophrasti non valens dissolvere, cum intellectus possibilis sit, quo est omnia fieri, et materia prima, qua similiter est omnia fieri, consentit quod materia prima et intellectus possibilis sint eiusdem naturae.*

²²⁷ It is summarised by Raphael Loewe in *Ibn Gabirol*, London: Peter Halban (Weidenfeld and Nicholson) 1989 44-52.

²²⁸ On Albert and Avicbron see A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen* Münster: Aschendorff 1903 1 212-4.

matter is separate from the forms which it will receive. For the intelligibles are forms, and since matter and intellect are both passively receptive of forms in the same way, they must be identical. If this was Theophrastus' argument, he answered it by saying that intellect was not passively receptive of forms, but it is reasonable to suppose that he set out the problem before trying to solve it. The point is related to that at **308A** 24-5: a difference in the nature of that which is received makes a difference in the nature of the recipient, and in **308B** 9-11.

In lines 3-4, in a particular case, we have *relationem et proportionem*, but in 5, a general statement, *ratio et proportio*. It is likely that Albert used the same words in each case, and that one is corrupt. On balance I would substitute *relatio* for *ratio* in line 5, but since this does not affect the sense I have not made the change in the printed text. One may further surmise that in the Greek original the one word *logos* stood alone behind both Latin terms.

Apparatus items

Albert, *DA* 179.84–180.2 refers only to “the later Peripatetics” and introduces the section “On the doubts which follow from (Aristotle’s) words about the possible intellect”, in which both **313** and **309C** occur. “The later Peripatetics” here must include Averroes and Avicenna; Theophrastus is also mentioned, once with Themistius (**313**) and once alone (**309C**), but we need not class him as one of the later Peripatetics.

- 309D** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Causes of the Universe and its Origin from the First Cause* 1.1 (vol.10 p.362b33-363a12 Borgnet) (*Op. omn.* vol. 17.2 p.3.21-38 Fauser)

The edition we used has now (1993) been superseded by the Cologne edition of W.Fauser. The text has been revised considerably, and I give the new version:

per se et non in alio existentium est genus unum; omnium autem quae sunt in uno genere fluxus est ab uno principio indivisibili; Deus igitur et noys et materia ab uno fluunt principio indivisibili secundum substantiam. principium autem eorum quae non sunt in alio, in quibus omnia alia sunt, non potest esse nisi id cui prima ratio convenit subjecti; hoc autem primo convenit materiae; illi enim nihil substat, et substat omnibus aliis; principium ergo essenziale omnium eorum quae sunt in substantia est materia. Deus igitur, qui omnibus praebet vim subsistendi per omnia diffusus, materia

videtur esse; noys vero, qui speciebus substat, praebens eis esse et subsistere in se, per materiam substantia est; species enim intelligibiles nullum habent esse nisi in intellectu. et haec ratio etiam Theophrastum duxit in errorem, ut diceret eandem potentiam acceptionis materiae et intellectus.

The translation is less affected:

“Of the things that exist by themselves and not in something else there is one genus; but of all the things which are **in** one genus there is a derivation from one indivisible origin; God therefore and *nous* and matter derive from one **principle indivisible as to substance**. But the origin of the things which are not in something else, [**and**] in which all other things are, can only be that to which the first account of substance belongs; but this belongs first to matter; for there is nothing which underlies that, and it underlies everything else; the essential origin therefore of all those things which are in substance is matter. God, therefore, who gives to all things the power of existing, **being diffused through all things seems to be matter**; and *nous*, which underlies species, giving them being and existence in themselves, is substance **through matter**; for intelligible species have no being except **in intellect**. And this argument led Theophrastus also into error, so that he said that the power of reception of matter and intellect was the same.”

Of these changes the most important is in line 9, where God is equated with matter, and after that is the loss of the Greek characters for *nous*, which might have been clues to Albert's sources. We are left with a Greek word, but now in Roman characters.

Albert is giving what he takes to be the views of Epicurus and his followers, and has said (3.16-18) that some people said that *nous* (*noym*), prime matter, and God were one and the same substance. The reason quoted here is the first of two. The theory is that of David of Dinant, whose works were condemned in 1210, and knowledge of whom comes largely from Albert and Thomas Aquinas.²²⁹ We can fit this first argument with what Albert gives as the second: God, *nous* (*noys*), and matter agree *in ratione substandi* (“as subsisting”) and *in ratione principiandi* (“as principles”) (3.38-4.12), and with what he gives at *Summary of Theology* 3.7 p.109b13-35—an argument based on lack of differentia between the three,²³⁰ leading to the view that God,

²²⁹ See Copleston (1956) 184-5, and, for the Alexander who is supposed to have influenced him, Sharples, (1987) 1197. See also Berschin (1988) 238 and 341 n.127-8.

²³⁰ Albert tells of a disputation he had with David's disciple Baldwin, who said: “whatever things exist and differ in no respect are the same. God and prime matter and *nous* exist and differ in no respect: therefore they are one and the same. *Nous* in Greek means (*sonat*) *mens* in Latin. He denied that *nous* was in the same relation to the intellect and the intelligibles as *hyle* is to the sensibles. He tried to prove that

nous and matter are all simple, and all are substances. As such all are of the same genus and have no differentia: therefore they are identical.

It is supposed that David used Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which was translated from Greek twice before 1210, and he would also have known the *Categories* from Boethius' translation. The argument given here rests on views set out by Aristotle in both works: "The things which ... (are) not in something else" refers to the discussion of substance in *Categories* 1b3-5, 2a11-13, and the reference to genus also has some connection with 1b16-24. Aristotle discusses substance, matter, and subject (*hupokeimenon*) in many places, including *Metaphysics* Z 1. All the MSS have the reading *prima ratio* in line 6, which would give "the first, or primary, account (of subject)", and that might refer to *Metaph.* Z 3 1029a2, where the first sense of *to hupokeimenon* is said to be matter, but we would have a better argument if we had *primo* for *prima*, to fit in with the following *primo* in line 7.

David may not have taken his material direct from Aristotle, for Albert says several times that he followed Alexander. Théry²³¹ has argued forcefully that for Albert this was Alexander of Aphrodisias, but the doctrines espoused by David are not in our Alexander. There is a reference in Albert to a work called *De Noi* by Alexander (See note 229) which it is difficult to identify with the *De intellectu* which we have, though Sharples now suggests that 112.9-19 in that work could have been misread by David as identifying God and matter.

It is unclear how much of what Albert says applies to Theophrastus. Since he makes similar remarks elsewhere, it is possible that he is just reusing his knowledge of Theophrastus to bring his name in here, without implying that the precise argument used by David is relevant to Theophrastus. But we are ignorant of the extent of

they differ in no respects thus: whatever things have no differentia (sing.) differ in no respect. For Aristotle *Topics* 7 said that that is the same, from which it does not differ with a differentia (*idem est, a quo non differt differentia*). But the prime simples have no differentia, because if they had, they would be composite. God, *hylē*, *nous* are prime simples, therefore they have no differentia: therefore they differ in no way: and so they are the same." This whole argument appears to be that of Baldwin, without supplements from Albert. Borgnet prints *nous* four times in Greek characters, but has *hylē* in Roman, but in view of Fauser's changes to *On the Causes* that is probably not significant. Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology* 1a 3.8, reports David as saying that God was prime matter, and in Obs.3 argues against David's use of the term *differentia*: God and prime matter are simple, and cannot therefore be differentiated. They are just diverse.

²³¹ Théry (1925) 58-66.

David's sources, and so cannot exclude the possibility that he also knew something of Theophrastus, presumably through Arabic sources. However Albert limits Theophrastus' part to an argument which led him to say that the power of reception (*acceptio*) of matter and intellect was the same. It is not clear which part of the preceding complex argument he is supposed to have used, and it is unlikely that he had anything to say about God in this connection. But the statement that intelligible species exist only in intellect is based on *DA* 1.3 407a7 ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα and 3.4 430a3-4 τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, and Theophrastus did discuss these points. So *nous* underlies species, and is their substance, through matter, which presumably means that *nous* here functions as their matter. It is clear that Theophrastus did not ultimately identify matter and intellect, but it is probable that he discussed arguments which might seem to support that identification. The argument given here is not identical with those we find elsewhere, and it is such that Theophrastus might have formulated it.

It looks as if the use of the Greek word *nous* for intellect was taken by Albert from Baldwin. Note also *hylē* in n.230. Before this Albert had recorded of David that he renewed the old error of Anaximenes, who said that all was one, and that (one) was God, according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics*. (This is not said in the *Metaphysics*, and the nearest is Xenophanes at A.5 986b24—"who looking at the whole heaven says that the one is God"). David said that the one was matter because only this was *verum* ("real"). He also covered Democritus, "pupil of Anaximenes" of whom he gives an obscure account ending with his saying—or perhaps implying—that matter was God, because *hoc quod omnia tenet, et in quo omnia fundantur ut in esse permaneant, non potest esse nisi Deus*. ("This which holds all things, and in which all have their foundations so that they may remain in being, cannot be anything but God.").²³²

²³² David supported this with reference to the words written in the temple of Pallas, which are interpreted as that Pallas is whatever has been, or is, or will be, with references to Plutarch and to *peplum*, Aristotle, Orpheus, Lucan and Seneca. (Albert later comments on these). *Peplos* is also referred to in Albert's *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.3.13 vol.3 p.76-7 which ascribes to Alexander "an Epicurean" views similar to those elsewhere ascribed to David. cf. *On the nature and Origin of the Soul* 2.5 vol. 9 p.408. Several medieval writers refer to a *Peplos* of Theophrastus (735, 736ABC FHSG) The reference to Anaximenes seems to be wrong, but is it just a mistake for Xenophanes? Albert on *Metaph.* 1.4.7 vol.16.1 p.55.13-16 says that the Alexander who influenced David was a follower of Xenophanes (Théry (1926) 59 and n.6). Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.2.7 p.245 about the similar views of "Alexander Graecus".

310A (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *Summary of Theology* 2.13 (77) 3.19 (vol.33 p.81b.13-16 Borgnet)

77 is on the union of the body and the soul. Under it are five questions. The third section (*membrum*) is: is there only one intellectual soul in all bodies, or many; the 19th way²³³ contains: Averroes on 3 De anima (that intellect is the place of intelligible species not the subject), argues thus: “whatever is the place of all intelligible species on one account is one, and being indifferent to all intelligibles is not divided, unless it is divided through place and position. If therefore place and position are removed, it will remain one and undivided, but place in no way applies to intellect, nor again does position: therefore it is not divided by place and position: therefore on one account of place, that is of containing and preserving intelligible forms, it will be in all that has intellect, being undivided in its substance by place and position. But what is one and undivided in substance is one and the same in all: therefore there is one and the same intellect in all men who have intellect. They think this argument is a very strong one.”²³⁴

This is not in Averroes’ *LCDA*. Albert (81a39-b12) gives an argument about how place could be divided, and follows it with this reference to Theophrastus. He refers again to this view as held by Theophrastus at 2.15 (93)²³⁵ p.202b, in the course of a discussion on whether ratio is the same as intellect(s), and rejects it on the grounds that intellect as matter would be informed, and when thinking of a stone would be a stone. Rather it is like a place (*locus*) or a *tabula rasa*. In short, Albert seems to have had a firm idea that Theophrastus rejected the *locus* account and accepted the matter account: “there is also in the soul the possible intellect which is not potentially as matter to the objects of intellect, as Theophrastus said wrongly, because if it were in such a potentiality to the objects of intellect it would be given form by any form it thought of to be of the nature of

²³³ For the 29th way see on 325.

²³⁴ *quidquid per unam rationem est locus omnium intelligibilium specierum, unum est, et indifferens ad omnia intelligibilia non dividitur, nisi per situm et positionem dividitur. si ergo removeatur situs et positio, manebit unum et indivisum, sed intellectui nullo modo convenit situs nec etiam positio: ergo situ et positione non dividitur: ergo in una ratione loci, continendi scilicet et salvandi species intelligibiles, erit in omnibus intelligentibus, per situm et positionem in illis secundum substantiam indivisus. quod autem unum et indivisum est in substantia, est unum et idem in omnibus: ergo unus et idem intellectus est in omnibus intellectum habentibus hominibus. hanc rationem reputant valde fortem.*

²³⁵ 77 at the top of the page in Borgnet is just a mistake.

that form, just as matter is given form through a form, and so in thinking of a stone it would be a stone, but it has a relation to its objects as their place, and like a *tabula rasa* to a picture, which is the place of the picture on itself and is preserving the picture.”²³⁶ Finally, at *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* 2.4 508b-510a, partly quoted in n.164, Albert gives as the third of Aristotle’s points about the possible intellect that it is rather the place than the matter of the intelligibles, but in discussing this he does not mention Theophrastus.

See also 322A 20-1 for Albert’s view that abstract form moves to the possible intellect as to its own place.

Themistius, *PDA* 94.27-95.13,²³⁷ takes up Aristotle’s 3.4 429a22-25: “the intellect called of the soul²³⁸ (I mean by intellect that with which the soul thinks (*dianoietai*) and has beliefs (*hupolambanetai*)’—which does not therefore also include *phantasia*—‘is not actually any of existing things before it thinks, so that it is reasonable that it is not mixed with the body’”. So far he is quoting Aristotle with the exception of the inserted clause about *phantasia*. But he goes on: “For a mixture is of body with body.” This last sentence is not in Aristotle, who has a different argument. Themistius goes on about the senses and body etc., and at 95.4 quotes “the sense is not without the body, but that (intellect) is separate from all body, and they say well who say that the soul is the place of forms, if we use ‘place’ catachrestically”. This develops Aristotle’s words at 3.4 429b5, which end with “that is separate from all body”. But he then goes back to what Aristotle has said at 429a27-8, about the soul being the place of forms, and adds his own qualification about ‘place’ being used catachrestically, and that it involves only the powers (*dunameis*) of the soul by which we think and perceive, whereas Aristotle had spoken only of intellect. At this point he introduces the potential intellect: “therefore this, the potential intellect, comes to exist even in babies.” But by sense and *phantasia* and their exercise it gets to know universals etc, and so becomes a more perfect intellect.

²³⁶ *est etiam in anima intellectus possibilis qui non est in potentia materiae ad intellecta, quemadmodum male dixit Theophrastus. quia si in tali potentia esset ad intellecta per quamlibet speciem intellectam formaretur ad esse naturale illius speciei, sicut materia formaretur ad esse per formam, et sic intelligendo lapidem esset lapis, sed habet se ad intellecta ut locus, et sicut tabula rasa ad picturam, quae locus est picturae in se et salvans picturam.* Albert then mentions Ghazali, but it is not obvious that the above passage is based on him.

²³⁷ Translated by Todd in Schroeder and Todd (1990), and in Todd (1996).

²³⁸ See on 307B.

Philoponus on *DA* 3.4 429a27-9 p.15.66-9 Verbeke²³⁹ says, on the authority of Alexander, that Xenarchus was misled by Aristotle's statement that the intellect was nothing in actuality and was the place of forms to suspect that it was prime matter. (The train of thought in Philoponus is not entirely clear). But our Alexander does not mention Xenarchus,²⁴⁰ and his only reference to *topos* is at 85.5-10, where he relates the material intellect to *topos*. We do not know enough of Xenarchus to judge this claim,²⁴¹ but it is probable that Theophrastus did say something on this point, though the claim that he equated intellect with prime matter must be rejected.²⁴²

Note that Albert discusses this view in connection with Theophrastus alone, and not with Themistius.

310B (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Unity of the Intellect (against the Averroists)* 3.2 (*Op. omn.* vol.17.1 p.29.3-21 Hufnagel)

The title of this work varies in the MSS: "Against the Averroists" is given only in some. The date is about 1263.

Here again Albert appears to be attributing to Theophrastus the view that the intellect is the subject and not the place of forms. This passage is printed because it adds something about the complications of this view.

Albert is replying to the point that what receives a form, which is one, must itself be one, and therefore the possible intellect must be

²³⁹ Philoponus' *Commentary on the DA* translated by William of Moerbeke *CLCAG* III 1966, which supersedes the edition of de Corte. This part of Philoponus' commentary has survived only in Latin. There is an English translation by W. Charlton and F. Bossier, London: Duckworth 1991.

²⁴⁰ Moraux (1942) 211 says that Alexander nowhere mentions Xenarchus in his extant works, and that this must therefore come from his commentary on *DA*. A trace of this discussion may be found in Alexander? *On Intellect* 106.20-3.

²⁴¹ John Dillon, in an unpublished paper, has observed that Stobaeus' information about Xenarchus that he defined the soul as "perfection and entelechy of form, both on its own and when combined with the body" is mysterious in its place among the materialist theories put together by Stobaeus. A similar point is made by Hans Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World' *ANRW* II 36.2 1119. Xenarchus would have been well-placed to know of the newly discovered works of Aristotle as a teacher of Strabo and a friend of Augustus.

²⁴² Julian in **158** seems to attribute to Xenarchus a criticism of Theophrastus' account of the fifth bodily substance. See Sharples, 'Theophrastus on the heavens' in J. Wiesner (ed.) *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung* Paul Moraux gewidmet Berlin: de Gruyter 1985 1 586.

one in all men.²⁴³ In the course of this he refers to “the objection of Theophrastus and Themistius”, which appears to be that the reception of the universal would be the reception of the subject, and the reception of one form would prevent the reception of its opposite or a different one.²⁴⁴ I think we must see this as only part of the story. We have seen that Theophrastus rejected the equating of the “material” intellect with prime matter, after showing how it seemed plausible. He probably went on to say that they differed in that the material intellect had, as it were, consciousness, the power to know, that it received forms as universals and not as particulars, and that as potentiality its receptiveness was different from that of prime matter. In particular, it could receive incompatible forms.

Albert’s intriguing distinction between spatial and formal reception rather than material seems to be a point being made against Theophrastus and Themistius, and is perhaps to be related to 310A.

Albert clarifies this in what follows (p.29.21-56), using the analogy of light, colour, and the transparent, and saying that light is in the transparent not as in a subject, because it does not colour it, but is in it as in a place. So the reception by a subject attributed to Theophrastus involves, as Albert goes on to imply, the intellect being affected by a form in the way that an object would be affected by colour, and this would exclude the possibility of its being affected by other forms.

Apparatus item

In *On the Fifteen Problems* ²⁴⁵ (*Op. omn.* vol.17.1 p.32.18-20) on the question whether the intellect of all men is one and the same in number,²⁴⁶ Albert says that if the intellect had something of matter, it must be that it was given a form by everything that it received, *quod in Theophrasto reprehendit Aristoteles* (“on which Aristotle found fault with Theophrastus”). It is only the latter point that is directly attributed to

²⁴³ Themistius, *PDA* 103,24-30.

²⁴⁴ Albert’s point that the reception of the universal is according to its *esse* and *ratio* is not in Them. loc. cit.

²⁴⁵ Of 1270. Thirteen of the questions were condemned in December 1270, and the letter of Giles de Lessines asking Albert to consider them and his reply should be before then. See F.J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School* Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press 1964 89-92.

²⁴⁶ Albert says that he has found only two new positions among the Peripatetics, and one old, on which all agree. He seems to use Farabi for the old Peripatetics, i.e. Anaxagoras on the potential intellect, and for the objection of Aristotle to Theophrastus. Craemer-Ruegenberg (1980) says that for Albert ‘Peripatetic’ equals ‘non-Christian’.

Theophrastus here, so that we have two points separately attributed to him, a) that intellect is the matter of forms, and b) that it is given a form by what it receives, and here they are linked together. If he did discuss them both he probably also related them himself. Otherwise Albert or an intermediary derived the second from the first. It is also possible that the light analogy comes from Theophrastus.

Albert concludes with a reference to Farabi, who might be his source here, but in *On the Unity of the Intellect*, which is written against the Averroists, 24,57-9 (quoted under **309A**) he indicates that Averroes is his source for linking Theophrastus with the view that the possible intellect is identical with matter. See also on **314A**.

311-12 We return to Priscian, who gives a series of problems raised by Theophrastus about Aristotle's doctrine of intellect.

311 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.6-7 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.29.12-15 and 18-23 Bywater)

Huby (1991). Huby and Steel (1997)

"Since" is introducing a comment on the question Priscian has raised at p.29.6-7, quoting what had already been raised at **307D.8**, "For what reason does it (intellect) not always think?" The thought seems to be that if it does not always think there must be something else which brings about the change from inactivity to activity. But this is absurd both because intellect should be independent of other things, and because Aristotle explicitly says (*DA* 2.5 417b24) that thinking is in its own power. The source of the next clause, "unless it is another intellect that starts the movement", is uncertain, but the language is simple and Priscian's next words, not printed here, "and these things are true whether he were to call intellect the undivided substance participated by soul²⁴⁷ or the rational soul itself," suggests that these words are still from Theophrastus.²⁴⁸ If they are, he may have been suggesting a solution to the problem "Why not always?". It is natural to see them as a reference to the agent intellect as interpreted by many later philosophers, though the justification for that in Aristotle is uncertain. But that is what we might expect from Theophrastus, who is trying to make sense of the material before him (See Huby

²⁴⁷ This is standard Neoplatonist phraseology.

²⁴⁸ See on **320A** for more about *kinôn*.

esp.134-5). Priscian passes to the next difficulty, that of applying the notion of activity to the relationship between intellect and its objects. Steel²⁴⁹ suggests convincingly that “But what is the implication?” is Priscian’s question, not that of Theophrastus. Theophrastus takes up a number of remarks of Aristotle, but the one most close to his words is the fragment *DA* 3.7 431b16-17, in the chapter containing bits and pieces presumably added after the main account that ends at 3.6. This begins: “in general the intellect, that which is in activity (*kat’ energeian*) is things (*ta pragmata*).” Theophrastus has “if, when it is active (*energôn*), it becomes things”, which appears to be taking Aristotle’s words as a premise. This raises the question whether Theophrastus was aware of these words in the position which they now occupy. They clearly relate to 3.6 on the relationship between intellect and its objects, and there are similar points in 3.4 and 3.5, but this is the closest, but their present position is puzzling.

The next premise is ambiguous: we have preferred “it is most both” to “each exists most fully”, as suiting the argument better. The conclusion in any event is: intellect then is things.” This is really no more than a repetition of Aristotle’s point, and as in Aristotle “things” must be taken to be objects of thought, and not mere thoughts. But Theophrastus adds a further point: if it is things when it is active, when it is not active, is it not only not things, but also not intellect?

Here it is intellect unqualified which is in question, whereas the rather similar argument about intellect and prime matter in 308 and 309 was about the material or possible intellect. It seems likely that here Theophrastus is again raising immediate problems about Aristotle’s account.

Barbotin (1954) 269 as part of his VII^a suggests, following Bywater, that Priscian at 29,26 quotes another line of Theophrastus: *ara oun ouden esti prin noein*; (“Is it therefore nothing before it thinks?”) That is possible. As we have seen, Theophrastus did consider this matter at length.

- 312 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the Soul* 2.8-9 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.30.22-31.2 Bywater)

Huby (1991). Huby and Steel (1997)

²⁴⁹ In a private communication.

This takes the subject of 311 further. The best way to take the text as it stands in the MSS at 25 (our line 3) is to see the words down to *phusis* as continuing the quotation, to be followed by Priscian's commentary. Wimmer did not accept this, but his alterations seem unnecessary. The language is not unaristotelian: Aristotle actually equates *ataktos*²⁵⁰ ("disorderly") with *para phusin* ("unnatural") at *On Heaven* 2 301a4, so that an "unnatural nature" will well convey the difficulty of understanding the nature of intellect which Theophrastus is developing. *Akritos* ("undiscriminating") is a word used from Homer onwards in a variety of senses, and though it occurs only once in Aristotle, at *Meteor.* 2.5 361b31 of Orion as an unreliable weather sign, it is appropriate here.

Who are the people who suppose that intellect is all things potentially and nothing in itself? The view resembles the one Aristotle expresses in several places, but is not stated exactly in his words. Rather, he distinguishes between "potentially" and "actually" or "in activity". (Or even, at 429a27, has simply "as it is (*nun*), it is nothing"). The big question is whether *kath' hauton* ("in itself") has a technical sense. Possibly Priscian is here attacking recent people who hold a view unacceptable to Neoplatonists, for whom *Nous* means something more positive. If that were the case it might be right to keep the MS reading and reject Wimmer's insertion of *ton* before *noun*. An alternative would be to interpret Priscian as saying that Theophrastus was refuting a view held by some of his contemporaries, and we have seen that this is also a possible interpretation of parts of 307A. After spelling out the reasons for this claim, which include a point about the contents and objects of thought, that if intellect is its objects it will be whatever object it is thinking about,²⁵¹ except when it is thinking about itself, Theophrastus seems to have

²⁵⁰ Theophrastus *Metaph.* 4a4 uses *ataktotera* of the study of nature, and *ataktion* at 11b4 with *apeiron* and *amorphia* for what in Plato and the Pythagoreans result from the indefinite dyad and its relationship to the One. We have translated *ataktos* as "disorderly", although Barbotin (see above) wanted "indefinable". Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* 134.6 uses *ataktôs* in the sense of "in a disorderly way" in a passage that seems to echo a part of Theophrastus' *Metarsiology*, which survives only in Arabic and has recently been translated by Hans Daiber (1992) 166-293. At [14] 14-15 he gives: "it is not correct (to say) that God should be the cause of disorder in the world". Probably some form of the word *ataktos* was used by Theophrastus here. See Jaap Mansfeld, 'A Theophrastean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic Thought', *Phronesis* 37 (1992) 325-6.

²⁵¹ Compare *DA* 3.8 431b29: in thinking there will not be a stone in the soul, but only its form.

referred to his original arguments (307BC) about the difference between intellect and matter, though Priscian is to some extent paraphrasing at this point. We then get the precise statement that intellect is *tode ti*, a “this something”. This notion has already been encountered at 307B, where Priscian says that matter is not a “this something”, but what else would intellect be? Aristotle, at *DA* 2.1 412a5-6, trying to define soul, divides *ousia* (“being”) into matter, which in itself is not *tode ti*, and *morphê* and *eidos* (here both meaning “form”), by which it is called *tode ti*, and third the compound of these. (So soul is an *ousia* as an *eidos*). He does not say in so many words that soul is *tode ti*, nor again that intellect is, but Theophrastus may be merely extending his views, not contradicting them. The notion of “this something” also appears in Averroes, though in a different context. In 308A 13-18 he argues that the material intellect is not *aliquid hoc* (“this something”), and at 28-32 he denies that the material intellect is *hoc* (“this”), though it is *substantia* (*ousia*), and this is said to be how Theophrastus and Themistius interpreted Aristotle. In 309A it is said that Theophrastus (here alone) argued that the material intellect has no form, but is *aliquid ens* (“some existing thing”). Since all this is not of intellect as a whole, but of the material intellect, which through Alexander became another way of referring to the potential intellect, there is no contradiction here between Averroes and Priscian.²⁵²

²⁵² *tode ti* is common in Aristotle, but since Greek lacks the complex symbolism of modern English some distinctions cannot be made in it. Thus *ti* may be either a general word like “thing”. or a gap-marker, like *x*, for which a variety of other words may be substituted, like, perhaps, “man” or “horse”. So here we have either “*nous* is a ‘this thing’”, meaning that it is a substance, or “*nous* is something that can be called ‘this *x*’”, where *x* is a substance word. Either the substance aspect or the classifying aspect of an expression of the form “this *x*” is being emphasised. To a large extent these two aspects go hand-in-hand, and the difference between them is unimportant. Aristotle’s use of the expression falls into three groups, those where the difference is not relevant, those—a surprising number—where the text is uncertain, and those where one or the other sense is called for.

In some other places in Aristotle’s works more or less the same point is made, that there is more than one kind of *ousia*, matter, form, and the combination of the two, and *tode ti* is linked with form. 1) *Metaph.* H.1 1042a26-31, where matter is *dunamei tode ti*, *logos* and *morphê* being *tode ti*, which is *choriston logoi* (“separable in definition”). 2) (2 senses only) *Metaph.* D.8 1017b23 gives the *hupokeimenon eschaton* and that which being *tode ti* is also separable—which is the *morphê* and *eidos* of each thing. Our original case seems simple: the form makes something *tode ti*. But in the other two cases there seems to be an equation of form and *tode ti*, which fits neither of the possible interpretations with which we started. Other relevant cases are: *Metaph.* Lambda 3 1070a9-13 where the text is corrupt, but there appears to be a distinction between matter, *phusis* (which is *tode ti* and “*hexis* into which”—if the

line 11 is based on *DA* 3.4 429b4-5, but there are differences of language: Aristotle has *to aisthêtikon* whereas Theophrastus picks up *aisthêsêôs* by means of *hautê*. This is acceptable, because Aristotle's point is that the senses are troubled by excess, but intellect is not, but Theophrastus is dealing with "potential" and "in activity" and making two distinctions, a) between intellect and matter, and b) between intellect and sensation. But at **307A.27-8** Themistius appears to quote the same passages but with "the senses" in the plural. **317.2-5** takes up the same points, though here Priscian seems to be paraphrasing rather than quoting Theophrastus.

- 313** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Soul* 3.2.3 (*Op. omn.* vol.7.1 p.180.18-44 Stroick)

This is in a digression about the doubts which arise from Aristotle's words about the intellect, that it is unmixed, separable, impassible²⁵³ and not *hoc aliquid* ("this something").²⁵⁴ Albert lists unmixed and impassible, and adds *intransmutabilis* ("unchangeable"), which presumably stands for *ametablêtos*, rare in Aristotle but found at *Metaph.* D 4 1014b28 and 12 1019a27, and related to the *ametablêsia* of *Physics* 5.6 230a7-18, and used by Theophrastus himself at *Metaph.* 4a8:²⁵⁵ the objects of intellect are *akinêtois* ("immovable") and *ametablêtois*. It can be supposed that being unchangeable follows from being impassible.²⁵⁶

Among others Albert lists three problems about the possible intellect which he attributes to Theophrastus and Themistius:

- 1) it is unchanging and therefore cannot *become* anything existing thing, and is eternal in the way that the unchangeable is eternal, which suggests a classification of types of eternity, and so cannot

text is correct), and the compound of the two; *DGC* 1.3 318b30—air is more *tode ti* and *eidos* than earth; *Metaph.* Z.4 1030a2-5, where again the text is unsure, but there seems to be a reference to *hoper tode ti* ("what 'this something' is"), for 'this' (without *ti*) belongs to *ousia* alone. See also *DGC* 1.3 317b9, 21, 31; *Metaph.* B.6 1003a9, Ø.7 1049a35, and Z.8 1033b22-6 "this such". A.C.Lloyd, *Form and Universal in Aristotle* Liverpool: Francis Cairns 1981 38 lists places where Aristotle calls form a *tode ti* and concludes that there are particular forms.

²⁵³ For these terms in Aristotle see above on **309B**.

²⁵⁴ For this see on **312**.

²⁵⁵ At *CP* 6.19.3 it is used of the characteristic of olive oil that makes it useful to scent-makers.

²⁵⁶ At *Metaph.* Δ 12 1019a27 *apathê* and *ametablêta* are found together, and the Latin Averroes *LCDA* 386.103 glosses *passiva* as *transmutabilis* in an appropriate context.

become anything eternal, and so cannot have the theoretical intellect produced in it.

2) its nature is such that it is not a potentiality which precedes actuality, and so nothing can be produced in it, and so the theoretical intellect cannot be produced at all.

For the point about potentiality see on **309A**.

3) since both the agent and the possible intellects are unchangeable the theoretical intellect cannot be produced in or by them. This involves the topic of more and less: the possible intellect is unchangeable, and the agent intellect must be even more so.²⁵⁷

These are technical arguments drawing on theories of Aristotle, but in the terms in which they are expressed they seem to be later than Theophrastus,²⁵⁸ not least because Aristotle presents his points as about intellect as a whole. Their origin is uncertain: lines 13-18 resemble Averroes in **308A** 34-44, but the rest is not easy to trace in either Averroes or Themistius. They may again come from a lost work of Themistius known in Arabic, but if so he was developing his own views. A difference between Albert and Averroes is that Albert treats these points as doubts raised by Theophrastus and Themistius, whereas Averroes turns them into positive views. This suggests that Albert had a source independent of, and more reliable than, Averroes.

After this passage the section continues with points from Averroes and Avicenna, and a passing reference to the Stoics, and returns to Theophrastus (alone) in the passage we have printed as **309C**. Throughout Albert says he is giving the views of the Peripatetics, who for him included Averroes and Avicenna, and he concludes (182.8-14) with the observation that all Peripatetics agreed that what Aristotle said was true, but they differed in their interpretation of him. All this gives the impression that he was carefully working on the material he had available, but it is difficult to accept that he was right about Theophrastus.

²⁵⁷ See Aristotle, *Topics* 5.8 138a25-9.

²⁵⁸ *intellectus speculativus* is the equivalent of Aristotle's *nous theôrêtikos*, but that does not play a great part in his *DA*. He uses the expression when distinguishing the theoretical intellect from the practical intellect at 3.9 432b27 and 3.10 433a15, and from *nous threptikos*, *nous aisthêtikos*, and other psychological functions at 2.3 415a11, but not as the third in a trio of possible, agent and theoretical intellects. Further, in our later material this "intellect" resembles more an individual thought.

Apparatus items: the following are all from Albert, *DA*:

179.94-180.2 lists the features of the intellect which cause the problems.

186.53-7 is in a digression on Averroes: "And in this way he satisfied Theophrastus, who had asked how it could be that the possible intellect was separate²⁵⁹ and unchanging, and the agent likewise, and yet the theoretical was subject to change and in time, like that which goes from potentiality to actuality."²⁶⁰

This question is like **308A.34-44**, but Albert's answer is about the two aspects of the universal, as a) true, and b) an entity in this world, and is based on *LCDA* 399.362-401.423. There Averroes first says he will try to reply, and then deals with the relationship of the theoretical objects of intellect to the agent and recipient if the former are generable and capable of being destroyed while the two latter are eternal.

196.10-14 "the second ... question, which Theophrastus tried to evade by saying that the possible intellect is never potential and by saying that the theoretical is eternal, is easily answered, for forms are not in prime matter in the same way as in the possible intellect, and there are four differences."²⁶¹

The second question at 195.54-7 was derived from the fact that both the possible intellect and prime matter are potentially all things, and so they ought to be identical, and matter ought to know forms, as intellect does.

Albert's four differences are: a) (196.17-21) forms exist in the possible intellect and in matter in different ways: this resembles Averroes at **308A** 19-22, though Albert gives no attribution; b) (196,23-33) (with Averroes) that in the intellect are universal forms which it can know, but in matter they are particular and matter cannot know them (cf. **308A.5-13**); c) (196,34-44) (with Avicenna) that matter does not

²⁵⁹ At Albert, *DA* 3.2.3 180.45-59 Albert gives two senses in which the Peripatetics spoke of the intellect as separate, a) *denudatum a specificantibus et individuantibus* ("stripped of what would make it specific and individual") and b) what is potentially something, before it has it. And at 181.36-8 he says that all the Peripatetics attributed both kinds of separation to the possible intellect and the rational soul.

²⁶⁰ *et sic satisfacit Theophrasto quaerenti qualiter esse possit quod intellectus possibilis sit separatus et intransmutabilis et similiter agens, et tamen speculativus sit transmutabilis et temporalis, sicut id quod exit de potentia ad actum.*

²⁶¹ *quaestionem ... secundam, quem Theophrastus volens evitare dixit intellectum possibilem numquam esse in potentia et speculativum dixit esse perpetuum, facillimum secundum determinata solvere est, quoniam formae nullo modo similiter sunt in materia prima et in intellectu possibili; et est differentia quadruplex.*

illuminate its forms by its own light, but intellect does;²⁶² and d) (196,45-56) (unattributed) intellect remains free in its operations, but matter is divided into parts by its forms and controlled by them.

Albert concludes (196,63-5) that these things have been said to answer the questions raised by the Peripatetics about the possible intellect. The first two are related to points made by Averroes, the third may be loosely based on Avicbron, for whom see also on 284, and the fourth is untraced. Whether the last two have any connection with Theophrastus we cannot tell.

314A (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Soul* 3.2.6 (*Op. omn.* vol.7.1 p.183.79-184.47 and 184.53-62 Stroick)

After 313 Albert gives several “digressions”, of which this is the second, the first being on Alexander;²⁶³ others are on Avempace and Abubacher, on Averroes, and on Avicbron.

314A largely repeats points from Averroes, but adds (76-8) that a possible intellect which was like prime matter could only become intelligibles with alteration and time, and so it would be passible and changeable, and so mixed with the body.

“Theophrastus and Themistius followed another path”: that is they differed from Alexander, who said that the possible intellect was the form of the body and that the agent intellect was separate from the soul of man.

The first point attributed to them is that there can be no possible intellect, qua possible, as part of the rational soul. This is proved as follows: if the first perfection/entelechy is unchangeable and eternal, so will the second be. But the first entelechy, intellect, is unchangeable, and so the second, thinking, will be so too. And the agent intellect is eternal in a certain way (to be discussed later), and so the possible intellect and their action will also be eternal. It is not said, but must be implied,²⁶⁴ that the possible intellect, being eternal, can never be in a state of possibility only; it cannot change from a potential to an actual state. The reference to Aristotle’s *Physics* could come from Theophrastus, but might have been inserted later.

²⁶² It is not easy to find the source of this in Avicbron.

²⁶³ For Albert’s knowledge of Alexander see Craemer-Ruegenberg (1980) n.7.

²⁶⁴ At 196.10-12 Albert says: *Theophrastus dixit intellectum possibilem numquam esse in potentia* (“Theophrastus said that the potential intellect never existed potentially (only)”).

The status of the next short paragraph (20-22) is unclear. *videntur* ("they seem") and *similiter* ("likewise"), suggest that Albert is not here straightforwardly reporting a further part of the argument, but either bringing in material from elsewhere or drawing his own conclusions. Two points are made, first, that the action just referred to (line 17) is the theoretical intellect; this is in agreement with what we are told elsewhere and raises no problems, and second, that thinking is equivalent to *denudare formas* ("abstracting forms") and this is the work of the agent intellect. This difficult point will be discussed separately (See 314B), but it can be treated as an afterthought which does not affect our understanding of the main argument.

The outstanding problem is the interpretation of lines 13-16: a) the agent intellect is eternal in the way that we say that the unchangeable is eternal. That selects one of a number of possible ways in which a thing may be said to be eternal, and raises no difficulties. b) "but with the agent having itself (behaving) in one way ...": why do we have the ablative absolute here? c) "will be that on which it acts ...". However we take the grammar of this sentence, the subject will be the agent intellect, and that on which it acts will be the possible, as is clear from what follows. But what behaving in one way has to do with it is obscure. d) "behaving in one way ...": this presumably takes up the "behaving in one way" of b), but what do they both mean? e) "acting in another way would be pointless" may mean i) because otherwise the agent would be redundant, ii) because acting otherwise would be pointless, iii) if it acted differently it would be redundant, iv) because if it acted differently it would be idle.²⁶⁵ "Behaving in one way" can be understood in connection with eternity: like the heavenly bodies, that which is eternal can be active only in one way, because otherwise it would change. But that seems sufficient in itself, and does not allow for e) It also does not explain the problem in c).

Albert, if he is to be relied on, appears to have two sources for Theophrastus and Themistius, neither of which is known to us. He introduces the second with *autem* in line 23, which here seems to have the force of "however", and indicates some difference between the two accounts. Here the material intellect is said to be part of the soul, whereas in the preceding passage the possible intellect was said not to be part of the soul; as Albert seems to equate the two there is a

²⁶⁵ *otiosum* corresponds to Aristotle's *matên* ("pointless") in Averroes' *LCDA* 533.24, but *otium* is also given as *argia* ("idleness") in Crawford's glossary to that work.

genuine, and not merely a verbal, difference. The argument used is on the same lines as before: the agent and possible intellects are eternal, and so is what is made from them both. And so there cannot be any possible intellect qua possible before it is made actual. But they (Theophrastus and Themistius) allow it to be in the soul as the subject of agent light. Lines 23-7 are difficult: the material intellect is perfected only by the agent, and not by the intelligible, and therefore what is made (from both) will be unchanging and eternal. This point recurs elsewhere, and it raises a serious problem: the result of the coming together of the agent and the possible intellect is the theoretical intellect, which is thinking. But thoughts come and go, whereas on this argument they ought to be eternal. It may be significant that only in line 23 is there a reference to the material intellect, and then Albert reverts to talk of the possible intellect, as if it is the same as the material one.

There follows (29-41) an exposition of Aristotle's light analogy in *DA* 3.5. As well as Aristotle's productive/agent intellect, and his potential/possible intellect, we meet the theoretical/speculative, not brought into the picture in this way by Aristotle, and the acquired, which does not appear in our material until Alexander.

This fourfold division of the intellect seems to come from Farabi, whose *Epistle on the Intellect* contains a very complicated account of intellects of many kinds.²⁶⁶ His fifth intellect (on a different scale), which he explicitly links with Aristotle and *DA*, has precisely these four aspects. But he does not mention Theophrastus in this connexion, though he does mention him elsewhere, most importantly on logic (See **81B** and **111C**, both from Farabi's commentary on the *De interpretatione*) and the names of the intellects in the Latin translation are not those used by Albert. They are *in potentia*, *in effectum*, *adeptus* and *agens*. For these Albert has: *possibilis*, *agens*, *speculativus* and *adeptus*.²⁶⁷ There is no problem with the possible or potential intellect,

²⁶⁶ The part relevant to us is given in translation in A. Hyman and J.J. Walsh, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Indianapolis: Hackett 1973 215-221. See also Thérèse-Anne Druart, 'Al-Farabi and Emanationism', in J.F. Wippel (ed.), *Studies in Medieval Philosophy* Washington D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1987 23-43. Farabi pays close attention to Aristotle's words, but interweaves them with a neoplatonist theory of emanation which requires every element mentioned to have its place in a scheme of descent from the highest being.

²⁶⁷ The British Library MS add. 10316, said to be of the fifteenth century, contains a *Carmen de antiquis opinionibus in physica* ("Poem about ancient views on physics"). f.7v has a heading in red ink: *De opinione Theofrasti et Temistii qui quatuor intellectus in anima humana esse dixerunt scilicet intellectum agentem, possibilem,*

but for the rest there are difficulties. Albert speaks of the “actual” intellect as the “agent”. whereas Farabi uses the word translated “agent” for the highest intellect which is external to the soul, though in the Anonymous *Questions on the three books of the On the Soul*, quoted below, *in actu* seems to be equivalent, and his *adeptus* seems to be equivalent to Albert’s *speculativus*,²⁶⁸ which leaves Albert’s *adeptus* outside.²⁶⁹ It is not easy to relate either Farabi’s or Albert’s scheme to Aristotle’s actual words, and both involve a development of the light analogy which goes far beyond Aristotle,²⁷⁰ but it seems unlikely that Albert used only Farabi, and the question remains whether Theophrastus is behind any of it. If, as seems likely, Alexander is behind

speculativum et adeptum, et hanc animam unam esse omnibus hominibus (“On the view of Theophrastus and Themistius who said that there were four intellects in the human soul: the agent intellect, the possible, the theoretical and the acquired, and that this soul was one in all men”). f.8r. has three lines in praise of Theophrastus followed by a flowery account of his views. A note at the side gives a sober interpretation: (just as there are four aspects to the Sun’s illumination) *sic in anima intellectiva intellectus agens est forma, intellectus possibilis est materia, ex quibus fit tertium compositum quod intellectus speculativus dicitur. quartum est intellectus adeptus qui ex conversione fit intellectus agens supra res intellectuales* (“So in the intellective soul the agent intellect is the form, and the possible intellect is the matter, from which arises a third thing composed (from them) which is called the theoretical intellect. The fourth is the acquired intellect which by conversion (See 322A.2) becomes the intellect acting over intellectual things.”) followed by: *immortalis est huiusmodi anima, scilicet in ea tantum moritur intellectus adeptus mortuo corpore, unica tantum in hominibus est anima intellectiva quae nobis continuatur per fantasmata circa quae operatur abstrahendo ab illis species intelligibiles quod non est aliud quam intelligere. cum hec anima non sit forma dans esse humano corpori pereunte corpore totum perit quod est essentialiter in homine*. (“A soul of this kind is immortal, that is, in it there dies on the death of the body the acquired intellect, and unique to men is the intellective soul which is joined to us through fantasmata around which it works by abstracting from them intelligible forms, which is nothing other than knowing them. Since this soul is not a form giving being to the human body, when the body perishes the whole perishes which is in man essentially.”) For the transcription I am grateful to Charles Burnett. The details would repay further study.

²⁶⁸ At 315.14 Albert says that the theoretical intellect is also called *in habitu* (“dispositional”).

²⁶⁹ At *Summary of Theology* 2.13 (77) 3.29, quoted below at 325, Albert has four intellects of which the formal corresponds to the theoretical here, and the rest are the same, and at *Summary of Theology* 2.15 (93), partly quoted at 310A, in section 2 he lists the agent, the possible, the acquired, and the speculative (theoretical) intellects, asking how reason differs from them.

²⁷⁰ In Farabi’s book translated by R. Walzer, (*Al-Farabi on the Virtuous State* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985) (title: *The Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Excellent City*) there are at XIII the potential, the actual, the hylic, the passive, and the active intellects. This ignores the acquired and has instead the hylic and the passive, and is indeed nearer to Aristotle, but still has nothing corresponding to the *speculativus* of Albert. This book was not translated into Latin (Gutas).

the use of *adeptus*,²⁷¹ we need not go back before him for that notion. But it is possible that the other three intellects do go back to Theophrastus.

In line 36 all Albert's MSS have: *quod vocatur speculativus intellectus, qui dicitur adeptus*. Not only is this an odd way of writing, but it is in conflict with lines 39-41, where *speculativus* and *adeptus* are clearly distinguished. I suggest that several words, ending in *intellectus*, have been lost by homoeoteleuton after *intellectus*.²⁷² Four intellects are probably also to be found in:

Anonymous, *Questions on the three books of the On the Soul* 3.67.171-9 (p.295.1-9 Vennebusch)

"But others, like Theoplaustus (Theophrastus) and Themistius, the commentators on Aristotle, supposed that the possible intellect was a potentiality of the rational soul given form by the light of the agent (intellect) with the brightness of its light over the images, which with the possible intellect makes * * * acquired in actuality, and this with the light of the agent on the possible, not through the reception of some intelligible species in the possible itself, so that they were supposing that the possible intellect was receptive not of some intelligible species, but only of the light of the agent, which light indeed, when it is received from the agent, by shining over the images gives to the possible that from being intelligent in potentiality it becomes intelligent in actuality, as they said."²⁷³

²⁷¹ In the Latin translation of Averroes *adeptus* is used both for "acquired" (*epiktētos*) and for "from outside" (*thurathen*) in contexts where the material from DGA is being considered. Alexander used *epiktētos* in connection with Aristotle's distinction between first and second entelechy: he has been seen as the inventor of that term, but in fact he uses it only once, at *On the Soul* 82.1.

²⁷² Winfried Fauser reports that in the fourteen MSS he has been able to check there is no evidence of this. I thank Edward Booth for this information. Sharples suggests that *qui dicitur adeptus* should be deleted, presumably because it is an addition based on a misunderstanding of the following lines. Davidson (1992) 28-9, 38-9 discusses the Arabic equivalent of "acquired".

²⁷³ *alii autem ut Theoplaustus et Themistius, expositores Aristotelis, posuerunt quod intellectus possibilis esset potencia animae rationalis formata lumine agentis cum splendore sui luminis super fantasmata, quae¹ † intellectu possibili † facit adeptum² in actu, et hoc lumine agentis in possibili, non per receptionem aliquarum³ specierum intelligibilium in ipso possibili, ita quod isti ponebant intellectum possibilem esse receptivum non aliquarum specierum intelligibilium sed solum luminis agentis, quod quidem lumen cum ab⁴ agente⁵ recipitur, irradiando super fantasmata dat possibili ut de intelligente in potencia fiat intelligens in actu, ut dixerunt.*

1 *quae* que cod: *qui* de Vennebusch cruces posuit Huby 2 *adeptum* cod.: *adepta* con. Sharples 3 *aliquarum* Huby: *aliarum* cod. 4 *ab* Huby: *in* cod. 5 *agente* cod.: *possibili* Vennebusch

The text is clearly corrupt, but here the acquired intellect, which elsewhere is the fourth, is clearly present: I would expect something about the theoretical to have fallen out. If so there must be a considerable lacuna in the area where we have put cruces.

qu(a)e (note 1) must either be feminine singular with the subject being *potencia formata*, and then one might suggest the reading *intellectum possibilem* as the object of *facit*, but all this seems improbable. Alternatively *quae* as neuter plural could be the object of *facit*, but then the text must be corrupt. It may or may not be a coincidence that there is a problem about *adeptum* here as there is in 314A 36, but neither passage helps the other much. *adeptum in actu* is odd, but not impossible. Sharples suggests “the images which it (the agent intellect) makes to be acquired in actuality in/by the potential intellect” with no lacuna and treating the singular *adeptum* as meaning that the actualised images just are the acquired intellect. In line 6 *aliquarum* makes more sense than *aliarum*, and is supported by the parallel *aliquarum* in line 8. In line 9 *agente* should be kept, as the source of light, but then *in* is unsatisfactory and should perhaps be changed to *ab*.

Vennebusch argues that this is more or less contemporary with Albert and Thomas Aquinas, dating it before 1300, but after Albert, *DA*, and that its viewpoint is nearer to that of Albert, but by no means identical with it.²⁷⁴ This passage, and what follows it about Avicbron and the Platonists, is quite close to Albert, *DA*, but there are sufficient differences in both language and argument to make it probable that Albert is not the direct source, or not the only source, for what the Anonymous says.

If Albert is indeed using material which is now lost for information about Themistius and Theophrastus, it seems best to suppose that the Anonymous also used that material, and that we can supplement or correct Albert from him. The main difference is the introduction of *fantasmata*, and that needs separate discussion. See on 322B.

Aristotle’s light analogy (*DA* 3.5 430a15-17) is very condensed: the productive intellect is a *hexis*, like light, which makes potential colours actual. This is developed in Albert as follows: the agent intellect (is the light source and) *denudat* (reveals, abstracts) colours, and the possible receives the light (of the agent), and the composite from

²⁷⁴ For the references to Theophrastus and Themistius Vennebusch refers to Averroes’ *LCDA*, but the passages in question—432.123-134 = 309B and 389.57-115 = (roughly) 308A have little in common with this one.

these is the illuminated transparency, which is the theoretical intellect, while sometimes the light is on an object (and then the object is known), and then there is the acquired intellect. The idea of light as a) illuminating a transparency, and b) illuminating objects, is not in Aristotle, but is a fair extension of his analogy, and illustrates the fact that our thoughts are now of one thing and now of another. No great metaphysical weight is put on the analogy, and it might ultimately come from Theophrastus, but only through Farabi.

Albert's way of introducing this is odd (lines 29-31)—“If they are asked ... they say”. But this surely need not lead to the conclusion that what follows is not what they say. He employs a similar device in the next section, though here he first sets out a long argument (lines 44-51) and only then gives their reply. He starts with Aristotle's likening of sensation to thinking at 3.4 429a13-18, with its implications that a) the intellect is receptive of form, or, precisely, of intelligible species, and b) to think is not only to reveal/abstract, but also to receive, intelligibles, and c) the agent by itself can reveal/abstract: hence only the agent and the acquired are needed.

This is presented as a set of problems for Theophrastus and Themistius, and is followed by their answer. It looks at first like an objection by someone else to which Theophrastus replied, which is unlikely, though not impossible. But it is in accordance with what we know of Theophrastus' methods to see it as his own problem—i.e. a difficulty he found in trying to interpret Aristotle—followed by his own reply. This involves making distinctions in his usual manner: a) there is no absolute agent in the soul, since the intelligence which is absolutely an agent cannot be part of the soul, but the light of the agent on the possible is called the agent;²⁷⁵ b) the distinction between agent, possible, and theoretical is like that between form, matter, and the composite whole: it is only a theoretical analysis, and they cannot in fact be separated. These two points are firmly based on Aristotle's text. He does primarily introduce the distinctions within the intellect as similar to the distinctions of form, matter, and the whole which are part of his general metaphysics, and he does make it difficult to leave the story there because of the ambiguous

²⁷⁵ At 109.4, almost immediately after 320A, Themistius has “So this potential intellect, when it has received its own form (*morphē*) with the productive (intellect) shining upon it ...” which might be a source for Albert, but Themistius goes on to talk about knowledge of simple and undivided things, clearly going on to the subject-matter of the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione*.

position of his productive intellect. Theophrastus' solution is no real solution because no real solution is possible, but he makes skilful use of the light analogy to clarify what is involved. On this view, however, there are consequences for the intelligibles. The rational soul is in no part the subject of the intelligibles, and the intelligible species/forms are not in the soul, except in so far as they are in the agent intellect, as colours are in light, which is their hypostasis.²⁷⁶ If Theophrastus used *hupostasis* in the way Albert says, it looks as if he was searching for a contrast with *hupokeimenon* (subject), and the idea of light as the hypostasis of colour is a good one. There is a linguistic gap here, which *hupostasis* fills.

There follows (61-8) a correction of the light analogy: in sight the sources of light (e.g. a lamp) and of sight (the eye) are spatially separate, and a better analogy for thought would be to have them united, as if the eye gave both light and sight. In this way we can think of the agent and the possible intellect as united. There is a parallel between "giving formal existence to colours" and "giving the form of intellectuality to the intelligibles", and it is implied that species/forms can exist independently and not just as objects of intellect: only when they are given the form of intellectuality do they become such actual objects. But perhaps this is no more than another way of saying that ideas exist in the unconscious.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Aristotle uses *hupostasis* predominantly in his biological works where it means "sediment", a meaning also found in Theophrastus (*HP* 9.8.3). The sense "substantial nature" (LSJ) of e.g. wood, is also found in Theophrastus (*CP* 5.16.4; 6.7.4). The distinction between reality and either (visible) reflection, or thought, with the expression *kath' hupostasin* predominating, appears in *De mundo* and other Hellenistic works (if the *De mundo* is Hellenistic).

²⁷⁷ It might be objected to the attribution to Theophrastus of a development of the rudimentary account of Aristotle that Albert wrote at a time when light was already a commonplace analogy for thought. But there are difference between the light metaphysics of Robert Grosseteste (c.1168-1253) and what is attributed to Theophrastus and Themistius by Albert. Grosseteste's frequently used "optical illustration" is described by James McEvoy, *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982 p.351 thus: "the intelligible light activates both the mind's object and the intellect, as the sun does the colour and the eye." In Albert's accounts the sun is absent, but the transparent plays an important part, and the eye is not activated by the light source. Further, Grosseteste only twice mentions the agent intellect, and in him that and the material intellect are different from those of the Peripatetics. (McEvoy 346-9, 357)

Four major influences have to be considered in examining these medieval theories, Plato, via Augustine and the Neoplatonists, Aristotle, immediately or via Arabic sources, the Bible, and finally actual or supposed facts about light. Even this is too simplified, for the Neoplatonists were influenced by Aristotle as well as by Plato, and Arabic writers by many Greeks. But when Albert says that he is drawing on

We return (69-84) to the familiar point (308, 309) that Theophrastus (named alone here) was concerned about the distinction between the possible intellect and prime matter. It is then repeated that an intellect possible in this way (i.e. purely qua possible) cannot exist in the soul, and that if it did it could only become the intelligibles with change and time.

Apparatus items, both from Albert, *DA*:

181 16-17 refers to *Peripateticorum ... quidam* who denied the existence of the possible intellect, whereas all Peripatetics believed in the agent intellect.

196,10-12: see on 313.

314B (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great *On the Soul* 3,2,6 (*Op. omn.* vol.7.1 p.185.18-30 Stroick)

This comes in the digression on Avempace and Abubacher, which immediately follows that on Themistius and Theophrastus. It is generally held that Avempace/pote and Abubacher are two names for one person, Ibn-Bājja (see on 140), although many medieval writers treated them as separate people. The passage is closely connected with 314A, but amplifies it to some extent. First, thinking is abstracting forms in the light of the agent intellect. This amplifies 314A 20-2, where abstracting is mentioned without any reference to light, though light does appear at 38 and 64. Secondly, no part of the rational soul is the subject of the intelligibles, which repeats 314A 61-2; thirdly, the possible intellect is part of the rational soul but never exists in potentiality (only), as it always has in it the light of the agent or the agent itself. This puts more clearly what is said in 314A 23-9, that the possible intellect is the subject of the light of the agent (or of the agent light): in 314B it has in it either the light or the agent itself. Thus being the subject of *x* is equivalent to having *x* in itself. The central point of all this is that the possible intellect is the subject not of the intelligibles, but of the agent intellect.

Averroes discusses Abubacher at *LCDA* 397.299-311 where he opposes him to Alexander: the material intellect is the *virtus imaginativa* prepared so that the *intentiones* in it are actually *intellectae*, and there is no other *virtus* subject to the objects of intellect except that one.

Theophrastus and Themistius, and his account is one that could have been worked out by Theophrastus, we should at least take seriously the possibility that he is right.

- 314C** Anonymous, *Questions on Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.15, cod. Oxon Coll. Mert. 275 f.83^rb (*Phil. Med.* vol.11 p.330.28-33 Steenberghen)

This anonymous work is from 1273-7, late in Albert's life, and has been attributed to either Siger of Brabant or Boetius of Dacia. The Oxford MS contains a set of questions on the three books of *DA*; the first two books are also in a Munich MS with considerable discrepancies from the Oxford text. There has been much controversy over the nature and origin of this material. The Munich MS contains a number of works, nearly all in one hand, and it has been argued that it was written between 1373 and 1377 by someone who was in Paris at the time, and recording courses that he had actually attended, or even given. In a table of contents at the end the scribe has attached the name of Siger of Brabant to the last work, and Grabmann argued that all the works, with one possible exception, were by him. Another view, put forward by Sajo, brings Boetius of Dacia into the picture. Van Steenberghen cannot accept this view as a whole, but suggests that possibly the MS belonged to Boetius himself or one of his disciples, neither of whom would bother to attach his name to the works which were in fact his.²⁷⁸ The Oxford MS is later, but still of the fourteenth century, and contains a number of works in various hands. The questions on the first two books of *DA* are close enough to the Munich MS to be ultimately records of the same course, but contain significant differences. The Oxford MS alone contains the questions on the third book of the *DA*.²⁷⁹ If these are part of the same work, they are by the same author, either Siger or Boetius. They are in harmony with the known views of Boetius, but objections have been raised against their attribution to Siger. We may be reasonably confident, however, that they are by a leading figure in the Averroist controversies of the 1370s, and that he would be unlikely to derive his information about Theophrastus only from Albert.

His methods, however, are puzzling. In Book III. apart from the cases we have here, he refers several times to Themistius. Once, 340.29, he himself draws on Averroes for his information, and that is probably also his source at 339.12; for one quotation, 307.1, no source has been found. But by the time he was writing Themistius' own *PDA* was available in Latin, and was certainly used in the

²⁷⁸ For bibliography see Van Steenberghen 129-33.

²⁷⁹ The questions, though in three books, do not follow the order of the three books of *DA*.

questions on the first two books. Theophrastus' name is added to that of Themistius only here at pp.330 and 332, and the view stated is not in the passages on Theophrastus in Themistius' *PDA* nor in Averroes.²⁸⁰ At 332 Avicenna is said to hold the same view as Theophrastus and Themistius, but not in such a way as to imply that he was the source used. In view of the fact that we have other evidence for material which no longer survives it makes sense to suppose that that material was also being used here.

This passage is from Question 15 "Whether it is necessary to posit the agent intellect", which dictates the form of the reply. Four arguments that it is not necessary to posit it are given, and then arguments that it is necessary: a) Aristotle said so b) Plato said it was not necessary, but Aristotle opposed that in his *Metaphysics* c) Avempace said that it was not necessary because of the object, but was so because of the intellect, Of Themistius and Theophrastus it then says: a) (with Avempace) that the agent is necessary because of the (possible) intellect, not because of the object, that the possible intellect is the subject not of the intelligibles but of the agent, and with 314A 23-5 that the material intellect is completed/perfected by the agent intellect, and not by the intelligible;²⁸¹ b) (separately) that the intelligible species (forms) are not received in themselves in the possible intellect, which also repeats a point in 314B and 314A 62-3; c) (separately) that the agent intellect is a separable substance like the intelligences above, which puts more explicitly what is said in 314A 52-4.

But that is opposed to Aristotle who said that intelligible species are received in the possible intellect and they become one thing in actuality.

Unlike 314B this is an independent work which is not derived from Albert, but may be expected to use independently the same source as his, or a related one, and thus to confirm what he says. Albert is not mentioned, but Thomas is twice, and no other contemporary.

Apparatus item

Question 16, is "Whether the agent intellect is a "habit" of the possible intellect". After a survey of anonymous opinions that it is in

²⁸⁰ The references to Averroes given by the editor are not satisfactory.

²⁸¹ The additions to the text in line 2 must be correct. The lacunae were caused by trimming when the manuscript was bound.

some way so the author says: "Some supposed that the agent intellect is a separate substance, like Themistius and Theophrastus and also Avicenna. But this is against Aristotle."²⁸²

Thus he roundly rejects the views attributed in **314C** to Themistius and Theophrastus and Avicenna.

- 314D** Ibn-Sab'īn, *Answers to Questions posed by the Roman King, Emperor of Sicily*, Demonstration that the Soul Survives after Death (p.82.16-18 Yaltkaya)

Ibn-Sab'īn, mystic and philosopher, born in Murcia in Muslim Spain, died in Mecca between 1269 and 1271. While in Ceuta during his travels eastwards he was asked to respond, on behalf of the Almohad sultan 'Abd-al-Wāḥid ar-Rashīd (1232-42), to the philosophical questions put to the sultan by the emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (d. 1250). In this particular response Ibn-Sab'īn paraphrases Themistius *PDA* 108 = **320A.14-16**. Cf. below on **324**.

"Pre-eternal" (*azālī*) is an Arabic theological term referring to eternity in the past, or beginninglessness. It is one of the standard epithets for God in Islamic theology. (DG)

This passage adds little to our knowledge of Theophrastus, Frederick's questions covered the eternity of the universe, theology and Aristotle's *Categories*. (PMH)

- 315** (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Soul* 3.3.7 (*Op. omn.* vol.7.1 p.217.1-58 and 67-76 Stroick)

Albert is here discussing, in connection with the question whether our intellect in this life can know intelligibles which are separate,²⁸³ the relationship between the intellect and its objects. In a sense they are one—thinking and thought are two sides of the same coin—but we do not always think, and we think of different objects at different times. As usual he has digressions about the views of various philosophers. In our passage, which follows a digression on Alexander (p.216.13-91), he makes the unhistorical claim that Theophrastus, as

²⁸² *aliqui ponebant intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam, ut Themistius et Theophrastus et etiam Avicenna. Sed hoc est contra Aristotelem.*

²⁸³ This is raised at 215.4-8 in connection with *DA* 3.7 431b17, where Aristotle asks the question but does not answer it. Albert goes on (8-18) to discuss the problem. See also on **322A**.

well as Themistius, was replying to Alexander. Further, there is nothing in our Themistius which corresponds to this claim. It is in accordance with Albert's methods, however, that he should have seen Themistius and Theophrastus as taking a stand which in fact was opposed to that of Alexander, even though they were not consciously doing so, and interpreted it in a picturesque way. The views attributed to Alexander are not all in our Alexander, but we get some help from Averroes,²⁸⁴ as we shall see.

Albert starts with a summary of the views of Themistius and Theophrastus which is in agreement with what we know about them from elsewhere,²⁸⁵ including the light analogy.²⁸⁶

To get the full argument attributed to Alexander as given by Albert we must put together lines 12-19 and 27-31: the possible as well as the theoretical or habitual intellect are destroyed (or generated (27-31), which amounts to the same thing). So the indestructible agent intellect informs the possible (line 15) to get the habitual, and

²⁸⁴ Averroes seems to have had at least two sources for Alexander: a) the *On intellect*, now part of *On the Soul Mantissa*, and of doubtful authenticity, and b) Alexander's own *On the Soul*. He quotes from a) three times, under the title *On intellect according to the view of Aristotle*, at p.483 = Alexander's 110.30-111.2 (for which see n.191), p.484 = 108.19-24 (not Aristotle of Mytilene) and p.394, which is not in the Alexander we have. For b), on p.394 he gives the gist of part of the opening of *On the Soul* correctly, but the quotation on p.482 is not traceable. Is it significant that in the former the words are *libri sui De anima* ("in his book *On the Soul*"), but in the latter only *libro De anima* ("in the (or a) book on the soul"), which might be a reference to the lost *Commentary on Aristotle's DA*? Further, on p.444 he expounds a view of Alexander on preparedness but says only that perhaps Alexander said this, because "we have not seen his exposition in this passage". Sharples suggests that he might also have used parts of the *Questiones*.

²⁸⁵ At 206.76-8 and 215.57-60 Albert returns to the point that the agent intellect is the form of the possible.

²⁸⁶ See e.g. 314A.21-2. *Hi* in line 8 looks at first sight as if it might refer to some other unidentified people, but a) it would be odd for Albert to introduce them here, b) we clearly return to Theophrastus and Themistius in the next sentence, and c) the views expressed, that both the possible and the agent intellect are separate and incorruptible, are what we have met before for Themistius and Theophrastus. It has only been denied that the possible intellect existed as possible.

The last four words (lines 10-11) can be translated in two ways (see n. ad loc.), but the point remains the same, that there is no question of some perishable thing being involved. There might be a question about *fiat*, because *fieri* and its presumable Greek equivalent *gignesthai* would seem to involve change and time, but the sentence should be taken as meaning that change and time do not come in when only imperishables are involved. Alexander's view, on the other hand, as reported in the next paragraph, involves the theoretical intellect (equated with the *intellectus in habitu*) continually coming to be and perishing. In fact there is no precise statement of this kind in either Alexander's *On the Soul* or the *On Intellect*, although what he says about the development of the νοῦς καθ' ἑξῆς implies that it changes. See also Averroes LCDA 448.129-30, 451.233-40, and 498.553.

both the latter are corruptible. But Themistius and Theophrastus have both the possible and the agent intellect as indestructible, so they must be fastening on Alexander's view that the possible intellect is destructible. They hold that that, like matter, must be indestructible for the matter/form analogy to work. The destructibility of the theoretical intellect should not be a problem as the destructibility of an individual substance is the norm.

The proof referred to in line 22 is given by Albert in the previous section, 3.3.6, in which he first raises the question whether the intellect joined with magnitude can know (*intelligere*) any of the things that are separate from magnitude or not. If it can, it must be not by *phantasmata* ("images") but by conjunction with separate intelligences. Aristotle had promised to discuss this, but did not fulfil his promise (3.7 431b17-19), and, following Farabi, Albert suggests *NE* Book 10.²⁸⁷

Albert goes on to discuss Alexander's views on this. At 216.1-10 he has: "And he (Alexander) gave as an example of this the ability to walk, since it is said to be perfect in those who walk when it has been strengthened to actually perform any act of walking; and this comes about in turn through the strengthening of the limbs and the practice of walking. And he said that it is in a similar way that the intellect is continuously strengthened and disposed towards the greater reception of light by means of the intelligibles, and strengthened in this way it perceives the separate agent (intellect) like a form".²⁸⁸

This has some basis in Alexander and Averroes, but the criticism of Alexander here is not close to anything in Averroes. The ultimate source is Alexander? 110.30-111.2:

"Thus the potential intellect thinks (*noei*) being made perfect and increasing. For as the power of walking, which man has as soon as he is born, is brought into activity as time goes on, with its being perfected not passively (κατὰ πάθος τι), in the same way, then, intellect made perfect thinks what are naturally objects of intellect

²⁸⁷ Farabi discussed Aristotle's treatment of intellect in the *Ethics* in his *Epistle on the Intellect*, calling this the fourth sense of intellect. But Farabi is here concerned only with Book 6, and Albert can hardly be referring to that.

²⁸⁸ *et huius dedit exemplum in potentia ambulandi, quoniam dicitur tunc perfecta in ambulantibus, quando fuerit confortata ad quamlibet ambulationem perficiendam secundum actum; et hoc fit successive per organorum confortationem et ambulationis usum. similiter autem dixit esse quod intellectus continue confortatur et disponitur ad maius lumen recipiendum per intelligibilia, et sic confortatus percipit separatum agentem ut formam.*

and makes the objects of sense objects of intellect by itself, as being actively productive.”²⁸⁹

This is translated at Averroes 483.117-24, with *potentia* for *dunamis*. It is not easy to be sure whether Albert is using Alexander directly, or Averroes. He says at 216.13-15 that this is the view of Alexander according to what can be understood from his words in his book *On the Soul*, and his book *On the Intellect and the Intelligible*. Averroes also refers to both books, but in a different way. In any case Albert indicates that he is interpreting rather than directly quoting Alexander. But this passage accounts only for the first half of Albert’s statement, that concerning walking, and the simple reference to intellect. The last words, “towards the greater reception ... like a form” (216.8-10) are less easy to trace, and may be Albert’s own contribution. It is also difficult to find anything in Averroes corresponding to the criticism attributed to Theophrastus and Themistius by Albert.

To sum up, Albert gives an account of an argument of Alexander which can only partially be traced to Alexander and Averroes, and then gives a criticism of it attributed to Theophrastus and Themistius which cannot be found in either Averroes or Themistius. He must be wrong at least in stating that Theophrastus criticised Alexander, but he does not usually completely invent arguments attributed to named sources. A remote possibility is that this criticism was originally in Averroes but is now lost: another is that Albert used a lost work of Themistius. But in any case it is difficult to suppose that both the argument found in Alexander and the criticism of it in Albert have their origin in Theophrastus.²⁹⁰

What we have so far left out in Albert—that intellect receives light and so perceives the separate agent as form—has some similarity to Alexander(?) 111.32-112.5 in *On Intellect*, now part of the *On the Soul mantissa*:

“As light, being productive of seeing in activity, is itself seen, and also what is with it, and through it colour, so the intellect from outside becomes the cause of our thinking, being thought also itself,

²⁸⁹ See n.191. But Albert thought of all this as being from Alexander.

²⁹⁰ Albert uses *virtus* here in 315 where he had *potentia* on p.216. A possible view is that there, in the section on Alexander, he was using Alexander directly, or Averroes—though the light analogy is not in the latter—but on p. 217, in the section on Theophrastus and Themistius, he is using another source, possibly Themistius himself. It may not be a coincidence that the Latin Averroes uses *virtus* at 488.243 in connection with Themistius, and not elsewhere.

not producing intellect itself, but perfecting the existing intellect through its own nature and leading it to its proper (objects)", with a following reference to having been increased and being perfected.

Averroes does not deal with this directly, but at 488.263ff. he again refers to Alexander, with walking at line 270, but it is as it were at a remove. His discussion continues with references to Themistius (489.294) and Peripatetic commentators (490.319). There is nothing about light, but *complementum* appears at 278.²⁹¹

Albert's argument at 24 is put in an organised way, first as a generalisation, that in the completion of the generated object the completion of the generated virtues is received, and then with a particular application: 1) the possible intellect and the habitual intellect are generated 2) so their end and completion (*telos*?) (i.e. their actually thinking) are generated 3) so by this means we do not get to a virtue which is not of the generated in so far as generated, and so not to the joining and union with the agent intellect, which is not generated. This amounts to an attack on Alexander's account of how the intellect knows its objects.

At 34 Albert goes on to Theophrastus' and Themistius' positive view, supposed to be a matter of not following Alexander, which is of course inappropriate for Theophrastus. But Albert frequently shows historical ignorance, and that by itself is not sufficient to exclude Theophrastus from consideration. The view is that the intellect composed of the possible and the agent (referring back to 314A.54-60) is joined to us through the imagination which stirred them, and so it knows the separated intelligibles.

This argument derives from Themistius, *PDA* 114.31: can the forms that are by nature separate, and the forms that are absolutely matterless, be known when (we are) in the body and not separated from extension (*megethos*)? This, says Themistius, must be looked into later, but just stated now. There follows an argument in defence of this view: for since the divine intellect does not know the enmattered, the enmattered would not know any of the separate. ... But not so. The enmattered intellect can separate the enmattered forms from matter and know them: it is even more in accordance with nature for it to know the separate.²⁹²

²⁹¹ The other quotation in Averroes, at 484.144-50, is of Alexander 108.19-24.

²⁹² This is hardly a sufficient argument, and Themistius repeats his intention to go into the matter again, but he never does. This is based on Aristotle *DA* 3.7 431b12-19 which itself is enigmatic, and also contains an unfulfilled promise to

Averroes (487.235-9) repeats Themistius' argument, with the comment that it is by the topic 'of more' (*a maiori*) (and less). Albert turns this into 'of less' (*a minori*), and adds that it is a topical argument, and probable in one way and not necessary. This is a rare occasion where we encounter a piece of dialectical argument. Aristotle, *Topics* 5.7 137b14-27, discusses the topic of more and less, and Albert is right in saying that it is only a probable argument. He then gives a much fuller account of the argument than Themistius (or Averroes), and although Averroes comments on the argument and to some extent develops it in the following lines, there is no clear source for what Albert says. Further, Albert has the words "probable in one way (*modo*) and not necessary", which make good sense, except for "in one way", and fits in with what follows: if the possible intellect were not separate, then in no way would there be a conclusive argument, but as it is their argument is probable. Averroes has something more puzzling: 488.242-9, according to the view that the material intellect is a *virtus* in a body, and generated, that argument will be sufficient in every way (*quoquo modo*), not probable. For it does not follow that what is visible in itself is more visible to us: colour is less visible than the light of the sun, but we cannot look at the sun, as we can at colour. This is clearly a counter example to the previous one. But if the intellect is not mixed with matter, then that statement (*sermo*) will be true. This does not make sense. The simplest solution is to rewrite lines 243-4 as *iste sermo non erit sufficiens quoquo modo, sed probabilis* ("that argument will not be sufficient in every way (i.e. final) but probable.") Some slight support for this is given by the fact that the first *non* in line 244 was originally omitted in C. We must also remember that this is a translation from the Arabic. But even then there are difficulties.

How much of this goes back to Theophrastus? Albert may have had works of Themistius which quoted Theophrastus. Similar matters are touched on by Priscian of Lydia in 318 and 319, and we may suppose that Theophrastus dealt with them in a consideration of *DA* 3.7.

discuss how what is not separate from *megethos* can know what is, together with *Metaph.* Λ 9 1074b33-1075a5, about God's knowledge. Commentators are unhappy about the *DA* passage, and Averroes (479-80) knows other readings. A different account of Themistius' argument is given by Thomas Aquinas. See apparatus items below.

Apparatus items

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.45.2218: This chapter is on whether in this life we can know (*intelligere*) the separate substances. Thomas reports that Themistius used a topic *a minori* but gives a slightly different account from his. He says that substances which are separate (from matter) are more intelligible than material ones: these are intelligible inasmuch as they are made objects of intellect (*intellecta*) in actuality through the agent intellect. But those are in themselves intelligible. If therefore our intellect is aware of (*comprehendit*) the material ones, much more is it created (*natus*) to know (*intelligere*) these separate substances. The relations between Themistius and Aquinas are unclear, and Albert is different again.

Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super tertium De anima disputatae* 24 p.363.11-19 Sharp *AHDLMA* 9 (1934): Simon (c.1240-1306) was a secular priest who was a regent master in theology at Oxford, and chancellor 1304-1306.²⁹³ His *Disputed questions on the third book of DA* is remarkable only for the fact that Simon, giving Albert as his source, mentions only Theophrastus, without Themistius.

"Theophrastus, as Albert reports, supposed that the agent and the possible intellect were separate substances and therefore supposed that we can understand separate substances through the agent and possible intellects, and he argued *a minore* that it seems more likely that the separate intellect can understand what is separate than what is joined, because the assimilation ought to be between the knowing and the known. But the intellect which is something separate understands what is joined. Therefore much more strongly it understands the separate (things). That position fails in this, that it supposed that the agent and possible intellects are separate substances, for the opposite of this has been proved."²⁹⁴

- 316 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.9-10 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.31.8-13 and 24-5 Bywater)

²⁹³ For more details see Sharp 307-9.

²⁹⁴ *Theophrastus, sicut recitat Albertus, posuit intellectum agentem et possibilem esse substantias separatas et ideo posuit quod nos per intellectum agentem et possibilem possumus intelligere substantias separatas, et arguebat a minore magis videtur quod intellectus separatus possit intelligere id quod separatum est quam id quod coniunctum est, quia assimilatio debet esse inter cognoscens et cognitum. Sed intellectus qui est quid separatum intelligit id quod coniunctum est. Ergo multo fortius intelligit separata. ista positio deficit in hoc quod posuit intellectum agentem et possibilem esse substantias separatas, huius enim contrarium probatum est.*

Steel (1978) 55-6. Devereux (1991). Huby and Steel (1997)

This extract from Theophrastus follows immediately on that at the end of 312, but in Priscian they are separated by comments of his own. It is not obvious that our lines 1-5 are from Theophrastus, but the repetition of parts of them by Priscian later with “he says”, not only of our line 5-6 but also of “it seems to be more a matter of disposition” at 32.19-20 and of “this as it were perfects its nature” at 32.22 makes it clear that they are.²⁹⁵

The lines quoted from Aristotle are in his discussion of the intellect as potential in 3.4 where he makes the familiar point that there are two levels of potentiality, e.g. that of the child who can learn but has not yet, and that of the adult who knows something but is not actively using that knowledge, and, correspondingly, two levels of actuality. At 2.5 417b15, the same distinction is worked out for sensing, and intellect is also mentioned. The child gets its first potentiality from its parent, and the second from teaching. That involves not being affected (*paschein*), but a kind of alteration which is a change to *hexeis* and nature. Theophrastus also refers to *hexis* and nature, as well as potentiality, and is probably drawing on Aristotle here.

The idea of perfecting or completing nature is not easy to find in Aristotle; perhaps the nearest is *NE* 7.12 1153a7-15 where Aristotle is rejecting the view that pleasure is a *genesis*, but while the relevant words *genesis*, *hexis*, *phusis* and *teleôsis* are there they are not in the appropriate arrangement.

²⁹⁵ In places lines 1-4 are almost exactly in the same words as Aristotle *DA* 3.4 429b5-9, and such differences as there are enable us to study the relationships between Priscian, Theophrastus, and Aristotle. The differences are partly accounted for by hiatus avoidance, but the text of Aristotle is in a bad state here so that Theophrastus may also be evidence for what Aristotle originally wrote, and Priscian also takes a hand. Thus in line 1 Priscian gives γὰρ where Aristotle has δ', almost certainly Priscian's alteration to make the connection with what he himself has just written. In 1-2 the order has been changed and ὁ omitted, but ὁ is also omitted by several other witnesses to Aristotle, MSS LW and Themistius 95.16, so that we cannot be sure what has happened; in line 2 φαμέν is inserted between συμβαίνειν and ὅταν which avoids the hiatus συμβαίνει ὅταν; exceptionally we then find δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν with hiatus for Aristotle's ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὐτοῦ, but that avoids the hiatus δύναται ἐνεργεῖν which immediately precedes this in Aristotle, and also the less severe αὐτοῦ ἔστι which immediately follows. In line 3 Theophrastus has ἔστι μὲν οὖν which is found in some witnesses to Aristotle but rejected by editors in favour of ἔστι μὲν. At the end of 3 Theophrastus has καὶ where Aristotle has ἢ (“or”) before εὔπειν which gives an admissible hiatus. But at 31.22-3 although Priscian repeats οὐ μὴν ... εὔπειν precisely, before that he has only δύναμει μὲν ἔστι καὶ τότε, a simplification of what he wrote earlier.

Themistius, *PDA* 56,1-11 on *DA* 2.5 417b15 commenting on the second kind of change (*metabolê*) which is not being affected (*paschein*) says that it advances towards the settled state (*hexis*) and the perfection (*teleiôtês*) of the nature. Since Theophrastus uses “perfect” in connection with “nature” here, and Themistius certainly knew parts of Theophrastus (see **307A** and **320AB**) it is possible that he is using Theophrastus here.

The becoming or *genesis* of line 4 must be connected with the *genetai* of *DA* 3.4 429b6 “when it (intellect) becomes each thing”, that is, becomes in a dispositional way, which is paraphrased in **316** 1-4.

But lines 4-5 are puzzling: a) the reading is uncertain, and Wimmer’s deletion of *ê* may not be the best solution. b) the repetition of *oun* seems unsuitable with our interpretation. We have assumed that the genitives of *hexis*, *dunamis* and *ousia* are connected with that of *tinós*. But we might have here two separate questions, only the first being about what produces the becoming: the second might be separate, and answer the question “of what is the becoming?” is it of a *hexis* and potentiality or of a substance?

A similar question appears in **320A**: “if the motive intellect came later” (than the conception of the foetus) “with (*meta*) what, and in what way, was its genesis” and in **320B**, where, according to Themistius, Theophrastus asked about the (potential?) intellect: “if it came later” (than the productive? intellect), “with what, and how, was its genesis?” But there *genesis* seems to mean “coming into existence”.

316 and **318** are embedded in Priscian’s own developments. The distinction between *hexeis* and potentiality on the one hand and being on the other is grist to his Neoplatonic mill. We can learn little more about Theophrastus, but it is noteworthy that at 32.19-22 Priscian discusses “it seems to be more a matter of disposition” as if there were no further information about its meaning in the text of Theophrastus available to him. And the word *ephexês* (“next”) with which **318** opens shows that Priscian has omitted nothing from Theophrastus here. Perhaps we should suppose that *hupo tinós* was left unanswered, and that we have a rhetorical question plus an explication of the nature of the genesis, answered finally as “It seems to be more (a matter of) disposition.”

Theophrastus seems to ignore the last sentence of Aristotle, that the intellect can know itself, or, as many prefer, think by itself.

In our line 5 Steel prefers “it itself” (*autê*) to “this” (*hautê*), and Devereux (p.40) thinks it is the nature of the passive intellect that is perfected.

- 317** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.17-18 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.34.29-35.1 and 35.24-7 and 29-30 and 32-3 Bywater)

Steel (1978) 146-9. Huby and Steel (1997).

This is printed here because it is on the same passage of Aristotle as is **316**, but it comes later in Priscian than **318**. Aristotle's text is uncertain, and so is that of Priscian/Theophrastus.

The notion of taking a term in the appropriate sense returns here in connection with the intellect's being things both potentially and actually. Various ways of taking the words are rejected: "potentially" must not be thought of in terms of matter or privation, and "actually" not (as before) in the same way as with sensation, but also not as involving an external and passive perfecting. These words might look like Priscian, but there are parallels in Theophrastus. Thus in **316** 4-5 *hexis* as it were perfects the nature of the intellect.²⁹⁶

Theophrastus, then, is saying that in thinking the intellect is not the same as (prime) matter, and is not passively made perfect/complete. The words of Priscian omitted in line 5 (35.1-2) are:

"where through the movement of the sense-organs there occurs the projection of the *logoi*, and this (sensation?) is aware (*theôrêtikê*) of external objects".

That is, for Priscian sensation is not just passive. We are in the usual position of not being sure where Theophrastus ends and Priscian begins, and even "but neither should we understand them as in the case of sensation" might be Priscian's, who continues with his account of how the words of Aristotle are to be taken *noerôs* ("in an intellectual sense").

lines 5-8: Priscian has already discussed the tablet at 26.29-27.3. Aristotle's remarks here are connected with an aporia of Anaxagoras. It seems unlikely that Theophrastus introduced the tablet, but the sentence is not easy to construe. *episêmainein* means to indicate or to approve, but is seldom used in this construction. It occurs also in Priscian at 37.5-6 (not 4, *pace* Index) where "indicated as worthy of enquiry" fits, and 17.28 (= **277B.72**) where the following text is uncertain and we have used "remarks". In the present passage

²⁹⁶ At 13.4-16 Priscian uses a similar vocabulary about sensing which appears to be his own, but that is due to a coincidence of subject-matter.

episêmênasthai could have as object *to dein* etc. which should refer to a quotation with *to* (“the”) meaning “the words”; *dein ... lambanein* is not in fact in the text, but *lêpton* is (line 2), and Priscian elsewhere shows some indifference to precise quotation. *Kántautha* in line 6, introducing a second *kai*, is also puzzling. Aristotle’s text is uncertain, and so is that of Priscian/Theophrastus.

Perhaps the best sense for all this is to see Priscian as suggesting off his own bat that with the words “must take in the appropriate sense” Theophrastus is glancing (looking aside) also at the unwritten tablet which is used by Aristotle as an aid in conveying the sense in which his words are to be understood. The lines omitted, 35.27-9, contain Priscian’s own interpretation. Lines 8-9 are similar to *DA* 429b30-1, but there are some differences, of which the most noteworthy is the introduction of “potential”, so that where Aristotle has “the intellect” Theophrastus has “the potential intellect is potentially its objects. Aristotle does not say this, but later writers have taken it for granted that this was what he meant. If Priscian is correct—and he may not be—Theophrastus is the pioneer in this interpretation. The other differences are trivial: *men ...de* may have been substituted for *all’* by Theophrastus to avoid the harsh hiatus of *entelecheiai ouden*; Theophrastus, with whom Simplicius agrees, has *prin noein*, but Aristotle, followed by Themistius, has *prin an noei*. Each of these sentences is followed by Priscian’s own interpretation.

On 269 the question was raised whether Iamblichus wrote *entelecheia* or *endelecheia*. This is the only place where it is likely that we have an actual quotation from Theophrastus in which he used that word, but in any case he must have used it in commenting on this area of Aristotle.

lines 3-4 See 307D for a related concept, and for 2-5 312.

The gap in line 5 covers Priscian’s developments in which he says that in the case of the intellect and things being identical both “potential” and “actual” must be taken *noerôs* “in an intellectual sense”, this being a Neoplatonist word not used by Aristotle. He continues with a detailed account and then returns to Theophrastus.²⁹⁷ The gap in line 8 contains Priscian’s own account of the unwritten tablet. and there are similar explanations in the gap in line 9

²⁹⁷ Priscian 35.23-4, the end of the portion omitted in line 5, at first sight seem to be by Theophrastus: “this is the way, then, that the ‘potential’ in the case of the intellect must be taken in the appropriate sense”, but it is in fact Priscian’s conclusion to his own account, given in the preceding lines.

and after the end of the passage. It follows that Priscian is choosing his quotations to suit his own purposes, and that in this item he adds little to our knowledge of Theophrastus.

- 318** Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.12 and 15 and 16 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.32.25-7, 29-33; 33.32-34.2 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997).

This is on a difficult section of Aristotle. First we must try to disentangle Theophrastus from Priscian. The words *enula* ("enmattered") and *aula* ("matterless") occur frequently, and it seems most likely that they are from Priscian. Aristotle himself used these words rarely,²⁹⁸ and at *DA* 3.4 430a2-6 has instead "the things without matter" and "the things that have matter". The words are common enough in Alexander and Themistius and later writers: it is possible that Theophrastus adopted them first; indeed in **319.10** *ta enula* might seem to be part of a direct quotation from him, but it is more likely that when they occur they are part of Priscian's commentary. So the first sentence here is probably Priscian's interpretation of *DA* 3.4 429b10-23 and Theophrastus' comments on it. There Aristotle introduces the differences between a thing and being a thing, with the examples of magnitude, water, and flesh. There are some textual difficulties, but he seems to be saying that the sensitive is aware of the hot and cold of which flesh is composed, but something else, or something which is to the former like a bent line straightened, or vice versa, is aware of being flesh. Snub is also mentioned. He then turns to abstract things, e.g. straight and being straight, the former having matter of a kind as does snub.²⁹⁹ In both cases Aristotle offers alternatives about how these different things are known: a) by ἀλλῶ ἢ ἀλλῶς ἐχόντι, and b) by ἑτερῶ ἢ ἑτερώς ἐχόντι.

²⁹⁸ *enulos* only at *DA* 1.1 403a25—of *pathê* (here emotions) as *enuloi logoi*, if the reading is correct, and *aūlos* probably not at all, though it has been read at *On Coming-to-be and Passing Away* 1.6 322a26-30: the reading *aulos* meaning pipe, duct, or hole is probably better, though neither is easy.

²⁹⁹ See also *DA* 3.7 431b12-16, 3.8 432a4-6. Aristotle has ἐν ἀφαιρέσει, Theophrastus probably ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως and perhaps ἐν ἀφαιρέσει, and Priscian <ἐν> ἀφαιρέσει (32.32 but this could be Theophrastus), ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως (33.20, 24, 26, but the latter is probably Theophrastus), 36.30 and κατ' ἀφαιρέσιν (34.9).

All we can be sure of about Theophrastus is that he asked a) “How (does it know) each of the two?”, i.e. how does the intellect know both the enmattered and the matterless? and b) “How (does it know) the (forms)³⁰⁰ in matter and in abstraction?”³⁰¹ Is this one class or two? Probably two, since the abstracts are generally thought of as not being in matter, although they are ultimately bound up with matter. Priscian immediately follows the lines we have printed with a reference to the views of Iamblichus and Plutarch, and then gives his own account. Nothing gives us any clue as to what else Theophrastus said.

Lines 7-9 are printed with some diffidence. They use only Aristotle’s expression b) given above, and refer it both to the pair matterless and enmattered, and to the pair the things in matter and the things resulting from abstraction. This is justifiable, for the distinction introduced by Aristotle here is something of a red herring. The central problem is how the intellect can know forms which are in matter; among these there are both forms the names of which connote also their matter, as in the case of snub, and forms the names of which connote no special kind of matter, as in the case of straight. But the latter, like the former, can only exist in connection with matter.³⁰² A straight line must be a line in or on some matter.

After b) “by something different” or “(by the same thing) in a different state”, two further alternatives are offered: c) “by the same thing and in the same state”, or d) “by both”. As in Aristotle, there is no clear answer, but since c) must be a single possibility, d) must refer to that and part or whole of b), i.e. both by the same thing in the same state and by something different and/or by the same thing in a different state. But how much of this is Theophrastus? At least d) “Both are true” seems like Priscian’s comment, which he follows with: “for the same thing is aware (*kritikon*) of the differences, I mean the intellective, and in the same state: for it does it by means of its own *logoi*—that gives us c)—and by in a way a different thing and (not “or”) in a different state, because it regards its own *logoi* either as causes, when from them it contemplates the enmattered, or as coordinate with the matterless, or even as effects of the intellectual forms, and, in virtue of this, with them being made different and in a

³⁰⁰ Since the argument is about forms, this is what must be supplied.

³⁰¹ The language here is unusual: *en* governs both *hulēi* and *aphairesei*. Aristotle uses both *ex* and *en* with *aphairesis*, and there is no case in which the noun is joined with another in the way it is here.

³⁰² There is no reference to Aristotle’s dyad at 3.4 429b20 as an abstraction on a higher level.

different state. This is clearly Neoplatonic doctrine and we can deduce nothing from it about Theophrastus.³⁰³ The more difficult question is whether the preceding alternatives, b) and c), are taken by Priscian directly from what Aristotle says or implies, or whether he is here quoting from Theophrastus. I do not think we can tell. Priscian's immediately following comment, that Theophrastus and Aristotle are agreed on a certain point, does not help much either, as that point is itself unclear. It has generally been taken to mean that there is some proportion between intellect and things, but it is not worked out. Priscian repeats *DA* 3.4 429b21-2 precisely, with the exception of *de* for *kai* ³⁰⁴ ... *ara*. "In general, as things are separable from matter, so are the things about the intellect (separable from intellect)." To sum up, it looks as if Theophrastus largely agreed with Aristotle, but raised two questions. How he answered them, if at all, we do not know.

319 Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 2.19-20 (*Suppl. Arist.* vol.1.2 p.36.6-9 and 37.23-30 Bywater)

Huby and Steel (1997).

This is the final passage from Priscian, because the MS ends abruptly, and the copyist has a note advising us to look out for the rest. That is, he believed that there was more, if it could be found.

Here there is again a difficulty in distinguishing between Priscian and Theophrastus, and what is printed is the minimum that is certainly attributable to Theophrastus. I propose to analyse the whole of Priscian down to the point where our MSS break off, to show what other sections may possibly be from Theophrastus.

a) printed section, 36.6-9 = our 1-4: Theophrastus sets out Aristotle's account of the relationship between intellect and its enmattered and matterless objects, analysing what has been said and adding some problems. The description of Aristotle's account is not in Aristotle's words, for it uses *aula* ("matterless") and *enula* ("enmattered"), which Aristotle does not. This is probably Priscian's summary, based on Theophrastus.

b) So that we may grasp these (problems?) more clearly, we must first analyse Aristotle's account in a few words.

³⁰³ See also Themistius *PDA* 95.35-97.7.

³⁰⁴ Many of Aristotle's MSS omit *kai*.

c) He says: there follows a summary and rewriting of Aristotle, not near enough to be a quotation, and so either Priscian's own summary, or the very words of Theophrastus. The first sentence runs: "Since", he says, "some are in matter, and others without matter—which are the bodiless and separate substances—in the separate that which thinks and that which is thought are the same". The words at 11-12—"which ... substances"—are probably Priscian's explanatory insertion. The rest is an accurate summary of part of *DA* 3.4 430a3-7, but it is not precisely what Aristotle says. If Priscian is being at all careful, he is here quoting Theophrastus.

d) 13-24 This is certainly Priscian's own commentary.

e) Aristotle: there follows what includes a quotation of 430a3-5, but with ἐν τοῖς χωριστοῖς ("in the separate (forms)") substituted for ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης ("in the case of the (things) without matter")—and three minor differences: this can be a quotation from Aristotle, but is such that it could be by either Priscian or Theophrastus.

f) 27-37.5 Priscian's commentary on the last section. g) 5-7 "Hence also with good reason (he asks)" followed by a paraphrase of 430a5-6. Aristotle has a parenthetical remark: "we must look into the reason for not always thinking", and Priscian has: "Why do we not always think, if at least there are in us both that which thinks and that which is thought: for both are the same". This turns Aristotle's impersonal "not always thinking" into the personal "we" form, and spells out, using what Aristotle says elsewhere, the reason why this is a problem. In its simplicity this could be Theophrastus, but it perhaps tells against that that the "hence" at the beginning refers back to what Priscian has just been saying, and it would seem more natural to take the subject here as Aristotle.

h) 7-8 "About this we have already enquired as far as possible." This seems to refer back to our section d).

i) 8-15 Priscian's further commentary.

j) Priscian quotes 430a7—"so that intellect will (does P) not exist in them"—almost exactly, comments on it, and at 18 quotes 430a7-8—"for without matter the intellect is the *dunamis* (potentiality) of such things"—exactly, followed by comments which include a reference to Plutarch of Athens.

k) 23-30 our second printed passage (5-11).

l) 30-34 a few more lines of Priscian's commentary, which end abruptly.

Possibly the following are from Theophrastus:

a) “Since some are in matter, and others without matter, in the separate that which thinks and that which is thought are the same”³⁰⁵ (36.10-13), b) “Aristotle has reminded us from the case of knowledge that in the things which are separate the thinker and the thought are one and the same” (36.24-5) and perhaps c) “Why do we not always think, if at least there are in us both that which thinks and that which is thought: for both are the same” (37.6-7).

These could then be among the distinctions and difficulties referred to in 319 3-4. All three are concerned with the point that that which thinks and that which is thought are one and the same in the case of the things which are separate, and at the end the question of why we do not always think is again raised.

It is difficult however to see exactly what it is that Theophrastus is supposed to have added to Aristotle. At 319.8 “that is knowledge in actuality, obviously, for that is its most proper state” have been assigned to Priscian, but they could be from Theophrastus. With regard to the enmattered the words “when they have been thought” at 319.10 are not in Aristotle who only has: “they will be present in the intellect”. If this seems a meagre harvest we should remember that we do not know what more may have followed.

320A Themistius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.5 430a10-25 (CAG vol.5.3 p.108.18-109.1 Heinze)

320B Themistius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.5 430a10-25 (CAG vol.5.3 p.102.24-9 Heinze)

Schroeder and Todd (1990). Devereux (1991). Huby (1991). Todd (1996).

Priscian of Lydia is no longer available at this point.

320A immediately follows **307A** in Themistius. We saw there that Themistius' introduction of the whole passage as being about the potential and the actual intellect was misleading, and here too we must be cautious about his descriptions of both **A** and **B** as being about the productive intellect. Rather they are mainly about *DA* 3.5.

³⁰⁵ ἐπειδή, φησί, τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἐν ὕλῃ τὰ δὲ ἄνευ ὕλης, ὅποῃαι αἱ ἀσώματοι καὶ χωρισταὶ οὐσίαι, ἐν μὲν τοῖς χωριστοῖς ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον.

First a small point of translation: in our line 2 there is ἐν πάσῃ φύσει, but Aristotle (430a10) has ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει. Following Aristotle, Todd has rendered ἐν πᾶσιν φύσει “in all nature”, whereas we have “in every nature”. The main point, however, is not affected.

In **307A** Themistius has raised the question how the intellect is connate, though from outside. The answer is that it must be included with it at its original generation. (**307A.7-8**) This is taken up at 21-3, where there are difficulties of interpretation. In **320AB** the word *sumphutos* is used, as opposed to the *sumphuês* of **307A**. Both *sumphuês* and *sumphutos* are used by Aristotle, and it is not easy to distinguish between them. Neither is used by him in the present connexion. If there is a difference, one would expect *sumphuês* to refer to the problem of *DGA*, i.e. how intellect is connate with either the body or the soul, and *sumphutos* to that of *DA* 3.4-5, how the potential and the productive intellect are related. (*sumphutos ekeinôi* of the potential intellect rules out its being related to the (feminine) soul). Galen, *On the Use of the Parts of the Body* 8-9, uses both terms in connexion with the covering of the brain, in a way that suggests that a *sumphutos* relationship is closer and more complete than a *sumphuês* one.

Aristotle speaks in various places of a *sumphuton pneuma*, and later Peripatetics had a doctrine of this. He also used *sumphuton* as the antithesis of *exôthen* and *thurathen*. Possibly then in **320A.7-8** Theophrastus is picking up the word *thurathen* from *DGA* and asking how it can also be *sumphutos*. But *sumphutos* is also used frequently as the antithesis of a group of words of which *epiktêtos* is one, so that Theophrastus might have used *sumphutos* as equivalent to *thurathen* after all, but it seems impossible that he should have confused the two senses in this way.

320A introduces a quotation from Theophrastus which paraphrases *DA* 3.5 430a10-12 and repeats exactly (omitting *gar* (“for”)) 18-19. Having asked “What are the two natures (i.e. the two parts of the intellect)?” Theophrastus accepted these points and described the potential intellect as subjected to (*hupokeimenon*) or united with (*sunêrtêmenon*) the productive. The word *sunêrtêsthai* is not in Aristotle’s text, but he used it frequently in his physiological works. It is contrasted with *sumphuesthai* in Galen, *On the Use* etc. 15.5: membranes frequently the one, frequently the other. *sumphuesthai* seems to be used of two separate things, like eyelids or lips, growing together, while *sunêrtêsthai* is translated knitted together, united. It is used by Theophrastus *DS* 26, of Alcmaeon’s account of the relation of all

the senses to the brain. It looks as if these words are being used here consciously as biological terms, the relationship being rephrased by *mikton* (“a mixture”). Here we have a clarification of Aristotle’s words.

(320B) The next section (7-10) is paralleled by **320B**;³⁰⁶ the two are almost identical except for the opening words; in **320A** these are: “If the moving (*kinôn*) one is connate”;³⁰⁷ but **320B**, which immediately follows a quotation of *DA* 3.5 430a23-5, begins: “if the *dunamis* is like a *hexis*;³⁰⁸ if it is connate with that (the productive intellect)”:³⁰⁹ here *dunamis* is unlikely to be a corruption of *dunamei*, and is puzzling. *hexis* presumably takes up Aristotle’s “as some *hexis*, like light”, words which are preceded by: “the one (the potential intellect) is such by becoming all things, the other (the productive) by making all things”, so that it is not clear even in Aristotle exactly how the *hexis* fits in. Both **A** and **B** then proceed: “*kai* (both) (**A** only) it should have at once and always (**A**)/always and at once (**B**). There is no verb; “been joined” is probably the best supplement, though Devereux (p.41) thinks that in **A** “been moving” of the motive intellect should be supplied. Both continue with “but if later, with what and how the genesis?”

³⁰⁶ See also on **316**. Thomas Campanella (1568-1639), *De homine: de anima intellectiva* 5.5 (Edizione Nazionale dei classici del pensiero Italiano ser.2 vol.14 p.78) gives a supposed quotation from Theophrastus: *si ab initio intellectus semper movet, cur non statim intelligimus? si advenit postea tanta vis, et species intellectu locat passivo, unde deceptio et oblivio?* (“If the intellect is always active from the beginning, why do we not at once think? If such a power comes in later, and locates forms in the passive intellect, whence come deception and forgetting?”) This is largely repeating Averroes, but the reference to the passive intellect is new. Since Thomas is so late, we should not treat him as evidence for an unknown piece of Theophrastus, but as giving us conjectural material.

³⁰⁷ *kinôn* is used of the intellect also at **311.3** (Priscian), and Themistius at 103.1-2 has:

“in all nature there is something which is matter, and something else which moves (*kineî*) that matter and completes it”. This is a paraphrase of Aristotle *DA* 3.5 430a10-12, but Aristotle does not use the word *kinein* there but says rather “which is the cause and productive” (τὸ αἰτίον καὶ ποιητικόν), where Themistius has “which moves and completes it”. Since this is in the passage between **320B** and **307A**, which both name Theophrastus, it is possible that here too Themistius is using Theophrastus.

³⁰⁸ Schroeder and Todd have “For if the faculty (of the intellect) is like a positive state”.

³⁰⁹ Schroeder and Todd have “if it is innate (to the soul)”, but since the Greek has *ekeinôi* (“to that”) in a form that is either masculine or neuter it can hardly refer to the (feminine) soul. Gutas reports that for 102.26 = **320B.2** the Arabic translator read *ei mên gar ôs êzis ã dúnâmis êkeînf*. The antecedent of the word translated ‘that’ in his translation given below is feminine, which seems to refer to the soul (*nafs*).

We could put the two openings together and have:

“if the moving one is connate, and if the *dunamis* is like a *hexis*, (and) if it was connate with that, it must have been so both at once and for ever etc. .”

That is clumsy, and one possibility is that Themistius paraphrased a single passage of Theophrastus twice, adapting the opening to suit his context. Alternatively Theophrastus repeated his words himself, but that seems less likely.³¹⁰

This can be seen as an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: genesis implies change, and change must have a reason. There is a dilemma: either a) the two were always together, or b) they came together later. The latter is rejected, with the argument that intellect is indestructible and is therefore uncreated.³¹¹ But if they

³¹⁰ The other differences between the two passages are: a) “at once and for ever (*aei*)” in **A** and “for ever (*aiei*) and at once” in **B**, b) *kai* (“also”) in **A.9** is omitted in **B**, c) “and falsehood” occurs in **A** but not in **B**, and Themistius repeats only “forgetting and deception” in **A.14-15**. These differences are consistent with either hypothesis.

³¹¹ A textual problem exists at this point: in **320A.9** and **320B.4** the Arabic gives different readings for οὖν ὥς: the latter (102.28) has the skeleton form of the word *hdā* meaning οὗτος (this), and the former (108.26) the skeleton form *jwhrā* meaning οὐσία (substance) in the printed text, which is doubtless also the reading of the Arabic MS upon which the edition is based, a unique copy in Fez in Morocco. (See Lyons (1973), 186.8 and 197.15). The reading οὐσία for οὖν ὥς in 108.26 is also defended by Gerald M. Browne, ‘Ad Themistium Arabum’ *Illinois Classical Studies* 11 1986 242. It is far from certain, however, that the Greek MS used by the Arabic translator also had οὐσία, for the corruption from *hdā* (οὗτος) to *jwhrā* (οὐσία) may have occurred within the Arabic tradition, i.e. somewhere between the translator’s autograph in the ninth century and the Fez MS which was copied in the 13th. For it is relatively easy to corrupt the Arabic word “this” (*hdā*) to the Arabic “substance” ([*jw*] *hnā*) in the accusative as required in the syntax of the sentence): all that is needed is the addition of two letters before the word for “this”; otherwise the only difference concerns the Arabic letters “d” and “r” which look very much alike in script.

For two other reasons the Greek archetype of the Arabic translator must have had οὗτος rather than οὐσία. First, palaeographically it is easier to explain a confusion between οὖν ὥς and οὗτος in a Greek archetype written in uncials than between οὖν ὥς and οὐσία. Second, assuming that the original text of the Arabic translator had “this” (οὗτος = *hdā*), the corruption of “this” into “substance” (οὐσία = *jwhrā*) can easily be explained as a marginal gloss incorporated into the text. The gloss would have happened most likely under the influence of Avicenna’s philosophy, in which the substantiality of the human soul is repeatedly stressed. In sum, the value of the Arabic tradition for the establishment of the Greek text of Themistius consists in its attestation, in MSS earlier than the seventh century, of a Greek variant of οὗτος for οὖν ὥς in 102.28 and 108.26. Similarly a variant of οὐσία for οὖν ὥς in 108.26 seems to be improbable. (DG)

Browne’s reading, followed by Todd, would give: “it is a substance ...”, but the main point remains the same. (PMH)

were always together, why not always? This should be explained from 3.4 430a5-6: we must enquire why we do not always think". cf. **307D.8** "But if it is immanent" needs examination. The Greek is *enuparchôn*, and the verb, meaning "existing in", is common in Aristotle, but here in both **A** and **B** the subject is unclear. Taking the whole drift of Themistius' account, it seems to be intellect as a unity.

The objection to a) is continued with "Why forgetfulness and deception³¹² (and falsehood in **A**)?" This does not come directly from Aristotle. He has two references to not remembering a) at 408b28 "When this perishes, it (intellect undifferentiated) neither remembers nor loves etc." a passage where Aristotle seems to be speaking of a kind of immortality without memory; and b) at 430a23 "We do not remember, because this is impassible, and the passible intellect is perishable."³¹³ But a) seems to refer to the lack of memory in the intellect after death—although how Aristotle reached that position before dying himself is unclear—and b) either to that or to the fact that we do not now remember our prenatal experience.³¹⁴ Theophrastus, on the other hand, seems to refer to the observed fact that our memories are unreliable and subject to positive errors. He departs also from the approach of *On Memory*, which is an empiricist account including the "place" system. His difficulties are connected precisely with *DA* 3.4 and 5. Aristotle there postpones a discussion of why we do not always think, but no such discussion exists in his *DA* or any other surviving work. Since the text of the last part of *DA* is less than satisfactory, it is possible that a discussion did exist which was known to Theophrastus, but was then lost, but it is also possible that Theophrastus raised a new point and tried to answer it with "Perhaps through the mixture." See also on **321**.

What is this mixture? If Themistius is playing fair,³¹⁵ Theophrastus cannot have said anything further about this mixture which would contradict Themistius' own account. That, given in **320A.10-14**, is that there was both a passive and perishable intellect which was called "common" and was inseparable from the body, and another

³¹² Schroeder and Todd have "confusion".

³¹³ The interpretation of these words of Aristotle is itself uncertain, but we cannot follow that here.

³¹⁴ We should probably ignore 3.5 430a22, which probably runs: "it is not the case that it (intellect) sometimes thinks, and sometimes does not think", even though some commentators, including 'Simplicius' 245,34, 263,8 read it as "it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not think".

³¹⁵ He plays fair in a way, by his full quotation from Theophrastus.

composed of the potential and the actual, supposed to be separate from the body and imperishable and uncreated. It was because of the mixture with the former that forgetting and deception occur. This is an idiosyncratic interpretation of Aristotle's difficult remarks on this subject, and is claimed by Themistius as his own, but is applied also to Theophrastus. At **320A.13-14** the language is ambiguous but it seems unlikely that Theophrastus said that the mixture was with Themistius' passive and perishable and "common" intellect.

Themistius' account takes up what he has said previously: on p.101 he uses quotations from Aristotle to distinguish the passible and perishable intellect from the potential, and says that it was the former that Aristotle called the common. Again on p.105 he takes Aristotle's τοῦ κοινοῦ ὃ ἀπόλωλεν at 408b28-9 as referring to "the common intellect", and not to the composite of body and mind which is surely what Aristotle meant. He does not attribute this view to Theophrastus in so many words, and it is most unlikely that the latter held such a view.

We have also seen a reference to a mixture in Averroes at **308A.69-70** to explain the intermittent occurrence of weakness and increase in the dispositional intellect. This is close to, but not the same as, what Themistius says, but since there is no obvious source in Aristotle for the idea it seems probable that Averroes took it from Themistius, though the differences are worrying. And it remains uncertain what Theophrastus could have meant. Devereux, p.42-3, has some interesting suggestions.

On **307A** we discussed Themistius' remark that Aristotle and Theophrastus found almost the same difficulties, whether it was from outside or connate, about the potential intellect "as well". We saw that this could mean "as well as the productive intellect" or "as well as one another". In any case we saw that the problem here was about the undifferentiated intellect, and we need not discuss it further.

As on **307A**, we give a translation of the Arabic, made by Gutas:

'After he too began on the subject of the active intellect which Aristotle treated with precision, he said:

"We ought to investigate that thing to which we are pointing, and say for all nature that some of it is like matter and potential, and some of it is cause and active", and that

"that which acts is always nobler than that which is being acted upon, and the first principle is nobler than matter."

These things, then, he accepts, while those with which he has problems are the following:

"What are these two natures? What is this substrate, or (what is) that which is attached to the active (intellect)? For the intellect is as if mixed out of the active and the potential (intellects). So if the (intellect) which moves is innate, it should also be eternal and perpetual, but if it is subsequent, then with what, and how, does its generation (come about)? It seems that it is an ungenerated substance if it is imperishable. Once it exists, why not perpetually? Whence come forgetfulness, error, and falsity?" —adding—"from the mixture".

From all this it is clear that what we have taken the case to be is not wrong; that in their opinion the perishable intellect that is subject to being-affected is one thing, which is what they also call "common" and "inseparable from the body"; it is concerning this one that Theophrastus says,

"From mixing with it (the body) there come about forgetfulness and error"

and that there is another, different, intellect like something composed of potential and actual, about which they believe that it is separate from the body, imperishable, and ungenerated. Regarding both these intellects they say that in one way they are two natures and in another that they are one, the reason being that that which is (composed) of matter and form is one.'

For 320B the Arabic has:

'Theophrastus poses problems in the statements in which he investigates Aristotle's theory of the active intellect, saying,

"If it is like a disposition or faculty of that, then, if it is innate, it should be eternal; but if it is subsequent, then, with what, and how, does its generation (come about), since it seems that this one is ungenerated if it is imperishable? Once it exists, why is it not perpetually? Whence come forgetfulness and error? It may be from the mixture."

For notes on this see the Appendix.

Apparatus items

Henry Bate's *The Mirror of divine and some natural things* was a theological encyclopedia with some scientific digressions. Henry (1246-1310) was a Belgian astrologer and theologian. He studied in Paris and was influenced by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, but he was outside the universities and so escaped the condemnations of 1270 and 1277. He cited Averroes a great deal, but was very eclectic and wanted to show the agreement of Plato and Aristotle.

In part 2 chap. 14 (p.60 van de Vyver) he paraphrases Themistius: "But Theophrastus, dealing with this material, first spoke hesitantly:

after some earlier doubts he says this: if indeed the active intellect has been implanted in man, he will always and at once have actually to think. But if (it came in) later, with what and in what kind of way does its generation come about? It seems therefore, he says, that it is uncreated, if indeed it is indestructible. And if it is immanent, why is it not always thinking? And why is there forgetfulness and deception? In reply he says: because of mixture."³¹⁶

He seems to be following **320B** from Themistius 102 rather than **320A** from 108 because he omits the word *pseudos* ("falsehood") which is the third in the list at **320A**. Later, in chap. 19 p.85 he says that Theophrastus, Themistius and Averroes and all the Greek and Arab commentators agree, but they use different words: where Theophrastus has "mixture" (*mixtura*), Averroes has *respectus*.³¹⁷

He treats Themistius' motive (*kinôn*) intellect as the active, reflecting a long period of distortion of Theophrastus' and Aristotle's meanings. And he takes Theophrastus' "at once and for ever" (εὐθὺς καὶ ἀεὶ) as referring to the ability to think, whereas we have taken it to refer rather to the time and length of the entry and presence of the external intellect.

Thomas Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect* (264) is an attack on Siger de Brabant and the Averroists who argued that the intellect was one in all men. Thomas proceeds, in his survey of previous opinions, to the Greeks, and quotes from Themistius *PDA* 103.32-5 where the sun and light are compared in different ways to the intellect, and concludes that it is God, according to the Catholics, or the highest intellect, according to Avicenna, that alone is one. Finally Thomas quotes from the end of our **320A**, adding the next line from Themistius, which includes the name of Plato. Thomas now had William of Moerbeke's translation of *PDA* to draw on, and so to reject misleading interpretations of Averroes.

321-7 All the remaining material is very late, but not for that reason to be ignored. It centres on problems which interested medieval thinkers,

³¹⁶ *Theophrastus autem, hanc tractans materiam, prius dubitando sic ait: si quidem activus intellectus homini complantatus est, semper et mox oportebit actu intelligere per ipsum. si autem posterius, cum quo et qualiter generatio fit eius? videtur, ergo, inquit, ut ingenitus sit, si quidem incorruptibilis. inexistens autem, propter quid non semper intelligit? propter quid oblivio et deceptio? respondens autem ait: propter mixtionem.*

³¹⁷ Henry has (p.84-5): *per nostrum addiscere in ipsa substantia intellectus secundum se nihil novae receptionis acquiritur, sed tantum respectus eius ad id quod intus, particeps est innovationis, ut iam dixit Averroes.*

both Muslims and Christians, about survival of death and knowledge of God and spirits.

- 321** Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.5 430a20-5 in the version of Michael Scot (CCAA vol.6.1 p.443.9-444.11 and 444.35-445.55 and 445.61-446.93 Crawford)

Huby (1991)

For the texts see on **308A**. Here the MSS vary in their use of the names of Theophrastus and Themistius, and further confusion is introduced by James of Piacenza (See apparatus). He is clearly reporting on, not recording, whatever version or versions of Averroes he had before him, and we cannot take him as direct evidence for what Averroes wrote, but equally cannot ignore him. We have followed the strongest readings, but given details of alternatives in the apparatus. In much of our passage Averroes is reporting the views of Themistius/ Theophrastus, but not very clearly. In what follows I relate his account to that of Themistius, and the place of Theophrastus remains obscure.

If this all comes from Themistius it comes in a strange way. There are two relevant sections of his *PDA*, 29.21-30.18 and 99.32-102.29, in the latter of which he suddenly brings in Theophrastus. Both Averroes and Themistius quote freely from both *DA* 408 and 430:

a) Themistius 29.22-30.24 quotes 408b18-29 fully, and with few differences from Aristotle; he says that Aristotle is talking about movement and that the arguments for the survival of intellect apply also to soul. The passage is wholly aporetic, and contains other matters not relevant to Averroes. Averroes **321.31-4** and 36-40 quotes a large part of 408b18-27, but then says (40-44) that Themistius relates 408b18—that the intellect is a substance and is not destroyed—to 430a22-3—that when it is separated it is immortal and eternal—which Themistius does not do in this work.

b) Averroes **321.9** (= 430a22) “And it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and sometimes not” corresponds to Themistius 99.35-6 “not sometimes thinking and sometimes not thinking” and 101.24, where it is part of a longer quotation (430a21-5).

c) Averroes **321.11-12** (=430a22-3) “And when it has been separated, it is what it is alone, not mortal” corresponds to Themistius 99.37-8, a paraphrase, and 101.24-6, part of a longer passage. “This

alone is immortal and eternal and separate" is at 102.35-6, "This alone is immortal and eternal" is at 103.9-10, and "This alone is immortal" at 103,15 and 17, but the context is different. Averroes does not give Aristotle's final words "and eternal".

d) Averroes **321.15-16** (= 430a24) "And we do not remember" and the extended passage at **321.44-6** (= 430a24-5) "And we do not remember, because that is not passible, but the passible intellect is capable of being destroyed, and without this nothing is thought" are partially in Themistius 101.10-12 "And we do not remember, because this is impassible, but the passible intellect is perishable", are in paraphrase at 102.16, and are quoted again at 102.22-4, with the significant change that the last words are: οὐδὲν νοεῖ οὐδὲ μνημονεύει, which must surely mean "it neither thinks nor remembers anything", the last word perhaps being an intrusion from 408b28, which Themistius has just quoted.

e) Averroes **321.36-40** (= 408b24-9) "And forming by the intellect and considering are different in this way, that something else is destroyed within, but it itself has no source of destruction in itself. But awareness and love are not the being of it, but of that to which this belongs, in so far as it belongs. And for that reason also, when that is destroyed, we will not remember, nor will we love" (For comments on this see p.18) and the repetition of the opening words at 47-8 are connected with Themistius 101.19 "But thinking and loving and hating are not a *pathêma* of that but of this which has that in so far as it has that; for that reason when this is destroyed it neither remembers nor loves", 102.20-22 "for that reason when this is destroyed it neither remembers nor loves; for they were not of that, but of the common thing which has perished" and 105.18, "But thinking and loving and hating are not *pathê* (pl.) of that but of this which has that in so far as it has that; for that reason when this is destroyed it neither remembers nor loves" and goes on: "for they were not of that, but of the common thing which has perished"; in each case Themistius omits the opening words given by Averroes and starts at 408b25. Further Averroes' version differs considerably from that of Themistius, which is very close to Aristotle.

f) finally the remarks at the end of **321** that the passible intellect is capable of desire echo Themistius 107.6-11.

So along with the similarities there are some discrepancies between Averroes and Themistius 101-7. Is Averroes just careless, filling out Themistius from Aristotle himself, is he using an Arabic translation

very far from the Greek, or is he using another work of Themistius? The ideas are likely to be those of Themistius, but his introduction of Theophrastus' name at 102,24 is abrupt, and clearly some people thought that the latter had some influence on the pages between 101 and 107 even when he is not mentioned. We may fairly assume that Theophrastus had something to say about the problems discussed here, but we must be cautious in using this material. Averroes is concerned to interpret Aristotle, and it is for this purpose that he discusses the views of Alexander and Theophrastus/Themistius as well as his own.

He summarises Theophrastus/Themistius'³¹⁸ view thus:

a) (321.4-5) the potential intellect is the material intellect in abstraction. This can hardly be the view of Theophrastus, for although at Priscian of Lydia p.35.32-3 (317.8-9) it does appear that Theophrastus used the expression "the potential nous", in the sentence "Potentially the potential nous is its objects, but it is actually nothing before it thinks", it is Alexander who appears to have been the first to refer to the "material" intellect.³¹⁹

b) (321.6-8) Aristotle's other intellect related to this is the agent intellect when it is joined to the potential intellect, and this is the theoretical³²⁰ intellect.

c) (321.9-11) on "And it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and sometimes not" he refers to the fact that the agent intellect sometimes touches the material intellect and sometimes does not.

d) (321.11-13) on "And when it has been separated, it is what it is alone, not mortal" Averroes largely repeats what he has said at b).

e) (321.14-16) He relates d) to "And we do not remember".

f) (321.16-28) He relates "And we do not remember" to the agent intellect (for Aristotle), but the question involves the theoretical intellect, which he therefore equates with the agent when joined to the potential.

At 321.18-28 Averroes considers the question why we do not remember, and endorses Themistius' view that it must be about the agent intellect as form to us. For if one supposes that the agent intellect is eternal but the theoretical is not, the question does not

³¹⁸ See the footnotes to 321 for the textual problems here.

³¹⁹ See Huby 138.

³²⁰ Themistius does not discuss the theoretical intellect directly, but at 102.11 (and 103.7) he misquotes Aristotle, referring to the theoretical intellect where Aristotle has "the intellect and the theoretical faculty (*dunamis*)" (2.2 413b24-5). But at 46.3 he quotes Aristotle's words correctly.

apply.³²¹ This relates to the long discussion in Themistius (101-2) which concludes that *we* are the agent intellect.

At 102.15 Themistius gets to the point: it is foolish to wonder why the perishable does not remember the actions of the impassible and eternal, but we can ask why what does not suffer and is eternal does not remember what it did with the perishable. Themistius has earlier (101.14-15) fleshed this out with evidence that we do not remember after death: we do not exact vengeance nor repay friendships nor appear to loved ones. Does any of this come from Theophrastus? He is not named here by Themistius, but since his name is found in places in this part of Averroes we should at least consider whether he is behind it all.³²²

Let us return to **320B**. This opens with the word *houtô* ("and in this way"), and somehow connects what follows with the immediately preceding quotations of *DA* 408b27-9 and 430a24-5. The only obvious connection is that both Aristotle and Theophrastus are concerned with forgetting, but in the case of Aristotle this seems to be after death whereas for Theophrastus it is normal forgetfulness in this life.³²³

322A (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Albert the Great, *On the Nature and Origin of the Soul* 2.16 (*Op. omn.* vol.12 p.43.7-18 and 40-56 Geyer)

322B (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Denis the Carthusian, *On the Light of Christian Theory* 1.50 (vol.33 p.292bB ed.1896-1913)

³²¹ In the passage omitted Averroes (445.55-61) says that to take the question as about the agent intellect as *adeptus* ("acquired"), as Alexander did, is far-fetched. For knowledge existing in us in a state of having been acquired (*in dispositione adeptionis*) is spoken of ambiguously with knowledge existing through Nature and teaching.

³²² It is not easy to follow Averroes' account. James of Piacenza, *Lecture(s) on the third (book) of On the Soul* (p.233.2-5 Kuksewicz) has: "if it is supposed that the theoretical intellect is eternal, that question does not apply, but if it is supposed that the theoretical intellect is not eternal, the question can be solved" for Averroes' "for one who supposes that the agent intellect is eternal and the theoretical intellect is not eternal this question does not arise." Perhaps Averroes wrote: "if we suppose that the agent intellect is eternal and the theoretical intellect is eternal the question does not apply, but if it is supposed that the agent intellect is eternal and the theoretical intellect is not eternal, the question can be solved." But none of this is likely to be directly from Theophrastus.

³²³ What follows in Themistius does not help either. He switches to the views that Aristotle's productive intellect was either the first God or propositions and the sciences which followed from them.

At this point there is an overlap between psychology and theology, which is not surprising in view of the fact that some commentators went so far as to identify intellect with God. So we have in **322A** the statement that the intellect knows the separate intelligibles in this life, and in **322B** that separate substances can be contemplated in this life, but full felicity is obtainable only after death. On these points Aristotle left unfulfilled promises in his psychological works, including *On Memory* 1 450a7-9, a reference to why we cannot think of anything without continuity, or of timeless things without time, and scattered remarks in his *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. These leave the matter open. Evidence about Theophrastus is lacking from Priscian and Themistius (unless we suppose that in places he uses Theophrastus without naming him), but the questions arise naturally, and are such as Theophrastus might have tried to answer.

Another factor is the interest of later philosophers, especially Neoplatonists and Muslims, in these matters. It was argued at length whether God can be contemplated in this life. This calls for a cautious treatment of our very late evidence, but does not exclude the possibility that Theophrastus was a pioneer here. And whereas in straight psychology late sources nearly always link him with Themistius, in theology he is linked with a variety of others.

There is a big question about what Aristotle meant by matterless intelligibles. In *DA* 3.4 429b20 the example of the dyad, as opposed to straight, seems to be a case of a matterless intelligible which is not itself either intellect or thinking, but Aristotle does not pay much attention to it. Other examples are God, the intelligences, and the human intellect, but on these too Aristotle had little to say. So the later interest in them comes from elsewhere.

322A

was written after Albert, *DA* of 1254-7, near in time to his *On Animals*, and not later than 1262-3 according to Geyer. It is an extract from a passage in which Albert says that there are two views about the work (*opus*) of the rational soul after death. Its first paragraph, purporting to give the views of Theophrastus and all followers of Aristotle, has a Neoplatonic cast and is discussed further under Theology. In lines 7 and 9 the expressions *formam animae* and *formam intelligentiae*³²⁴ must

³²⁴ The Latin words *intelligentia* and *intellectus* have different meanings in different contexts. The trio *ratio*, *intellectus*, *intelligentia* is in [Augustine], *On the Spirit and the Soul*—attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux—(*PL* 40 779-832). *Intelligentia* is the faculty of illuminated wisdom, *intellectus* the power which knows the immaterial beings, and *ratio* knows the forms of material things. These are all just powers of the soul, not entities. These views were taken from Isaac de Stella, who got them

refer to the forms impressed by the soul and the intelligence on what is beneath them. So the intelligence impresses something on the rational soul which that soul contemplates and in so doing reacts to the form from the intelligence. All this is pure Neoplatonism.³²⁵ In the part omitted in line 9 the method/mode referred to is said to occur in oracles etc. The second paragraph gives Albert's own views, on which he is largely in agreement with Theophrastus, and has close connections with Aristotle. What it appears to mean is that all thought is by means of abstraction, but the intellect can abstract not only from images but from things themselves. That is, in this life we can only know through images, but when separated from the body the intellect can make abstraction from things themselves.

In the third paragraph Albert explains how he differs from Theophrastus, and this brings us back to earlier topics. He interprets Theophrastus' view, as he does elsewhere,³²⁶ as involving only the agent intellect in the soul, whereas he himself posits also a possible intellect (*qua* possible). Since this can be accepted as genuinely based on Theophrastus, we should accept the preceding paragraph as well. For the last lines compare **310A** and the commentary there.

322B This is part of a criticism by Denis of a theory put forward by Thomas Aquinas that there is no knowledge without a *phantasma*. Lines 1-2 are Denis' Proposition XLV. As put here there seem to be two independent points, a) that all knowledge is by a *phantasma*, and b)

indirectly from Proclus *On Fate*, which is lost in Greek, though William of Moerbeke's translation survives. In a different tradition, derived from Aristotle's *DA* via numerous intermediaries, Arabic as well as Greek, both *intelligentia* and *intellectus* tend to become hypostatized; *intelligentia* tends to be applied to what is intermediate between God and man, which means angels in Christian (and Arabic) theories, while in those nearer to Aristotle it means the intelligences which are attached to the stars. But there is no trace of any other term than *nous* in Aristotle and his immediate followers, so that this distinction cannot go back to Theophrastus.

³²⁵ In *On the Intellect and the intelligible* 1.1.4 Albert is discussing Plato's view that the cognitive soul is caused by the intelligence, and gives three reasons for this, the second of which, at p.481b(not a) 19-28, resembles lines 5-9 here, but is again clearly from a Neoplatonist source.

³²⁶ At Albert, *DA* 3.3.6 p.215.4-18 Albert discusses this problem and gives two ways in which the intellect might be joined to the separate intelligence which gives intelligible forms. That might only produce intelligible forms in us or our intellect might be joined to it as producing (them) and being a form. In the latter case if our material intellect were joined to the separate agent of the intelligences this would be greater felicity and divinity than the human intellect could attain. Albert does not mention Theophrastus here, but goes on to give the views of Alexander. The next digression, on Themistius and Theophrastus, given in **315**, follows. The passage is much less flowery than **322A**.

that man in this life cannot know separate substances. But Thomas himself connects the two (*Summary of Theology* 1a 84.7 and 88.1), in the sense that a) implies b): Denis rejects b) and so implicitly rejects a). But since it was Thomas who made the strong link between a) and b) there is no reason why Theophrastus should not have accepted b), whatever he held about a).

Although Theophrastus' name is part of a list, we must not dismiss the claim out of hand. To understand the point at issue we must first look at Aristotle: a) *DA* 3.7 431a16-17, a single contextless sentence: "hence the soul never thinks without a *phantasma*".³²⁷ b) 3.8 432a8-9: "in thought (*theôrein*) it is necessary to use *phantasmata*." These remarks were taken up by later thinkers, and it is entirely possible that Theophrastus discussed these sentences and even connected them with questions about the contemplation of God. And about 431b17-19 ("About whether it is possible for one to know anything of the things which are separate when one is not separate from size, or not, must be considered later") Averroes has a long discussion. He says that he knows a second translation:³²⁸ "And at the end we will consider whether the intellect, being in the body, is able to comprehend anything of those things which are separate from the body, or not." Averroes notes (480.31-2) that it is this question that Themistius discusses. It is possible that this is indeed what Aristotle wrote, and that Theophrastus had it before him. But whatever Aristotle wrote, he either did not keep his promise or it was lost extremely early.

By the time of Thomas and Denis it was agreed that the separate intelligences included God and the intelligences. What Aristotle meant is less clear.

323A (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Denis the Carthusian. *On the Light of Christian Theory* 1.50 (vol.33 p.292bB ed. 1896-1913)

323B (Dubious report concerning Theophrastus) Denis the Carthusian. *On Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences* 1.1.3 (vol.19 p.116aA ed. 1896-1913)

³²⁷ Themistius does not comment on this, but Averroes does (469.20ff).

³²⁸ *et in postremo perscrutabimur utrum intellectus, essendo in corpore, non separatus ab eo, possit comprehendere aliquid eorum qu(a)e separantur a corporibus, aut non* (Scot's Latin).

323A unusually links Theophrastus only with Farabi, Avicenna³²⁹ and Ghazali.³³⁰ Averroes held that felicity was attainable in this life only, and by study.³³¹ The interest in the attainment of felicity by contemplation of God and the separate substances was a feature of medieval thought. But it is possible that Theophrastus also expressed himself in this way. His treatment of the intellect was important for later philosophers, and he may have gone on to extend the theme into the sphere of theology. There is nothing extravagant or neoplatonising here, and he did write on both happiness (436 12) and divine happiness (436 13).

For *illustratio* (line 7) we can get help from 1.47 (p.289aC) above. In discussing the beatitude of the rational soul Denis begins with the contemplation of an intelligible and goes on to the *conversio* ("turning") of the soul towards the intellectual light of the superior intellect, according to Denis (the Areopagite) and Avicenna. Then: "The natural beatitude of the separated soul must be placed in the contemplation of that intelligible, through the contemplative union with which, or as united with which, it is more strongly illuminated, more clearly understands, and looks more gloriously upon the purity of the first truth."³³² He gives much more on the light of the intelligible on inferior minds etc.

484 from Cicero may be relevant: it does not tell us much with certainty about Theophrastus, but could be based on something he said about the soul's state after death when its desire for knowledge is satisfied.

323B Theophrastus is listed here without Themistius but with Porphyry. But here Porphyry appears to head the list of the Platonists, while Theophrastus is at the end of the Peripatetics, so that there may be

³²⁹ For Avicenna see D.Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden: Brill 1988 162-3.

³³⁰ See on 303.

³³¹ e.g. at *On the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect* p.108 Bland: those cut off in their prime will suffer not-being or pain, for felicity is attained by study. Plato's retired guardians were in a position to enjoy felicity. (See L.Hannes Halle a/S 1892 p.10, n.3. See also J.Hercz *Drei Abhandlungen über die Conjunction der Separaten Intellekts mit den Menschen* Berlin 1869 28f; *Ivry Journal of the American Oriental Society* 86 1966 76-85.)

³³² *in illius intelligibilis contemplatione beatitudo naturalis animae separatae constituenda est, per cuius contemplativam unionem, seu cui unita, fortius illustratur, sincerius intelligit, et primae veritatis puritatem splendidius intuetur.*

no connection. It is difficult to account for the order in which the names appear.

beatitudo has connections with the beatific vision, and should not be limited to ordinary happiness. See also **260**, where a distinction between what can be done now and with our own natural powers to know the intelligences, and something of a more exalted kind, is implied. See also **322**.

For Avicenna see **309C**. Denis' claim is based on the conclusion of *FL*. For Plotinus see e.g. I 4.3.33-4 and 4.4.1-2. For Avicenna see on **323A**.

- 324** Averroes, *Commentary on the Metaphysics* 12(L).3 1070a25-7 (p.1488.7-9, 1489.1-6 Bouyges)

Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics. A translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book Lām, by Charles Genequand. Leiden: Brill 1986. (This is a frequently inaccurate translation; see the review by D.Gutas in *Der Islam* 64 [1987] 122-6). A.Martin, Averroes *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Livre Lām/Lambda*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1984

Averroes is commenting on a parenthesis by Aristotle, which read as follows in the Arabic translation at his disposal: "As for whether there is anything that persists at the end, we perhaps ought to enquire about it, for with some things there is nothing that would hinder (their persistence), as for example whether the soul is like this—not all of it but the intellect (only), for perhaps it is impossible for all of it", which resembles the thought of *DA* 3.5 430a22-3, "that (this) when separate is only what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal." He reports Alexander's views, and then goes on to the different views of Theophrastus, other ancient Peripatetics, and Themistius.

The report of Alexander's views derives from his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, of which only a small part survives in Greek.³³³ Averroes knew an Arabic translation of the original work by Alexander, but had access to only the first two-thirds of it.³³⁴ At the end of **324** he refers to his own account in his *LCDA* which we have

³³³ J. Freudenthal, 'Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles untersucht und übersetzt', *Abh. der königlichen Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin* 1884, phil.-hist. Kl., no.1. For later work see Sharples (1987) 1182.

³³⁴ See Genequand, 7.

printed at **308A**. For the Arabic term *mustafād* (“acquired”, *adeptus*) for Alexander’s *thurathen* see J.Finnegan, ‘Texte arabe du Περὶ νοῦ d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise’, *Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph* Beyrouth 33 1956 171ff.

For the views of Theophrastus Averroes draws directly on the paraphrase by Themistius in **320A**, lines 14-17, a frequently quoted passage (cf. above Ibn Sab’īn in **314D**); for the Arabic text of Themistius, the one used by Averroes, see the edition by M.C. Lyons, 197-8. Averroes substitutes the words “matter” and “form” for the *dunamei* and *energeiai* of Themistius and refers to his lengthy analysis of the subject in his *LCDA*. (DG)

Huby adds that terms for the “parts” of the intellect used by interpreters of Aristotle have varied: Genequand gives “acquired” for Gutas’ “appropriated last”, “derived” for Gutas’ “acquired”, and “active” for “agent”. Within this context these differences are not significant.

Averroes says that most commentators thought that the material intellect survives, and goes on to the position of the separate agent intellect. What follows is not entirely clear: he seems to say that the agent intellect itself has two aspects, as form and as material intellect. But as we have seen on **307** and **320** these distinctions may postdate Theophrastus, and the passage does not help us with him.

- 325** Averroes, *Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul* 3.5 430a20-5 in the version of Michael Scot (CCAA vol.6.1 p.452.257-60 and 452.265-453.285 and 290-3 Crawford)

This passage deals with material in Aristotle beyond the point where Priscian leaves off. Theophrastus is not mentioned in any of our MSS, but James of Piacenza (see apparatus) says that here Averroes compares the views of Themistius, Theophrastus, and Alexander. There is therefore a chance that the views attributed to Themistius are also those of Theophrastus, though it is equally likely that James was mistaken. Further, Albert the Great refers in two places to Averroes as arguing against Theophrastus as well as Themistius with arguments that may be from this passage:

In his *Summary of Theology* 2.13 (77) 3.29 (vol.33 84b4-18 Borgnet), he says: “the twenty-ninth way³³⁵ is again that of Averroes in the

³³⁵ Of arguing whether there is one intellectual soul in all bodies, or many. **310A** is on the nineteenth way.

Commentary on the third (book of) *On the Soul*, and he argued like this: what is universally active about all things does not act unless it is founded on something which is receptive of its action: the agent intellect is universally active about all intelligibles: therefore it does not act unless it is founded on the possible intellect, by which all intelligibles can come into being. And from this he goes further, arguing against Themistius and Theophrastus and Alexander that if the agent is something eternal and separate, it must be that the possible on which it acts is separate and eternal, because otherwise it would not be founded in action: and from this again he goes further, that if the agent and the possible are eternal, it cannot be but that what is created and generated by the agent in the possible, like the knowledge of truth from necessary principles, is incorruptible and eternal and separate. From this (way) he concludes that the whole intellectual soul, including the agent intellect and the possible and the formal and the acquired, is separate and incorruptible,"³³⁶ and in his *On the Unity of the Intellect* 1 (p.12.72-8):

"And for that reason he (Averroes) says that if the agent (intellect) is eternal it is necessary that the possible should be eternal,³³⁷ speaking against Themistius and Theophrastus.³³⁸ and therefore he enquires how it can be that if the agent is eternal and the passive is eternal that also that which is made from the agent on the passive should be subject to generation and corruption."³³⁹

³³⁶ *vigesima nona via est iterum Averrois in Commento super tertio De anima, et arguit sic: agens universaliter omnia non agit nisi fundatum in aliquo quod receptivum est actionis eius: intellectus agens est universaliter agens omnia intelligibilia: ergo non agit nisi fundatum in intellectu possibili, quo est fieri omnia intelligibilia. et ex hoc procedit ultra, dicens contra Themistium et Theophrastum et Alexandrum quod si agens est quid aeternum et separatum oportet quod possibile in quod agit sit separatum et aeternum, quia aliter non fundaretur in actione. et ex hoc iterum procedit, quod si agens et possibile sint aeterna, non potest esse quin factum et generatum ab agente in possibili, sicut scientia veritatis ex principiis necessariis, sit incorruptibile et aeternum et separatum. ex hac collegit quod tota anima intellectualis secundum intellectum agentem et possibilem, et formalem et adeptum, sit separata et incorruptibilis.*

³³⁷ Or, with a comma after *necesse est*, "which is necessary, (then) the possible is eternal."

³³⁸ Albert here seems ungrammatical and incomprehensible, and perhaps there is something wrong with his text. But if he is referring to Averroes' *LCDA* our record of that may be faulty, and possibly Theophrastus' name has fallen out there too. Compare the mess at 443-4, our **321**. See also **308A.43-4** and **313.9-18**.

³³⁹ *et ideo dicit quod si agens est aeternus, quod necesse est quod possibilis sit aeternus, loquens contra Themistium et Theophrastum: et ideo quaerit qualiter esse possit, quod si agens est aeternum et patiens aeternum, et quod factum ex agente in patiente sit generativum et corruptivum.*

This is not very close to **325**, and the opening lines are puzzling, so that there may be something wrong with the text; we may add *LCDA* p.406.566-84 which refers only to Themistius: "And Themistius thought for that reason that we are the agent intellect, and that the theoretical intellect is nothing other than the connection of the agent intellect with the material intellect alone. And it is not as he thought, but we must believe that there are three parts of the intellect in the soul, of which one is the intellect which receives, the second that which makes, and the third what has been made. And two of them are eternal, that is, the agent and the recipient; but the third is generable and capable of being destroyed in one sense, but eternal in another."³⁴⁰

Averroes discusses at great length these two ways, concluding (407.601-604) that as known by us the objects of intellect are generable and capable of being destroyed, but as each unique they are eternal.

This is not very close to Albert and quite different in language. Averroes refers to Alexander and Themistius at 453.294, but again that is not close and the language is different. The most striking thing, however, is that the material in **325** is not in our Themistius. His *PDA* at p.99-108 is entirely different.³⁴¹ Here again it looks as if Averroes may have been using another source, also from Themistius, which could have used Theophrastus.

In the passage omitted in line 4 Averroes deals with Plato, and in that omitted in line 23 he gives his own view, that Aristotle introduced the agent intellect because the *intellecta speculativa* are generated in the way that he has said. He says he will go on to compare the three views, and in doing this, at line 296, he says that he differs from Themistius over the nature of the dispositional intellect, and in the way of positing the agent. Themistius only needs the material intellect, or that and the agent intellect *in modo similitudinis* ("by way of analogy"). For without true generation there is no agent.

See also 466.31-47 and 495-502.

³⁴⁰ *et ideo opinatus est Themistius quod nos sumus intellectus agens, et quod intellectus speculativus nichil est aliud nisi continuatio intellectus agentis cum intellectu materiali tantum. et non est sicut existimavit, sed opinandum est quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem est efficiens, tertia autem factum. et due istarum sunt eterne, scilicet agens et recipiens; tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis uno modo, eterna autem alio.*

³⁴¹ Lines 6-7 of **325** which say that the agent intellect is not joined with us as innate at the beginning are something like **307A.2-3**, but the context is quite different.

- 326A** Thomas Aquinas, *On Peter Lombard's second book of Sentences* 17.2.1 (vol.6 p.534a3-34 ed. 1856)
- 326B** Thomas Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect* 265 (p.89b10-18 Spiazzi)

M. de Corte, 'Themistius et Saint Thomas d'Aquin' *AHDLMA* 7 1932 47-83, especially 67,79. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists* translated from the Latin with an introduction by Beatrice H. Zeller Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1968

- 326A** The origins of Latin Averroism are obscure, because none of its works survives and we have to use opponents. It is unlikely that it developed much before 1250. In this work of 1254-6 Thomas uses Averroes' *LCDA*, but attributes to Averroes the view that Themistius and Theophrastus held, among other things, that the possible intellect is one in all men. This they did not. With some exceptions Thomas follows **308A** closely, but the insertion of "one" (*unus*) in line 15 is not justified. It is true that Averroes in leading up to 406.575 does himself argue tentatively for this view, as interpreting Aristotle and being correct, but Thomas withdrew his remarks about Theophrastus and Themistius in 1270, in **326B**, after reading Themistius in Latin, as de Corte shows. See on **307A** for Thomas' statement that he has not seen Theophrastus' books.³⁴²

line 12 *phantasmata* See on **322B**.

It is a notorious puzzle that Albert the Great at one time believed that Averroes denied the unity of intellect both active and potential, in all men, but the Latin Averroists believed that he maintained it. R.Miller (1954) 59 has shown that it was fairly easy for Albert to do this on the basis of the *LCDA*: the passages quoted by Miller which support the view that he held this are largely from aporetic accounts the upshot of which is left unclear. Certainly there is no passage in which Averroes states clearly that Theophrastus and Themistius held such a doctrine.

Apparatus items

Antony of Parma: see on **309B**.

Matthew of Aquasparta, *Thirteen different Questions about the Soul* 7.2 (p.122.16-38 Gondras) agrees with **308A**.34-72 except a) at 16-18,

³⁴² Denis the Carthusian, *On the second Book of Peter Lombard's Sentences* 17.1 repeats Thomas' words almost exactly.

where he says that Themistius and Theophrastus wanted the theoretical intellect to be one, eternal and not countable (*numeratus*), which comes from Thomas, and at p.122.26-38 which differ from 308A.44-72, as follows: "A sign of that (that the agent intellect is the form of the potential intellect, and is joined with us through it) is that everything acts through its form. Since, therefore, the activity of the intellect, which³⁴³ is in our power, belongs to the habitual intellect, and abstracts species from images, it must be that the agent intellect, through which such abstracting occurs, is the form of the potential intellect, and is the habitual intellect, inasmuch as it is actually giving form to the potential intellect. Hence they (Theophrastus and Themistius) supposed that just as the agent is eternal, and the possible is eternal, so intelligible species are eternal; and for that reason it is not the case that the intellect sometimes thinks, and sometimes does not think, for this reason, that new species are created, but on account of a new impression of the agent intellect due to its being joined to us from its mingling with the possible intellect."³⁴⁴

Matthew (c. 1240-1302) was about twelve years younger than Thomas, and clearly used his *On the Sentences* here. He was a Franciscan who lived in Paris, Bologna and Rome, and followed Bonaventure and Augustine.³⁴⁵ See also on 308A. Denis the Carthusian (see app.) also follows Thomas closely in both works.

[Robertus Grosseteste], *Summary of Philosophy* 11 (*Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln* ed. L. Baur Münster 1912 472.18-23): "And for this reason Theophrastus and Themistius and later Averroes were tremendously mistaken when they supposed that in all individual men there was a possible intellect that was even numerically one and the same, and most of all Aristotle, when he thought that the agent intellect differed from the possible intellect in substance. Among the old philosophers only Avicenna openly contradicts them."³⁴⁶

³⁴³ This relative is masculine, and must therefore refer to the intellect.

³⁴⁴ *istius autem signum est quod unumquodque agit per formam suam. cum ergo actio intellectus, qui est in potestate nostra, pertineat ad intellectum in habitu, et abstrahit species a phantasmatis, oportet quod intellectus agens, per quem fit talis abstractio, sit forma intellectus potentialis, et sit intellectus in habitu, prout est actu informans intellectum possibilem. unde posuerunt isti quod sicut agens est aeternus, et possibilis aeternus, sic species intelligibiles sunt aeternae; et ideo non contingit quod intellectus quandoque intelligit, quandoque non intelligit, per hoc quod fiant novae species, sed propter novam impressionem intellectus agentis secundum quod continuatur [in] nobis ex commixtione sua cum intellectu possibili.*

³⁴⁵ See Copleston (1956) 448-51.

³⁴⁶ *ideoque enormiter erraverunt Theophrastus ac Themistius posteriusque Averroes, qui*

Baur pp.126*-141* discusses the authenticity of this work, which refers to a comet of 1264, whereas the genuine Grosseteste died in 1253. He thinks it was at least published in the 1250s.

Themistius in his *PDA* does not say this, but he could be very confusedly supposed to have done so in 103,21-105,13, but not obviously in connection with Theophrastus. It is unlikely that this author had access to other works of Themistius. The reference to Avicenna is to his *On the Soul* 5.5, and to Averroes to his *LCDA* p.406.575-6 Crawford.³⁴⁷

326B follows on from the passage reported under **320**. Thomas concludes from his study of Themistius himself that Averroes was wrong.

Apparatus item

Thomas at 214 blames Averroes for the mistaken views of his own contemporaries. For more see Gutas' views in the Introduction.

327 Radulphus³⁴⁸ Brito, *Questions about Aristotle's third book On the Soul* 1 (p.95.162-7 Fauser)

eundem unicum intellectum possibilem in omnibus individuīs hominum etiam secundum numerum esse posuerunt, et maxime Aristoteles, qui intellectum agentem ab intellectu possibili differre secundum substantiam arbitratur. quibus inter veteres solus manifestius Avicenna contradicit.

³⁴⁷ Averroes, p.406.575-407.584, sums up his view: from this we believe that the material intellect is one in all men, and also that the human species is eternal (as we said elsewhere) therefore the material intellect is not *denudatus* from the natural principles common to the whole human species, i.e. first propositions and singular formations common to all. For these intelligibles are unique according to that which receives them, but many according to the received *intentio*. They must then be eternal in the way that they are unique etc. He seems to be saying that abstract 'ideas' are eternal and unique, but not as joined to us. At 605ff he pursues an alternative possibility.

At 410.684-411.704, in the course of replying to Theophrastus, he says that the claim that the recipient must have nothing actually of what it receives is not simple, but conditional; it does not mean that the recipient is nothing at all. The relation of the agent intellect to it is that of light to the transparent, and forms are colours. This seems to be a simple working out of Aristotle's analogy, and Theophrastus is not mentioned. There immediately (705) comes a reference to *adeptio* and the acquired intellect, but not as part of the light analogy.

At 710-19 Averroes says that his account, with intellect being both unique and many, solves questions, e.g. that different men know different things, but a student can learn from his master.

³⁴⁸ This name is usually found in its Latin form, but he has been called Raoul Brito de Hotet, and the French commonly call him Raoul le Breton or Raoul Renaud.

Brito, who was at the Sorbonne in 1300 and died in 1320, and was influenced by Thomas Aquinas, is here quoting from the Latin translation of Themistius by William of Moerbeke p.235.8 Verbeke. The clause about the illuminating and illuminated intellects is taken directly from that translation, but it is in a passage where Theophrastus is not mentioned. The rest is an interpretation of Themistius' views, and there is nothing in them which justifies the use of the word *adeptus* ("acquired").³⁴⁹ It is interesting that Brito brought in the name of Theophrastus, but there is no reason to suppose that he was correct in so doing. It is more likely that he saw that name before this passage at p.102 (320B) and after it on p.107-9 (307A and 320A), and so applied it here.

It is appropriate to add here a note on **Bessarion**, whose works contain several references to Theophrastus. Many of these repeat what we already know,³⁵⁰ and we decided that we should not print anything at all because Bessarion was well outside the period we had decided to cover and was unlikely to have new material. But Peter Lautner³⁵¹ has argued that one passage does contain new material. I quote *In Calumniatorem Platonis* ("Against the Defamer of Plato") 3.27.3 (vol.2 p.408.19-29 Mahler)

ταῦτα δὲ Θεόφραστος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, Θεμιστιός τε καὶ Ἀβερὸς οὕτω νοοῦσιν, ὥς κοινοῦ τινος ὄντος, ἐξ οὗ ἕκαστος ἄνθρωπος ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι νοῦν ἑαυτῷ προσλαμβάνει, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἀποδοθῆναι τε καὶ οἰκειωθῆναι αὐτῷ μέρος θνήσκων οὕτω καταλιμπάνει εἰς τὸ κοινόν, ὥσπερ καὶ γενόμενος ἐμπεριειλήφει, οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἂν τις γεννηθεὶς μετέχειν λέγοιτο τοῦ ἡλίου, ἀποθανὼν δὲ στερεῖσθαι καὶ ὃ ἔλαβε φῶς ἤδη καταλιπεῖν. θύραθεν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπείσιν μήτε γινόμενον μήτε φθειρόμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγέννητον. κοινὸν δ' ὅμως τοῦτό γε ἀγαθὸν ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδεὶς ἀρνεῖται. οὐχὶ οὖν μερικὴν τινα ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν θύραθεν ἐπεισιοῦσαν ἐκείνοι βούλονται, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀπειλημένην κατ' ἐξιδίωσιν. καὶ εἰ τις δὲ παραδέξαιτο τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου λέξιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἐγγεννᾶσθαι, ἐν ἣ οἶεται μεγάλην ἰσχὺν ἐγκεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἔπεται ἀπλῶς ἄρχεσθαι τοῦ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν ἅμα τῷ σώματι, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐν τινὶ ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἦν πρότερον,

³⁴⁹ W. Fauser (*Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De Anima* Munster: Aschendorff 1974) 161-2 lists various terms for intellects in Arabic and Greek.

³⁵⁰ With one exception no passage quoted by Bessarion naming Theophrastus is untraceable, and nearly all are precise quotations. Most probably he collected them from Simplicius and Proclus.

³⁵¹ 'Theophrastus in Bessarion' *JHS* 115 1995 155-60.

ὥς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ νοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος αὐτοῦ εἶναι.

(“These remarks” (Aristotle’s at *DA* 1.4 408b18-19 and *DGA* 2.3 736b28 that the intellect appears to be a substance inborn in us, and not to be destroyed, and that the intellect alone comes in from outside and alone is divine) “Theophrastus and Alexander, Themistius and Averroes take like this, that there is something common, out of which each man, at the moment of his creation, acquires for himself an intellect, and again when he dies leaves behind in the common stock the part given to him and made his own, in the same way as when he came into being he took it into himself, no differently from the way a man might when created be said to share in the sunshine, and when dead to be deprived of it and forthwith to leave behind the light which he had received. For the light of the sun also comes upon men from outside and neither comes to be nor is destroyed, but is indestructible and uncreated. And yet no one denies that this good thing³⁵² at least comes to exist in men as a thing common to all. Therefore they do not want the soul which comes in from outside to be a divisible soul, but to be taken off from the common stock by appropriation.³⁵³ And if anyone were to accept the opposite interpretation of that that it is created inside (the body), a view in which there is thought to be great strength, it does not simply follow that the existence of the intellect begins simultaneously with the body, but that it is in some indivisible thing in which it was not before, as being the origin and the beginning not of the existence of the intellect, but of its completion”).

Bessarion was familiar with Theophrastus,³⁵⁴ but we cannot relate this material to anything of Theophrastus that survives. On the other hand 1) the simile of the sun occurs in Themistius’ *PDA* 103.20-

³⁵² Lautner takes this to be the intellect, but the sun seems preferable.

³⁵³ Lautner takes *kat’ exidiōsin* as meaning a process of becoming particular. He has a full account of the term *exidiōsis*, which appears to be used only by Arethas (c.850-944), and to mean “peculiar characteristic”. It is unlikely then that Bessarion’s report is verbally close to any of the sources he names, and Lautner appears to accept that this is probably Bessarion’s own contribution. He tries to find this doctrine in our 307A.24-5, but he ignores the fact that there Themistius is speaking of Aristotle as well as Theophrastus.

³⁵⁴ But Glenn Most has argued that he cannot be the author of the Latin translation of Theophrastus’ *Metaphysics* attributed to him, for that is based on Greek material dating from after his death. (Théophraste, *Métaphysique* Paris: Les Belles lettres 1993 p.lxxviii) See also Lautner n.11.

104.29, but the main drift of the argument is different; this is a passage which comes between the two discussions of Theophrastus (320B and 307A+320A) and where it might be natural to see the influence of Theophrastus. But we are then thrown back on Themistius himself as evidence, and do not need Bessarion. 2) Alexander is less similar to Bessarion, and may be ignored, though Lautner has some ingenious arguments here. 3) Averroes in places has some similarity to Bessarion, but where he discusses Theophrastus (and Themistius) he does not apply this interpretation. Lautner argues that Bessarion is reliable in his accounts of the other writers named, and that he is therefore reliable about Theophrastus. But what we have is a short account which does not exactly fit any of these writers, let alone all, so that it is unreasonable to see it as good evidence for an aspect of Theophrastus' thought that is elsewhere unknown.

What Bessarion says in itself has a Neoplatonist ring. Lautner points out that he appears to identify *nous* and *psuchê*, and in the same sentence he speaks of the soul as *merikê* ("particular"), both of which are typically Neoplatonist positions. Again, Lautner does not face up to the fact that this single account is supposed to be the joint view of Themistius, Alexander and Averroes as well as Theophrastus. See also n.145.

We may also refer to the remarks about *nous* in Porphyry's *On Abstinence*, 584D.23, "for the gods the best first-fruits are a pure mind (*nous*) and a soul free of emotion (*apathês*).” Theophrastus is not named in this excerpt, but it completes a set of passages where Porphyry quotes from Theophrastus extensively. It is similar to 584A.154, where it is said that men must approach sacrifice "cleansed in character". We cannot discuss here the extent to which Porphyry used Theophrastus for his own purposes, but the use of *apathês*, a Stoic term, raises doubts.³⁵⁵ In addition *psuchê apathês* introduces a harsh hiatus unusual in Theophrastus.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵ See W. Pötscher, *Strukturprobleme der Aristotelischen und Theophrastischen Gottesvorstellung* Leiden: Brill 1970 (*Philosophia Antiqua* 19) 80-1.

³⁵⁶ J. Bouffartigue, in his introduction to the Budé edition of *On Abstinence* (Paris 1977) vol.1 xxvi ff. studies Porphyry's methods of quoting and using other authors. He shows how he sometimes distorts the original shamelessly.

APPENDIX

Themistius on Theophrastus in Arabic (or, What Averroes Read)¹

DIMITRI GUTAS

With one exception (FHS&G 314D), all the Arabic fragments of Theophrastus on the subject of the intellect are found in the works of Averroes (FHS&G nos. 308A, 308B, 309A, 309B, 321, 324); thus, Averroes cites the opinions of Theophrastus on the intellect at most seven times.² His source is Themistius's paraphrase of Aristotle's *De anima*, extant both in the Greek original and in Ishāq ibn-Hunayn's Arabic translation, which contains an extensive section quoting expressly from Theophrastus's *On the Soul*.³ Averroes repeatedly refers to and is inspired by this passage in a number of his works.

The original passage by Theophrastus in Themistius, as well as the use that was made of it in its Arabic version by Averroes, have attracted considerable attention in recent scholarship.⁴ There is still

¹ This Appendix is adapted, with slight modifications, from Section V of my article, "Averroes on Theophrastus, through Themistius," which was presented to the 4th *Symposium Averroicum* (Köln, September 1996); see Gutas (1999).

² That is, if one also counts the entry no. A5 below under "*Sarḥ* (*Commentarium magnum*) on *De anima*," where the reference by Averroes would appear to be to Themistius and not to Theophrastus. Also FHS&G 325 is to be discounted as a Theophrastean fragment, for Averroes cites there Themistius only.

³ In the paper mentioned in note 1 above, I argued that it is improbable to the extreme that Averroes had access to either one of the other two possible sources, the Arabic translation itself of Theophrastus's *On the Soul*, (*Fihrist* 252.7 Flügel = FHS&G 265, 1b), and a book on the soul by Themistius, independent of his paraphrase, which the *Fihrist* (253.27 Flügel) lists also as available in Arabic in two books (*Kitāb an-nafs, maqālatayn* [*sic*]).

⁴ Themistius's paraphrase of *De anima* 3.4-8 was translated into English by F.M. Schroeder and R.B. Todd in their *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect* (1990), pp. 100-117, with notes and extensive literature; the passage by Theophrastus is translated on pp. 100-101 and 113-117. The entire paraphrase of Themistius is now available in an English translation by R.B. Todd, *Themistius on Aristotle on the Soul*, London: Duckworth, 1996. "Aristotle's theory of the intellect and its interpretation by Averroes," who also used the relevant passages in Themistius's paraphrase, was extensively discussed by A. Hyman in a similarly entitled article published in *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. D.J. O'Meara [*Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* 9], Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1981, pp. 161-191. Averroes' understanding of the material intellect and his arguments with and against the entire Aristotelian tradition were recently studied anew and in

room, however, if we are to decide with anything approaching certainty the precise sources of Averroes on this subject, for yet another, more specific analysis. To this end, I am giving below in English translation the *Arabic* version of Themistius's long section on Theophrastus. This is useful for two reasons. First, it offers a translation of the Arabic—and not the Greek—text as *Averroes* would have read and understood it; and second, it presents the entire section divided into its constituent parts, visually distinguishing what Themistius indicates was said by Theophrastus from his own summaries of what he perceives to be the common positions of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

* * *

THEMISTIUS ON THEOPHRASTUS ON THE INTELLECT⁵

It is best that we also mention what Theophrastus said about the potential intellect and about the actual intellect. Concerning the potential intellect he said the following:

*As for the intellect*⁶

- [a] *how—I wish I knew—[is it], being from outside and as if carried [in]? For, as it is, it is contiguous.*⁷
- [b] *And what is its nature? For the claim that it is actually nothing but potentially all things is correct, as is the case with sense-perception, for we ought not to believe about it that it is nothing at all in itself—for*

depth by H.A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect*, New York and Oxford: OUP, 1992, pp. 258-314. Echoes of these arguments, with special reference to Theophrastus, are analyzed by P.M. Huby, "Medieval Evidence for Theophrastus' Discussion of the Intellect," in *RUSCH* 2, pp. 165-181.

⁵ M.C. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius Commentary on Aristoteles De Anima*, London: Cassirer, 1973, pp. 195.15-198.9 (which corresponds to the Greek text edited by R. Heinze, *Themistii in Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis* [CAG V,3], Berlin, 1899, pp. 107.30-109.3). The page references after an Arabic or Greek word or phrase refer to these two editions respectively. In the following translation I have tried to follow, for purposes of comparison, the wording of Todd's translation (pp. 133-134) to the extent allowed by the sense of the Arabic. The italic print indicates the text that an Arab reader would have taken to represent Theophrastus's words. All paragraphing and numbering are added for easy reference.

⁶ I.e., the potential intellect, as is obvious from Themistius's preceding words and from Theophrastus's own statement in [b] below.

⁷ The Arabic term used is *muwāṣil* (195 *ult.*), translating *συνφύης* (107.32); Davidson translates "linked", p. 261 and note 13.

that would be contentious—but that it is a certain underlying potentiality as is the case with things mixed with matter.

- [c] *But that it is from outside perhaps ought to be posited not by way of being carried [in], but by way of being included together in the first generation.*
- [d] *And how—I wish I knew—do the intelligibles come about? And what is being-affected for them?⁸ For it [i.e., being-affected] must [occur], since it [i.e., the potential intellect] is going to come to actuality as sense-perception does. But which being-affected and which change can occur from a body to something incorporeal? And is the starting point from that [i.e., the body] or from itself? For someone might think that being-affected occurs to it only on account of that, because it does not occur from itself for some things in a state of being-affected and for some principle of everything.⁹*
- [e] *It is in its power to intelligize or not, just as [perception with] the senses is in its power.¹⁰*
- [f] *It is appropriate that it might appear that this too is repugnant, namely, that the [potential] intellect should have the nature of matter, with the result that it itself would be nothing while all things would be possible with respect to it.*

[Theophrastus also said] other things related to these which it would be too long to relate, despite the fact that what he said is not long but rather extremely abridged and concise on the term itself.¹¹ As for the concepts, what he said contains many problems, many reminders, and much solving of the problems. These are in Chapter Five of his book on *Physics* and Chapter Two of his discussion on the soul. What appears from all these statements is that

⁸ The Arabic has the same reading as the Greek MSS and does not corroborate Heinze's addition <ὅπ> (108.1). The normal sense of the Arabic sentence, as written, would be, "And what is it for them to be affected?" Since, however, this can hardly be the meaning in context, a knowledgeable Arabic reader could conceivably understand the prepositional phrase *lahā*, "for/to them" (translating αὐτῶν), as meaning, "And what is being-affected on account of them?"

⁹ There was apparently a problem in the Greek manuscript tradition with τῷ in line 108.5; manuscript Q read τὸ *in rasura*, accepted by Spengel. The archetype of the Arabic translator read τῶν, as a consequence of which he understood the sentence as follows: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ [*scil.* πάσχει] τῶν <μὲν> ἐν πάθει τῶν δὲ ἀρχὴν πάντων εἶναι.

¹⁰ The Arabic supports Heinze's punctuation; cf. Todd p. 190, note 75.

¹¹ Apparently the translator understood τῇ λέξει (108.9) to refer to the term "intellect" under discussion here.

[1] they¹² were having, also concerning the potential intellect, almost one and the same problem—whether it is from outside or contiguous—;

[2] they were trying to specify precisely how it could be from outside and how it could be contiguous; and

[3] they were saying that it was also unaffected and separate, like the active intellect and the intellect in actuality; for he [Theophrastus] said,

[g] *The intellect is unaffected—unless indeed it is*¹³ *in a different way!*

and he also said,¹⁴

[h] *In its case, being-affected ought not to be understood as being moveable—for movement is incomplete—but rather as activity.*

After he had gone on for some time in his argument he said,

[i] *The senses cannot be without body; but as for the intellect, it is separate.*

After he, too, began on the subject of the active intellect which Aristotle treated with precision, he said,

[j] *We ought to investigate that thing to which we are pointing, and say,*¹⁵ *for all nature, that some of it is like matter and potential, and some of it is cause and active;*

and that

[k] *that which acts is always nobler than that which is being acted upon, and the first principle is nobler than matter.*

¹² The plural pronoun in Arabic (in *annahum*, 196.17) would refer to more than the two philosophers immediately involved, i.e., Aristotle and Theophrastus, so that an Arab reader might be induced to include Plato as well, who was mentioned earlier in Themistius's text (107.23 Heinze = 195.8 Lyons). In the Middle Arabic of the translations, however, the distinction between dual and plural tends to be blurred.

¹³ The Arabic omits παθητικός (108.16), which might suggest that its inclusion in the Greek manuscript tradition is an interpolation; cf. the omission of the preceding ἅλλως in Heinze's manuscript Q.

¹⁴ Reading *wa-qāla aydan* in the singular instead of the plural in Lyons (197.4).

¹⁵ Reading the first person plural together with the Greek, *ilayhi nušīru fa-naqūla*, instead of the third person singular pointing in Lyons (197.8), *ilayhi yušīru fa-yaqūlu*. In either case, the meaning is not affected since what Theophrastus is pointing to is sentences from Aristotle's *De anima* III.5.

[continuation of the above]

[Arabic: 186.4-10 Lyons
(= Greek: 102.26-29 Heinze)]

These things, then, he accepts, while those [matters] with which he has problems are the following:

Theophrastus poses problems in the statements in which he investigates Aristotle's theory of the active intellect, saying,

[l] *What are these two natures?*

[m] *What is this substrate, or [what is] that which is attached to the active [intellect]? For the intellect is as if mixed out of the active and the potential [intellects].*

[n] *So if the [intellect] that moves is innate, it should also be eternal and perpetual; but if it is subsequent, then with what, and how, does its generation [come about]? It seems that it is an ungenerated substance¹⁷ if it is imperishable.*

[n] *If it [the active intellect] is like a disposition or faculty of that,¹⁶ then, if it is innate, it should be eternal, but if it is subsequent then with what, and how, does its generation [come about], since it seems that this one is ungenerated if it is imperishable?*

[o] *Once it exists, why not perpetually?*

[o] *Once it exists, why is it not perpetually?*

[p] *Whence come forgetfulness, error and falsity?—adding—from the mixture.*

[p] *Whence come forgetfulness and error? It may be from the mixture.*

¹⁶ The translator clearly read the Greek as, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις ἡ δυνάμις ἐκεῖνον (102.26). The antecedent of "that" (*tilka*, 186.6) in the Arabic is not clear; it is feminine, which would appear to refer to the soul, *nafs*, though the word does not appear in the text.

¹⁷ The unique Arabic MS of Fez has here (197.15) *ḡawhar*, "substance," and it is clear that Averroes also read *ḡawhar* in his manuscript of Themistius's paraphrase. It would seem, however, that the original translation by Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn had *hādā*, "this," instead of *ḡawhar*, as in the parallel passage of 186.8 Lyons, translating οὗτος (instead of the οὗν ὡς in Heinze 108.26 and 102.28), and that *ḡawharan* ("substance," in indefinite accusative) is a corruption of *hādā*, ("this") that occurred within the Arabic tradition. G.M. Browne, "Ad Themistium Arabum," *Illinois Classical Studies* 11 (1986): 242, and, following him, Todd, p. 190, note 80, assume that *ḡawhar*, substance, stood in the original translation by Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn and that accordingly Ishāq's Greek archetype had οὐσία in 108.26, but then fail to resolve the discrepancy that this generates with Themistius's earlier parallel passage in 102.28 Heinze, which has οὗν ὡς / οὗτος.

From all this it is clear that what we have taken the case to be is not wrong:

[4] that in their opinion, the perishable intellect that is subject to being-affected is one thing, which is what they also call “common” and “inseparable from the body;” it is concerning this one that Theophrastus says,

[p1] *From mixing with it [the body] there come about forgetfulness and error;*

[5] and that there is another, different intellect, like something composed of what is potential and what is actual,¹⁸ about which they believe that it is separate from the body, imperishable, and un-generated.

[6] Regarding both these intellects they say that in one way they are two natures and in another that they are one, the reason being that that which is [composed] of matter and form is one.

* * *

From this it is clear that Themistius has two sorts of citations from Theophrastus. The first consists of twenty-one points quoted verbatim—or almost verbatim—(printed in italics above and numbered with letters from [a] to [p] and [p1]). The second is a series of six statements (numbered in Arabic numerals from 1 to 6) presenting with approval a summary of what, in the opinion of Themistius, Aristotle and Theophrastus believed about the potential and active intellect.

Averroes’ citations of Theophrastus on this subject occur most notably in his *Šarḥ Kitāb an-nafs*, the so-called *Commentarium magnum* on the *De anima*, extant in the Latin translation of Michael Scot,¹⁹ and also once each in his *Tafsīr* on the *Metaphysics* and in a small essay on the conjunction of the human intellect with the active intellect.²⁰ Taken individually, all these references by Averroes to

¹⁸ Note that the translator understands the genitive article in τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, (108.32) not as referring to the implied masculine noun νοῦ (i.e., τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦ “the potential and actual [intellects]”), but as the genitive of the substantival neuter formation τὸ δυνάμει καὶ <τὸ> ἐνεργείᾳ <ὄν> (“what is potential and what is actual”). For the significance of this interpretation for Averroes’ understanding of this passage see below in this section under “*Tafsīr*” of the *Metaphysics*,” entry no. 6.

¹⁹ *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F.S. Crawford, Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.

²⁰ Because the history of the transmission of this last piece is complicated, a brief note is in order (see the detailed account, with bibliography, by Davidson pp.

Theophrastus's theory of the intellect can easily derive from the text in Themistius's paraphrase translated above, as follows:

A. Šarḥ (*Commentarium magnum*) on *De Anima*

1) Crawford 389.57-63 (FHS&G 308A, first part), where Theophrastus and Themistius are mentioned together, discusses the statement in paragraph [n] above.

2) Crawford 390.86-391.116 (FHS&G 308A, second part), where again Theophrastus and Themistius are mentioned together, develops the arguments stated in paragraphs [p], [p1], [m], [e], and [5] and [6].

3) Crawford 399.351-361 (FHS&G 309A) develops themes mentioned in paragraphs [b] and [f], and then [j], [l], and [m]. In this passage in Averroes, Theophrastus is mentioned alone ("third is the question of Theophrastus"), but the reference is clearly to the question in paragraph [b] above ("what is its nature?"), where Themistius identifies it as a question by Theophrastus. The issue of "*receptio*" and "*preparatio*" mentioned by Averroes in this passage refers to the "underlying potentiality" in paragraph [b] (ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν, 107.35 = *quwwatun mā mawḏū'atun*), but this is not, in context, Averroes' main focus; his entire discussion in this passage is rather occasioned by Alexander's theory of the material intellect as mere disposition (*isti'dād*), against which Averroes is vehemently

264-5). Averroes wrote at least two, and possibly three, short essays on the possibility of the conjunction or contact of the human intellect with the divine active intellect. All three survive only in a medieval Hebrew translation, the original Arabic having been lost. The first two, which bear no specific title and which appear to be genuine works by Averroes, were published last century by J. Hercz and translated into German: *Drei Abhandlungen über die Conjunction des separaten Intellekts mit dem Menschen von Averroes (Vater und Sohn)*, Berlin: H.S. Hermann, 1869. Hercz was a student of M. Steinschneider, who has a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the translation and transmission of these three pieces in his *Al-Farabi*, St-Petersbourg, 1869, pp. 94-109. See also Hercz's introduction. The third, bearing the title of "Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction" (and of doubtful authenticity according to Davidson), was published most recently with an English translation by K.P. Bland, *The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni*, New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982. The first two essays edited by Hercz also exist, fused together as a single piece, in a medieval Latin version entitled *De animae beatitudine* and spuriously attributed to Averroes; see H.A. Davidson, "Averrois Tractatus de Animae Beatitudine," in R. Link-Salinger, ed., *A Straight Path* [Festschrift A. Hyman], Washington, 1988, pp. 57-73. Theophrastus is mentioned only in the first of the two pieces published by Hercz.

arguing (Crawford 395, 430.77-432.137, 442-443),²¹ and in the course of which he also mentions Theophrastus's position.

4) Similar to the preceding is also the context of the passage in Crawford 432.123-134 (FHS&G **309B**), where this time Theophrastus and Themistius are again mentioned in tandem.

5) In Crawford 444.11, apparatus (FHS&G **321**), some manuscripts read "Theophrastus" instead of "Themistius," but this is clearly due to a misreading of the name. The theories discussed by Averroes are those of Themistius from his paraphrase.²²

B. *Tafsîr* of the *Metaphysics*

6) Averroes mentions once Theophrastus's views on the intellect, again in association with Themistius, in the *Tafsîr* on the *Metaphysics*.²³ Here Averroes echoes Themistius's summary of the views of Aristotle and Theophrastus as stated in paragraphs [5] and [6] above. The following juxtaposition of Averroes' text with that of Themistius will best bring out the similarities as well as the differences between them:

[Arabic Themistius, §§5-6 above]	[Averroes, p. 1489.2-6 Bouyges]
There is another, different intellect,	The material intellect survives; the <i>separate</i> active intellect is like form in the material intellect,
like something composed of what is potential and what is actual, ... [which] is separate from the body, imperishable, and ungenerated; ... [these two intellects] in one way are two natures and in another they are one, the reason being that that which is	[together] resembling something composed of matter and form; ("separate" above)
composed of matter and form is one.	it is the one which in a way creates the intelligibles and in another receives them ... it makes them in its aspect as form and receives them in the aspect of the material intellect.

²¹ See the extensive discussion of Averroes' arguments against Alexander in Davidson 282-285.

²² Similarly, Averroes' text from Crawford 452.257-453.293, printed as no. **325** in FHS&G, does not mention explicitly Theophrastus but only Themistius.

²³ Averroës: *Tafsîr ma bâ'd at-tabi'at*, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1948; reprint, 1973, vol. III, p. 1489.1ff. = FHS&G **324**.

The translator of Themistius, Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn, understood the crucial description of the active intellect in 108.32 Heinze (συνγείμενον ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, “a combination from the potential and actual [intellects]”) as meaning “something composed of what is potential and what is actual” (see above, note 18). On the basis of this reading, Averroes then interprets “what is potential” and “what is actual” as “matter” and “form” respectively. This enables him, in consequence, to claim that the intellect as form is the active intellect and that the intellect as matter is the material intellect. Since the compound of the potential and the actual is claimed by Themistius to be “separate, imperishable, and ungenerated,” it follows for Averroes that each of the two components, the active and the material intellect, is also imperishable; hence his opening statement in this passage that the material intellect survives.²⁴ This reading by Averroes is consistent with his later theory of the material intellect.

C. First brief essay on the Conjunction (Hercz)

7) Hercz 14-16 (German), 5 (Hebrew) = FHS&G **308B** (Latin translation of the essay, with a reference in the apparatus to the doublette of this passage in the *De animae beatitudine*). The views expressed in this passage are those mentioned in paragraphs [b] and [n] above. The name in this paragraph appears either as Theophrastus or Themistius in both the Hebrew and Latin manuscripts of the piece. Steinschneider²⁵ thought Themistius was the correct reading, though Theophrastus would appear to be preferable as the *lectio difficilior*, and the wrong attribution would probably be due to misread or undifferentiated abbreviations in the Latin manuscripts. Be that as it may, the confusion of the two names in both the Hebrew and the Latin tradition must stem partly also from Averroes’ constant mention of the two in tandem.

²⁴ See the extensive discussion of Averroes’ later theory of the material intellect as occasioned by his reading of Themistius in Davidson 287-293; cf. Arthur Hyman, “Aristotle’s Theory of the Intellect and Its Interpretation by Averroes,” pp. 175-86, and R.B. Todd in Schroeder and Todd, *Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect*, p. 116, note 175. For Averroes’ further elaboration of the theory of the active intellect as form and the dispositional (*in habitu*) intellect as matter, with the material intellect acting as the locus, or subject, where the two meet, see Davidson 332-335.

²⁵ *Al-Farabi*, p. 97, for the Hebrew manuscripts; cf. Hercz, p. 14, note 24. For the Latin manuscripts see the references in FHS&G **308B**.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[See also the list of abbreviations on pp.ix-x]

- Accatino, P. and Donini, P. *Alessandro di Afrodisia, L'anima*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1996.
- Baltussen, J.N.M. *Theophrastus on Theories of Perception*, Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1993 (*Quaestiones Infinditae* 6).
- Baltussen, J.N.M. 'The Purpose of Theophrastus' *De Sensibus* Reconsidered' *Apeiron* 31 1998 167-99.
- Barbotin, E. *La théorie de L'intellect d'après Théophraste*, Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1954.
- Beare, J.I. *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1906.
- Berschlin, W. *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. J.C. Frakes, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America 1988.
- Blumenthal, H.J. and Clark, E.G. (eds.) *The Divine Iamblichus*, London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993.
- Blumenthal, H.J. *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity* London: Duckworth 1996.
- Copleston, F. *A History of Philosophy*, London: Burns Oates and Washbourne vol.2 1956 (Bellarmino Series 12).
- Craemer-Ruegenberg, I 'The Priority of Soul as Form and its Proximity to the First Mover: Some Aspects of Albert's Psychology in the First Two Books of His Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*' in Kovach, F.J. and Shahan, R.W. (edd.) *Albert the Great Commemorative Essays*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1980 49-62
- Daiber, H. 'A Survey of Theophrastean Texts and Ideas in Arabic: Some New Material' in Fortenbaugh et al. 1985.
- Daiber, H. 'The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation', in Fortenbaugh and Gutas 1992.
- Davidson, H. *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992.
- Devereux, D. 'Theophrastus on the Intellect', in Fortenbaugh and Gutas 1992 32-43.
- Dillon, J. *The Middle Platonists*, London: Duckworth 1977 repr. with Afterword 1996.
- Fortenbaugh, W.W. et al. (edd.) *Theophrastus of Eresus: On his Life and Work*, New Brunswick: Transaction 1985 (*RUSCH* 2).
- Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Gutas, D. (edd.) *Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings*, New Brunswick: Transaction 1992 (*RUSCH* 5).
- Gätje, H. *Studien zur Überlieferung der Aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam* Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1971
- Görransson, T. *Albinus, Alcinoüs, Arius Didymus* Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis 1995.
- Gutas, D. 'The Life, Works, and Sayings of Theophrastus in the Arabic Tradition' in Fortenbaugh et al. 1985 63-102.
- Gutas, D. 'Averroes on Theophrastus, through Themistius' in Endress, G., Aertsen, J.A., and Braun, K. (edd.) *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition [Proc. of the 4th Symposium Averroicum Köln 1996]*, Leiden: Brill, 1999.
- Hicks, R.D. *Aristotle De anima*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1907.

- Huby, P.M. 'Stages in the development of language about Aristotle's *Nous*', in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (edd.) *Aristotle and the later Tradition*, (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Suppl. vol. 1991) 129-43.
- Huby, P.M. and Steel, C. *Priscian on Theophrastus on Sense- Perception* (Huby) with 'Simplicius' on Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.5-12 Notes by Peter Lautner London: Duckworth 1997.
- Lyons, M.C. *The Arabic Version of Themistius' 'De Anima'*, Norfolk and London: Cassirer 1973.
- McMullin, E. (ed.) *The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1963.
- Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T. *Aëtiana I The Sources*, Leiden: Brill 1997 (*Philosophia Antiqua* 73).
- Miller, R. 'An aspect of Averroes' Influence on Albert' *MS* 16 1954 57-71.
- Morau, P. *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Liège and Paris (Bibl. fac. Philos. et Lettres Liège) 1942.
- Morau, P. *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen 1 von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias; 2 Der Aristotelismus im I und II Jh. n. Chr.*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1973 (Peripatoi 5) and 1984 (Peripatoi 6).
- Ophuijsen, J. Van and Raalte, M. van *Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources*, New Brunswick: Transaction 1998 (RUSCH 8).
- Regenbogen, O. Art. 'Theophrastus', *RE* suppl. 7 (1940) 1354- 1562.
- Rouse, M.A. and R.H. 'The Texts called "Lumen Animae"', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 41 1971.
- Runia, D.T. 'Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics' in Algra, K.A., van der Horst, P.W., Runia D.T., *Polyhistor: studies in the history and historiography of ancient philosophy presented to Jaap Mansfeld*, Leiden: Brill 1996
- Schroeder, F.M. 'The Provenance of the "De intellectu" attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 6.1 1995.
- Schroeder, F.M. and Todd, R.B. *Two Greek Commentators on the Intellect*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1990.
- Sharples, R.W. 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation' *ANRWII* 36.2 1987.
- Sharples, R.W. *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* Commentary vol.5 *Sources on Biology* Leiden: Brill 1995 (*Philosophia Antiqua* 64)
- Sharples, R.W. *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* Commentary vol.3.1 *Sources on Physics with Contributions on the Arabic material by Dimitri Gutas* Leiden: Brill 1998 (*Philosophia Antiqua* 79)
- Sorabji, R. (ed.) *Aristotle Transformed The Ancient Commentators and their Influence*, London: Duckworth 1990.
- Steel, C.G. *The Changing Self A study on the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*, Brussels 1978.
- Steinmetz, P. *Die Physik der Theophrast*, Bad Homburg: Max Gehlen, 1964 (Palinogenesia 1).
- Stratton, G.M. *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle*, London: Allen and Unwin 1917.
- Tarrant, H. *Scepticism or Platonism? The philosophy of the Fourth Academy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985.
- Théry, G. *Autour du Decret de 1210: I David de Dinant*, Paris 1925 (Bibl. Thomiste 6) II *Alexandre d'Aphrodise* 1926 (Bibl. Thomiste 7).
- Thorndike, L. *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* New York: Columbia University Press, 1934 repr. 1983.
- Todd, R.B., *Themistius On Aristotle On the Soul*, London: Duckworth 1996.
- Wimmer, F. *Theophrasti Opera*, BT 1854-62; Paris: Didot 1866.

INDICES TO THE TEXTS

PRINCIPAL TERMS: GREEK

- ἀγένητος uncreated **320A.9,16 320B.4**
 ἄγραφος with no writing **317.6.8**
 ἀδιάπτωτος infallible **301A.39**
 ἀ(υ)εῖ always **278.33 307D.7 320A.10**
 320B.5 continually **277B.42 312.7**
 in every case **320A.3** for ever
 320A.8 320B.3
 αἶρ air **277A.1 277B.2,9-41** passim
 277C.1 278.2,5 280.7
 282.4,10,12,14,16 294.9
 ἄθροισμός aggregation **301A.36,38**
 αἰθήρ aether **278.2**
 αἰθέριον made of ether **269.1**
 αἰσθάνεσθαι perceive, sense
 277B.13,43,45,65 280.7.8 282.18
 295.2 296.1 (bis)
 αἰσθησις perception, sensation,
 sense-perception **273.1**
 277B.49,51,55,58,62 279.9
 282.23,26 294.6 297.4 299.2
 301A.42 312.10 317.5 sense **275A.5**
 278.32 282.1,23,26,30 293.2 295.1,3
 296.2 296.9 301A.5,7-
 10,13 (bis),18,24 (bis),44,48 301B.1
 307C.6,10
 αἰσθητήριον sense-organ **273.2,4**
 277B.11,16,34,56 278.30 279.2
 282.5,7,11,20,25,32 296.7 299.3
 αἰσθητικός perceptive **282.9,22,23**
 connected with sense **299,2**
 αἰσθητόν object of sense, sense-object
 273.1,2 275A.6
 277B.12,17,51,53,57,65,66
 282.2,7,33 294.5 299.4
 301A.4,5,9,13,18
 αἰσθητός perceptible, perceived
 277B.44,49
 αἴτιον (n.) cause **278.23 (bis) 320A.3**
 αἴτιος cause **278.20 282.23,30**
 ἄκοή hearing **274.3,4 277A.2**
 277B.34,48 293.5
 ἀκούειν hear **277B.32,41 282.15**
 understand **312.9**
 ἀκουστικός capable of hearing **282.16**
 of hearing **293.1**
 ἀκουστόν object of hearing **282.14**
 ἀκριβής accurate **301A.39**
 ἄκριτος indiscriminating **312.3**
 ἀληθής true **282.19 299.2 318.9**
 ἄλλος different **312.7**
 ἄλογος irrational **298A.3,5 301A.7**
 ἅμα at the same time **274.1 278.34**
 ἀμβλύτης weakness **280.8**
 ἀμιγής unmixed **282.21**
 ἄμικτος unmixed **282.19**
 ἀναζωγράφειν picture **301A.26**
 ἀνάκλασις reflection **277B.1,9**
 ἀναλογεῖν be in a similar relation, be
 analogous **277B.75 294.3**
 κατὰ ἀναλογίαν analogically
 307B.6 312.8
 ἀναμείνειν wait **280.10**
 ἀναμιγνύναι mix **14,10 (T) 277A.1**
 ἀναπλάσσειν model **301A.27**
 ἀναπλασμός model **301A.31**
 ἀναπνεῖν breathe in **277B.37**
 ἀναπνοή breathing **277B.31,35**
 breathing in **277B.52**
 ἀναπόδεικτος indemonstrable
 301A.7o
 ἄνεμος wind **277B.39**
 ἄνθρωπος man **298A.3 301A.28**
 ἀντιλέγειν argue against **277B.73**
 ἄνω at a high level **301A.3**
 ἀνώνυμος nameless **277C.1**
 ἀξιοῦν require **275A.5** claim **296.5**
 maintain **282.27** think right
 312.8
 ἀπαθής impassible **307D.3,4**
 ἀπάτη deception **320A.10,14 320B.5**
 ἀπεῖναι be absent **299.5**
 ἀπλοῦς simple **278.5bis 282.4,5**
 ἀπλῶς tout court **278.23** without
 qualification **277B.45** simply **273.9**
 282.16,20 307D.1
 ἀποδέχεσθαι accept **320A.5**
 ἀπολαμβάνειν enclose **277B.13**
 ἀπορεῖν raise difficulties, problems,
 questions **275A.3 278.10 275B.3**
 307C.5 320B.2

- ἀπορία problem **278.28**
 ἀπορροή effluence **278.18,27**
 ἀπόρροια effluence **277B.6**
 ἀπό τινος from something **301A.15,16**
 cf.18
 ἀποτύπωσις imprinting **277B.2,9**
 ἀποφαίνεσθαι declare **277B.51 307C.1**
 ἄπτεσθαι be in contact **277B.51** tackle
 320A.1
 ἀπτός touchable **282.2**
 ἀπτικός related to touch **277B.21** able
 to be touched **293.3**
 ἀργία inactivity **22,1(T),10,14**
 296.4,5,9
 ἀρκεῖν be sufficient **277B.27** be
 adequately equipped **282.8**
 ἀρχή starting-point **297.1 301B.1,2**
 307C.9 307D.3 origin (contr. ὕλη)
 320A.4
 ἄρωμα herb **277B.54**
 ἀσπίς shield **294.8(bis)**
 ἀσυνήθης unusual **275A.8**
 ἀσώματος incorporeal **307C.6,7**
 307D.1
 ἄτακτος disorderly **312.3**
 ἀτελής incomplete **307D.5**
 ἄτοπος absurd **273.4 278.24 295.3**
 307B.3 307C.1 (all T)
 ἄυλος without matter **318.2** matterless
 33,25(T?) 318.8 319.2,9
 αὐτόθεν immediately **275A.5**
 ἀφαιρέσις abstraction **318.6,8**
 ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ from itself **27,11,12** [with
 MSS reading], **14 307C.8,[9],10**
 28,16(T) 307D.3
 ἀφή touch **282.2**
 ἄφθαρτος imperishable **320A.16**
 indestructible **320B.4**
 ἀφιστάναι be removed **279.7**
 ἀχώριστος inseparable **320A.13**
 ἀχρώματος colourless **280.4**
- βαρύς low **277B.70,72,73,76** heavy
 301A.46
 βροντή thunder-clap **277B.40**
- γένεσις coming to be <something>
 316.4,6 coming to be **320A.8**
 320B.4
 γενικός in general **301A.27**
 γεννᾶν produce **280.2**
 γένος genus **301A.35**
 γεῦσις taste **277B.20 294.2,4,7**
 γευστός tastable **275A.9** able to be
 tasted **293.3**
- γῆ earth **277B.39 278.6**
 γί(γ)νεσθαι become **307C.5 311.4**
 316.1 come to be **319.6** occur
 273.8 277B.28,33,51 299.4 be
 277B.55 294.3
 γι(γ)νώσκειν know **282.3**
 γλυκύς sweet **274.1**
 γλῶττα (Att.) tongue **274.2 277B.12**
 294.2,11
 γνωρίζειν know **295.3**
 γνώσις knowledge **301A.44**
- δευτερεύειν come second **301A.8**
 δέχεσθαι receive **278.13 277B.19,21**
 δηλοῦν make clear **277B.70**
 διαβιβάζειν pass on **279.5**
 διαιρεῖν divide from **14,3(T) 278.38**
 διαίρεσις distinction **307B.5**
 διαλύειν dissolve **282.23**
 διανόησις activity of understanding
 301A.33,34
 διάνοια understanding **298A.1**
 301A.22,29,30,32 301B.2
 διανοίγειν open up **277B.36**
 διαπορεῖν develop difficulty **320A.5**
 διαπορθμεύειν convey **277C.2**
 διαπορθμευτικός conveying **277C.4,5**
 διαρθροῦν set out **319.5**
 διάρθρωσις dissection **275A.2**
 διάστημα distance **279.10**
 διάθεσις state **278.3,4**
 διατείνειν extend **278.28** stretch
 298A.2 298B.3
 διατιθέναι set out **296.2**
 διαφανής transparent **275A.7**
 277B.18,25,59 277C.4
 278.1,6,8(bis),24,26,28,31.36,37bis
 279.1,7,8
 διαφορά difference **280.8** differentia
 277B.69
 δι' ἑαυτοῦ through itself **316.2**
 διελεῖν make a distinction **26,3(T)**
 307B.5 divide up **4,2(T) 274.3**
 διηχής transsonant **277B.18,19,23,26**
 277C.4
 διηχητικός transsonic **277B.24**
 διυκνεῖσθαι come through (T) **17,15**
 277B.58 get through **276.1 17,7**
 277B.50
 διορίζεσθαι determine **295.4** make
 distinctions **320A.1**
 δίοσμος transodorant **277B.19 277C.3**
 διττός twofold **301A.2,4**
 δοκεῖν seeming **277B.7**
 δοκιμάζειν test **301A.48**

δόξα opinion **301A.41,43**
 δύναμις faculty **297.4** potentiality
 307A.6 307B.2 316.4,6 320B.2
 power **277C.1,5**
 δυνάμει potentially **277B.23 307A.4**
 307B.7,21 317.8 potential **277B.22**
 (of νοῦς, οὐσία) **307A.1,2 307C.4**
 312.1,4,9 316.3 317.7,8 318.5 in
 potency **301A.8**
 δύνασθαι be potential **301A.30,31**
 δυνατός potentially **307B.4 307C.3**
 possible **277B.32,33**

 εἶδέναι know **282.14**
 εἰδοποιεῖν give form **278.35**
 εἶδος form **273.6,8**
 277B.4,6,7,47,56,67 318.2,4,7
 320A.17 species **301A.35**
 εἰδωλικός phantasmal **277B.3,5**
 εἵκειν yield **301A.41**
 εἶναι exist **312.1 319.3** be (what it is)
 318.2,3,4
 εἰσφέρειν bring in **277B.35**
 ἐκπέμπειν emit **277B.68** send out
 277B.67 278.30
 ἔκστασις upset **293.3**
 ἐκτείνειν extend **301B.3**
 ἔμφασις representative image
 277B.4,6
 ἐμφράσσειν block **277B.45**
 ἐναντίος opposite **296.4,5**
 ἐναργής self-evidence **301A.6** ἐνάργεια
 self-evidence **301A.10,23**
 ἐγγί(γ)νεσθαι come in **273.9** arise in
 277B.56 be produced **301A.24**
 ἐνδελέχεια perpetual motion **269.3**
 ἐνέργεια actuality **301A.30** activity
 277B.5,17,48,56,62,65,66,67
 278.8,9,12,14,36 279.2,3,5 296.3
 307C.6 307D.6 311.1 ἐνεργεία
 actually **277B.23 317.2,4** in activity
 307B.8 312.1,9 actual **277B.22**
 320A.15 κατ' ἐνέργειαν in actuality
 319.8 actually **277B.70 316.1**
 ἐνεργεῖν be active **278.32 316.2**
 activate **279.3**
 ἐνεργητικῶς actually **301A.32**
 ἔννοια concept **301A.34,37**
 ἐντελεχείᾳ actually **317.9**
 ἔνυλος enmattered **318.6,8 319.2,4,10**
 in matter **318.3**
 ἐνυπάρχειν exist in **278.1** be inside
 277B.44 be present in **319.3** be
 immanent **320A.9 320B.4**
 ἐξέτασις testing **301A.46**

ἔξις disposition **316.4,5,6 320B.2**
 ἐξομοίωσις becoming like **273.7**
 ἐξομοιούσθαι become like **273.2,5**
 ἔξω external **277B.17,41** outside
 275B.1 277B.27
 ἐπάγειν bring in **278.14** add
 277B.11,70 278.20 307B.3
 τὸ ἐπάγομενον implication **311.4**
 ἐπείρεισις pressure **301A.16**
 ἐπιβολή point of view **301A.28**
 ἐπιγί(γ)νεσθαι arise **277B.56**
 301A.10,20
 ἐπικαλύπτειν cover up **277B.36**
 ἐπικρατεῖν predominate **282.20**
 ἐπικρίνειν have extra awareness **296.3**
 ἐπισημαίνειν remark **277B.72**
 indicate **317.5**
 ἐπισκέπτεσθαι look into **320A.2**
 ἐπισκήπτειν urge **282.19** (Corr. from
 first imp.)
 ἐπιστήμη knowledge **301A.34,39bis**
 branch of knowledge **301A.40**
 319.7
 ἐπιστήμων know(ing) **316.1**
 ἐπιταράσσειν disturb **275A.7**
 ἐπιφέρειν bear in **278.29** bring in
 277B.57 bring **293.3**
 ἐριστικόν captious **307A.5 307B.1**
 ἕτερος different **318.7**
 εὐθύς straight **301A.47** at once **307A.8**
 320B.3
 εὐλόγος reasonable **275A.7**
 εὐπίλητος dense **277B.29**
 εὐρίσκειν find (... out) **316.4**
 εὐφύλακτος easy to keep in **277B.29**
 εὐώδης fragrant **277B.53**
 ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ in its own power **307C.9**
 311.3
 ἔχειν possess **319.6** grasp **296.6**

 ζῆν live **282.26bis**
 ζητεῖν seek **307C.3**
 ζυγόν balance **301A.46**
 ζωή life **298A.2 298B.3**
 ζῶον living creature **20,5 282.22** living
 thing **301A.11**
 ζωτικός vital **277B.46,49**

 ἦχεῖν sound **277B.42,45**
 ἦχος sound **277B.44,48 277C.3** noise
 293.5

 θερμαίνειν heat **278.12 279.4,5**
 θερμός hot **282.20,26**
 θερμότης heat **278.11**

θέσις position **280.3**
 θεωρητικός speculative **37,26T 319.7**
 cognitive **318.5**
 θιγγάνειν touch **275A.6**
 ἴδιος special **295.1**
 ἱκανός sufficient **278.15**
 ἴσως equally **277B.3,8 278.11**
 ἵχνος footprint **301A.14,15,25**
 καθ' αὐτό in itself **275A.8 279.3 312.4**
 in its own right **278.37 279.8**
 καθόλου universal **301A.37**
 κανών ruler **301A.47**
 καταλαμβάνειν seize **293.4**
 κινεῖν move **273.2 277B.42,59,60**
 278.26,31,33 279.1,2,4,6,7,8
 301A.9 311.1 arouse **277B.58** start
 movement **311.3** set in motion
 277B.13 κινῶν motive **320A.7**
 κίνημα movement
 301A.10,14,17,19,21,22,28
 κίνησις motion **277B.31 307D.6**
 movement **277B.42bis,46,49 278.31**
 295.2,4 301A.10
 κινητικός moving **307D.5**
 κοινός common **7,25 275A.6**
 277B.24,25,26 277C.1 282.21
 283.6,21 295.1,2 296.2,8 301A.6
 320A.12
 κόρη pupil (of eye) **277B.29**
 κοῦφος light **301A.46**
 κρίνειν be aware of **296.5,9 318.8**
 κρίσις judgement **301A.21**
 κριτήριον criterion **301A.1,4,7,44**
 κτύπος crash **293.5**
 κύριος proper **277B.53 319.8**
 κυρίως properly **278.14**
 λείος smooth **277B.3,5**
 λευκός white **277B.74**
 λήθη forgetting **320A.10,13 320B.5**
 λίθος stone **279.6 294.8**
 λογικός rational, of reason **298A.2,4,5**
 298B.2 301A.21
 λόγος account **277B.16** ratio **273.6,8**
 282.17bis,23,24bis,28,29,30bis,33
 argument **296.2** reason **301B.2**
 μαθαίνειν learn **316.3**
 μέγεθος size **295.3**
 μέλας black **277B.74**
 μέρος section **280.5** κατὰ μέρος
 particular **301A.35** ἐπὶ μέρους
 particular **301A.37**

μέσος in the middle **294.7** ana meson
 intermediate **275B.1**
 μεταβάλλειν change **312.7**
 μεταβολή alteration **307C.7 307D.2**
 (both T)
 μεταγενής who came later **277C.2**
 μεταδιδόναι give a share **279.1**
 μεταλαμβάνειν receive a share **279.1**
 μεταξύ between **277B.20,28,56,61**
 279.9 in between **275B.1**
 277B.59,67bis 282.3bis 294.3,4,
 6bis
 μιγνύναι mix **282.6**
 μικτός mixture **320A.6**
 μίξις mixture **277B.27 282.24,31**
 320A.10,13 320B.5
 μνήμη memory **301A.12bis,19,25**
 μορφή shape **273.5 277B.2,9 15,7,24**
 21,19 295.4
 μοχλός lever **279.5**
 νέφος cloud **277B.40**
 νοεῖν think **307C.10 311.3,6,8**
 312.2bis,5,6bis 317.9 319.6,10
 grasp (intelligible) **307D.4**
 understand **278.15**
 νόσις intellectual activity **301A.5**
 νοητόν object of intellect **301A.4,5**
 317.8 319.5,7,9,10 intelligible
 (thing) **307C.5 307D.7bis**
 νοούμενον object of intellect **311.6**
 νοῦς intellect **298A.1 298B.2,3**
 301A.8,22,29,30,33
 307A.2bis,15,21,25,28
 307B.3,5,6,7,8 307C.2 307D.3,4
 311.1,2,3,5,6,7bis,8 312.4,10bis
 317.2,7,8,9 318.5,10 319.2,3,5,8,11
 320A.1,6,12,17 320B.2
 οἰκεῖος own **296.6**
 οἰκείως in the appropriate sense
 317.6
 οἶκος room **280.9**
 ὅλως in general **278.16** wholly **307D.3**
 ὁμογενής homogeneous **7,25 275A.7**
 277B.11
 ὅμοιος like **277B.14bis,22bis** similar
 7,25(T) 275A.6 277B.26 the same
 277B.16
 ὁμοιότης similarity **301A.19**
 ὁμοίως similarly **276.1** the same
 277B.14 in a similar relation
 277B.72,74
 ὁμοίωσις becoming like **273.3,7**
 ὁμολογεῖν agree **278.25**

ὄνομα name **277C.3 298A.1 298B.3 307D.7**
 ὀνομάζειν name **278.15**
 ὄντως real **294.2**
 ὄξύς high **277B.69,72,73,76**
 ὀρᾶν see **277B.30,71,76bis 278.19,20,22 294.8**
 ὄρασις **277B.28**
 ὀρατόν thing seen **277B.60**
 ὀρατός visible **278.23bis,24** be seen **275A.8** able to be seen **293.3**
 ὄργανον organ **296.6** tool **301A.45**
 ὀσμή smell **277B.52 277C.2**
 ὀσφραίνεσθαι smell **277B.32 282.15**
 ὀσφραντικός connected with smell **277B.36** capable of smelling **282.16**
 ὀσφραντόν object of smell **282.14**
 ὀσφρησις smelling **277B.37** smell **277A.1 277B.19,26,34,52 282.12**
 οὖς ear **277B.33,45**
 οὐσία substance **316.5,7** κατ' οὐσίαν essentially **319.9**
 ὄψις sight **277B.5,18,24,59 279.4,8bis 280.3,8,(9) 282.12 294.3 295.3 295.3 296.7**
 πάθημα effect **299.4** affection **278.13**
 παθητικός passive **307D.3,5 320A.12** received passively **317.4** emotional **293.2**
 πάθος affect **278.3,4 301A.13,14,18,24** effect **307C.7** effect produced **307D.2bis** ἐν πάθει being affected **307C.9**
 παραβολή comparison **277B.77**
 παράδειγμα simile **317.7**
 παράδοσις what has been handed down **275A.3**
 παρακελεύεσθαι recommend **307C.3**
 παραποδίζειν interfere **277B.48**
 παρατείνειν extend **278.9**
 παρῆναι be present **277B.56 278.34 279.4 299.4**
 παρουσία presence **278.17**
 πάσχειν be affected passively (contr. ποιεῖν), **278.11,13** be affected **273.2 274.1 277A.2 277B.15,22,47,63,64 296.7,8 301A.23 307C.5,8 307D.7** be passive (contr. ποιεῖν) **278.28 320A.4**
 πάταγος clash **293.5**
 πέρας limit **8,9 278.7e**
 περιχεῖν surround **280.7**
 πικρός bitter **274.1**

πίστις conviction **301B.1**
 πλῆγῃ blow **277B.41** striking **277B.33**
 πλήττειν strike **277B.50 294.8,9**
 πνεῦμα blast **277B.40**
 ποιεῖν do **277B.59** make **311.2** be active (both contr. πάσχειν) **278.12,27** be productive (contr. πάσχειν) **320A.4** produce **277B.60,61,62,63bis,64**
 ποίησις act of production **277B.62,63,64,65**
 ποιητικός productive **320A.1,3,6,7 320B.2**
 ποιότης quality **277B.21**
 πόρος pore **277B.36**
 πούς foot **301A.16**
 πρᾶγμα thing **301A.3,48 311.3 318.10** object **311.4,5,7,8bis 317.2 318.10**
 προαίρεσις choice **301A.21**
 προιέναι advance **277B.5**
 προσπίπτειν fall (up)on **277B.39,52 293.5 294.5** make impression **301A.23**
 προσρηγνύναι break against **277B.40**
 προστιθέναι add **275A.3** incline **301A.43**
 προτείνειν offer **275A.4**
 πτοία excitement **293.4**
 πῦρ fire **278.6,12,16 279.5 282.5**
 σάρξ flesh **294.2,11**
 σίδηρος iron **279.4**
 σκιαγραφία shadow-painting **277B.7**
 σκοτεινός dark **280.9**
 σκότος darkness **278.19,21 280.6 296.7**
 σκοτώδης dark **280.7**
 στέρησις privation **317.3**
 στοιχείον element **282.32**
 στρεβλός crooked **301A.47**
 συμβαίνειν follow **10,13 278.22** happen **24.23 299.4 31,9 316.2**
 συμφυῆς intrinsic **280.2** connatural **277B.41** connate **307A.3**
 σύμφυτος connate **320A.7 320B.3**
 συναιρεῖν bring together **275A.3**
 συναισθάνεσθαι perceive **296.3**
 συνамφότερον combination **318.4,6**
 συνάπτειν make one **277B.42**
 συναρτᾶν unite with **320A.6**
 συνεῖναι coexist **319.10**
 συνεργεῖν cooperate **277B.49,59**
 σύνθετος compound **278.6**
 συνιστάναι arise **301A.33**
 συγκατατιθέναι assent **301A.43**

συγκεῖσθαι be composed **320A.15**
 συγκεφαλαίωσις summing up
301A.36,38
 συντελεῖν contribute **277B.30**
 σχέσις relationship **282.31,33**
 σχηματίζειν give a shape **277A.2**
 σχολή activity **320A.19**
 σῶμα body **269.1 278.3bis,7,16,18**
280.2 312.11 320A.13,15 σωματικός
 bodily **277B.4,6 278.17**

τάξις arrangement **280.3** order
301A.6,8
 ταραχή disturbance **293.4**
 τελείωσις perfecting **317.4**
 τελειοῦν make perfect, perfect **278.35**
316.5 bring to perfection **307D.8**
 τέχνη skill **301A.34,39,40bis**
 τεχνίτης craftsman **301A.45**
 τίμιος valuable **320A.4**
 τόδε τι this something **307B.6 312.10**
 τρέπειν alter **301A.24**

ὕγρον moist **277B.12,15bis 282.21**
 ὕγρον moisture **277B.20bis,24**
 ὕδωρ water **277B.24,26,28,29bis**
277C.1 282.4,10,12
 ὕλη matter **273.6,8 278.34 307B.4,6**
307C.2 312.9 317.3 318.6,8,10
320A.3,4,17
 ὑλικός material **307B.2 307C.1**
 ὑπάρχειν be present in **319.5bis,9,11**
 ὑπιδόμενος glancing **317.6**
 ὑποκείμενον substratum **277B.17**
 ὑποκείμενος underlying **307B.2**
 subjected to **320A.6**
 ὑπομνήσκειν suggest **317.1**
 ὑπό τινος by something **301A.15,16**
 cf17
 ὕστερογενής later development
301A.41
 ὕστερον later **320A.8 320B.3**
 ὑφιστάναι subsist **277B.8** be
 produced **301A.38**

φαίνεσθαι appear **15,23 277B.7**
301A.42

φαντασία imagination **297.3 298A.3,4**
298B.3 24,22 299.1,3 phantasia
301A.12,13,20,21,25,26,42
 φάντασμα image **24,24 299.4 301A.36**
 object of phantasia **301A.27**
 φάρυγξ windpipe **282.16**
 φθαρτός perishable **320A.12**
 φθείρειν destroy **282.23**
 φιλόσοφος philosopher **320A.18**
 φροντίς thought **320A.19**
 φῦναι be natural **278.19** become of a
 nature **301A.32**
 φύσις nature **8,1 9,7 278.1,15 301A.3**
26,2 307B.4 27,4 307C.2 312.3
31,13 316.5 320A.2,5,16 growth
301A.41
 φωνή sound **277B.13**
 φῶς light **277B.3,71,72,73,75bis**
278.8,13,16,19,20,23,35,36,37
 φωτίζειν give light **8,30 278.9**

χείρ hand **279.6 294.9**
 χρῆσθαι use **307D.6**
 χρήσιμος useful **277B.35**
 χρώειν colour **278.7 279.9**
 χρῶμα colour **273.4 277C.5**
278.22bis,24,26,29,32,33,35
279.1,3,6,7 280.2,4,6,8,9
 χυμός taste **273.5** flavour **275A.10**
277B.12 278.25
 χωριστός separable **318.9** separate
278.35 296.6 307B.8 307D.1 312.11
319.2 320A.15

ψεῦδος falsehood **320A.10**
 ψοφεῖν make a noise **277B.39**
 ψόφος sound **273.5**
277B.19,31,34,38,43bis,47,50,69,
70,71,75,76
 ψυχή soul **269.1 273.4 293.4**
301A.10,17,25,28,31,42
 ψυχικός connected with the soul
307B.7

ὡσαύτως ἔχειν be in the same
 condition **318.9**

PRINCIPAL TERMS: LATIN

- absolutus** pure 314A.52 **absolute** in its purity 314A.53
- abstrahere** abstract 303.24 321.5 326A.11 308B in title, 309A.11, but perhaps 'separate' would be better in last two, 322A.20, 326A.11
- abstractio** abstraction 303.24 322A.10,12,16
- abstractus** abstract 303.28 304.25 309A.11 separate (d) 309B.10 321.5,11.43
- acceptio** reception 309D.13
- accessio** addition 302.3
- accipere** receive 315.24
- acquisitus** acquired 308C.6
- actio** activity 308A.63 action 315.19 326A.10 acting 325.10
- actum** action 314A.17,20 made actual 314A.28 activity 314B.9
- actus** act 304.15 308C.5 322B.1
actuality 308A.37 309C.2 in actu actually 303.19,25 304.26,30 308A.1,4 308B.2 actual 308A.35,51 325.17 in actuality 308A.60 actu actually 304.38314A.34,35,63,72
- addiscere** learn 304.2 325.3
- additio** addition 308A.69
- adeptus** acquired 308A.68 (Mantinus) 314A.36,41,51 321.24 327.3
- adhaerere** be attached 302.2
- adiutorium** help 322A.13
- adiuvare** assist 305.10 help 305.10
- adsentiri** assent 302.11
- advenire** come to 314A.73
- aer** air 285.1,2 286.2,5
- (a)eternus** eternal 308A.42-4 308C.5 313.3,4,12 314A.9,10,12-14,17-19,27 321.19,23,44 325.3 326A.4,17-19,20
- affixus** joined 270.5,6
- agens** agent 270.8,10
304.14,16,18,20,24,25,28,29,31,34.3 6 305.15 308A.36,38,41,43,45,47, 49,51,58,67 313.10,11,13-15,17 314A.5,14-16,20, 22.24,25,37, 38,49,51-5,63,66 314B.4,8 314C.1,5 315.4,7,9,15,18,33,35,48 321.7,10, 12,14,18,26,27 322A.19,20 325.6, 11,18,22,26,27 326A 5-8,13, 17,19,23 326B.4 327.2 active 325.20,22
- agere** be active 304.2 act 315.48 react 322A.8
- aliquid hoc** this something 308A.13
- ambitus** sphere 310B.6
- amor** love 321.38
- anima** soul 268.1 270.3,11 300.3 304.18,20 308A.58 314A.4,6,23-4,28,53,54,61,63,68,70,75,80 314B.4,7 321.49,51 322A.5-8,18,19 323A.2 spirit 323A.8
- animalis** of the soul 289.1
- annexio** linking 308C.6
- antecedentia** (n. pl.) antecedents 305.8
- antiquus** old 309B.4
- applicatio** application 304.19
- aqua** water 285.2
- ars** art 304.27
- artifex** craftsman 308A.40
- artificialis** of artefacts 308A.39
- artificium** skill of a craftsman 308A.39
- assimilare** assimilate 325.20
- augmentabilis** that can be increased 308A.64
- augmentatio** increase 308A.65
- auscultare** listen 321.50
- beatitudo** supreme happiness 323B.3
- bonitas** excellence 322A.4
- bonus** good 305.14
- caelum** heaven 284.1,14,15
- candor** brightness 289.3
- causa** explanation 284.6 286.2 cause 322A.3,5 reason 325.12,14
- certus** sure 305.16
- cogitativus** of thought 300.16
cogitative 308C.7
- cognitativus** cognitive 300.15
- cognitio** cognition 303.20 knowledge 321.22
- cognoscere** know 304.23 308A.9-11 322B.4 be aware of 314A.73
- collatio** bringing together 305.7
- color** colour 283.2,3 303.19 304.29 314A.63,65
- commentator** commentator 283.1

- commentum** commentary 268.1 284.9
288.3 290.1 291.1 292.1 304.4
- comminutio** crunch(ing) 292.3
- communis** in common with 300.12
- comparatio** relate 321.6
- complementum** completion
315.24,25,29
- complere** fill up 270.12
- componere** compose 308A.50
315.34,36,40 325.17 put together
314A.39 make up 326A.5
- componens** component 314A.58
- compositio** synthesis 314A.26
- compositum** the composite 314A.57-9
- comprehendere** understand 308A.9
grasp 308A.61
- comprehensivus** capable of conceiv-
ing 309A.10
- conceptum** foetus 270.11
- concipere** take in 315.41
- concludere** be conclusive 315.44
- conclusio** inclusion 308A.21
- concupiscibilis** capable of desire
321.49
- confortare** strengthen 322A.15
- confortatio** strengthening 315.23
- confusio** confused state 303.2
- congregatum** combination 308A.27
- coniunctio** conjunction 326A.22
- coniungere** join 304.16,18
315.35,37,42
- connexio** connection 308B in title
- comprehendere** grasp 302.5,8
- consequentia** (n.pl.) consequences
305.8
- considerare** consider 321.36,47
- constitutus** situated 290.2
- contemplare** contemplate 322A.9
323A.3
- contemplatio** contemplation 323A.7
- continuare/i** be conjoined 315.49
326A.7,23 be joined 321.7 325.7
- continuatio** joining 315.29
conjunction 325.9,19,20 326A.6
- continuum** continuity (extension)
322A.14
- contrarius** opposite 291.2
- contritio** grind(ing) 292.3
- convenientia** agreement 305.7
- convenire** belong 309D.5,6 accord
with 325.16
- conversio** conversion 322A.2
- convertere** turn 323A.8
- copulare** join 308A.52 325.5
- corporalis** corporeal 308A.18
- corporeus** bodily 270.7
- corpus** body 270.5,6 284.3,10-12
291.1 300.3,14 308A.32 309B.9,10
314A.78 322A.13 323A.4 326A.16
- corrumpere** destroy 308B.14 315.14
321.32,33,37,42
- corruptibilis** capable of being
destroyed 308A.30 308B.13
321.35,46 326A.18 corruptible
315.16,18
- corruptio** source of destruction
321,37
- creare** create 308A.63,66
- debilitas** weakening 308A.69
- demonstrare** show 308B.10 demon-
strate 321.5
- demonstratio** proof 309B.5
- dens** tooth 292.3
- densus** dense 284.1,3,6,10-12,14
- denudare** abstract 308A.58,59
314A.21,38,48,49 314B.4 315,6
remove 309B.3
- denudatio** abstracting (or revealing)
314A.35
- deservire** be subject 308C.7-9
- designare** indicate 288.1
- determinare** resolve 305.16 limit
310B.6
- detinere** retain 284.14
- deus** god 288.1 309D.3,8
- di(y)aphanus** diaphanous 284.5
303.19 **diaphanum** transparency
314A.39 314B.9
- differentia** difference 305.8 309C.6
- diffinitio** definition 308A.2,5
- diffundere** scatter 286.5 diffuse
309D.9
- dignus** noble 304.9,10
- diligere** love 321.40
- diminutio** weakening 325.8
- disponens** organizer 304.14
- dispositio** disposition 304.32 way
308A.17 state 325.11,15,23
- distinctio** awareness 315.38
- distinctivus** capable of making
distinctions 309A.10
- distinguere** make distinctions 304.24,
29,34 314A.55 distinguish 308A.10,
17 give a definite character
310B.13 (pass.) distinct 314A.70
- distrahere** tear asunder 289.3
- diversitas** diversity 305.4 325.23
difference 308A.24,25
- diversus** different 308A.12,15

- doctrina** learning 303.19
dubitatio doubt 321.16
- educere** draw out 270.6
effectus effect 287.1 actuality 305.12
 resultant 326A.18
effluere be derived 270.4
elementum element 309B.2
ens existing thing 308A.1,4 entity
 308B.2 309A.5,8 313.12
entitas existence 308B.11,12
esse essence 270.3 310B.13 state
 303.23 to be 303.24 being 308B.3
 309A.11 309D.10,11 321.38
 existence 310B.7 314A.65 321.5
essentialis essential 309D.7
excellens surpassing 289.2
exemplum example 305.3
exercitio exercise 315.23
existere exist 309D.1 325.3
expositor commentator 308A.28
 308B.1 321.3 325.2
extra outside 304.34 **ab extra** from
 outside 300.9
extrahere draw 308A.36,37
- facere** create 325.14
factio production 313.18
factum produced 308A.44-7,56
 created 325.22
falsus false 302.3,10,15
fatigatio tiredness 321.33
felicitas felicity 323A.5
fiducia confidence 325.11
finalis final 323A.5
finis end 315.29
fluere derive 309D.3 flow 322A.3
fluxus derivation 309D.2
forma form 270.13 300.3,27,28 304.6,
 11,35 308A.3,7,8,11,12,15-20, 23,
 27,32,39,59 308B.4,8,10 309A.5,8
 309C.4 310B.13 314A.22,38,
 56,57,73 B.3 315.4,10,16 321.12,18
 322A.3,6-9,20 326A.6,13
formalis formal 303.13,16-18 304.12
 314A.65
formaliter formally 300.7,13 323A.2
formare form 321.36,47
frigor cold 290.2
fundari be founded 283.4
- generabilis** capable of being created
 308A.30 308B.13 326A.18
generare generate 308A.56,64,67
 315.24-9 create 308B.14 315.14
- generatio** generation 308A.46 313.19
 325.19,27
genus genus 303.3 308A.22,24
 309D.1,2
- habitus** habit 304.21,24,35,38,39
 305.10,12 **in habitu** dispositional
 308A.68 315.14,28 326A.4,9,11,13
hoc aliquid this something 326A.16
homo man 270.1,15 300.3 304.23
 305.4 308B in title 322B.1,4
 323B.30
hora hour 289.2
humanus human 300.12
hypostasis hypostasis 283.2 314A.64
- ignescere** be set on fire 292.1
ignis fire 285.2
ignotus unknown 303.12,13
illuminatus illuminated 314B.9
illustrare illuminate 305.15 327.5
illustratio being illuminated 323A.7
i(y)maginatio imagination 309B.1
 322A.14 325.9,21
imaginativus of imagination 300.16
 imaginative 308C.6,7
immaterialis immaterial 300.7
immixtus unmixed 300.11 313.2
 314A.11,84
immortalis immortal 300.6,8 323A.4
immortalitas immortality 268.1
impassibilis impassible 313.2
 314A.12,83
impedire impede 310B.13
imperfectus imperfect 304.1
impingere strike upon 284.7
imponere propose 308A.26 bring in
 325.13
impressio impression 326A.24
imprimere impress 302.2,3 322A.6,8
improbatio disproof 314A.2
inchoatio inchoate state 303.2
inchoativus inchoate(ness) 303.17
includere enclose 308A.23
impossibilis incompatible 315.13
inconveniens incongruity 310B.10,12
 incongruous 315.10,17
incorruptibilis incorruptible 300.8
 315.9,10,11 indestructible NB
 315.15,17
indagatio hunting about 305.7
indefectibiliter unfailingly 323A.7
indigere need 304.24,28
individualis individual 308A.12,18
indivisibilis indivisible 309D.2,3

- inducere** introduce into 270.11
 310B.12 bring into 304.21,33
 305.13 induce 304.37,38
- informare** give form to 300.4 315.15
- innatus** innate 325.7
- inopinabilis** implausible 309A.9
- inorganicus** non-organic 300.8,14
- instrumentalis** instrumental 304.21
- instrumentum** instrument 304.32
- intellectio** intellection 309D.11
- intellectivus** intellectual 300.7,13,17
 303.20 of intellect 322B.1
 (intellect) 300.15
- intellectualis** intellectual 270.1,4,12
 300.7 323A.2
- intellectualitas** intellectuality 314A.67
- intellectum** object of intellect
 308A.16,63,67 322A.10,15 315.51
 325.3,10,14,15
- intellectus** intellect 270.8,9,13,15 (or,
 meaning) 300.6,9,11,18 303.12,
 15,23,24,27 304.8,15,17,19 305.9,
 11,13-16 308A.2,5,19, 29,35,37,38,
 41,42,45,47-50,54,55,65,66,68,71
 308B.3,8,9 and in title 308C.4,5
 309A.1,4 309C.7 309D.13 (and 11
 in new version given in Commen-
 tary) 310A.2 310B.3 313.5,7,9-11,
 13-17 314A.5,14-16,20,22,24,25,
 37,38,49,51-5,63,67,70,73,75-77,79,
 81,82 314B.6 314C.1,2,4,5 315.4,7,
 9,14,15,18,28,33,35,36,44, 46,48,51
 321.4-8,10,12-15,17-19,24-29,31,34,
 36,41,45,47,49 322A.12,13,18
 323B.3 325.6,8,11,13,17,18,22,25,
 26 326A.1,4- 9,11,13,17,19,23
 326B.2,4 327.1-5 intelligible 325.16
- intelligentia** intelligence 300.17
 308A.67 314C.5 322A.2,4,5,8,9
 323B.4
- intelligere** think 308A.1,4,52,53
 308C.4,5,8,9 314A.11,21,35,48
 314B.3 315.5,6,8,19 321.9,21,35,46
 322A.14 326A.9,21 be intelligible
 308A.46 understand 308A.59,60
 308B.10 315.37 321.1,4,9 325.12
 (pass.) intellectual 326A.20
- intelligibilis** intelligible 270.13
 303.15-18 304.26,38 305.17
 308A.56,67 309C.4 309D.11 310A.3
 313.4 314A.24,33,35,41,45,
 47,48,62,63,67,68,76,83 314B.5
 314C.2 315.5,6,35,41-43 322A.3
 326A.22
- intendere** understand 321.6,12
- intensus** intense 290.1
- intentio** intention 303.22 idea
 308A.3,7 concept 325.9,21
- intervenire** intervene 287.1
- intransmutabilis** unchangeable 313.2,
 4,7,10,12,14,16 314A.13,15,25,
 26,83
- invenire** find out 305.7 find 309A.7
 325.15
- irradiare** irradiate 304.20
- irradiatio** shining 300.17
- irreverberabiliter** immovably 323A.6
- iustus** just 304.37
- lapis** stone 292.3
- lacrimari** weep 290.2
- localis** spatial 310B.6
- locus** place 310A.2 310B.4
- lucere** shine 286.2 287.1 288.2
- lucidus** bright 303.19,25 322A.3
 luminous 314A.39
- ludere** sparkle 286.2,5
- lumen** light 284.3,6 286.5 287.1,2
 289.1,3 300.17 304.19 305.14,17
 314A.29,32,34,40,54,65,66 314B.8,9
 322A.2
- lux** light 270.7,9 283.1,2 284.7,8,
 10,12,14 288.2 304.28,30 314A.64
 314B.4,10 315.7 322A.15,20
- magnitudo** magnitude 315.43
- materia** matter 270.7 303.28 304.6,7,
 12,14,36 308A.6,8,11,20,21, 23,24,
 27,39 308B.8,10,11,15 309A.9,10
 309C.4,7 309D.3,6,8, 10,13 310A.2
 310B.5 314A.56,58,71,72 315.16,41
- materialis** material 308A.2,3,5,7,29,
 38,42,49,50,54,55 308B.4 309A.1
 314A.23 321.5,10,13,15,28 325.8,
 13,25,26
- a minori** from (the topic of more
 and) less 315.38
- mixtio** mixture 308A.53,69 309B.2
- mixtus** mixed 309B.10 314A.79
- modus** standard 304.31,36 mode
 305.4 308A.20 314A.60
- mors** death 321.20
- mortalis** mortal 300.4,13 321.12,44
- motivus** motive 304.30
- motor** mover 314A.19
- motus** movement 286.4 303.7,9
 motion 314A.19
- movere** induce 308A.25 stir 315.36
- moveri** move 303.10,11 314A.19
 322A.20

- mutuus** mutual 284.8
- natura** nature 270.8 300.14 304.2,6,10,11 305.14 308A.10,13,17,19,25-27 308B.8 309A.1,8,9 321.23 322A.6 325.6
- necessarius** necessary 313.12,13 314C.1 315.39
- nives** snow 289.3
- nota** mark 309D.9 but this word is absent in the version given in the Commentary.
- nous** (noys see Commentary) nous 309D.3,9
- numerus** number 303.3
- nuncupare** call 284.15
- objectio** objection 309C.7 310B.8,10
- objectum** object 314C.2
- obumbrare** overshadow 322A.13
- oculus** eye 291.3 292.1
- offendere** impress 284.7
- opacus** opaque 284.6,10-12,14
- operabilis** possible 304.32 possible action 304.33
- operatio** operation 304.36,37
- opinari** hold an opinion 302.6,11,16
- oppositio** opposition 284.8
- oppositus** opposite 310.14
- opus** work 314A.22 322A.2
- orbis** sphere 284.1
- ordo** order 270.14 304.4
- otiosus** pointless 314A.16
- parare** (pass.) be ready 305.6,11
- pars** part 267.1 284.1,13,15 304.18
- particularis** particular 304.5,24,29,34
- passibilis** passible 309B.10 314A.77,78 321.45,49
- passivus** passive 300.15,18 309C.5 313.14
- pati** be passive 313.15 325.20,22
- penetrare** penetrate 284.11
- percipi** perceive 302.1,15
- percussio** blow 292.2
- perfectio** perfection 304.6,7,19,11,12,17,22,33,35 308A.49 314A.8.10 327.2
- perfectus** perfect 304.2
- perficere** perfect 314A.24 315.23 perform 315.19
- permixtus** mixed 314A.78
- peritus** experienced 270.17
- perpetuus** everlasting 300.11
- pertinere** pertain 326A.11
- pervenire** achieve 315.25
- perversor** perverter 326B.5
- phantasia** imagination 315.36
- phantasma** image 300.18 322A.12 326A.12 phantasm 322B.1
- philosophus** philosopher 300.5
- Philosophus** the philosopher (Aristotle) 286.2 300.9
- pictura** picture 309C.3
- planta** plant 286.3
- plenus** full 323A.5
- ponere** posit 304.4 308A.55 suppose 304.17,19 309A.5
- possibilis** possible 304.8 305.13 309C.2,7 310B.3 313.8,11,17 314A.5,6,17,25,27,28,30,38,49,51,54,55,66,70,73,74,76,80,82 315.4,8,27,32,35,45 322A.19,20 326A.1 326B.2,4 327.2
- possibilitas** possibility 308B.5
- potentia** power 270.4 289.1 300.7,16 309D.13 potentiality 303.14,16,18 304.7 308A.37,61 308B.3-5,11,12,14 309C.2,5 310B.6 313.6,19 (abl.) potentially 314A.33,72 in **potentia** potential(ly) 308A.3,7,8,16,35,36 314A.33 314B.8 321.4,8 325.18
- potestas** power 326A.11,12
- praebere** give 309D.8,10
- praeinducere** preinduce 270.11 (or aforementioned)
- preparatio** (state of) preparedness 309A.6,7 309B.1,3,7,8
- praeparatus** prepared 309C.2
- primus** original 270.10 prime 308A.6,8,11,21,23 308B.8,15 309A.9,10 309C.7 314A.71,72 in **primo** at the beginning 325.7
- principatum** principle 270.1
- principium** element 270.8 principle 303.17 304.22,33 309D.1 (see new version in Commentary) 326B.2 beginning 304.27 origin 309D.2,4,7
- probabilis** probable 315.39,47
- probatio** proof 315.22
- procedere** be successful 303.21 pass 304.1
- propalare** declare 308A.57
- propinquus** close to 304.10
- proportio** relation 308B.9 proportion 309C.3,5
- proportionaliter** in the appropriate state 304.37
- proportionatus** proportional 308B.6

- propositum** case in point 284.13
purpose 304.3,7,9
proprius appropriate 303.7 proper
323A.2
purus pure 291.2 305.9 322A.4
- quaestio** question 305.15
- raducari** be rooted 283.3
rarus rare 284.4
ratio reasoned answer 305.11 ratio
309C.5 account 309D.5 argument
309D.12 310A.1 reason 321.50
rationalis rational 270.1,3,12 300.3
314A.6,61 314B.4,7 321.51 322A.8
receptibilis capable of receiving,
receptive 303.2-4
receptio reception 308A.20,24
310B.2-4,8,14 315.5 receptiveness
309A.6,7 receiving 325.10
receptivus receptive 303.27,28 309C.5
which can receive 308B.4
recipere admit 284.14 receive 303.5,6,
9,12 314A.49,82 315.50 308A.11,12,
15,19,20,25,41,43,62 308B.6
310B.7,13 314C.4 325.6
recipiens recipient 326A.19
reddere give 305.11
reducere bring to 304.15,16
relatio relation 309C.3
rememorari remember
321.16,20,40,45 325.4
remotus out of the question 321.16
repugnare oppose 302.6,7
res thing(s) 304.25 reality 321.42
respicere look at 321.51
retentivus retaining 284.4,9
retinere retain 284.13
revertere revert 308A.64
- sanctus** saint 288.1
sapiens wise man 300.6,16
scibilis knowable 305.7,17
scientia knowledge 303.12
305.4,10,11 science 304.27,39
scire know 304.23 305.5,6
secta school 314A.3
senectus old age 321.34
sensibilis sensible 270.4 280A.8
314A.46,47
sensitivus concerned with sensation
267.2 sensitive 270.2
sensus sense 314A.45,,46 322A.14
sentiens sentient 270.14,15
separabilis separable 323A.4
- separatus** separate(d) 300.11 304.20
309C.1 314A.12,70 314C.5
315.9,37,41-3,45,46 322A.15 322B.4
323A.3
serenitas fine weather 286.1
similitudo resemblance 270.7 analogy
308A.47 simile 325.26
simplex simple 309B.9 in pure state
325.16
simplicitas simplicity 314A.60
singulus particular 305.8
sol sun 285.1
solaris of the sun 286.5
sparsus scattered 284.5
species species 303.3 304.25,29
309D.10,11 323A.2 326A.12,20,22
form 304.38 305.17 308B.6 310A.3
310B.5,6 314A.46,47,62 314C.4
speculari gaze 322A.4 322B.2
speculatio speculation 270.12
speculativus theoretical 304.39
308A.42,48,50,56,66,71 308C.5
313.5,9,16 314A.21,36,40,55
315.13,33 321.8,13,15,19,25,27,29
326A.8
sperma seed 270.8
spiritualis spiritual 308A.18
spissus thick 284.1,3,12
splendor brightness 314A.40
stans established 305.9
stare stand 315.19
status state 322B.4
stella star 284.1,15 288.1,2
subjectum subject 270.2 283.2,3 303.4
309B.1,3 309D.5 310A.2 310B.7,8
314A.29,31 314B.5 substrate
309A.8 314A.62
subicere subject 309B.8
subsistere exist 309D.9,10
substantia substance 270.3 283.2
300.6 303.4,20 304.20 308A.29
309D.3,8,11 308B.2,3,5 314A.56
314C.5 321.32,42 322B.5 323A.3
326A.8
substantialis substantial 300.3
substare underlie 309D.6,10
sumere take 305.5
superior higher 314C.6
supermundanus supermundane
323A.8
susceptivus taking in 284.4,5 recep-
tive 314A.46,47
sustinere endure 291.2
- tabula** tablet 308C.3

- tangere** touch 321.10,14 325.7
tempus time 286.1 289.1 308A.46
 313.19 314A.77 322A.14
tenebra darkness 284.8 288.2
tenebrosus opaque 284.12
terminatio making determinate
 308A.21
terminus term 303.7 304.23 313.18
terra earth 286.4
titubari sway 286.4
titubatio swaying 286.5
(ratio) topica topic 315.39
transmutabilis changeable 314A.78,79
transmutatio alteration 314A.77
transparens transparent 284.5
tremere tremble 286.2,5
tremor trembling 292.2

unio union 315.30
unire unite 315.18
universalis universal 303.23
 304.5,7,16,26,28,31,36 308A.3,7,13
 310B.3,4,6,7

universaliter universal 305.14

validus considerable 286.4 strong
 292.2
vegetabilis vegetable 270.2
vegetativus vegetative 270.4
ventus wind 286.3
verberare strike 284.1
veritas truth 308A.45
verus true 302.2,10,15
vicinus near to 304.9
videre see 285.2 289.2 314A.66
virtus virtue 270.6,8,11 304.31,38
 315.23-6,46 power 289.1 309B.9
 capacity 308A.14 faculty
 308C.6,7
vis power 300.14,15 309D.8
visibilis visible 304.30
visus sight 289.3 304.28,29 314A.65
vita life 270.1,7 321.21 323A.3,6
vivus alive 270.14
voluntas will 308A.64

PRINCIPAL TERMS : ARABIC

(The order of the entries follows the Arabic alphabet)

bi-aḥara	later, subsequently 324.2	mufāriq	separate 324.6
arḍ	earth 306.1, 4	fāsid	perishing, dying with the death of the body 324.3
azalī	pre-eternal 314D.2	mufasssir	commentator 324.5
baḍr	seed 306.2-3	fa‘ala	make, fashion 324.7
baqiya	survive, live after death 324.2	bi-l-fi‘l	actual 314D.3
bāqin	surviving 324.5	fa‘āl	active, agent 314D.3, 324.6
ḥulūl ‘alā	alighting upon 272.1	munfa‘il	passive 314D.2-3
istaḥraḡa	extract, bring out 306.3	mustafād	acquired (Θύραθεν, <i>adeptus</i>) 324.2
ḥalaqa	create 324.7	qabila	receive 324.7-8
maḍhab	doctrine 324.4, 8	aqlaqa	stir, disturb 306.3
ra‘a	be of the opinion 324.5	quwwa	faculty 314D.2
ra’y	view, opinion 324.1	bi-l-quwwa	potential 314D.3
masmū‘	heard, listened to 306.1-3	muktasab	appropriated 324.2
ṣūra	form 324.6, 8	makān	place 306.3
maṭbū‘	innate, imprinted 306.1-2	mā’	water 306.2-3
aṭlaqa	to free 306.3	mādda	matter 324.6
ṭayarān	flying 272.1	maššā’	Peripatetic 314D.1, 324.4
‘asal	honey 272.3	bi-l-malaka	dispositional (<i>in habitu</i>) 324.3
‘aql	intellect 314D.2, 324 <i>passim</i> ; intellection 306.1-2	nabbaha	rouse 306.3
ma‘qūl	intelligible 324.7	naḥla	bee 272.2
‘amal	function, activity 306.2	nafs	soul 272.1
		nawm	sleep 306.3
		hayūlānī	material (ὕλικός) 324.2, 5-6, 8
		waṭāq	fetters 306.3

TITLES OF ANCIENT WORKS (OTHER THAN THOSE BY THEOPHRASTUS)
REFERRED TO IN THE TEXTS

(For references to Theophrastean titles see the listings in **265**)

GREEK

πρὸς Θεόφραστον (*Reply to Theophrastus*) by Epicurus **280.1**
Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν Θεοφράστου Φυσικῶν (*Epitome of the Physics of Theophrastus*) by
Simplicius **279.10-11**

LATIN

De animalibus (On Animals) by Aristotle **300.9**
De anima (On the Soul) by Aristotle **300.10**
Fons vitae (Source of Life) by Avicbron **284.7**
A Commentary on (the work) on the soul **304.4**
Commentary by The...us **288.2-3**
on the second *On the Soul* by The...us **287.2**
on the third *On the Soul* by The...us **283.1**
on the third of the *Posterior* by The ... us **285.1**
Physica (Physics) by Aristotle **303.8 304.3 308B.15**
Problemata (Problems) by Aristotle **286.3**

ARABIC

The book of Aristotle and of Theophrastus on the soul **266.2**
Commentary on On the Soul by Averroes **324.8**

PERSONS AND GROUPS REFERRED TO IN THE TEXTS

Abubather Aristotle held that the rational soul is mortal **300.1**; (on possible intellect **314B.1**); phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.6**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.2**

Academy (old) on truth **302.12,14**

Alexander Aristotle held that the rational soul is mortal **300.1**; on material intellect **309B.2**; on intellect **314A.42**; on intellects **315.12,20,22,27,32,45** **324.1**; on potential intellect **321.2**; man can know separate substances **322B.5**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.1** on the intellect that survives **324**

Anaxagoras embryology **270.10**; intellect unmixed etc **300.10-12**

Antiochus one can hold an opinion **302.14** (**301A**)

Apuleius supreme happiness in intellect **323B.3**

Aristotelians some say the soul a body made of ether **269.1**

Aristotle book on the soul **266.2**; calls soul perpetual motion **269.3**; embryology **270.10,15**; Theophrastus his colleague **271.1**; on sensation **273.3** **275A.3** **275B.2**; on sounds **277B.69**; named the transparent **277C.4**; on number of the senses **282.1**; (as 'the Philosopher') on fine weather **286.2**; on organs of taste and touch **294.1**; no special sense for common objects **295.1**; on how we perceive that we perceive **296.2**; on imagination **297.3**; on intellect and imagination (**298A.1**) **298B.1**; said to have held that rational soul is mortal **300.2**; (as 'the Philosopher') that the intellect is from outside **300.9**; on the criterion **301A.2**; on truth **302.9**; on movement in his *Physics* **303.8**; on universals **303.21,23,26**; on universal and particular and form and matter **304.5**; on intellect **308A.26,33,34,55,57,72**; on material intellect **309A.2** **309B.5** **309C.8**; on possible intellect **314A.30**; on intellect and intelligibles **314A.44** on potential intellect **317.7**; matterless forms **318.1,11**; intellect and its objects **319.1**; on productive intellect **320A.2,20** **320B.1**; on theoretical intellect **321.26,27**; followers of **322A.1**; on the soul after death **323A.9**; on material intellect **325.12**; possible intellect one in all men **326A.14** **326B.1**

Avempace (Avempote) Aristotle held that the rational soul is mortal **300.1**; (on possible intellect **314B.1**); on agent intellect **314C.1**; phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.6** **323B.1**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.1**

Averroes (Avenroys) embryology **270.16**; Aristotle held that the rational soul is mortal **300.1,20**; (on intellect **308C.1**); intellect the subject of intelligible forms **310A.1**; phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.6** **323B.1**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.1**; (as "Commentator" reports Themistius and Theophrastus on intellect **326A.3**; perverter of Peripatetic view **326B.3**

Avicbron on light **284.7**; (as Platonist) supreme happiness in intellect **323B.2**

Avicenna embryology **270.16**; (as later Peripatetic) on knowledge **305.2**; phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.5**; on soul's final felicity **323A.1** (**300**)

Carneades on whether wise man holds an opinion **302.6**

Dion (as example) **301A.7,23**

Epicurus on Theophrastus re colours **280.1**; criterion **301A.1**

Farabi (as later Peripatetic) on knowledge **305.2**; phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.6**; on soul's final felicity **323A.1** **323B.1**

Ghazali (as later Peripatetic) on knowledge **305.2**; man in this life can know separate substances **322B.5**; on soul's final felicity **323A.1**

Homer some men good by nature **305.14**

Macrobius on soul's final felicity **323B.3**

Nicolaus of Damascus (as old Peripatetic) on state of preparedness **309B.4**

Peripatetics (more experienced) on embryology **270.17**; intellect immortal **300.5**; on the criterion **301A.2**; on knowledge **302.1,12,14**; (old) **305.1** (later) **305.2** on modes of knowledge; on preparedness **309B.5**; on intellects **314A.42 314D.1**; man in this life can know separate substances **322B.3**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.1**; on intellect **324.4**

Plato proved immortality of the soul **268.2**; on reflections **277B.3,4**; on objects of intellect **325.2**; on possible intellect **326B.2**

Platonists man in this life can know separate substances **322B.3**; supreme happiness in intellect **323B.3**

Plotinus supreme happiness in intellect **323B.2**

Polemo on truth **302.9**

Porphyry (as old Peripatetic) on knowledge **305.1**; (as Platonist) supreme happiness in intellect **323B.2**

Themistius on light **284.2**; Aristotle held that the rational soul is mortal **300.1**; on knowledge **305.1**; on material intellect **308A.28 308B.1**; on theoretical intellect **308A.70** (v.l.); (on intellects **308C.2**); on preparedness **309B.4**; on reception **310B.9**; on intellect as unmixed **313.20**; on intellects **314A.1,3 314D.1 321.4,23, 25,40 324**; on possible intellect **314B.1,6**; on agent intellect **314C.3** on intellect and its objects **315.1,3**; phantasms not necessary in thinking **322B.6**; on objects of intellect **325.2,4,25**; on possible intellect **326A.2 326B.1,4** on intellects **327.1**

Xenocrates on truth **302.9**

Zeno (Stoic) on truth **302.17**

INDICES TO THE COMMENTARY

TEXTS DISCUSSED OR CITED

Page references are given for notes only when relevant.

AENEAS OF GAZA

Theophrastus 31

AETIUS

Placita 1.15 66; 3.5.11 23

ALBERT THE GREAT (ALBERTUS

MAGNUS)

On Animals 195; 3.2.8 (=376A) 24;

9.2.3 (=376B) 24; 15.2.10

(=376C) 24; 16.1.4 (=377) 24;

16.1.11 (=270) 21-5, 95

*On the Causes of the Universe and its
Origin from the First Cause* 1.1

(=309D) 142-5; 1.1.5 141; 1.2.7

(=305) 110-11

Dionysii de divinis nominibus 106

On the Ethics 105.92 n.145; 106.53-

5 107; 106.56-107.9 (=304) 106-

10; 107.13-14 109; 107.18-21,

36-8, 48-56 n.147; 308.11- 14

n.147

On the Fifteen Problems 32.18-20 149

On the Intellect and the Intelligible

1.1.4 n.325; 1.6 141; 2.2 21; 2.2

506a15-16 23; 2.4 n.164, p.147;

2.24 23

Metaphysics 1.4.7 n.232; 2.7 24;

5.2.7 n.232

On the Nature and Origin of the Soul

1.1 21; 2.5 n.232; 2.16 (=322A)

194-7

Physics 1.3.13 n.232; 1.3.15 n.137;

2.2.14 n.144

Posterior Analytics 1.1.3 (=303) 102-6

On the Sentences 107

On the Soul 21, 195; 1.2.15 25 n.41;

179.84-180.2 142, 156; 3.2.3

180.18-44 (=313) 154-7; 180.45-

59 156 n.259; 181.16-17 165;

181.36-8 156 n.259; 181.81-90

(=309C) 140-2; 182.8-14 155;

3.2.5 183.46-74, 183.79-184.47,

184.53-62 (=314A) 157-65; 3.2.6

185.18-30 (=314B) 165; 186.53-

7 128 n.182, 156; 3.2.9 189.3-9

141; 195.54-7 156; 3.2.13

196.10-12 157 n.264; 196.10-

14,17-21,23-33,34-44 156;

196.45-56,63-5 157; 3.2.17 139;

203.1-24 139-40; 204.30-63 110;

205.21-4 135; 206.76-8 n.285;

215.4-8,8-18 168 n.283,196

n.326; 215.57-60 n.285; 216.1-10

170-1; 216.13-15 171; 216.13-91

168; 216.17 171 n.290; 3.3.6

170,196 n.326; 3.3.7 217.1-

58,67-76 (=315) 168-74

Summary about Creatures 140

Summary of Theology part 1 tract.1

question (7) memb. 30 art.1

135-6; 2.4 2.4 n.137; 2.13 (77)

81a39-b12 146; 2.13 (77) 3.29

81b.13-16 (=310A) 146-8; 84b4-

18 168 n.269, 200-01; 2.15 (93)

146-7, 160 n.269; 3.7 143 n.230

On the Unity of the Intellect against the

Averroists 1 12.72-5 201-2; 3.2

24.57-9 136,150; 29.3-21

(=310B) 106,148-9; 29.21-56

149

ALBERT(?)

De impressionibus aeris 16

ALBINUS/ ALCINOUS

Teachings 1 n.4; 4.8,14,19-23 n.113;

4.13 96; 10.3 n.45

ALCHER OF CLAIRVAUX

([AUGUSTINE])

On the Spirit and the Soul PL vol.40

779-832 195 n.324

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

- On Intellect* (part of *On the Soul Mantissa*) 1 n.4, 169 nn. 284, 286; 106.20-3 148 n.240; 108.19-24 169 n.284, n.291; 110.30-111.2 169 n.284, 170; 111.15-19 129; 111.32-112.5 171; 112.9-19 144; 112.31 23 n.38
- On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 199
- On Aristotle's On Sense* 88.18-89.5 51; 126.19-20 39
- On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 34.1-10, 34.13-15 (=90A) 95
- Questions and Solutions* 1.2 7.10-11 52; 1.20 34.28-9 75 n.91; 2.7 52.27-30, 53.14-18 134 n.203; 3.2 89-91 n.84
- On the Soul Mantissa* 26 n.42, 169 n.284
- On the Soul* n.42, 169 nn.284, 286; 82.1 161 n.271; 84.5 134; 84.8-9 129 n.190; 84.17 and 85.3-4 134 n.203; 85.5-10 148
- On Aristotle's On the Soul* 23 n.38, 26 n.42

ALEXANDER?

De noi 144

ANONYMOUS

Carmen de antiquis opinionibus in physica ("Poem about ancient views on physics") 159 n.267

ANONYMOUS

Commentum On the Soul 107

ANONYMOUS

Liber de Causis 110

ANONYMOUS

Questions on the three books of the On the Soul 3.67.171-9 161-2

ANONYMOUS

Questions on Aristotle's On the Soul 3.15 330.28-33 (=314C) 166-7; 307.1, 339.12, 340.29 all 166; Question 16 167

ANTONY OF PARMA

Enquiry about the Possible and Agent Intellects 140

APOLLONIUS

Amazing Stories 49 (=726A) 77-8

ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM

On Events in Nature 68

ARISTOTLE

- Categories* 1b3-5, 1b16-24 2a11-13 all 144; Boethius' translation 144
- On Coming to be and Passing Away* 1.3 318b30 153 n.252; 1.6 322a26-30 n.298; 2.3 330a30-b6 n.87
- On Dreams* n.122; 1 458b28 87-8; 1 459a15-17 24, 87; 2 459b5-23 87; 2 459b24-460a12 n.80; 3 461a2 75; 3 462a8-15 88
- Eudemian Ethics* 8.2 1248a23-31 n.162
- On the Generation of Animals* 6-7, 91, 184; 2.3 736a24ff 21; 736a27-b5 95; 736a35-b1 24; 736b2 24; 736b8-14 25; 736b27-8 22, 116; 736b28 116, 207; 737a7-13 22 n.36, 116-7; 2.6 744b21 22 n.36, 116 n.156; 2.6 745a4 116 n.156; 3.11 762b16-18 116 n.155; 5.2 781a16-17 n.68
- On Heaven* 1.3 278a12f n.47; 2.12 292a18f n.47; 3.2 301a4 152
- De Interpretatione* 113
- On Memory* 187; n.122; 1 450a7-9 195; 449b30-50a5 97 n.120; 450a7-9 195
- Metaph.* xvii, 144, 167; A 5 986b24 145; a 2 993b10 123; B 6 1003a9 n.252; D 4 1014b28 154 n.256; 1019a27 154 n.256; D 8 1017b23 n.252; D 12 1019a27 154; Z 1 144; Z 3 1029a2 144; Z 4 1030a2-5 n.252; Z 8 1033b22-6 n.252; H 1 1042a26-31 n.252; V 7 1049a35 n.252; L 3 1070a9-13 n.252; L 8 n.47; L 9 1074b33-1075a5 n.292
- Meteor.* 40; 2.5 361b31 152
- Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4 1095b9-10 111; 2.3 1104b4 96; 2.4 1105b2-12 107; 7.12 1153a7-15 175; book 10 170; 10.9 1179b20 111
- Parva Naturalia* (Arabic) xiii, xiv
- On Philosophy* 18
- Physics* xvii, 1.5 188a31-b8 104; 1.8 192a25-34 132; 2.4 196b17-22

- 107; 2.5 197a7-8 107; 3.1 201b4-5 26; 5.6 230a7-18 154; 8.3 234b10-20 26; 254a29 26; 8.4 255a22-3 n.72
- Posterior Analytics* 1.1 71a1-2 102-3; 1.2 71b20-72b4 104 n.136; 1.31 87a29-30 n.68; 2.19 99b20 104 n.136; 99b25-6 104 n.136; 99b28-9 102; 99b32-4 103; 100a8 103; 100a10 104
- Protrepticus* 19
- On Respiration* 7 473b15-27 46 n.65
- On Sense* 6; 1 437a24 68; 2 437b24-438a5 60; 438a4 60; 438a13-14 42; 438a14 63; 438a15 45; 438b6 63; 438b21-4 45; 3 439a13-b18 63; 439a22-5 53; 439a30 53; 440a15-21 60; 5 442b29 79; 442b29-443a2 38; 444b16-19 39, 46; 6 446b6-9 39; 7 448a5-6 34; 448b17-449a20 n.51
- On Sleep* 2 455a15-22 81; 455a21 80; 456a27-9 93
- On the Soul* xiv-xv, 3, 6; 1.1 402b13 87; 403a25 179 n.298; 1.2 404b1-6 22; 404b5 123; 405a13-19 22; 405a16-17 138; 1.3 407a4-5 123; 407a7 145; 1.4 408a34-b29 n.43; 408b18 96; 408b18-19 116 n.154, 207; 408b18-29 191-2,194; 408b28-9 91, 187-8; 408b29 28; 1.5 410b27-31 18; 2.1 20; 412a5-6 153; 412b20 63; 413a2-3 63; 413a6-7 n.46; 2.2 413b24-5 193 n.320; 2.2 413b29-30 24; 2.3 415a11 155 n.258; 2.5 416b33 32; 416b35 42; 417a17-20 42; 2.5 417a22-b2 n.149; 417b5-9 125; 417b15 175-6; 417b18-20 45 n.60; 417b24-5 119; 417b24 124, 129, 151; 418a2-6 32; 2.6 45; 2.7 418a26-419b3 52; 418a31-b1 52; 418b4-13 63-4; 418b6-9 52; 418b9-11 52; 418b11-13 52; 418b14-20 52; 418b15 60 n.75; 418b26-8,28-31 63; 419a13-15 52; 419a23-5 53; 419a26-31 47; 419b1-2 40; 419b19-21 47-8; 2.8 419b29-33 40; 420a2-b4 44; 420a4,12 48; 420a9 42; 420a26-8 50; 2.9 421b9 38,42; 421b13 37; 421b18-19 46; 2.10-11 35,36; 2.10 422a8 79; 422a15 60; 422a16-17 58; 422a34-b2 79; 422a34-b16 44; 422b15-16 45; 2.11 422b32-3 44; 423a5 37, 48; 423b1 37; 423b1-26 78-9; 423b17-23 49; 423b20-25 47; 2.12 424a17-32 33; 424a28-32 72; 424b3-21 (424b15-18) 38; 3.1 424b31-3 69, 72; 424b33-4 69; 424b33-425a2,3 68; 425a5-6 71; 425a9-10 72; 425a17-18 81; 425a14-29 79-80; 425b12-25 81; 3.2 425b20-2 82; 425b24-6 86; 426a2-19 63; 426a15-16 58; 426a27-b2 72; 426a27 83; 426b29-427a8 34 n.51; 427a2-5 83 n.97; 3.2, 3.3 86; 427a20 48 n.68; 427b7ff 87; 428a11-12, 16-18 87; 428a14 100; 428a19-28 84; 428a20-24 100; 428b7 88; 428b10-17 97, 99; 429a1-2 99; 3.4 and 5 123, 184; 3.4 106, 175; 429a10 85; 429a13-18, 129,163; 429a22 122-3; 429a22-4 118,126; 429a22-5 147; 429a27-8 147,152; 429a30-1 126; 429b4-5 154; 429b5-9 175 n.295; 429b5 147; 429b6 176; 429b10-23 179; 429b20 180 n.302, 195; 429b21-2 181; 429b23-5 138; 429b30-1 111,118,178; 430a2-6 179; 430a3-4 145; 430a3-7 182; 430a5-6 125,182,187; 430a7-8 182; 3.4-5 123,151; 3.5 91,128,159; 3.5 430a10 126 n.173, 184; 430a10-12 118,184,185 n.307; 430a15-16 23; 430a15-17 73,162-3; 430a16-17 106; 430a17-18 138; 430a18-19 184; 430a21-5 191; 430a22 187 n.314, 191; 430a22-3 199; 430a23 187; 430a23-5 185; 430a24 124 n.169, 192; 430a24-5 192,194; 3.7 431a14-15 89; 431a14-17, b2-10 n.120; 431a16-17 197; 431a24 36; 431b12-16 179 n.299; 431b12-19 128 n.187, 179 n.292; 431b16-17 151; 431b17 168 n.283; 431b16-17 151; 431b16-19 129 n.188; 431b17-19 170,197; 3.8 431b21-2 95; 431b29 152 n. 251; 432a2 n.165; 432a4-6 179 n.299; 432a8-14 n.120, 99; 432a8-9 197; 432a12-14 104 n.136; 432a16,18 85; 3.9 432a30-b2 87;

- 432b26 123; 432b27 155 n.258;
3.10 433a15 155 n.258; 433a31
123; 433b29 85, n.120; 3.11
434a7-8 n.120; 3.12 435a5-10
40,41; 3.13 435a15-20 35
Topics 5.7 137b14-27 173; 5.8
138a25-9 155 n.257; 7 n.230
On Youth and Old Age 3 469a10-12
80
- [ARISTOTLE]
On things that can be heard 800a3-4
39
Problems 5; 75; 11.23 39; 31.29 46
n.64; 33.2 n.91
On the Universe 77; n.276
- ARIUS DIDYMUS
fr. phys.3 19 n.32; 16 89, n.102, 94
n.106, n.118; 17 35 n.52, 51
n.69
- [AUGUSTINE]
On the Spirit and the Soul - see
ALCHER OF CLAIRVAUX
- AVEMPOTE
*Treatise on the Contact of the (Active)
Intellect with Man* 92,217
- AVERROES
*Commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics* 90; 139; 1488.7-9,
1489.1-6 (=324) 199,209,216-7
Commentary on the Parva Naturalia
xiii
*Long Commentary on Aristotle's On
the Soul* xiv-xv; 4; 146; 384.25-8
130 n.192; 386.103 n.256;
387.22-389.63 and 389.71-
391.116 (=308A) 126-31, 153,
n.274, 209; 389.63-70 n.180;
389.83-390.97 n.185, 131;
391.117-392.146 130.131;
392.158-393.175 130,131 n.195;
394 n.284; 397.299-311 165;
399.344-6.351-61 (=309A) 133-
7.153, n.143, 209; 399.362-
401.423 156; 406.566-407.584
202-3; 406.575-407.584 205
n.347; 407.601-4 202; 408.605
205 n.347; 409.654-410.663 137;
410.684-411.704 205 n.347;
411.705 205 n.347; 411.710-19
205 n.347; 432.123-34 (=309B)
137-9, n.274, 209; 443.9-444.11,
444.35-445.55,445.61-446.93
(=321) 191-4; 444 169 n.289,
209; 445.55-61 n.321; 448.129-
30 169 n.286; 451.233-40 169
n.286; 452.257-60,265-
453.285,290-3 (=325) 200-
02,209, 216 n.22; 453.294,296
202; 466.31-47 202; 469.20ff.
n.327; 479-80 n.292; 480.31-2
197; 482 169 n.284; 483 169
n.284; 483.117-24 171; 484 169
n.284; 484.144-50 n.291;
487.235-9 173; 488.242-9 173;
488.243 n.290; 488.263ff 172;
489.294 172; 490.319 172; 495-
502 202; 495.462-71 129 n.188;
498.553 169 n.284; 533.24 n.265
Middle Commentary on the Ethics 107
*On the Connection between the Abstract
Intellect and Man* 156F-G
(=308B) 104,131-2,209
*On the Possibility of Conjunction with
the Active Intellect* p.108 Bland
198 n.331
Tal n.136
Treatise on the Soul's Beatitude 131-2
- AVICEBRON
Fountain of Life 74,141,199; 3.173
141
- AVICENNA
On the Soul 5.5 205
- BESSARION
Against the Defamer of Plato 3.27 206-
8
- BONAVENTURA
In 2 Sent. 7 p.2.2.1 n.135
- CICERO
Academics 2.30 n.117
Lucullus 112-3 (=302) 100-02
Tusculan Disputations 1.22 18; 1.44-
5 (=484) 198
- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
Patchwork 2.2 9.5 (=301B) 100; 2.4
95-6

DENIS THE CARTHUSIAN

- Commentary on Boethius' books On the Consolation of Philosophy* 2.4.14 (=300) 90-2
Commentary on the Gospel according to John 1.5 (=260) 199
Elements of Philosophy 45 (=322B) 198-9
On the Light of Christian Theory 1.47 194-7, 198; 1.50 (=323A) 197-8
On Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences 1.1.3 (=323B) 197-9 17.1 n.342
Depository of Wisdom Literature chap. on Theophrastus saying no.3 (=272) 30; no.5 (=163) 31; no.15 (=306) 112-3

DIOGENES LAERTIUS

- Lives* 5.29 94 n.109; 5.42 12

[DIONYSIUS]

- De Caelesti hierarchia* 7.1 and 8.2 n.74

EPICURUS

- Letter to Herodotus* 54 57,67; 79 57
Letter to Menoeceus 134.6 152 n.250
Letter to Pythocles 109 57

EPIPHANIUS

- On Faith* 35-9(162) 20

EUSEBIUS

- Preparation for the Gospel* 14.10 n.143

EUSTRATIUS

- Commentary on the Ethics* 107

FARABI

- Epistle on the Intellect* 159-60 n.287
The Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Excellent City XIII 160 n.270

FARABI?

- De differentiis regionum* 16

GALEN

- Anatomical Procedures* 14
On the Concord of the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato 14
On the Constitution/Composition and Powers of Simple Drugs 3.4-5 (=336B) 71

- On the Use of the Parts of the Human Body* 14; 8-9 184; 10.3 75-6; 15.5 184
Quod animi mores 15

GREGORY THAUMATOURGOS

- A work in sections on the soul to Tatian* 15 n.25

HENRY BATE

- The Mirror of divine and some natural things* 2.14 and 2.19 189-90

HOMER

- Odyssey* 8.134 111

IAMBlichus

- On the Soul* in Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 435.17-31 (=152) 27; in Stobaeus *Anth.* 1.49.32 (=269) 18-20, 178

IBN-BĀJJĀ

- On the Soul* 91
Treatise on the Contact of the Intellect with Man 92

IBN-AN-NADĪM

- Fihrist (Index)* xiii n.2, 8-9; 252.7, 253.27 p.209 n.3

IBN SAB'IN

- Answers to Questions posed by the Roman King, Emperor of Sicily* 82.16-18 (=314D) 168

JAMES OF PIACENZA

- Lecture(s) on the third (book) of On the Soul* 150.1-152.17 (=308C) 131 132-3; 215.25-7 138 n.219; 233.2 194 n.322

JEAN DE RIPA

- Lecture on the First Book of the Sentences* question 2.2.1 333.4-334.17 134, 135 n.207

JEROME

- Defence against Rufinus* (=65) 30-1

JULIAN

- Speeches* 8(5).3 (=158) 148 n.242

LIGHT OF THE SOUL *B*

xi, 5, 7; (Thorndike vol. 3 p.553)
 64; prologue (=267) 16-17; 7,
On the Blessed Virgin, Ma (=287)
 75; 7, *On the Blessed Virgin*, Q
 (=284) 74; 8, *On the Angels*, D
 (=288) 76; 9, *On the Apostles*, I
 (=283) 73; 23, *On Worldly*
Affluence, L (=289) 76-7; 37, *On*
Confession, Ta (=291) 77; *On*
Confession, Ya (=292) 77; 38, *On*
Contemplation, B (=290) 77; 38
On Contemplation, S (=285) 74;
 56, *On Sleeping*, P (=342) 92; 61,
On Rejoicing, D (=286) 74-5; 72,
On Sleep, F (=343) 92; 72, *On*
Sleep, R (=344) 92; florilegium
 cap.9 *On the Soul* (=268) 17

LUMEN ANIMAE SEE LIGHT OF THE SOUL

MARIUS VICTORINUS

GL 6 p.159.8-13 n.47

MARTIANUS CAPELLA

1.7 n.34; 2.213 n.34

MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA

Thirteen different Questions about the
Soul 7.2 130-1, 203-4

MATTHEUS DE EUGUBIO

Whether that which the movers of the
heavens know etc 248.18-21 136-
 7; 251.3-6 136-7

MAXIMUS CONFESSOR SEE GREGORY THAUMATOURGOS

MICHAEL OF EPHEBUS (PSEUDO-PHILOPONUS)

On Aristotle's DGA 22 n.40

NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS

On the Philosophy of Aristotle fr.6
 Roeper; T 9.2 Drossart Lulofs
 139
Refutation of those who claim the
intellect to be identical with the
intelligibles (T5 4(c) and 6
 Lulofs) 139

PHILOPONUS

On Aristotle's On the Soul 292.32

52; 319.14-17 52; 322.25 52;
 353.8-12 52; 353.29-30 52;
 354.12-16 (=277C) 51-2 15.66-9
 Verbeke 148

PSEUDO-PHILOPONUS SEE MICHAEL OF EPHEBUS

PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA

Conclusions 160.5-7 128 n.181

PLATO

Alcibiades I 132A-133A 41
Phaedo 14; n.28; 67B 17
Phedron 17
Phaedrus 17
Sophist 266B-C 41
Symposium 202E3 51
Timaeus 14; 45B8-C2 45; 45B-D
 14,17,60; 46A-B 40 67CD 60

PLOTINUS

I 4.3.33-4 and 4.4.1-2 199

PLUTARCH

In Reply to Colotes 7 1110 C-D (280)
 66-7
On the Right Way to Listen 2 37F-38A
 (293) 77-8

PROPHYRY

On Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics
 1.3 (716) 37,39
On Abstinence 2.5.19 (584A.154)
 2.61.1 (584D.23) 208 3.25.3
 (531) 85
On the Soul 107 n.143

PRISCIAN OF LYDIA

Answers to Chosroes 2 57.10-58.25 93;
 3 61.4 75; 62.7-28 92
Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse
On the Soul 2-3,6; 1.1 1.2-8
 (part of 273) 32-3; 1.14 55; 1.18-
 19 88; 2.6.19.22 n.114; 2.10,19
 55; 3.18-24 34; 3.27-9 (part of
 273) 32-3; 3.34-4.2 (=274) 34;
 4.2-6 34; 5.5 57; 5.19-21 35;
 5.22-6.15 61-2, n.78; 6.27-7.1 50;
 7.6-11 62; 7.9 52; 7.20-8 (275A)
 35-6; 8.1-9 (part of 278) 52-64;
 8.14-23 54 n.70; 8.15 57; 8.29-
 9.7 (part of 278) 52-64; 9.27 63;
 9.30-3 (part of 278) 52-64; 9.34-
 10.1 54-5; 10.3-5,13-17 (part of

- 278)** 52-64; 10.5-13 56; 10.17-11.4 58-9; 11.4-5 75; 11.14-20 (part of **278**) 52-64,68; 11.20-13.30 61; 11.25 57; 11.20-13.30 61; 12.10, 12.20-22, 12.30 all 62; 12.25 63; 12.29-30 66; 13.4-16 n.296; 13.17 55; 13.25-7 62; 13.27-30 63; 13.30-14.3 (part of **278**) 52; 14.10-12 (=277A) 38-40; 14.16-17 (=276) 37; 14.22-5 (=275B) 35-6; 15.6-9 (part of **277B**) 40-51; 15.20-17.33 (part of **277B**) 40-51; 16.20 65; 17.28 117; 18.1-7 79; 18.7-17 (=294) 78-9; 19.12 41; 19.14-20.9 (part of **282**) 68-73; 20.22-5 (part of **282**) 68-73; 20.28 72; 20.28-9 71; 21.4-8 (part of **282**) 68-73; 21.16-20 (=295) 79-80; 21.20-32 80; 21.32-22.1 and 22.9-14 (=296) 81-3; 22.14-16 82; 22.33-4 (part of **297**) 3 n.7, 84; 23.4-5 (part of **297**) 84; 24.20 57; 24.20-4 (=299) 86-9, 98; 24.23 55; 24.32-25.1 88; 25.10-26 88-9; 25.28-26.7 (=307B) 121-3; 26.29-27.3 77; 27.3-6,8-14 (=307C) 123-4; 28.13-17.20-3,29,31, and 29.1 (=307D) 124-5; 28.17-20 124; 28.23-5 125; 29.3-6 (=298B) 86; 29.6-7 125.150; 29.12-15.18-23 (=311) 150-1; 29.17 85; 29.26 151; 30.22-31.3 (=312) 151-4; 31.8-13 (part of **316**) 174-6; 31.22-3 175 n.295; 31.24-5 (part of **316**) 174-6; 32.19-20.22 175-6; 32.25-7,29-33,33.32-34.2 (=318) 179-81; 32.32 n.299; 33.20,24,26 n.299; 34.9 n.299; 35.1-2 177; 34.29-35.1 (part of **317**) 177-9; 35.24-7, 29-30, 32-3 (part of **317**) 177-9; 35.23-4 178 n.297; 35.27-9 178; 35.32-3 197; 36.6-9 (part of **319**) 181-3; 36.10-13 183; 36.24-5 183; 36.30 n.299; 37.5-6 (not 4, pace Index) 177; 37.6-7 183; 37.23-30 (part of **319**) 181-3
- PROCLUS**
On Fate n.324;
On Plato's Timaeus I 250.24 ff. 89 n.101; II 120.8-122.17 (**159**) 27
- PTOLEMY**
On the Criterion 4.1-14 n.124; 16.17 43
- QUSṬĀ IBN-LŪQĀ**
On the Difference between the Spirit and the Soul, Introduction; (=266) 13-16
- RADULPHUS BRITO**
Questions about Aristotle's third book
On the Soul I 95.162-7 (=327) 205-6
- [**ROBERT GROSSETESTE**]
Summa philosophiae I1 204
- SEXTUS EMPIRICUS**
Against the Logicians 1 (= *Against the Mathematicians* 7) 216-26 (=301A) 86, 93-9; 246 98
- SIGER DE BRABANT**
Questions about the intellectual soul 140
- SIMON OF FAVERSHAM**
Disputed quaestions about the third (book) of On the Soul 24 363.11-19 174
- SIMPLICIUS**
On Aristotle's Categories 304.32-305.4 (Iamblichus) (=152) 27; 435.17-31 (=153A) 27
On Aristotle's On Heaven 1.24 20; 552.31 (=112C) 95; 602.5-6 (=281) 67-8
On Aristotle's Physics 412.31-413.9 (=153B) 27; 924.12 26 n.43; 964.21 26 n.42; 964.23-9 27.29; 964.29-965.6 (=271) 25-30, 96-7; 965.22-5 29
- SIMPLICIUS(?)**
On Aristotle's On the Soul 3; 132.30-2 50; 135.25-136.2 58; 136.20-9 (=279) 65-6; 139.2-5 51; 220.38 85-6; 245.34 187 n.314; 263.8 187 n.314; 286.27-32 (=298A) 65,84-6

STOBAEUS

Anthologium 1.16.1 66; 1.49.32
 (=269) - See IAMBlichus; 319.6-
 8, 63.18-19, 366.5-12, 366.12-
 367.9, 370.22 all in n.32; 1.58 =
 Arius Didymus fr.16 89, 94
 n.110; see 148 n.241

STRATO

fr. 144 Wehrli 39

SUDA

on *diosmos*, on *osphrantikos*, on *rhis*
 51

SYRIANUS

On Aristotle's Metaphysics 68.26-36
 (=85B) 95

THEMISTIUS

Paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul
 xii, xiv-xv; 29.21-30.18 191; 46.3
 193 n.320; 55.17-35 n.149; 56.1-
 11 176; 62.11 51; 62.29-32 51;
 88.14-15 85; 94.27-9 123; 94.27-
 95.13 147; 95.16 n.295; 95.35-
 97.7 181 n.303; 98.34 n.157; 99-
 108 202; 99.32-102.29 191; 101
 188; 101-7 192-3; 101.10-12 192;
 101.14-15 194; 101.19 192;
 101.24-6 191; 102.11 193 n.320;
 102.15 194; 102.16 192; 102.20-
 22 192; 102.22-4 192; 102.24-9
 (=320B) 185-90, 194, 213
 nn.16, 17; 102.26 183 n.309;
 102.28 p.213 n.17; 102.35-6 192;
 103.1-2 183 n.307; 103.7 193
 n.320; 103.9-10 192; 103.15, 17
 192; 103.20-104.29 207-8;
 103.21-105.13 205; 103.24-30
 149 n.243; 105 158; 105.18 192;
 107.6-11 192; 107.23 p.212 n.12;
 107.30-108.18 (=307A) 115-21;
 108.1 p.211 n.8; 108.5 p.211
 n.9; 108.9 p.211 n.11; 108.16
 212 n.13; 108.18-109.1 (=320A)
 183-90 (108.26 213 n.17;
 108.28-30 91); 108.32 p.214
 n.18; 109.4 104 n.136, n.275;
 109.4-5 91; 114.31 171

Latin translation by William of
 Moerbeke 235.8 Verbeke 206
 Arabic version 200, 210-14
 on book I *Posteriorum* 74
On the Soul xii

THEODORE OF GAZA

Translation of DGA 24

THEOPHRASTUS

On the Coming-to-be of the Elements
 n.14
On Derangement (=328 no.8) 13
On Experience (=265 no.6) 13
On Fainting (=326 no.2) 75
On Fire (137 no.13) 11, 75
On Flavours, Colours and Fleshes
 (=137 no.36) 67
On Forms (=246 no.4) 13
On the Images (=137 no.35) 12, 13
On Inspiration (=238 no.9) 13
Metarology n.67, 59; [14] 14-15
 152 n.250
Meteorology n.14, p.46
On Motion (=137 no.2) n.14, p.10
Metaphysics xvii, 9, 20; 4a4 n.250;
 4a8 154; 5b3-7 27; 6a10 n.158;
 9b6 95; 9b12-13 76; 11b4 152
 n.250
On the Modes of Knowing (=265 no.
 7) 13
On Odours 38
On Old Age (=438 no.18) 13
Opinions of the Natural Philosophers
 (=137 no.6) 11
On the Part of the Soul connected with
Sensation (=265 no.1d) 10, 16
Physics (=137 no.1) n.14,
 11, 65, 84, 85
Plant Explanations (De causis
plantarum) (=384 no.2) 11, 38;
 5.16.4 n.276; 6.1.1 38, 65; 6.2 67;
 6.7.4 n.276; 6.19.3 n.255
Research on Plants (Historia
plantarum) (=384 no.1) 9.8.3
 n.276
On Sense-perception (=265 1c) 10,
 32
On Sensation(s) (and the Sensible)
 (=265 no.4) xiii, xiv, 9, 10-
 12, 41, 53, 60; 1 60; 5 60; 18
 75, 76; 19-22 60; 20 38-9; 26
 68, 184; 27 41; 32 73; 36 46; 49
 n.88; 50-1 41; 72-82 67; 72 80;
 80 60; 90 38-9
On Sleep and Dreams (=328 no.11)
 13
On the Soul (=265 no.1b); xiii, 6, 8;
 n.14, 9, 15-16
Thesis on the Soul (=68 no.36) 10
On Vision (=265 no.5) 13

THEOPHRASTUS (?)

Book of Commentaries 13,74,77
Commentary on (Aristotle's) On the
Soul (=265 no.3) 17
On the Power and Capacity of the Soul
 (=265 no.2) 10, 76

THOMAS AQUINAS

On the Sentences 17.2.1 (=326A) 130-
 1, 203
Summary of Theology 1a 3.8 n.230; 1a
 84.7 and 88.1 197
Summa contra Gentiles 3.45.2218 174
On the Unity of the Intellect 210 xiii,
 xv,121; 214 205; 218 121; 264
 190; 265 (=326B) xv,203-5

THOMAS CAMPANELLA

De homine: de anima intellectiva 5.5
 185 n.306

THOMAS OF YORK

Sapientale 7.76-7 131

THUCYDIDES

2.28 76

ULRICH OF STRASSBURG

On the Highest Good 4.tract.1 cap.3
 154-165 (new 305B) 111-2

WALTER BURLEY

On the Powers of the Soul 111.2-8
 131

XENOPHON

Anabasis 4.4.12-13 76

ZACHARIAS OF MYTILENE

Ammonius 31

PERSONS AND GROUPS (ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL)

(For persons marked * see also the *Index of Texts Discussed or Cited*; references are to page numbers and footnotes.)

- ‘Abd-al-Wāhid ar-Rashid 168
- Abubacher (*see* Avempace) 92,165
- Academy (Old) 102
- *Aeneas of Gaza 31
- *Aëtius 23
- *Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus)
 - 4,90,139,140-1,143-5,148-9,154-6,
 - 158-60,162-3,167,168-174,189,203;
 - nn.277,326
- *Albinus 96; n.4
- Albumazar (Abū-Maʿṣar) 90
- *Alcher of Clairvaux n.324
- Alcinous 96; n.4
- Alcmaeon 68,184; n.77
- *Alexander of Aphrodisias 26, 133-4,
- 137-8,141,144,148,153,157,159-61,
- 169-72,179,193,199-200,202,206-8;
- nn.38,173,321
- Alexander 144; nn.229,232
- Alkindi 90
- Ammonius 31
- Anaxagoras 22,23,41,73,123-4,138,
- 177; n.246
- Anaximenes 145
- Andronicus 138
- *Anonymous (Boethius of Dacia or
- Siger of Brabant) 166
- *Anonymous (ed. Vennebusch) 161-2
- Antiochus 94,95,100,101-2; nn.108,111
- *Antony of Parma 140
- *Apollonius 77
- Arcesilas 31
- *Archytas of Tarentum 68
- Aristarchus 66
- Aristotelians 51
- Aristotle xvii,6,7,18-202 *passim*
- Aristotle of Mytilene 129; nn.4,38
- Aristoxenus 6
- *Arius Didymus 51,89; n.52
- Augustine 105
- Avempace/Avempote xiv,91-2,140,
- 165,167
- *Averroes (Avenroys) xiv,xv,xvi,4,114,
- 120-1,126-33,136-8,142,146,155-6,
- 171-3,189,197,198,199-205, 207;
- n.284
- Averroists 148,166,190,198,204-5;
- n.211
- *Avicbron 74,141,156-7,162
- *Avicenna xvii,22,90,106,131,142,155,
- 167-8,190; n.311
- Baldwin 143-5
- Berengar of Landorra 5
- *Bessarion 206-8
- Boetius 141
- Boetius of Dacia 166
- Carneades 31,101
- Chaldaeans n.35
- Chosroes 2
- Chrysippus 57
- *Cicero 7,100-2,198
- Cleanthes 23
- *Clement of Alexandria 100
- Collectaneus 141
- Damascius 2
- David de Dinant 143-5
- Democritus 41-2,60,66,145
- *Denis the Carthusian 4-5,196-9, 204;
- n.342
- Dicaearchus n.32
- Diogenes of Apollonia n.88
- *Diogenes Laertius 12,66
- Dion 98
- Empedocles 14,41,53,60; n.54
- *Epicurus 66-7,94,97,143; nn.82,258
- *Epiphanius 20
- Eudemus 6,114
- *Fārābī xiv,xvii,16,90,106,150,159-60,
- 163,170,198; n.246
- Farinator 5
- Frederick II (Emperor) 168
- *Galen 15,75-6,184
- Ghazālī 90,106,131,198; n.236
- Giles of Rome 90
- Gotfredus 5
- Gregory of Nazianzus 31

- Grosseteste 111,205; n.277
 [Grosseteste] 204-5
 Gundissalinus 141
- Henricus Aristippus 17
 *Henry Bate 189-90
 Henry of ? 90
 Hesiod 111
 Homer 111
- *Iamblichus 18,180
 Ibn-Bājja, *see* Avempace
 Ibn-an-Nadīm xiii,7,11-12; n.217
 Ibn Bakkūš 11,12
 Ibn Buṭlān 112
 Ibn Riḍwān 112
 *Ibn-Sab'īn 168,200
 Isaac de Stella n.324
 Ishāq ibn-Ḥunayn xiv,16,209; n.2
- *James of Piacenza 125-6,131-3;
 nn.189,219,322,200
 James of Venice n.130
 Jerome 30
 *Joannes de Ripa 134-5
 John Damascene 141
 John of Spain n.22
 *Julian n.242
 Justinian 2
- Kindī *see* Alkindi
- Lucan n.232
 Lucullus 102
- Mantinus 126,133
 *Matthew of Aquasparta 131,203-4;
 n.189
 *Matthew of Gubbio 136-7; n.203
 Megethius 68
 Michael of Ephesus 24
- Neoplatonists 85,152; n.277
 *Nicolaus of Damascus 137-9
- Orpheus 18-19; n.232
 Orphics n.32
- Peripatetics 7,23,29,49-50,141,142,155,
 157,165,172,184,198; nn.128,246,
 259,277
 *Philoponus 2,51,148
 ([Philoponus] n.40
 *Plato 23,60,167; nn.250,277
- Platonists 198
 Plotinus 199; n.166
 *Plutarch 77; n.232
 Plutarch (of Athens) 180,182
 Polemo 101
 *Porphyry 110,141,198; nn.135,137
 *Priscian of Lydia 2,3,6, *passim*; n.7
 *Proclus nn.324,358
 Pythagoras 23
 Pythagoreans 60
- *Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā 9
- *Radulphus Brito 205-6
 Rufinus 30-1
- Scot, Michael 103,126
 *Sextus Empiricus 7,94-5
 Siger of Brabant 140,166,190
 *Simon of Faversham 174
 *Simplicius 2,3,27,65; nn.314,350
 Stoics 94,97,101,155; n.32
 *Stobaeus 18,n.69
 *Strato 26,29,39,66
 *Suda 51
 *Syrianus 95
- *Themistius xiv-xvi,3,31,73,74,90,114,
 116-7,123,127,129-133,137-40,148-
 9,153-63,166-74,176,179,183-95,
 197-8,200-08, Appendix;
 nn.3,177,179,185,217,219
- Theodore of Gaza 24
 Theophilus 16
 *Theophrastus *passim*
 *Thomas Aquinas xv,90,106-7,121,
 130-1,143,167,174,189,190,196-7,
 203-5
 *Thomas of York n.196
- *Ulrich of Strasburg 90
- William of Moerbeke 102,190,206;
 nn.232,324
 William of Paris 90
- Xenarchus 148
 Xenocrates 23,101
 Xenophanes 145
 *Xenophon 76
- Yahyā ibn-ʿAdī 8-9
- *Zacharias of Mytilene 31
 Zeno of Citium 101

GENERAL SUBJECT INDEX

- abstract(ion, -ing) 106,128,135,158,
162,179,180,196
- act(ing) 61,64
- activity 27,54,124,151
- (the) actual 45
- after-images 87
- agent, particular, universal 108
- air 40,45,48,70-1
- aisthêsis* 33,95
- aisthêtikon* 48,87,154
- aisthêton* 129
- Al-Andalus xiv-v
- ametrablêtos*, *ametrablêsia* 154
- animals 97
- apathês* 208
- apotuposis* 41
- Arabic evidence xiii-xvii, 8-10,11-12,
15,119,120,188-9,210-17
- Arabic philosophy in Spain xiv-xv
- argia* 82
- Aristotelians of Baghdad xiv, xvii,
16
- astrology n.35
- ataktos* 15
- Averroism (Latin) 203

- Baghdad 8-9,13,15
- beatitude 199
- body 55,147,157; n.178

- change 81,104,n.286
- colour 44,50,52,57,59,62-3,66
- commentum* 107
- common (sensibles etc) 79-81,82
- conception (of child) 21
- confusio* 103
- connate 117,185
- consciousness 149
- contemplation 323
- corporeal 28
- criterion 94,99

- darkness 52,53,56,82
- death 187
- deception 187
- definition 17
- denudare* 128,128,156; n.259
- diabibazein* 66

- dianoia* 17,85,96,98,99,107
- diaporthmeuein, esthai*, 51-2
- diathesis* 53,64
- diêches* 43,44,53,59
- differentia* n.230
- diosmon* 43,44,52
- disposition 109,176
- distance 61,104
- divine body 20
- doxa* 99
- dreams 13,92-3
- dunamis* 22,103,185

- ear 45
- earth 70; n.70
- eclipse 76
- effluence 38-9,55,60
- eidopotein* 63
- eidos* 32-3,99,153
- emission 62
- emphasis* 41,60
- enargeia* 95,97
- endelecheia* 18-19,20; nn.32,34
- energeia* 39,45; n.57
- enmattered 172,179-81
- ennoia* 98
- entelechy (*endelecheia*) 18-20,27,178;
n.32
- epereisis* 57
- epiginesthai* 96
- epistêmê* 87
- epistemology 87,93-113
- epithetos* 117
- epitome 65
- erga* 18
- eternity 154,158
- extension 172
- eye 43,68,77

- felicity 198
- fire 52,56,67-8,75
- first principles 105,108-9
- flavour 58,70
- flesh 67-8
- foetus 22,25,22
- forgetfulness 187-94
- form 56,147-8
- formal potentiality 104

forms 32-3,54,127,142,157,172,180
 sensible 61,127 substantial 134-5

generation 184
genesis 136,175-6,186
 generic man 98-9
 God 143-5,195

habitus 107,109,111-2,167
 harmony 83
 hearing 39,44-5,48-9
 heat, the *hor* 54-5,71-2
hexis 104,109,176,185
homoeidês 36
homogenês 36,44
hulê 126,143
 hypostasis 73,164

ichnos 96
idioma 57
 images 86-9
 imagination 83-93,130,172
 immortal 191-3
inchoatio 103-5
 incorporeal 119
 inspiration 77-8
 intellect, unqualified 28,86,91,94,105,
 116,121,126,146,148,149,150,153,
 154 acquired 130,160-1,200 active
 160,188,190 actual 160 agent 128,
 130,137,150,155,167,169,196,201
 common 187-8 at conception 21-2
 dispositional 130,160 enmattered
 315 habitual 169 impassible 124
 material 90,126,128,132,133,134,
 135,137,153 motive 176,190
 passible 187-8 passive 91,119,160
 possible 130,137,138,140, 141,150,
 155,156-61,201 potential 116,147,
 178,183 productive 129 speculative
 (theoretical) 123,128,130,156-7,
 169,170,194
 intellect, objects of 119
 intellectuality 139
 intelligibles, intelligible objects 122,
 124,126,168 (matterless) 105,129,
 170
 intelligible species 163,167,204
 intelligences 136-7,196,199
intentio 165

kinêma 96
kinêsis 47,96
 knowledge 183
korê 44

krasis 73
krinesthai 23

language 55,177-8
 Latin 'schoolmen' xv
 light 52,54-7,64,108,130,139,160,162,
 169,171
logoi 32,71,73-6,83,177
logos 33,112

magnitude 170
matên n.265
 matter 63,118,121-2,143,145-6; n.204
 matterless 172,179-81,195
 medium 35-8,56,68-70,78
 memory 96-7,187
 menstruating woman 64
meros 67
metabole 176
metaphrasis n.49
 mirrors 64
 mixture 133,147,187-90
mnêmê 96-7
modo (uno) 173
 moist(ure) 71,79
 more and less 37,173,174
morphê 153
 motion 25-30,49,124
 movements 96
 music 77

nature 107-8,127,184
noêmata 145
noêsis 85,95
 nose 31
 Anaxagoras' *nous* 138, called 'of the
 soul' 122-3,147
nous 85,95,143,145,208; n.4

opposites 34
ordo 95
orexis 123
ousia 18,153

Pallas n.232
paschein 33
 passivity 124
pathêma 55,64
pathos 53,55,124
 perfection 109,157
phantasia 87,88,96,98,99,147 *katalêptikê*
 101
phantasma (fantasma) 84,162,170,197
phantastikon 87,89
photourgos 57

- phusis* 21,53,56
pistis 100
 pitch 50
 place 146-8
pneuma 15,93
 position 146
 potential 44-5,152,175
 preparedness 134,138
 prime matter 108,127,132,135,139-41,143,148,149,156,165,177
 probable argument 173
prohairesis 107
 projection 177
propositum 107

 ratio 72,146
 reception 139,145,149
 receptiveness 134-5,139-40
 reflections 40

schéma 39,41
 seeing 41,60-1
 self-awareness 81,82
 self-evidence 97
 semen 116
 sensation 34,36,45,61-2,72,78,86,130,177
 sense 94,147
 sense-objects 36,37,42,45,50,130
 sense-organs 36,42,50,68-9,71,86
 senses 32-3,49,68,121
 separate 138,156
 shape 39,41,81
 similarity 34,36
 size 80
skotopoiis 57
 smell 38,39,45,46,50,70-1
 soul 34,90,207 (definition) 17-30
 vegetative etc. 22,24-5,153 rational
 86,91,150,157,165,196
 soul-source 116
 sound 46,48-9,50

 species 110,145,146
sperma 21
spiritus 21
 star 74,76
 subject 144,149
 substance 144,146,174?
 substances (separate) 174
 substratum 43-4,63
 sufficient reason 186
 suitability 134,138-9
summetria 73,83
sumphuês 48,67,184
sumphutos 184
 sun 88
 survival 191

 tablet 134,139,141,177
 taste 44,58,79
taxis 95
 theology 195
 things 151
 thinking 124,128,129-30,133,150,151,152,160,168,170,177,182-3,191
 this (something) 122,127,153,154
 thunder 48,77
thurathen 116,200
 time n267
 touch 34,35,37
 transparent 35,38,44,59,61-5,69,162-3
 transsonant 59

 unity (of intellect) 203
 universal(s) 94,103,106,149,156; n.110

 virtue 108,172
virtus imaginativa et cogitativa 132-3
 voice 39,86

 water 45,71
 winds 48

zôê 86

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA

AND J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

Recent volumes in this series:

64. Sharples, R.W. *Theophrastus of Eresus*. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 5. Sources on Biology (Human Physiology, Living Creatures, Botany: Texts 328-435). 1995. ISBN 90 04 10174 8
65. Algra, K. *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought*. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10172 1
66. Simplicius. *Commentaire sur le manuel d'Épictète*. Introduction et édition critique de texte grec par Ilsetraut Hadot. 1995. ISBN 90 04 09772 4
67. Cleary, J.J. *Aristotle and Mathematics*. Aporetic Method in Cosmology and Metaphysics. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10159 4
68. Tieleman, T. *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul*. Argument and Refutation in the *De Placitis* Books II-III. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10520 4
69. Haas, F.A.J. de. *John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter*. Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10446 1
70. Habets, A.C.J. *A History of the Division of Philosophy in Antiquity*. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10578 6
71. Andia, Y. de. *Henosis*. L'Union à Dieu chez Denys l'Aréopagite. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10656 1
72. Algra, K.A., Horst, P.W. van der, and Runia, D.T. (eds.) *Polyhistor*. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy. Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10417 8
73. Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T. *Aëtiana*. The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer. Volume 1: The Sources. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10580 8
74. Slomkowski, P. *Aristotle's Topics*. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10757 6
75. Barnes, J. *Logic and the Imperial Stoa*. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10828 9
76. Inwood, B. and Mansfeld, J. (eds.) *Assent and Argument*. Studies in Cicero's *Academic Books*. Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum (Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995). 1997. ISBN 90 04 10914 5
77. Magee, J. (ed., tr. & comm.) *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De divisione liber*. Critical Edition, Translation, Prolegomena, and Commentary. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10873 4
78. Olympiodorus. *Commentary on Plato's Gorgias*. Translated with Full Notes by R. Jackson, K. Lycos, & H. Tarrant. Introduction by H. Tarrant. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10972 2
79. Sharples, R.W. *Theophrastus of Eresus*. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 3.1. Sources on Physics (Texts 137-223). With Contributions on the Arabic Material by Dimitri Gutas. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11130 1
80. Mansfeld, J. *Prolegomena Mathematica*. From Apollonius of Perga to Late Neoplatonism. With an Appendix on Pappus and the History of Platonism. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11267 7
81. Huby, P. *Theophrastus of Eresus*. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Volume 4. Psychology (Texts 265-327). With Contributions on the Arabic Material by D. Gutas. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11317 7
82. Boter, G. *The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three Christian Adaptations*. Transmission and Critical Editions. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11358 4